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The Labor–Management Relations Act, 80 Pub.L. 101; 61 Stat. 136, informally the Taft–Hartley Act, is a United States federal law that monitors the activities and power of labor unions. The act, still effective, was sponsored by Senator Robert Taft and Representative Fred A. Hartley, Jr. and legislated by overriding U.S. President Harry S. Truman's veto on June 23, 1947; labor leaders called it the "slave-labor bill"[1]


while President Truman argued it would "conflict with important principles of our democratic society,"[2] though he would subsequently use it twelve times during his presidency.[3] The Taft-Hartley Act amended the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA; informally the Wagner Act), which Congress passed in 1935. The principal author of the Taft-Hartley Act was J. Mack Swigert[4] of the Cincinnati law firm Taft, Stettinius & Hollister.
Contents

1 Effects of the act
1.1 Closed shops
1.2 Union security clauses
1.3 Strikes
1.4 Treatment of supervisors
1.5 Right of employer to oppose unions
1.6 NLRB
1.7 Federal jurisdiction

1.8 Other

2 Entertainment industry

3 Opposition to the Act

4 See also

5 Further reading

6 References

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Effects of the actAs stated in 29 U.S.C.A. 141, the purpose of the NLRA is:

[T]o promote the full flow of commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers in their relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for preventing the interference by either with the legitimate rights of the other, to protect the rights of individual employees in their relations with labor organizations whose activities affect commerce, to define and proscribe practices on the part of labor and management which affect commerce and are inimical to the general welfare, and to protect the rights of the public in connection with labor disputes affecting commerce.

After the Act, management was allowed to run its company in what it viewed as the most efficient way.[5] The amendments enacted in Taft-Hartley added a list of prohibited actions, or "unfair labor practices", on the part of unions to the NLRA, which had previously only prohibited "unfair labor practices" committed by employers. The Taft-Hartley Act prohibited jurisdictional strikes, wildcat strikes, solidarity or political strikes, secondary boycotts, secondary or "common situs" picketing, closed shops, and monetary donations by unions to federal political campaigns. It also required union officers to sign non-communist affidavits with the government. Union shops were heavily restricted, and states were allowed to pass "right-to-work laws" that outlawed union shops. Furthermore, the executive branch of the Federal government could obtain legal strikebreaking injunctions if an impending or current strike "imperiled the national health or safety," a test that has been interpreted broadly by the courts.
Taft–Hartley was one of more than 250 union related bills pending in both houses of Congress in 1947.[3] As a response to rising union radicalism and Cold War hostilities, the bill could be seen as a response by business to the post-World War II labor upsurge of 1946. During the year after V-J Day, more than five million American workers were involved in strikes, which lasted on average four times longer than those during the war.[6] The Taft-Hartley Act was seen as a means of demobilizing the labor movement by imposing limits on labor's ability to strike and by prohibiting radicals from their leadership, people who were typically more active in union activities.[7]

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Closed shops
Main article: closed shop
The outlawed closed shops were contractual agreements that required an employer to hire only labor union members. Union shops, still permitted, require new recruits to join the union within a certain amount of time, but only as part of a collective bargaining agreement and only if the contract allows the worker at least thirty days after the date of hire or the effective date of the contract to join the union. The National Labor Relations Board and the courts have added other restrictions on the power of unions to enforce union security clauses and have required them to make extensive financial disclosures to all members as part of their duty of fair representation. On the other hand, Congress repealed the provisions requiring a vote by workers to authorize a union shop a few years after the passage of the Act when it became apparent that workers were approving them in virtually every case.
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Union security clauses
Main article: union shop
The amendments also authorized individual states to outlaw union security clauses (such as the union shop) entirely in their jurisdictions by passing right-to-work laws. A right-to-work law prevents unions from negotiating contracts or legally binding documents requiring companies to fire workers who refuse to join the union. Currently all of the states in the Deep South and a number of traditionally Republican states in the Midwest, Plains, and Rocky Mountains regions have right-to-work laws (with five states – Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Kansas and Oklahoma – going one step further and enshrining right-to-work laws in their states' constitutions).
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Opposition to the Act
Union leaders did not like the bill when it was proposed. Harry Truman vetoed Taft-Hartley, but Congress overrode his veto. More Democrats joined Republicans in voting for the bill and the override than voted against it.[9] Despite this, union leaders in the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) continued to support Democrats and vigorously campaigned for Truman in the 1948 election based upon a (never fulfilled) promise to repeal Taft-Hartley.[10] Organized labor nearly succeeded in pushing Congress to amend the law to increase the protections for strikers and targets of employer retaliation during the Carter and Clinton administrations, but failed on both occasions because of Republican opposition and lukewarm support for these changes[citation needed] from the Democratic President in office at the time. Ralph Nader, presidential candidate from 1992 to 2008, said on his web site nader.org in July 2002, "Taft-Hartley entrenched significant executive tyranny in the workplace, with ramifications that are more severe today than ever. ... It is past time for the repeal of Taft-Hartley."
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from the
Encyclopædia Britannica



