[original] History lessons of WWII
This is lesson number one:Battle of North Cape
December 20th, 1943, the convoy fleet numbered JW-55B sailed from Great Britain. Its heading for USSR. Three days later the convoy fleet numbered RA-55A began its voyage from USSR and its target is Great Britain. The JW-55B fleet had 10 destroyers, 2 frigates and 1 minesweeper in escort. The other convoy fleet also had these ships for escort. Meanwhile, Vice Admiral Bernet's three cruisers were also sailing nearby for close cover. And meanwhile, Vice Admiral Fraser was also cruising in this area with the battleship HMS Duke Of York.
December 22th, German aircraft spotted the convoy fleet of JW-55B. But because it was very late at night, the Germans didn't attack.
The next day, the German sent 20 Ju-88 bomber to attack the fleet. But the anti-aircraft forces shot down two bomber and suffered no lost.
December 24th, German aircraft continued to track the fleet and Vice Admiral Fraser believed that the surface ships will soon arrive. He ordered the fleet to sail backward for 3 hours to disturb the calculation of the speed of the fleet and at the same time, Fraser's fleet hurried to the fleet at the speed of 19 knots.
December 25th, Fraser held that the RA-55A fleet was not spotted by the Germans and ordered to sent 4 destroyers to reinforce the JW-55B fleet. He also ordered JW-55B fleet to turn north and leave the dangerous area quickly. 2 p.m. that day, the German commanders made the decision of sending German battle cruiser "Scharnhorst" and 5 other destroyers to destroy the fleet. This order would be carried out by Rear Admiral Eric Bay of the German navy. Bay do not think that this is a wise decision because the sunset on Arctic Ocean is very early, and the day would last for 2 to 3 hours. So, the battle would depend on radars. Unfortunately for Bay, the German radar is much less effictive than the British ones, in additon, most of the crew member on the Scharnhorst are newcomers, though some veterans was ordered to came to this ship from another battleship, this ship was in trouble. Bay told the commander of German navy to cancel this mission but was refused. The commander Dunniz even ordered that he must carry out this mission or be killed.
When Bay's fleet sails from Norway, the British agent immediately sent out the report about the German fleet. So Fraser decided that RA-55A fleet must turn north and the cruiser fleet will accelerate and cover the JW-55B fleet. He and his battleship fleet wil intercept the Greman fleet.
December 26th 7:30 a.m., the German fleet arrived at 40 miles east to a nearby island called Bear Island.
8:40 a.m., the radar on Bernet's flagship,HMS Belfast, caught a light signal from 31000 meters away. 9:21 a.m., cruiser HMS Sheffield spotted the German fleet 11000 meters away using bare eyes. Now, the RA-55A fleet is out of danger, but the JW-55B fleet's future is still inpredictable. The British cruisers fire first, even though the shells gathered around the German fleet, they cannot search British fleet by bare eyes or by radar, because the wind is blowing in their direction and the snow dash to the Germans and the German radar just cannot spot the British fleet nearby. So, the German ship can only fire to the direction of the flame. During the battle, the radar of Scharnhorst catch the signal of the British fleet, but a shell hit the battle cruiser and completely destroyed the radar. Bay ordered to retreat, because he knew that in the dark Arctic Ocean, no ship can fight without radar. Just in the act of retreat, Scharnhorst was hit by two other shells. Fortunately, one of them did not explode, and thereby, prevented the Scharnhorst from a much bigger lost.
After the German ship retreat, it is just an hour''s sail to the nearest port. But Bay did not choose to go back to base, instead, he use the sun to mark the British ship. The reason is, if he can sink some ships in the fleet, it will make the USSR out of fuel or out of ammunition. He ordered the Scharnhorst to turn northeast and find the convoy.
The British warships, which were following the Scharnhorst, did not expect the battle cruiser make a turn. The lost radar contact with Scharnhorst. But Bernet soon thought he had discovered the plan of German and he turned for northwest. But he did not discovered that German is heading for north east.
10:00 a.m., the German aircraft spotted the Fraser''s fleet, but because the weather is so bat, that the pilot''s report had uncertain things, a German intellegence worker deleted an important sentence. This is "there is probably one battleship." This sentence decided the German''s fate. The report was sent to Bay, he thought this is only smaller warships and paid no attention.
10:30 a.m., the 4 destroyers which are from the fleet of RA-55A meet Bernet''s fleet.
11:00 a.m., the cruiser fleet spotted the Scharnhorst and opened fire. The Scharnhorst immediately fires back. Bernet ordered the destroyers to fire torpedoes, but because of the strong wind on the sea, destroyers could not found a perfect place to fire torpedoes. So they can only fire with their 5 inch guns. HMS Norfolk was hit on the bridge, 13 crew are lost. But Scharnhorst was hit by more shells and Bay believe that the British battleships were firing at him, so, he ordered to retreat.
After the retreat of Scharnhorst, the cruiser fleet followed the wounded German battle cruiser, but when Bay want to fight with the fleet, Bernet retreats and thereby avoid direct contact.
Finally, at 4:17 p.m., the flagship of Fraser''s battleship fleet, HMS Duke of York, spotted the Scharnhorst by radar. 23 minutes later, the battleship fire a star shell, but Bay could only ordered the anti-aircraft gun shot down the star shell. Another 5 minutes passed, the battleship fired her 15 inch gun, while Bay orderd his ship to retreat at the speed of 31 knots. Even thought, Scharnhorst did not escape the range of the British battleship, one of her 11 inch gun turret was destroyed. At 6:20 p.m., the British fleet ceased fire.
6:35, four British destroyers caught up with Scharnhorst. They fired 14 torpedoes. 3 of them hit the Scharnhorst, include one hit under the bridge and another one hit the engine. the Scharnhorst''s speed dropped to 22 knots.
7:00, HMS Belfast, HMS Norfolk and HMS Duke of York found their game again, they fire relentlessly to Scharnhorst. Many crew was killed by the powerful gun of British ships. Now, Bay knows that the ship was doomed, he reported to the chief commander "We are engaged with battleships of enemy and we are determined to fire until our last shell".
7:11 p.m., the Scharnhorst slowed down and began to tilt, Bay ordered to abandon ship. Then the British destroyers fired 55 torpedoes to Scharnhorst and hit 11 of them. The Scharnhorst caught fire and finally explode. Among the 2000 crews of Scharnhorst, only 36 was saved by British destroyers.
The battle of North Cape was over. Special post about the "Giant" of Royal Navy--HMS Hood
She was the proud of Royal Navy, in a long period of time, she was the most beautiful and the largest of all warships in the whold world. But like the heroes of Greek myth, she met a tragic ending after her extraordinary life.
The life of HMS Hood:
On September 1st, 1916, the construction began at John Clydebank shipyard.
On March 5th, 1920, the construction finished.
From 1920 to 1926, she was commissioned by the Native Land fleet of Royal Navy.
In 1923, it was commissioned the task force of Royal Navy and travled around the world.
From 1929 to 1931, she was reequiped in Portsmouth.
From 1931 to 1936, she entered service again in the Native Land fleet, and had a partially modernize in 1933.
From 1936 to 1939, she carried out neutral patrol mission in Mediterranean fleet (during the time of Spanish Civil War)
In 1938, her armor was thickened.
From Janurary 1939 to August 1939, it was reequipped again in Portsmouth.
From August 1939 to March 1940, she continued to serve in the Native Land fleet.
From March 1940 to May 1940, it was partially reequipped in Darvenport.
From May 1940 to August 1940, it served in the Mediterranean fleet, and her engine failed when she was chasing the French battle cruiser Strasburg.
From August 1940 to Janurary 1941, she served in the Native Land fleet for the fourth time.
From Janurary 1941 to Feburary, she was equipped with radars.
On 21th May, 1941, she and another battleship HMS Prince Of Wales went to join the hunt of Bismarck.
On 6:00 am, 24th May, 1941, ONE 381 milometer shell hit the middle of HMS Hood, and penetrated through the thin armor on the deck. And after that, the her magazine exploded, the ship broken in two, the ship was actually formed a right angle when it was sunk in 6:03. Only three of the 1400 crews was alive. Lesson three:
"The Secret Capture"
The German submarine U-110 met its end on May 9, 1941 when it was captured . This is what most people view as the most important capture of the entire war and it was so secret that even the crew of U-110 did not know of it! U-110, under the command of Kptlt. Fritz Julius Lemp, had been attacking a convoy along with U-201 (Oblt. Adalbert Schnee) when Lemp left his periscope up too long (probably to confirm a kill, he sank two ships on that day amounting to 7500 GRT) and the escort HMS Aubretia spotted it and rushed to the scene dropping depth charges.
