[REBORN FROM THE ASHES][comments][01.16-17]

fancywwUID: 2583671

Words and expressions:
Senior Fellow 高级研究员
international standoff (僵局)
Untenable: not able to be defended  *an untenable position*
commendable efforts
yielded no progress
compunction: 内疚
using violence to quell protests
intransigence：不妥协，不让步
galvanise：1. 用锌镀(铁)2. 激起某人行动起来
proxy：n. 1. 代表权;代理权(尤指投票);代理人,代表2. （测算用的）代替物，指标 3. (英国国教教区献给主教等的)巡游费4. (对代理人的)委托书；adj. 1. 代理(人)的；代表的；代替的retaliation：报复，反击
unilateral：单方面的
it would alter the region's strategic landscape dramatically.
nipping in the bud strategy
pre-emptive：先发制人的

Comment:
The defending side, General Wald 's main point is that military action is not preferable but necessary. His three arguments are: the urgency of the problems, the positive role the military option can play. I really doubt that whether war can achieve peace, like the General mentions:"military action is an option of last resort is the best hope we have for international security and peace"? General himself has admitted the possible risk of military action.

On the contrary, I am quite persuaded by Doctor Landau, the opposite side, that military strike can play a positive role only in an early stage. At the current stage, Iran already has nuclear facilities spread throughout the country, so the military strike will pay high price and sacrifice. And I am even convinced by the point that to eliminate proliferation is to change the motivation of Iran. It can hardly be achieved by military action. If the action successfully destroyed the nuclear facilities in Iran, it might contrarily strengthen Iranian's will to reconstruction them in an even larger size.

Finally, Dr. Landau analyses the reasons why military action be considered an option presently. And she sharply points out that the diplomatic option needs a serious makeover. The international negotiation team--US, Russia, France, UK and China, plus Germany--are not on the same page, just like the General describes: Russian reluctance, Chinese indifference and EU apprehension.

splendidsunUID: 2723757

1-16&17
Comment：
Two experts explain their opinions about whether US need to take military action to curb the nuclear programme of Iran. I agree with the one who is against the motion.  Despair over the unsuccessful diplomatic efforts to curb Iran's nuclear ambitions so far has raised the perceived value of military action, but I insist that the best way to proceed is still diplomacy.
Military actions might have little effect of curbing the promotion of nuclear program. However, it would bring severe hurt and casualties of the rank and file which may raise the vengeance about the world. Also rebuilding the collapse cities is a heavy economic burden for the whole world.
Thus, the most efficient and effective way to solve this problem is diplomatic way that countries make an agreement together and each member implement their own promise.

sanction 制裁
belligerent交战国
viability 可行性，生存能力
standoff 僵局，冷战
foolhardy 有勇无谋的，蛮干的
untenable站不住脚的
implement执行，实施
last resort最后手段
commendable值得赞扬的
yeild 产生
reluctance 勉强，不情愿
have no compunction about doing 不后悔……
intransigence不妥协，不让步
upcoming即将到来的
deployment部署，调度
Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP)巨型穿地导弹
vigilance警觉
know-how诀窍，专门技能
Persian Gulf波斯湾
nuclear deterrent核威慑力量
retaliation报复
pre-emptive先发制人
fortification防御工事
backfire逆火



1. Too often belligerent motives are ascribed to anyone who suggests the viability of the military option in resolving the international standoff over Iran's nuclear programme.
2. It would be foolhardy to argue that military action is the preferred policy option for stopping Iran's nuclear aspirations, which are strategically untenable for the United States.
3.For this kind of nipping in the bud strategy to work, the nuclear programme must be limited in scope, so that serious damage can be achieved with a single blow.
4.beyond the military response itself, it would open an account between Iran and whoever attacked it that would be very difficult to settle.
5.Regardless of how successful a particular attack might be, it is less likely to become the basis for a long-term solution to the challenge posed by a determined proliferator than would be a negotiated bargain.


抽象句型
1.Beyond A, it would open an account between B and C that would be very difficult to settle.除了带来A意外，它还会为B和C之间的带来一个非常难解决的问题。
2.Regardless of A, it is less likely to become the basis for a long-term solution to B.
不管A， 他对于B不是一个长久之计

domudomuUID: 2670967

Nobody wants another war in the Middle East. Most people, including our two debaters, agree that a diplomatic solution is preferable. The question is whether a negotiated deal is feasible. Both Chuck Wald and Emily Landau concur that diplomacy, even with President Barack Obama's hand stretched out to Iran, has been unsuccessful. General Wald says it is time to move to tough sanctions and, if that fails, military action. Dr Landau says it is worth giving diplomacy another shot.

Defending the motion

General Chuck F. Wald

Senior Fellow, Bipartisan Policy Centre

Too often belligerent（交战的好战的） motives are ascribed to anyone who suggests the viability of the military option in resolving the international standoff over Iran's nuclear programme. However, the argument in favour of military action is not about what is preferred but rather about what might be necessary.

Against the motion

Dr Emily Landau

Senior research associate at the Institute for National Security Studies

The correct statement is that the world would be a safer place if Iran did not acquire a military nuclear capability. But bombing Iran's nuclear facilities is not going to achieve that goal, especially at this late stage of the game. It is with this in mind that I oppose the motion.

The proposer's opening remarks

I welcome this debate on such a provocative question. Too often belligerent motives are ascribed（把。。归于，认为是由于） to anyone who suggests the viability of the military option in resolving the international standoff（僵局） over Iran's nuclear programme. However, the argument in favour of military action is not about what is preferred but rather about what might be necessary.