United States [1947]formally Labor–Management Relations Act (1947), in U.S. history, law—enacted over the veto of Pres. Harry S. Truman—amending much of the pro-union [url=]
[/url]Wagner Act of 1935. A variety of factors, including the fear of Communist infiltration of labour unions, the tremendous growth in both membership and power of unions, and a series of large-scale strikes, contributed to an anti-union climate in the United States after World War II. Republican majorities in both houses of Congress—the first since 1930—sought to remedy the union abuses seen as permitted under the Wagner Act.

The Labor–Management Relations Act of 1947, sponsored by Sen. Robert A. Taft (Ohio) and Rep. Fred A. Hartley, Jr. (New Jersey), while preserving the rights of labour to organize and to bargain collectively, additionally guaranteed employees the right not to join unions (outlawing the closed shop); permitted union shops only where state law allowed and where a majority of workers voted for them; required unions to give 60 days’ advance notification of a strike; authorized 80-day federal injunctions when a strike threatened to imperil national health or safety; narrowed the definition of unfair labour practices; specified unfair union practices; restricted union political contributions; and required union officers to deny under oath any Communist affiliations.
The [url=]
[/url]Landrum–Griffin Act of 1959 set further union restrictions, barring secondary boycotts and limiting the right to picket.

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Acts, Bills, and Laws, Labor-Management Relations ActThe Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, sponsored by U.S. Senator Robert A. Taft and Representative Fred A. Hartley, was designed to amend much of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (the Wagner Act) and discontinued parts of the Federal Anti-Injunction Act of 1932.  The Taft-Hartley Act was the first major revision to the Wagner Act, and after much resistance from labor leaders and a veto from President Harry S. Truman, was passed on June 23, 1947. The Taft-Hartley Act provides for the following: It allows the president to appoint a board of inquiry to investigate union disputes when he believes a strike would endanger national health or safety, and obtain an 80-day injunction to stop the continuation of a strike.
It declares all closed shops illegal.
It permits union shops only after a majority of the employees vote for them.
It forbids jurisdictional strikes and secondary boycotts.
It forbids unions from contributing to political campaigns.Although many people tried to repeal the act, it stayed in effect until 1959 when the Landrum-Griffin Act amended some of its features