U-110 survived the first attacks but then HMS Bulldog and HMS Broadway came and joined in the hunt. U-110 was forced to surface and HMS Bulldog immediately went onto ramming course (its commander realized at the very last moment that a capture might come off and tried to avoid hitting U-110 which he almost did) which Lemp noticed and ordered "Abandon Ship". Lemp figured that since the boat was going to be rammed (and presumably sunk) its secrets were safe within it. Only when he was in the water did he realize that the boat was not sinking and attempted to swim back and prevent capture and that was the last seen of him. Many say he was shot in the water by a British sailor but that may not be at all true.
The British made several journeys between U-110 and HMS Bulldog to collect whatever they could get their hands on inside the boat. This must have been a real treat as U-110 was abandoned in a hurry and being a IXB class long range submarine she did not sink as rapidly as VIIC class mid range submarine would likely have done. It is very likely that numerous U-boats were sunk using the material found inside U-110.
The day after the boat was captured someone realized that the allies already had the most important part of U-110, namely the secret documents and Enigma machine and that the Germans might find out that the British had the boat soon and, assuming the worst, change all codes and cipher system. The boat thus "accidentally" sank when being towed to Britain. 15 men were killed in the action and 32 captured. Lemp himself did not survive as noted above. More pictures of HMS Hood Lesson five: the U-505
Construction was completed and the submarine launched in Hamburg, Germany on May 25, 1941. The submarine was actually commissioned for action on August 26, 1941.
In 1942, the U-505 was responsible for sinking 8 allied ships (3 American, 2 British, 1 Norwegian, 1 Netherlands, 1 Columbian) with a total tonnage of 44,962 tons.
On November 11, 1942, the U-505 was heavily damaged by a British seaplane. Ironically, the bomb blasts during the attack also brought down the seaplane killing its entire crew. The U-505's call for help brought in three U-boats to provide medical help and spare parts. It took four weeks before the U-505 was able to return to port and earned it the distinction of being the most heavily damaged U-boat to return safely.
After that, the bad luck of the ship continued as six attempts to leave port were thwarted by either sabotage at its home port in France, battle damage (a depth charge attack rendered the radar system inoperable) or breakdowns at sea (sometimes after only 2 days at sea).
These problems apparently took their toll on Commander Peter Zschech. On October 24,1943 he committed suicide in the control room of the U-505 during a lengthy depth charge attack.
First Officer Paul Meyer assumed command of the U-505. He skillfully evaded the attackers and returned the U-505 and its crew safely to Lorient, France.
Under its new captain Harald Lange, the U-505 finally returned to action. On June 4, 1944, U-505 was attacked by the USS Guadalcanal task group 22.3 under the command of Captain Daniel V. Gallery. U-505 was boarded and captured by sailors from the destroyer escort USS Pillsbury, the first time an enemy ship of war was captured on the high seas by U.S. Navy sailors since 1815 (when the USS Peacock seized HMS Nautilus as part of the War of 1812).
As the USS Guadalcanal pulls alongside, sailors from the task group fly the U.S. flag over the captured submarine in June of 1944. The USS Abnaki, a U.S. Navy fleet tug, met the task group in mid-ocean to complete the tow to Bermuda. The U-505 was kept there in secrecy until the end of the war.
In 1946, the U.S. Navy planned to scuttle the U-505 by shelling her for target practice. Admiral Gallery's brother, Father John Gallery learned of this and called MSI President Lenox Lohr to see if MSI would have an interest in saving the U-505. Lohr immediately revealed 10-year old plans to include a submarine in the exhibits of the museum and began efforts to bring the U-505 to Chicago.
The people of Chicago raised $250,000 to help prepare the boat for the tow and installation at the museum. On September 25, 1954 the U-505 was dedicated as a war memorial and as a permanent exhibit. these materials are very helpful, thank you.
keep it going~~ 最初由 syd 发布
these materials are very helpful, thank you.
keep it going~~
All right!
Lesson Six: the escort carrier USS Block Island (CVE-21)
Many U-boats was sunk directly linked with the fighters on this ship, this is her record of big anti-submarine successes.
28 Oct, 1943
The German submarine U-220 was sunk in the North Atlantic, in position 48.53N, 33.30W by depth charges from two Avenger and Wildcat aircraft of the American escort carrier USS Block Island.
17 Mar, 1944
The German submarine U-801 was sunk in the mid-Atlantic near the Cape Verde Islands, in position 16.42N, 30.28W, by a Fido homing torpedo from 2 Avenger aircraft (VC-9) of the US escort carrier USS Block Island and depth charges and gunfire from the US destroyer USS Corry and the US destroyer escort USS Bronstein.
19 Mar, 1944
The German submarine U-1059 was sunk south-west of the Cape Verde Islands, in position 13.10N, 33.44W by depth charges from Avenger and Wildcat aircraft of the US escort carrier Block Island (VC-6).
6 May, 1944
The German submarine U-66 was sunk west of the Cape Verde Islands, in position 17.17N, 32.29W, by depth charges, ramming and gunfire from Avenger and Wildcat aircraft of the US escort carrier USS Block Island and by the destroyer escort USS Buckley. Lesson Seven: the first escort carrier on the world--HMS Audacity.
HMS Audacity was the first of the Royal Navy escort carriers. She was launched 29 March 1939 as the North German Lloyd cargo/passenger liner MV Hannover being completed on 10 May 1939. She was caught outside home waters by the outbreak of war, and captured by the British light cruiser HMS Dunedin and the Canadian destroyer HMCS Assiniboine Assiniboine in the West Indies on 8 March 1940 while trying to run the blockade.
Taken into the Royal Navy as Sinbad, then renamed Empire Audacity and commissioned as an Ocean Boarding Vessel 11 Nov 1940. Converted to escort carrier by Blyth Shipbuilding from 22 Jan 1941, commissioned 20 June 1941. Renamed Audacity 30 July 1941.
As the first Escort carrier the design she had no space for a hangar or a lift, so her aircraft were parked on deck. Three arrestor wires and an open conning position on the starboard side were fitted, together with a minimal anti-aircraft armament. As the principal air threat was perceived to be Condor long-range reconnaissance aircraft, her aircraft were all fighters. Hurricanes were proposed but not available, while the Grumman Martlet was not only available but had been specifically designed for carrier operations. Eight aircraft were embarked.
HMS Audacity commenced her war service when she sailed with her first convoy in September 1941 to Gibraltar. On 21 September, one of her aircraft shot down a Focke-wulf Condor which had just been making a bomb run attack on the convoy rescue ship Walmer Castle. The ship carrying over 80 survivors was set on fire and had to be sunk by gunfire from a corvette.
Audacity participated in two more convoys before being sunk
17 Dec, 1941
The German submarine U-131 was sunk north-east of Madeira, Portugal, in position 34.12N, 13.35W, by depth charges and gunfire from the British escort destroyers HMS Exmoor and HMS Blankney, the British destroyer HMS Stanley, the British corvette HMS Pentstemon and the British sloop HMS Stork, and by depth charges from a Martlet aircraft (Sqdn. 802) of the British escort carrier HMS Audacity.
Sunk on 21 Dec, 1941 by U-751 (Bigalk). Lesson Eight: Illustrious class fleet aircraft carrier HMS Formidable
HMS Formidable operated mainly in the Mediterranean. Her initial role was to accompany a convoy to Capetown from December 1940 to January 1941. Subsequently she was called to the Mediterranean to replace the damaged HMS Illustrious in February 1941.
She took part in the Battle of Cape Matapan 27-29 March 1941, and in the two following months was involved in convoy escort. She supported Crete operations in May where she suffered serious damage in air attacks by 1000kg bombs on 26 May 1941, and so was out of action for six months. Between June till December 1941 she underwent repairs in the USA, after which she sailed for the Indian Ocean to join the Eastern Fleet remaining there between March-August 1942.
In October 1942 she returned to the Mediterranean and remained there until October 1943. She took part in the North African landings in November 1942, Sicily landings in July 1943, and Salerno landings in September 1943. On completion of her Mediterranean tour of duties she took part in an Arctic convoy in October 1943.
17 Nov, 1942
The German submarine U-331, which sunk the British battleship HMS Barnham, was sunk in the Mediterranean north of Algiers in position 37.05N, 02.27E after she had been badly damaged by a Hudson aircraft she signaled surrender to a seaplane but was attacked by a torpedo-equipped aircraft Albacore from the British aircraft carrier HMS Formidable (Squadrons 500 and 820).