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Closed Shop
Labor, 1842 - 1947Collective bargaining by unions faced general hostility in the courts, which at first considered such practices to be anti-competitive and illegal. As unions gained legal acceptance, their contracts began to assert greater union influence over hiring and added requirements for union membership. Following World War II, a backlash developed that resulted in the Taft-Hartley Act, which banned certain practices. The most extreme form of union control is the "closed shop," in which only members of a union can be hired. Sometimes, when a new or replacement worker is needed, the union supplies the new employee. A strike for a closed shop became legal when the Massachusetts Commonwealth's chief justice, Lemuel Shaw, ruled in the case of Commonwealth v. Hunt (1842). Shaw also ruled that a trade union was lawful, and its members were not collectively responsible for the illegal acts committed by individuals. A "closed shop" became illegal in the United States with the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. A closely allied term is the "union shop." Under that arrangement, union membership is not required for employment, but a new employee must join the union within a specified period of time. By midsummer 1937, membership grew to an estimated 4,000,000 in the Congress of Industrial Organizations (C.I.O). Under the dynamic leadership of John L. Lewis of the United Mine Workers (U.M.W.), the C.I.O led strikes for: the closed shop, the C.I.O.'s right to be the exclusive agent for workers in collective bargaining, and the use of the new sit-down strike tactic. In a sit-down strike, workers take possession of a premises and then refuse to leave until demands are met. In March 1937, General Motors and Republican Steel contested the new sit-down's legality, calling for the Michigan courts to rescue their properties by ordering injunctions against sit-down protesters. Those actions caused a further rise in tension between the workers and factory owners, until Governor Frank Murphy's intervention successfully prevented widespread violence in the automobile industries. In response to the C.I.O. strikes, Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act (1938), with the objective of the “elimination of labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standards of living necessary for health, efficiency and well-being of workers.” Restrictions on union shops were created by the Taft-Hartley Act, but the provisions have been weakened by subsequent legislation. Anti-union groups have persuaded many state legislatures to enact "Right to Work" laws at the state level that prohibit union shops. Those laws do not apply to such industries as airlines and railways. The argument for a union shop is that all employees will receive greater benefits from collective bargaining performed by a union than would an individual employee. The employees should contribute financially to support the collective bargaining process because they benefit from it. On the other hand, the "right to work" argument is primarily motivated by a concern for individual freedom to decide whether or not to support unions by paying dues. Obviously, without monetary support from employees through compulsory union dues, the unions would suffer.

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Right-to-work laws are statutes enforced in twenty-two U.S. states, mostly in the southern or western U.S., allowed under provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act, which prohibit agreements between trade unions and employers making membership or payment of union dues or "fees" a condition of employment, either before or after hiring.

ARTICLE

from the
Encyclopædia Britannica


in the United States, any state law forbidding various union-security measures, particularly the union shop, under which workers are required to join a [url=]
[/url]union within a specified time after they begin employment. The [url=]
[/url]Taft–Hartley Act of 1947 outlawed not the union shop but the closed shop (which can hire union members only) everywhere in the United States. But section 14(b) of the act did encourage the passage of state right-to-work laws by allowing state laws against union-security measures to supersede the federal law.

The strongest support of right-to-work laws generally has come from small business; the 19 states with right-to-work laws in 1966 were concentrated in the South and West and did not include any major industrial state. Indiana was the only industrial state to pass a right-to-work law, but it repealed it in 1965.
Right-to-work laws have periodically become important political issues; in 1966 the Lyndon B. Johnson administration attempted to eliminate such laws by seeking repeal of section 14(b); the effort was thwarted in the Senate with a filibuster led by Senator Everett Dirksen of Illinois.
Supporters of right-to-work laws maintain that they guarantee a person’s right to work without being forced to join a union. In addition, they argue that such laws do not weaken the bargaining power of unions but merely permit a worker to bargain on an individual basis if he so chooses. Opponents contend that the name right-to-work law is misleading because such laws do not guarantee employment to anyone. On the contrary, they maintain that such laws tend to reduce workers’ job security by weakening the bargaining power of unions.

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Taft-Hartley: A Workers' Nightmare  

[size=+1]UPS workers rallied in New Jersey on Aug. 13, a week before they won their strike. Without intervention, the Teamster members were able to win a decent contract. But under the Taft-Hartley Act, President Clinton could have ordered the strikers back to work and sabotaged their fight. In fact, he was urged to do so by everyone from UPS management to Newt Gingrich. No politician should be allowed to rob workers of their most powerful weapon against employers.

[size=-1]Photo: [size=-1]©J.K. Condyles
Republicans and spineless Democrats dominated the Congress. In the White House sat a Democratic president who identified more with business than with labor. The mood was aggressively anti-worker. Legislators stomped around calling for laws to reign in "big labor." In fact, over 200 anti-labor bills were pending in Congress. It was fifty years ago: 1947.
The anti-labor drive in Congress came to focus on two bills: The House bill was introduced by Rep. Fred Hartley (R-NJ), a right-winger who had been friendly to Hitler Germany and imperial Japan right up to the eve of World War 2. A roughly similar bill was introduced in the Senate by Sen. Robert A. Taft (R-Ohio), the ultraconservative, wealthy son of a U.S. president who had political ambitions of his own. But both bills were written by lobbyists for corporations like General Electric, Allis-Chalmers, Inland Steel, J.I. Case, and Chrysler, and the Rockefeller interests.