HMS Formidable was refitted between January -June 1944 and then her aircraft were involved in the operation \"Mascot\" attack on the German Battleship Tirpitz in Norway on 17 July 1944. She took part in further attacks on Tirpitz 22, 24 and 29 August 1944 as part of the \"Goodwood\" operations.
HMS Formidable sailed for the Eastern Fleet on 16 September 1944, being stationed at Gibraltar between September 1944 till January 1945 after machinery breakdown. She finally joined the British Pacific Fleet in place of the damaged HMS Illustrious on 16 April 1945. She subsequently took part in air strikes against Sakishima Gunto between April-May 1945. Between 4-9 May 1945 she was hit by Kamikazes - yet was able to operate aircraft within a few hours of attack, her aircraft later took part in air strikes against Japanese home islands between July-August 1945. HMS Formidable arrived in Sydney, Australia on 23 August, subsequently undertook trooping voyages to UK September 1945-November 1946.
Formidable was reduced to reserve at Rosyth in March 1947, stricken 1950 and sold on 11 November 1953. She was scrapped at Inverkeithing from November 1956. speaking of WWII, I think there is a game we cannot miss=>
commandos!!! 最初由 syd 发布
speaking of WWII, I think there is a game we cannot miss=>
commandos!!!
Yes, I believe your're right, but what the post is talking about is reality.
PS: Commandos is quite a good game. Lesson nine:
The Battle against the U-boat in the American Theater (Part I)
December 7, 1941 - September 2, 1945
The political settlement ending World War I left a bitter legacy that poisoned international relations and led within 20 years to an even more devastating war. By the 1930's, totalitarian regimes in central Europe and Japan threatened their neighbors. In the Far East, Japan occupied Manchuria in 1931 and 1932, a first step in seeking the domination of China over the next dozen years. In Europe, Adolf Hitler assumed dictatorial power in Germany in 1933 and rebuilt that country's military forces. Between March 1938 and September 1939, Hitler annexed Austria, dismembered Czechoslovakia, and, with the acquiescence of the Soviet Union, invaded Poland on 1 September 1939. Having guaranteed the integrity of Poland's borders, Great Britain and France declared war against Germany on 3 September. Between February and June 1940, Germany overran Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France, leaving only Great Britain to oppose Hitler's ambitions in western Europe.
As the world edged closer to another major conflict, the United States maintained a strong isolationist position in the international community. By 1939, however, President Franklin D. Roosevelt realized that the United States could not remain neutral indefinitely as the Axis Powers-Germany, Italy, and Japan gradually escalated their aggression and violence. While the United States remained unwilling to wage war, President Roosevelt gave China in the Far East and Great Britain in Europe all the encouragement and support possible.
While providing aid to China and Great Britain, the United States began to build its war industry and rearm, thus preparing for entry into the war. President Roosevelt sought to make the United States an "arsenal for democracy." The Allies obtained armaments and supplies from United States manufacturers, at first on a "cash and carry" basis, later on credit under the Lend-Lease program.
By 1941, the German submarine offensive against Allied shipping in the Atlantic threatened to starve Great Britain. Like Japan, she was dependent on ocean borne commerce to sustain her economy and defend herself. The British population depended on imports for a third of its food and for oil from North America and Venezuela to sustain its lifeblood, but German submarines in 1940 and 1941 were sinking merchant ships and tankers faster than the British could replace them. Consequently, the United States gradually undertook a greater role in the campaign that British Prime Minister Winston Churchill named the Battle of the Atlantic.
In September 1941, the U.S. Navy began to escort convoys in the western part of the North Atlantic. Within a month, a German submarine attacked a U.S. destroyer (USS Kearney, DD432 on 17 October 1941) escorting a convoy near Iceland, leaving several sailors dead or wounded. On 31 October, a German submarine sank a U.S. destroyer (USS Reuben James, DD245) 600 miles (966 km) west of Ireland, killing 115 of the crew.
Despite this loss of life, events in the Far East rather than in Europe pushed the United States into World War II. By July 1941, Japanese forces had occupied French Indochina, and U.S. economic sanctions had cut off much of Japan's oil and other imported resources. In October, the Japanese government decided on war, even as it negotiated with the United States. Japanese military leaders hoped to strike a blow that would paralyze the U.S. fleet in Hawaii long enough to establish a defensive ring from Southeast Asia through the East Indies and eastward in the Pacific as far as Wake Island. This strategic plan would have provided Japan with unlimited access to the rich resources of Southeast Asia. As the opening stage of this plan, a Japanese aircraft carrier task force attacked the American naval base at Pearl Harbor and nearby facilities in Hawaii on 7 December 1941.
THE ROLE OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES IN THE ANTI SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN
The United States was not prepared for war. Though the Battle of the Atlantic had raged since September 1939, the United States lacked ships, aircraft, equipment, trained personnel, and a master plan to counter any serious submarine offensive. However, steps taken just before and shortly after the Pearl Harbor attack helped the U.S. Navy enhance its submarine defenses. The U.S. Coast Guard was transferred to the U.S. Navy in November 1941, and the next month President Roosevelt named Admiral Ernest J. King Commander in Chief, United States Fleet. In March 1942, the admiral became Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) as well, giving him the authority and means to direct the U.S. effort in the Battle of the Atlantic, particularly in the American Theater.
This theater included the North and South American continents, except Alaska and Greenland, and the waters about the continents to mid Atlantic and mid Pacific Oceans. After Pearl Harbor, the U.S. Navy organized its existing East Coast naval districts into sea frontiers, with the Eastern Sea Frontier extending from the Canadian border to northern Florida. The Gulf Sea Frontier encompassed the Gulf of Mexico as far south as the border between Mexico and Guatemala, most of the Florida Coast, the northern half of the Bahamas, and the eastern half of Cuba. The Panama Sea Frontier covered the Pacific and Atlantic coasts of Central America and Colombia, and the Caribbean Sea Frontier included the rest of the Caribbean and the northeast coast of South America.
To provide adequate anti submarine measures in this vast area, the U.S. Navy needed trained manpower and specialized surface vessels. As early as 1937, it started training personnel for convoy escort duty in surface vessels, but by 1941 had only a few qualified officers for this duty. Shortly before the United States entered the war, the U.S. Navy's General Board chose the Hamilton Class Coast Guard Cutter as the ideal anti submarine ship. It proved to be an outstanding American escort vessel, but as late as October 1942 only five were on anti submarine convoy patrol in the North Atlantic. The U.S. Navy also had too few destroyers for its needs, even with the use of World War I era ships, and for the first few months of the war had to rely on smaller craft, including civilian yachts, for anti submarine patrols.
The U.S. Navy's air arm in 1941-1942 was as inadequate as its anti submarine surface fleet. Initially, the U.S. Navy had no escort carrier, a type that eventually was very effective against the German submarines. It also lacked aircraft capable of long range or very long range patrols over the ocean.
Prewar plans called for the US Army Air Forces (USAAF) to support naval forces in case of an emergency. To supplement its meager anti submarine forces, the U.S. Navy turned to the USAAF, commanded by General Henry ("Hap") H. Arnold. USAAF doctrine, however, emphasized strategic bombing, and the USAAF had no equipment or trained personnel for the specialized job of patrolling against, detecting, and attacking submarines from the air.
The USAAF's medium and long range bombers, including the twin engine Douglas B-18 Bolos and North American B-25 Mitchells and the four engine Boeing B-17 Flying Fortresses and Consolidated Vultee B-24 Liberators, were potentially capable of an anti submarine role. These carried bombs rather than depth charges and lacked radar or other special submarine detection equipment. Also, like the U.S. Navy, the USAAF had many demands for the few aircraft on hand. The shortage of aircraft equipped for anti submarine war continued into mid 1943, with fighters and light bombers often used as anti submarine aircraft.
Initially, the USAAF leadership considered the USAAF's role in anti submarine war to be temporary, and the major thrust of its efforts remained strategic bombing. Thus the USAAF somewhat reluctantly began flying anti submarine missions in a two front naval war waged off both the East and West Coasts of the United States.
OPERATIONS OFF THE U.S. WEST COAST
DECEMBER 1941 - FEBRUARY 1943
After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the greatest danger of submarine attack apparently was along the West Coast of the United States, but the Japanese submarine fleet never presented much of a threat. Japanese strategic policy limited submarines primarily to attacks on enemy naval forces, with merchant shipping being a purely secondary target. Even if naval policy had been different, in December 1941 Japan had only 20 submarines capable of traveling from Japan to the West Coast.
During December nine of these patrolled off the West Coast, attacking ten commercial vessels and sinking one merchant ship and three tankers. Then, between February and October 1942, four other Japanese submarines patrolled off the West Coast up to a month at a time. They sank seven ships, including a submarine (USS Grunion, SS-216, sunk off Kiska, Aleutian Islands on 30 July 1942), and on at least three occasions attacked installations ashore, inflicting little damage. No Japanese submarines operated off the West Coast again until late 1944, when one sank two more ships.
On 28 November 1941, HQ USAAF ordered the 2nd and 4th Air Forces, the two organizations that shared responsibility for West Coast air training and defense, to support the U.S. Navy in patrolling against submarines. Their commanders worked closely with U.S. Navy authorities to institute offshore patrols that avoided duplication of effort and still covered essential areas of coastal waters.
Lack of experience and different administrative and operational methods initially clouded liaison between the USAAF and the U.S. Navy. The establishment of a joint information center in late December 1941 at San Francisco, California helped solve the liaison problems. Differing methods of patrol created some inter-service tension. The U.S. Navy used a search pattern shaped like a fan, with every aircraft branching out from a central point on diverging courses, while the USAAF flew a parallel track search pattern, with each aircraft on patrol flying parallel within sight of the aircraft on either side. The USAAF pilots soon adopted the fan pattern in the interest of inter-service cooperation and more efficient coverage of the patrol areas. The U.S. Navy flew patrols close to the shore, but the USAAF anti submarine missions ranged up to 600 miles (966 km) offshore from Seattle, Washington, in the north all the way south to the coastline of Lower (Baja) California.
In December 1941, the USAAF had only 45 modem fighter aircraft, 35 medium bombers and ten long range bombers stationed on the West Coast. To meet the immediate need for more long range aircraft, on 8 December, the USAAF created a temporary collection agency of air crews and B-17's formerly bound for the Philippine Islands. This "Sierra Bombardment Group" participated in offshore patrols until early January 1942 when the absence of an immediate threat became obvious and scheduled movements of aircraft to the Southwest Pacific could resume.
While the Sierra Bombardment Group provided short term relief from personnel and aircraft shortages, it did not solve problems presented by untrained, inexperienced personnel and lack of submarine detection equipment. The available aircraft were not equipped with radar or other devices, and detection of enemy submarines depended solely on eyesight. The anti submarine air crews occasionally mistook whales and floating logs for Japanese submarines. They frequently reported and attacked enemy submarines, but rarely confirmed results. A B-25 crew of the 17th Bombardment Group (Medium), 2d Air Force, bombed a submarine near the mouth of the Columbia River on 24 December 1941. They claimed it sank, but in fact no Japanese submarine was sunk off the West Coast during World War II.
In February 1943, the USAAF ceased flying anti submarine patrols off the West Coast. Japanese submarines had not appeared off the coast since October 1942, and U.S. Navy aircraft and surface vessel strength had grown sufficiently strong to handle any new threats.
OPERATIONS OFF THE U.S. EAST COAST
DECEMBER 1941 - JUNE 1942
In complete contrast to the West Coast, German submarine forces posed a deadly threat to U.S., British, Canadian, and other Allied shipping off the East Coast of the United States. Because of British reliance on imports, Germany's leaders sought to destroy Allied shipping. Admiral Karl Doenitz, commander of Germany's submarine force, had formulated a strategy of attacking Allied shipping at weakly defended points to achieve the greatest destruction at the least cost. Furthermore, Germany had the submarine force to pursue Admiral Doenitz's strategy. It began 1942 with 91 operational submarines; at the peak of its strength a year later, it had 212. These submarines, sailing from bases in France, took about three weeks to reach American waters. Modified to carry an extra 20 tons of fuel, they could remain on patrol two to three weeks, and averaged 41 days at sea. Admiral Doenitz managed to extend this time by refueling and resupplying the operational submarines from specially modified submarines. Called "milch cows," they carried enough fuel and supplies to resupply other boats and extend their time at sea to an average of 62 days with one refueling and 81 days with a second refueling. The first submarine "milch cow" deployed at sea in March 1942.
The sudden entry of the United States into World War II caught Admiral Doenitz by surprise, with no submarines immediately available to send to American waters. He allocated five long distance submarines, all he could quickly make ready, to Operation DRUMBEAT, his code name for operations against shipping in U.S. coastal sea lanes. These sailed from Lorient, France, between 23 and 27 December 1941. On 11 January 1942, some 300 miles (483 km) east of Cape Cod, Massachusetts, the leading submarine, U-123, commanded by Captain Reinhard Hardegen, sank an Allied merchant ship, the first combat loss in the American Theater. Three days later, Captain Hardegen sank another ship just off the coast of Massachusetts.
Captain Hardegen and the rest of the German submariners used tactics that Admiral Doenitz had developed during the inter war years. Usually, the submarine would lie on the shallow continental shelf in as little as 30 meters (98 feet) of water during the day, then surface to attack at night. The submarine operated on the surface to obtain a favorable position, then hit the target with two to four torpedoes. If the ship did not immediately sink, the Germans sometimes gave the ship's crew time to abandon ship, then finished the vessel off with shells from the deck gun. As German submarine commanders realized the vulnerability of Allied merchant shipping and the inability of the U. S. anti submarine forces to respond or patrol, they sometimes attacked from the surface in the daytime.
Using these tactics, the Germans between mid January 1942 and the end of June sank 171 ships off the East Coast, many of them tankers. For several months, the German submarine offensive gravely threatened the cargo carrying capability of the Allies. Not until the last quarter of 1942 did the United States build merchant ships rapidly enough to offset losses inflicted by the German submariners. During the first half of 1942, the Allies lost three million tons of shipping, mostly in American waters. The submarine attacks claimed about 5,000 lives, and the loss of irreplaceable cargoes grievously endangered Great Britain's ability to continue the war.
This perilous situation resulted in part from the tragic U.S. delay in taking such precautionary measures as controlling maritime traffic and organizing submarine defenses. German submarine captains arriving in American waters in the first half of 1942 found merchant ships following peacetime sea lanes and sailing practices. The ships, sailing independently instead of in convoys, were silhouetted at night against the brightly lit coast, making the job of the enemy much easier. U.S. military leaders until May 1942 undertook little effective action to find and attack submarines whose positions were known through distress signals from torpedoed ships or to redirect merchant shipping away from waters where attacks had taken place. While no one reason can be cited for the delay in instituting defensive measures, the general state of American unpreparedness is perhaps the best explanation.
Early in the war the USAAF and the U.S. Navy pooled their meager resources for anti submarine patrols. In response to a U.S. Navy request, the USAAF on 8 December 1941, directed the I Air Support Command and I Bomber Command of the 1st Air Force to initiate patrols in the Eastern Sea Frontier. The I Air Support Command's observation and pursuit (fighter) aircraft patrolled out to 40 miles (64 km) offshore from Portland, Maine, south to Wilmington, North Carolina, but usually had fewer than ten aircraft per day on patrol. The I Bomber Command, 1st Air Force, relied on its medium B-25 and B-18 bombers to fly up to 300 miles (483 km) offshore and its heavy B-17's to cover up to 600 miles (966 km) out. On the average, however, until March 1942 this command had only three aircraft flying each day from Westover Field, Chicopee Falls, Massachusetts, and three from Mitchel Field, Hempstead, Long Island, New York, not nearly enough to patrol the Eastern Sea Frontier effectively.
The USAAF obtained the assistance of the Civil Air Patrol (CAP) to augment I Bomber Command's efforts. Organized a week before the war began, the CAP consisted of civilian pilots willing to fly their own aircraft off the coast to look for submarines and to assist in the rescue of survivors. Receiving only aviation gasoline from the USAAF, the CAP began patrolling on 8 March 1942, eventually establishing 21 stations from Bar Harbor, Maine, to Brownsville, Texas. With the help of the CAP, the I Bomber Command flew almost 8,000 hours in March, about as much as in January and February combined. The additional patrols forced German submarines to remain submerged except on the darkest nights.