A WORKERS' NIGHTMARE

The measures were a workers' nightmare: They restored anti-strike injunctions; limited labor's ability to mass picket; prohibited secondary boycotts; restricted political contributions by unions; outlawed welfare funds not jointly controlled by management; authorized employer interference in organizing; denied "economic" strikers the right to vote in representation elections; allowed bosses to fire workers for some types of union activity; outlawed the closed shop, and authorized states to ban the union shop; opened union treasuries to raids through lawsuits; and interfered in internal union politics by requiring officers to sign affidavits that they were not "communists."
It was no surprise that corporations were out to get the unions: In a little more than a decade, the number of union members in the U.S. had grown from less than 4 million to some 15 million. Labor had flexed its muscles soon after World War 2 ended in 1945 with a series of strikes aimed at dramatically increasing living standards for industrial workers. Electrical, oil, steel, auto, rubber, and packinghouse workers, among others, went on strike simultaneously, bringing the U.S. to the verge of a general strike in basic industry. Their successful job actions modestly redistributed the corporations' bloated war-time profits.

EMPLOYERS VS. NEW DEAL

In response, corporations were mounting an attack on New Deal legislation that had given workers some of their newfound strength. Big business also employed the Cold War to whip up a "red scare" that wreaked internal havoc in unions across the country. C.E. Wilson, head of General Electric, frankly declared the Cold War had two targets: labor at home, and the Soviet Union abroad.
In April 1947, the CIO organized a "Defend Labor" month, urging mass actions, plant-gate rallies, and an all-out campaign to get resolutions, letters and telegrams sent to Washington to counter Taft-Hartley and the whole labor assault. Sixty members of the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE) spent a frustrating two days trying to convince members of Congress that any of the 200-plus anti-labor bills would be disastrous. They didn't get a good reception: Taft refused to meet with them. Indiana's Sen. Homer Capehart, a manufacturer employing UE members, told the union delegation he was "against big business, big unions, and big government. But I'll start on big unions."
On April 17, the House passed the Hartley bill. And on May 13, 1947, the Senate voted 68-21 to adopt the Taft bill. Democrats were split exactly 50-50, with 21 voting for, and 21 against.
Heavy pressure convinced President Harry Truman to veto the bill at the last minute. But in a move Bill Clinton must have studied, he did little to influence the override vote that followed. Both House and Senate voted to override the veto.

  LABOR'S BALL AND CHAIN

Taft-Hartley has been labor's ball and chain ever since. Early on, labor made a bid at resisting the law. UE, the Steelworkers, and other CIO unions pledged not to cooperate with the new Taft-Hartley Labor Board. CIO president Philip Murray and Mineworkers president John L. Lewis vowed they would not sign the measure's red-scare affidavit. But within a few years, unions were forced to submit.

In 1953, U.S. News and World Report could ask, "Are Unions Slipping? No Growth in Six Years." In 1946, the CIO's membership had been 6.3 million; by 1954, it was 4.6 million. Overall, union membership fell from 33.7 percent of the labor force in 1947 to 31.5 percent in 1950. Although union membership began rising slowly to reach a post-war high of 34.7 percent in 1954, that was followed by a steady decline, aided heavily by the employer tools supplied by Taft-Hartley. Under the legislation, employers can get in the way of almost every union activity -- from organizing the shop to going on strike to mobilizing community support for a campaign.

CAN'T GET RID OF IT

With the Democratic Party moving ever rightward, repeal of Taft-Hartley has stayed on labor's back burner. An effort to get part of the bill repealed during the Carter administration failed miserably -- despite a large Democratic majority in both houses. The return of a Democratic President and Democrat-controlled Congress in 1992-94 did not raise real hope of repealing Taft-Hartley. And yet American workers -- both the organized and the unorganized -- unwittingly suffer the effects of Taft-Hartley every working day.
-- Peter Gilmore