As the number of patrols increased, the USAAF overcame numerous deficiencies in its anti submarine efforts. Originally, aircraft were unarmed or armed with bombs instead of depth charges. They could not fly at night and none had radar before March 1942. The air crews lacked training in navigation, recognition of ships, and anti submarine attack tactics. In December 1941, forced to rely on eyesight alone, they often reported incorrectly the sighting of surfaced and submerged submarines. On 29 December near Newport, Rhode Island, a USAAF bomber dropped four bombs on a U.S. Navy destroyer that the air crew had mistaken for a submarine. Fortunately, the bombs exploded harmlessly.
The United States sought the guidance of Great Britain, which had been waging anti submarine war against Germany since 1939. As suggested by the British, the USAAF and the U.S. Navy established a Joint Control and Information Center in New York City on 31 December 1941. The center tracked the movements of merchant shipping, plotted enemy contacts, and determined the locations of all surface and air anti submarine patrols.
One British capability the Americans remained unable to exploit until mid 1943 was intelligence that virtually pinpointed the locations of enemy submarines. During the inter war period, Germany developed a machine, called Enigma, to encipher the military codes used to transmit radio messages. Early in World War II the British, in cooperation with the French and Polish govemments in exile, developed the means to break the German codes enciphered by the Enigma, with intelligence derived from the broken codes known as ULTRA. The British routed convoys around the locations of enemy submarine wolf packs, using ULTRA information as well as intelligence derived from aerial reconnaissance, radio fingerprinting (identification of individual enemy radiomen by their distinctive method of sending messages), and radio direction finding. Shortly after the United States entered the war, Great Britain agreed to provide pertinent ULTRA intelligence to the U.S. military. However, on 1 February 1942, Germany replaced its original Enigma machines on the Atlantic Uboat net with a new, more complex machine employing more encrypting rotors, resulting in codes that the British could not decipher. Not until 13 December 1942, six weeks after the capture of German code books related to the new Enigma from a badly damaged enemy submarine, were the British able to again read the German Uboat code. (They soon discovered that the Germans had broken the Allied code directing convoy traffic, a discovery that resulted in a new British code in March 1943.) By August, the British and Americans were reading German messages almost as soon as they were intercepted, but for much of the time between January 1942 and October 1943, when the USAAF participated extensively in the anti submarine war, ULTRA intelligence was sporadic or nonexistent.
To add to the intelligence woes of the Americans in 1942, the U.S. Navy initially failed to send the information it did receive from the British to the using commands. Consequently, the intelligence was not being used in operations against the enemy. Even if it were disseminated, intelligence data often lost its usefulness because it was not quickly communicated from U.S. Navy to Army organizations or down the chain of command in either service.
In large part, the intelligence lapse stemmed from the chaos and confusion that Army and U.S. Navy commands suffered in the first few months of the war. This confusion also led to faulty tactics that usually resulted in unsuccessful attacks on enemy submarines. Attacked submarines often escaped because the aerial and surface attacks were sporadic rather than sustained. Through inexperience, poor training, and lack of adequate forces, both U.S. Navy surface forces and USAAF air crews often failed to follow up initial anti submarine attacks.
Once again the USAAF and the U.S. Navy turned to the British for applied lessons in tactics. British tactics exploited the weaknesses of the submarine, which had to surface, usually at night, to recharge its batteries, ventilate the boat, and permit crew members a chance to come topside. Constant aerial patrolling to as far as 600 miles (966 km) out to sea restricted opportunities for submarines to operate on the surface. Until the first USAAF aircraft received radar sets in March 1942, the submarines could surface and attack almost at will during dark nights or inclement weather, but the advent of night flights using radar to locate surfaced submarines added considerably to the value of the routine anti submarine air patrol. By June 1942, I Bomber Command aircraft had vastly increased sightings of and attacks on German submarines.
As the British had learned, when an air crew sighted an enemy submarine, it had to act quickly to achieve surprise. An attack later than 15 to 35 seconds after the submarine submerged usually proved unsuccessful. By flying in clouds and attacking at an angle from 15 to 45 degrees, the pilot increased the chances of a hit or near miss. The attack itself required the aircraft to fly as low as possible, preferably about 50 feet (15 m) above the water, and to drop the depth bomb within 20 feet (6.1 m) of the submarine's pressure hull. As the aircraft passed over the submarine, the air crew would fire the machine guns in an attempt to damage it and suppress antiaircraft fire.
The first successful USAAF aircraft attack on a German submarine, U-701, on 7 July 1942, incorporated these tactics. The official history of I Bomber Command records the attack from an Lockheed A29 Hudson piloted by Lieutenant Harry J. Kane of the 396th Bombardment Squadron (Medium) based at NAS Alameda, California but operating from MCAS Cherry Point, North Carolina.
"Lieutenant Kane attacked by the book. He was flying a routine patrol from Cherry Point, North Carolina. He sighted a submarine seven miles (11 km) away. Since he was using cloud cover, he was able to approach it undetected, closing in on a course of zero degrees relative to the track of the submarine. He attacked from 50 feet (15 m) at 220 miles per hour (354 km/h), releasing three MK XVII depth charges in train about 20 seconds after the target submerged. The submarine was still visible underwater as the bombs fell. The first hit short of the stem; the second, just aft of the conning tower; the third, just forward of the conning tower. Fifteen seconds after the explosions, large quantities of air came to the surface, followed by 17 members of the crew."
Accumulated experience coupled with British coaching, improved radar, depth bombs, and other equipment resulted in noticeably higher levels of success for USAAF anti submarine patrols during July, August, and September 1942. In the previous quarter, only seven of 54 attacks resulted in damage to submarines, but in the third quarter, eight of 24 attacks damaged submarines, not counting the one sunk on 7 July.
By this time, the Americans owed a great deal to the British for sharing their anti submarine experience. But in one area they appeared slow to assimilate British methods. Early in the Battle of the Atlantic, Great Britain had recognized the need for close cooperation between sea and air anti submarine forces at higher as well as operational levels of command. But such cooperation at the higher levels of the USAAF and the U.S. Navy was frequently elusive, partly because of historical rivalry. Between World Wars I and II, the two services had argued bitterly over the roles of their respective air arms, the U.S. Navy insisting on responsibility for all missions over the ocean and the Army insisting on controlling all long range, land based aircraft. The jurisdictional problem continued into the war and at times handicapped efforts to counter enemy submarine attacks in American waters.
Partially as a result of the jurisdictional dispute, multiple headquarters had overlapping responsibility for anti submarine operations. Since its doctrine emphasized centralized operational control of aircraft, the USAAF found this situation objectionable. To achieve centralization, General Arnold in March 1942 proposed to Admiral King the establishment within the USAAF of an organization to conduct all air operations against submarines. The U.S. Navy did not accept this idea because it would give the Army a traditionally U.S. Navy mission and bring naval aircraft under Army control. Most USAAF units involved in anti submarine operations came under I Bomber Command, and, in an effort to reduce organizational confusion, I Bomber Command was placed under the operational control of the Eastern Sea Frontier on 26 March. Gradually, I Bomber Command reoriented the training of its flying personnel, obtained additional aircraft, and adapted its equipment to the anti submarine mission. General Arnold, along with most other USAAF leaders, believed that progress in bringing the USAAF's anti submarine resources and operations under one headquarters was largely offset by U.S. Navy policies. The U.S. Navy allocated the USAAF anti submarine squadrons to the sea sector commanders and would not ordinarily allow aircraft allocated to one sea sector or frontier to operate in another. Transfer of aircraft from one sea frontier to another to meet changing submarine threats proved difficult and usually too late.
This significant difference in U.S. Navy and USAAF doctrine aggravated disputes caused by inter-service rivalry. The USAAF perceived the U.S. Navy command structure as inflexible and its strategic concept as essentially defensive. The U.S. Navy confirmed these perceptions as it built up its forces until it could institute a coastal convoy system, one of the most important and effective defensive measures. The first convoy sailed from Hampton Roads, Virginia, southward bound, on 14 May 1942. Admiral King sought increased support from the USAAF for convoy escort duties. The USAAF preferred to concentrate on long range over water patrols, but until mid1943, the USAAF had to divert considerable aircraft to convoy escort duties, probably the best use of scarce resources.
The formation, equipping, and training of effective sea and air anti submarine forces against the German offensive on the East Coast required time. The U.S. Navy, supported by the USAAF, gradually progressed with various defensive measures and increasingly effective air patrols forced the Germans to greater caution in the waters of the Eastern Sea Frontier. By June 1942, German submariners had turned to the less dangerous waters of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. Lesson ten: Part II of the article
OPERATIONS IN THE GULF OF MEXICO
AND THE CARIBBEAN SEA
JANUARY - OCTOBER 1942
Only five ships had been sunk in the Gulf Sea Frontier in the first four months of 1942, but in May 1942, submarines sank 41 ships, totaling 219,867 gross tons, with 55 percent tanker tonnage. By July 1942, the enemy had sunk 62 ships in the Gulf of Mexico. As many as four enemy submarines at a time prowled the Gulf of Mexico between May and August 1942, taking advantage of skimpy air patrols and the lack of a convoy system.
The shift of the German submarine offensive to the Gulf overwhelmed the resources of the U.S. Navy and the USAAF, which were barely adequate to defend against submarines in the Eastern Sea Frontier. The U.S. Navy had created the Gulf Sea Frontier in February 1942 with minimal surface and air forces, and the USAAF had contributed only 14 observation aircraft and two worn out B-18's. To counter increased submarine attacks, the USAAF, between 8 and 10 May, sent a squadron of light bombers (A-29's) to Jacksonville, Florida, and six medium bombers (B-25's) to Miami, Florida and on 20-21 May sent a detachment of B-25's to Havana, Cuba, to patrol the Yucatan Channel.
On 26 May, the 1st Air Force created the Gulf Task Force and stationed it at Miami. This organization, which continued to operate until November 1942, cooperated with the Commander, Gulf Sea Frontier, to provide operational control of all USAAF aircraft that flew anti submarine patrols in the area. At the end of July 1942 the U.S. Navy instituted a convoy system in the Gulf of Mexico, and German submarines faced the same dangers they had off the East Coast. On 4 September 1942, the United States lost the last ship sunk by enemy action in the Gulf of Mexico, as Admiral Doenitz withdrew all submarines from the Gulf.
The devastation of German submarine attacks in the Caribbean Sea Frontier matched that in the Gulf Sea Frontier. Having dispatched a sizeable force to the U.S. East Coast, Admiral Doenitz fixed the opening of the Caribbean operation for the new moon period of February 1942. On 16 February, a German submarine sank two tankers off San Nicholas, Aruba, then moved into the harbor and shelled a refinery, inflicting little damage but killing four people. In February and March, the Germans operated six submarines in the Caribbean Sea, each patrolling for two to three weeks before returning to France. Then, in April, a second wave of submarines arrived in the area; some, refueled and replenished northeast of Bermuda by "milch cow" submarines, stayed up to six weeks. By July, the German submarines had sunk some 141 ships and sank another 173 ships in the Caribbean Sea Frontier and its approaches by September. Between February and September, the German submarines sank an average of 1.5 ships each day, destroying over one million gross tons in the Caribbean and adjacent waters.
U.S. military leaders had been aware of possible threats in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico at the beginning of the war. The USAAF, fearing an attack on the Panama Canal, in December 1941 transferred to the Canal Zone 80 additional fighter aircraft, nine heavy bombers, and four mobile radar sets. In February 1942, the 6th Air Force assumed responsibility for the aerial defense of the Panama Canal. Major General Davenport Johnson, Commander General 6th Air Force, concentrated aerial patrols on the Pacific side in fear of a carrier borne Japanese attack. Then in April 1942, when the German submarine threat became evident, the 6th Air Force, cooperating with the U.S. Navy, instituted anti submarine patrol flights as far east as Curacao. Most flights were by tactical aircraft, such as Bell P-39 Airacobra’s and Northrup A17's, which could fly only during daylight; lacking radar and trained observers, the pilots had little luck in spotting enemy submarines. On the other hand, 6th Air Force aircraft occasionally attacked friendly ships and submarines, fortunately without damaging them.
The USAAF in February 1942 organized a provisional force, later designated the Antilles Air Task Force. Scattered about the Caribbean in Trinidad, Curacao, Aruba, St. Lucia, Surinam, British Guiana, Puerto Rico, St. Croix, and Antigua, it consisted of about 40 B-18 medium bombers, seven Douglas A20 Havoc light bombers, and several fighter aircraft. Although remaining substantially the same size through the year, the task force obtained radar equipped aircraft, vastly increasing its anti submarine capability. Prior to July the air crews reported few sightings of or attacks on submarines, but in July and August attacked 20. To supplement these efforts, the 1st Air Force sent six B-18's equipped with radar to the Caribbean Sea Frontier. This unit, shuffled from one island and commander to another from August to November 1942, accomplished little.
The U.S. Navy extended the convoy system to the Caribbean Sea Frontier, with the first convoy sailing on 10 July 1942, between Guantanamo, Cuba, and the Canal Zone. In reaction, Admiral Doenitz redeployed his submarines to the Trinidad area where targets were lucrative and relatively unprotected. In August, the submarines sank only one ship in the rest of the Caribbean while destroying ten near Trinidad. Because of the extensive Caribbean air patrols, the submarines attacked independently, continuing their success into September, sinking an additional 29 ships totaling 143,000 tons.
The USAAF stationed detachments of B-18's at Trinidad, Curacao, Dutch Guiana, and British Guiana in June 1942; but these aircraft, lacking radar, could not stem the German efforts in the area during July and August. On 17 August, to aid the Caribbean Sea Frontier, the USAAF sent a detachment of B-18's equipped with microwave radar to Key West, Florida. The detachment, which always patrolled the Trinidad area, moved to other bases in the Caribbean and was based at Trinidad between 22 September and 16 October 1942.
OPERATIONS OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES anti submarine COMMAND
OCTOBER 1942 - AUGUST 1943
By October 1942, the USAAF had been engaged in anti submarine war for almost a year. During that time it had laid the basis for an effective organization and made plans for a larger anti submarine force. To take advantage of these plans, the USAAF on 15 October 1942, activated the US Army Air Forces anti submarine Command (AAFAC) to replace I Bomber Command, which held most of the USAAF's anti submarine resources. I Bomber Command furnished the personnel, aircraft, and equipment for the new organization, which remained under U.S. Navy operational control. The AAFAC provided a greater unity of command of anti submarine forces in the War Department, resulting in increased flexibility and more effective operations. The I Bomber Command had been handicapped in its efforts because its primary mission remained longrange bombardment. The anti submarine task was secondary and presumably temporary. "Now," in the words of the official history of the USAAF in World War II, "as an officially constituted anti submarine unit, the AAFAC was able to attack its problems with undivided energy, free at least from any immediate uncertainty as to its mission." The reorganization extended to subordinate elements as well. By 20 November 1942, the AAFAC had organized the squadrons it had inherited from I Bomber Command into the 25th and 26th anti submarine Wings with headquarters at New York and Miami respectively.
In January 1943, the command had only 19 squadrons and only 20 B-24's, the aircraft type most useful for long range anti submarine patrolling. The command grew rapidly until, by September 1943, there were 25 anti submarine squadrons, most of which flew B-24's modified for anti submarine war. At the end of 1942, most of these squadrons operated in the Gulf, Caribbean, and Eastern Sea Frontiers on endless patrols with few sightings and fewer attacks. The U.S. Navy continued to require the AAFAC to commit sizeable forces in these areas to counter what was a diminishing German threat the five to ten submarines that Admiral Doenitz kept along the U.S. coast and in the Caribbean Sea. From September 1942 until mid1944 these few submarines maintained pressure on the American anti submarine forces. To counter the submarine threat in the Caribbean, the Army Air Forces anti submarine Command continued to fly patrols and escort coverage from Cuba. These operations, which had begun as early as June 1942, generally kept the German submariners from making successful attacks in the Caribbean Sea Frontier, although two ships were sunk there as late as July 1943.
The Germans found the hunting more profitable in the area of Trinidad until midyear 1943. The AAFAC consequently based B-18's at Edinburgh Field, Trinidad, from early January until August 1943. In November and December 1942, German submarines sank 18 ships. Increased aerial patrols paid off with no losses of friendly ships near Trinidad from January to July 1943. During this time, the USAAF B-18's engaged mostly in convoy escort and coverage missions. In July-August, German submarines sank four merchant vessels. The USAAF anti submarine squadrons, flying both B-24's and B-18's, made six attacks and participated in two killer hunts to foil the enemy offensive in Trinidad waters.
In addition to the Trinidad area, the German submarines operated extensively in the South Atlantic Ocean in 1943, where merchant vessels sailed independently because there was no convoy system. The AAFAC sent a detachment of B-24 aircraft in May from Trinidad to Natal, Brazil, to patrol the South Atlantic sea lanes at ranges beyond the reach of the Brazilian Air Force. The next month, the detachment moved to Ascension Island, added two more aircraft, and flew patrols over the South Atlantic Ocean until August 1943.
Although important, the AAFAC's operations from October 1942 in the Eastern Sea Frontier, the Gulf Sea Frontier, and the Caribbean Sea Frontier constituted only a small part of the war against the German submarines. In fact, by midsummer 1942, the U.S. Navy's and the USAAF's anti submarine warfare efforts had forced Admiral Doenitz to withdraw most of his forces from these areas. The German submarines moved back to the North Atlantic to exploit weaknesses in Allied anti submarine efforts there. Consequently, the AAFAC turned to the reinforcement of the meager anti submarine air forces in Newfoundland.
OPERATIONS FROM NEWFOUNDLAND
OCTOBER 1941 - JULY 1943
In October 1941, far to the north, an USAAF detachment of four to six B-17's had begun anti submarine patrols over the northwest Atlantic Ocean from Gander Lake, Newfoundland. The B-17's were armed with machine guns and bombs but carried no radar or depth charges. In July 1942, the 421st Bombardment Squadron (Heavy), also flying B-17's and with a primary mission of long range bombardment training, replaced the detachment. The squadron cooperated with Royal Canadian Air Force and U.S. Navy organizations in Newfoundland to carry on its secondary mission of anti submarine war. Then, in the fall of 1942, the Army Air Forces anti submarine Command made anti submarine patrol the squadron's primary mission, re designating it the 20th anti submarine Squadron (Heavy).
The 421st had replaced the B-17 detachment in Newfoundland even as the Germans increased submarine activity in the 500mile (805 km) gap between 25 and 45 degrees West longitude that the Allies could not cover with land based aircraft. This gap in air coverage allowed the German submarine wolf packs to attack convoys without being spotted or attacked from the air. Admiral Doenitz organized the submarines in two screens running in a northwesterly direction at either end to catch the convoys as they sailed into the gap. The sea lanes northeast of Newfoundland, marking the eastern edge of Allied air coverage, were especially dangerous.
The Allied convoys sailed under several other disadvantages from September 1942 until March 1943. Fuel shortages kept them close to the shortest track to and from Great Britain. Winter weather favored the submarines which often approached the convoys without being detected until too late. For most of 1942 the British could not decipher Enigma transmitted code, but the Germans could read the Allied convoy code. The Germans located and intercepted Allied convoys more frequently and successfully during this period than at any other time in the war.
Germany redeployed its submarines to the mid Atlantic in June and July 1942, and the offensive became effective in July and August. By then, the enemy had 86 submarines in the North Atlantic, and approximately this number remained operational there until June 1943. In August and September 1942, the submarines located 21 of 65 convoys that sailed, attacked seven, and sank 43 Allied ships.
During the Allied Conference in January 1943 at Casablanca, French Morocco, Great Britain and the United States agreed to deploy B-24 aircraft to patrol the mid Atlantic gap. Modified B-24's, with a radius up to 1,000 miles (1,609 km), could fly day or night in all but the worst weather to detect and attack submarines. The British immediately began operating Liberators, the Royal Air Force designation of the B-24, from bases in Ireland and Iceland to cover the eastern part of the gap, but the U.S. Navy did not send any aircraft to cover the western stretches of the mid Atlantic. During February 1943 21 ships totaling almost 200,000 tons were lost, mostly in the western gap. The next month in the Atlantic, the Allies lost 38 ships of 750,000 tons and an escort in four convoys.
On 18 March a B-24 detachment of the 25th anti submarine Wing established a headquarters at St. John's, Newfoundland, and began anti submarine patrols on 3 April 1943. By the end of the month the Army Air Forces anti submarine Command had three B-24 squadrons operating from St. John's and Gander Lake, Newfoundland. The squadrons engaged in convoy coverage and in broad offensive sweeps ahead of the convoys. In April and May they made 12 sightings of German submarines, which resulted in three attacks, but the B-24's did not sink a submarine.
During April 1943, Allied long range B-24 aircraft and escort carriers closed the mid Atlantic gap in air coverage, effectively neutralizing the German submarine offensive. That month the Germans sank only three Allied merchant vessels while losing four submarines. In May Germany lost 31 submarines in the North Atlantic, and on 26 May, Admiral Doenitz withdrew his boats from the North Atlantic, essentially conceding victory to the Allies in the Battle of the Atlantic. Almost 1,700 Allied ships crossed the ocean in June and July 1943 without a loss. Lesson Eleven: Part III of the article
DEVELOPMENT OF ANTI SUBMARINE EQUIPMENT AND TACTICS
Admiral Doenitz recognized that improvements in Allied tactics and weapons had turned the tide of war against the German submarines. He noted in a memorandum dated June 1943:
"The war at sea is at present characterized by a decrease in the victories of our U.S. Navy against enemy merchant shipping. The principal exponent of this type of warfare, the submarine, is limited in operational capacity by the ever growing strength of the enemy's anti submarine defenses and in particular by the enemy Air Force, using as yet unknown equipment and weapons."
The "unknown" equipment and weapons owed their existence at least in part to the 1st SeaSearch Attack Group which General Arnold established on 17 June 1942, at Langley Field, Hampton, Virginia. The group engaged in the development of equipment and tactics best suited for aerial anti submarine warfare. Among the devices that the group helped develop or test were the absolute altimeter, the magnetic anomaly detector (MAD), the radio sonic buoy, improved airborne depth charges, longrange navigation, and airborne microwave radar.
The absolute altimeter used a modified microwave radar to determine an aircraft's exact altitude to within 10 feet (3 m). This altimeter, replacing the less accurate barometric instrument, permitted aircraft to fly safely as low as 50 feet (15 m). The low altitude attack substantially improved the chances of destroying the target. This device was standard equipment on USAAF anti submarine aircraft by 1943.
The magnetic anomaly detector (MAD) operated by sensing a change in the magnetic field of the earth, an anomaly that could be produced by the steel hull of a submarine. Aircraft outfitted with this device would patrol in an area where a submarine had been spotted but had submerged. Combined with the use of a radio sonic buoy to listen for the sounds of a submarine, the MAD permitted an intensive search with a high probability of success. Another important development was the use of LORAN (long range aid to navigation). The aircraft received radio signals from three known points, allowing the navigator to pinpoint his location to within four miles (6.4 km) at a range of 1,200 to 1,500 miles (1,931 to 2,414 km) from transmitters. LORAN permitted efficient control of converging forces. LORAN coverage extended over the Eastern Sea Frontier, Gulf Sea Frontier, and most of the Caribbean Sea and North Atlantic Ocean.
The 1st SeaSearch Attack Group also helped develop an effective depth bomb with shallow fuse settings for about 25 feet (7.6 m). Eventually, the Americans and British developed a blunt depth bomb that sank slowly and exploded at the desired depth to destroy the submarine. This depth bomb became standard in early 1943.
Perhaps the most important task of the 1st SeaSearch Attack Group was to develop techniques for using Airborne Surface Vessel Detection (ASV) radar to find surfaced submarines. The radar that eventually went into production was 10centimeter wave equipment, known as ASV10. The British had developed a long wave ASV radar and used it to find submarines in 19411942. As early as March 1942, the I Bomber Command had four B-18's outfitted with the long wave radar sets, but the Germans outfitted their submarines with a long wave radar detector that effectively countered the British radar. The United States quickly developed the microwave radar, which the Germans never effectively countered. The first microwave sets were hand manufactured and delivered to the 1st SeaSearch Attack Group in June 1942. By February 1943, a skilled radar operator could identify surfaced submarines at more than 40 miles (64 km) and even the conning tower of a boat running decks awash at 15 to 30 miles (24 to 48 km).
Radar sets were notoriously unreliable and difficult to maintain, and scientists assigned to the 1st SeaSearch Attack Group found much of their time consumed by seminars in the field on basic functions and maintenance of equipment. Consequently, the USAAF established a unit in the group to train ground personnel in its proper maintenance.
Initially the ASV10 radar sets were placed on B-18 medium bombers flying anti submarine patrols. Some 90 B-18's carried the equipment by the end of June 1942, but the Allies needed the microwave radar on the B-24. Equipped with auxiliary fuel tanks, microwave radar, and a powerful search light, this very long range bomber was ideal for extended anti submarine patrols. The USAAF outfitted its first two microwave radar equipped B-24's in September 1942, and the 1st SeaSearch Attack Group acquired a squadron of B-24's in December.
Using the B-18's and B-24's assigned to it, the 1st SeaSearch Attack Group trained combat crews in the tactical employment of new equipment. In general, the USAAF employed three broad types of anti submarine operations: (1) routine aerial patrol of waters in which an enemy threat might exist; (2) air escort or coverage of convoys within range of land based aircraft; and (3) intensive patrol of an area in which one or more submarines had been spotted, an operation the USAAF termed a "killer hunt" (in contrast to the U.S. Navy expression "hunter killer"). At various times, each of these operational tactics had its place in the anti submarine war.
Early in the war, the USAAF usually used the aerial patrol to restrict and hamper enemy operations. Such flying required precise navigation and reliable communications, and the crew had to identify surface craft accurately to avoid attacks on friendly vessels. However, an air crew on routine anti submarine patrol could fly hundreds of hours without sighting a submarine. As most German submarines withdrew in the summer of 1942 from American waters, the routine patrols, with virtually no chance of spotting an enemy submarine, became the nemesis of the Army air crews.
Aerial escort of convoys came close to being as resented as the routine patrols. The USAAF considered these anti submarine operations to be primarily defensive in character, but they were absolutely essential to prevent enemy submarines from attacking convoys. After the institution of the coastal convoy system on 15 May 1942, the U.S. Navy frequently called on the USAAF to protect convoys, initially between Key West, FLorida and the Chesapeake Bay, later in the Caribbean.
Although convoy duty was essential, the USAAF preferred the offensively oriented killer hunt. This tactic most effectively used the newly developed sonic buoys, magnetic anomaly detectors, and microwave radar. A patrolling aircraft that spotted and unsuccessfully attacked a German submarine would radio its location to its home base. The information would be passed on to U.S. Navy authorities, who would dispatch a force of ships and aircraft to maintain contact with the submarine and attack it as the opportunity arose.
The killer hunt took large numbers of aircraft and surface vessels from normal convoy escort and patrols, and the U.S. Navy did not regularly employ it until mid 1943. The escort aircraft carriers used this tactic very effectively against German submarines, including the "milch cows." The escort carriers coupled with ULTRA allowed the Allies to attack not just defensively, as in convoy escort, or fortuitously, as in aerial patrol, but also actively by seeking out the enemy submarines. Between June and October the escort carriers, guided by ULTRA intelligence, located and destroyed nine of the ten refueling submarines operating in the Atlantic Ocean.
The first killer hunt to result in a destroyed submarine occurred much earlier in the Gulf Sea Frontier on 10-13 June 1942. A German submarine, U-157, sank a ship north of Cuba on the night of 10 June. Within three hours, a radar equipped B-18 out of Miami, Florida was patrolling in the vicinity and early on the 11th unsuccessfully attacked the surfaced submarine. Other USAAF B-18's in the area contacted and attacked the submarine several times over the next two days. Meantime, five U.S. Navy ships out of Key West, Florida sailed to the area. Making sound contact with the submerged submarine on the 13th, the U.S. Navy crews sank it with depth charges.
DISSOLUTION OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES anti submarine COMMAND
The killer hunt involved close cooperation among the operational forces of the USAAF and the U.S. Navy. Unfortunately, this cooperative attitude did not lessen inter-service rivalry concerning organization, control, and use of land based aircraft. The USAAF deemed the U.S. Navy's continuing operational control of its aircraft an intolerable situation, especially since the U.S. Navy kept most of the anti submarine Command's aircraft on endless patrol off the East Coast. To meet the USAAF's objections and achieve better control and coordination between the services, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, proposed in April 1943 a centralized anti submarine organization under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral King rejected this proposal but on 20 May 1943, established the Tenth Fleet, a U.S. Navy command with jurisdiction over all anti submarine activities. Although the Tenth Fleet brought needed order to the American anti submarine effort, Army leaders remained unhappy because the AAFAC remained under the U.S. Navy's operational control. Besides, in the opinion of General Arnold and the USAAF leadership, the U.S. Navy appeared to be duplicating the USAAF's efforts. By this time, the U.S. Navy was receiving large numbers of B-24's to use on anti submarine patrols.
On 9 July 1943, after several meetings, the Army and the U.S. Navy agreed that the USAAF would withdraw from anti submarine operations. In accordance with this agreement, the USAAF by 6 October turned over 77 B-24's configured with anti submarine equipment to the U.S. Navy in return for an equal number of unmodified B-24's from the U.S. Navy allocation. On 31 August the USAAF re designated the AAFAC as the I Bomber Command and assigned it to the First Air Force, re designating the anti submarine squadrons as heavy bombardment squadrons. The 25th and 26th anti submarine Wings were disbanded, but two anti submarine groups overseas, the 479th anti submarine Group at Dunkeswell, England and the 480th anti submarine Group at Port Lyautey, French Morocco, continued operations into October 1943 before being inactivated. Thus, the USAAF ended its anti submarine mission, mostly disdained in spite of its strategic significance as temporary and secondary to the USAAF's responsibilities as a strategic bombing force.
German submarines sank fewer than 20 ships in the Atlantic Ocean between September 1943 and the end of the war. Still, the submarine threat tied down large Allied naval and air forces. Hitler recognized the Atlantic Ocean as his first line of defense in the West and the danger of the anti submarine forces if they should be released to undertake other military tasks against Germany. Thus, the submarines operated until the end of World War II, even returning in small numbers from time to time to the Caribbean Sea or the East Coast of the United States.
USAAF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE anti submarine WAR
Statistics underline the menace of the German submarine offensive. Submarines sank over 2,600 Allied ships, totaling about 15 million tons. Germany built 1,162 submarines, of which 785 were sunk, 156 surrendered at the end of the war, and the rest scuttled or otherwise destroyed. German submarines operated between September 1939 and May 1945 not only in the North Atlantic and American waters but also in the South Atlantic, Caribbean Sea, Gulf of St. Lawrence, Mediterranean Sea, Indian Ocean, Kola Inlet in North Russia, as well as around the Cape of Good Hope and along the coasts of Australia and Brazil.
During the Battle of the Atlantic the Canadians and the British sank most of the German submarines destroyed in the American Theater. The U.S. Navy and the USAAF cooperated with Canadian and British forces to stifle the German submarine offensive off the East Coast, in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, and in the North Atlantic Ocean. Since the Japanese made relatively few submarine attacks off the West Coast, the USAAF contributions there mostly amounted to reassuring the public and governmental officials that anti submarine operations were in place to defend shipping and deter the enemy.
During the war, increasingly effective anti submarine air patrols resulted from deployment of modified B-24's, development of various finding aids and other technological advances, and experience in the specialized tactics of hunting and attacking submarines. After the war, Admiral Doenitz cited the radar equipped very long range B-24 as a decisive factor in the defeat of the German submarines in the North Atlantic. The USAAF and the U.S. Navy explored the best tactical combination of radar, depth bombs, and the magnetic anomaly detector in the aerial search for submarines. Working together at the tactical level, the two services conducted a successful offensive action against enemy submarines, helping to turn the tide of submarine war against the German submarine fleet within about 18 months.
As part of the overall Allied anti submarine effort, the USAAF significantly affected the outcome of the campaign. In terms of the force available, the USAAF increased its anti submarine force from a few obsolete observation aircraft, medium bombers, and B-17's, all without radar, to 187 operational B-24's, 80 B-25's, 12 B-17's, and seven Lockheed B34 Ventura’s, most equipped with microwave radar and other detection equipment. These 286 aircraft were assigned to the Army Air Forces anti submarine Command when, on 24 August 1943, the USAAF withdrew from anti submarine operations in the American Theater. In this theater, USAAF aircraft flew over 135,000 operational combat hours on anti submarine patrols. Altogether, the USAAF participated in 96 attacks on German submarines between 7 December 1941 and 24 August 1943. These statistics do not include the contribution of the AAFAC in the anti submarine Campaign, European-African-Middle Eastern Theater, nor of the Army Air Force's bombers which frequently attacked the German submarine bases and sometimes sank submarines anchored in their berths.
The USAAF's anti submarine campaign harassed the Germans to the point of ineffectiveness. Even the efforts of the small unarmed Civil Air Patrol aircraft in the shallow coastal waters contributed to this outcome. The German policy from the beginning of the war was to withdraw from areas that became too dangerous because of heavy aerial patrols. By May 1943, Germany had lost the strategic initiative in the Battle of the Atlantic. Aircraft had forced the enemy to submerge so frequently and stay down for such extended intervals that their targets escaped and Uboat activity became so handicapped that the returns barely justified the expense. cool!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
could it be used in awa?
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