It would be foolhardy（有勇无谋的） to argue that military action is the preferred policy option for stopping Iran's nuclear aspirations, which are strategically untenable（站不稳脚，难以防守的） for the United States. No American general is eager for war. There remain levers, such as biting sanctions, that have yet to be tried. They should be implemented immediately and given a chance to work. But, should all other options fail to thwart（阻扰，对。。。构成阻力） Iran's nuclear ambitions, a US-led military strike is preferable to an Israeli attack, and certainly preferable to a nuclear weapons-capable Iran. Thus, I believe that maintaining and asserting publicly that military action is an option of last resort is the best hope we have for international security and peace. I have three main reasons for this view.

First, we are running out of both time and options. Diplomacy has failed. The Obama administration's commendable（值得表扬称赞的） efforts to reach out to Tehran for the past year have yielded no progress, as the Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, has acknowledged. Instead, Iran has had an additional year to continue enriching uranium and has grown impudent enough to dictate deadlines for negotiating to the international community. While there is still hope for a new round of sanctions against Iran, these would have to be both multilateral（多方面的多边的） in scope and much stricter than previous iterations（反复，重复，循环） in order to have any effect. Given continuing Russian reluctance, Chinese indifference and EU apprehension（忧虑，担心）, it seems unlikely that we will see internationally-backed（支持） biting sanctions soon, if at all.

Nor does the prospect of regime change strike me as a particularly likely solution to this problem. The Iranian government appears to have no compunction（内疚，后悔，懊悔） about using violence to quell（制止，结束，镇压) protests. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, in particular, has so insinuated itself into Iran's economic and political structures that it has greater financial incentive to maintain power by deadly force than to make political concessions. But even should the opposition somehow succeed in wresting power from the current regime(政治制度）, there has been no indication among some of its leaders that it would curtail（限制，缩短） Iran's nuclear programme. Whether a new regime would be friendly towards the West is questionable, and I fear that they certainly will not be nuclear-adverse.

Meanwhile, it is increasingly likely that Iran will be able to develop a nuclear weapon by the end of 2010, should it choose to do so. A series of reports by the Bipartisan（两党的，代表两党的） Policy Center, Meeting the Challenge, which I co-authored, make clear that given Iran's known nuclear capabilities at Natanz and its growing stockpile（屯聚的物资，大量储备） of low-enriched uranium（铀）, Tehran（德黑兰） could be in a position to begin constructing a nuclear weapon by as early as March of this year. This is the timetable that must drive our policy, and not consideration for when sanctions or regime change might materialise（使具体化，使有形）.

Second, we must be realistic about the positive role the military option can play in averting a nuclear weapons-capable Iran. Holding war games or deploying an additional battle carrier group to the area might do more than any sanction to persuade Tehran that continued intransigence is too dangerous. Moreover, without necessarily firing a single shot, the US Navy could blockade Iranian ports in support of any international sanctions.

Should such pressure prove insufficient, and only once all other policy options have been exhausted, the United States could and should launch a punishing strike against Iranian nuclear and military installations. Such an attack would mostly involve air assets not currently strained by operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. We would also derive significant advantages from the presence of US forces in countries that border Iran. At the same time, we would need to ensure that our regional allies have additional air, missile and coastal port defence capabilities as well as upgraded facilities and militaries, so as to protect key assets.

Air strikes may disclose（揭露说出表明） the previously unknown locations of Iranian facilities as Iranian forces move to protect them. The upcoming deployment of the Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) will give US air units additional ability to destroy nuclear sites buried underground. But even should those facilities resist sustained bombing, their entrances and exits will not.

We must, of course, be conscious of the major risks of military action. These include the possibility of US and allied casualties, galvanising(激起某人行动起来） Iranian support for the government, either direct or proxy Iranian retaliation, and unrest in the region, fomented by Iran.

It is also important to recognise that in order to be successful any military strike would require years of continued vigilance（警觉警界）. It is too late to eliminate Iran's nuclear know-how; any bombing campaign would only delay their nuclear development. Thus, we would have to retain the ability to strike previously undiscovered sites and to ensure that Iran does not revive its nuclear programme.

Third, we must weigh the risks of failing to stop Iran's nuclear programme. Should the Iranians acquire a nuclear weapon, or even the ability to quickly assemble one, Iran would dominate the Persian Gulf, threaten moderate Arab regimes, embolden radicals throughout the region, pose an existential threat to Israel and destabilise Iraq. Additionally, with an effective nuclear deterrent, Iran will be freer to sponsor terrorism, wage proxy warfare, derail the Middle East process and violently repress its burgeoning democratic movement.

On the other hand, if Israel, in an event to prevent the above coming to pass, chose to conduct a unilateral（单方面做出的，仅一方面影响的） military strike, it would alter the region's strategic landscape dramatically. Not only would such a strike be less effective than one led by the United States, it would yield widespread international condemnation—at least publicly—and could provoke Iranian retaliation against US interests and allies.

We all hope for a peaceful resolution of Iran's nuclear ambitions. But should we fail to reach one, a US-led military strike will be the least bad option available to us.

The opposition's opening remarks

The correct statement is that the world would be a safer place if Iran did not acquire a military nuclear capability. But bombing Iran's nuclear facilities is not going to achieve that goal, especially at this late stage of the game. It is with this in mind that I oppose the motion.

Military strikes can play a certain role in dealing with states' illegal military-directed nuclear programmes, but only when carried out at an early stage and preferably with the element of surprise. For this kind of nipping in the bud strategy to work, the nuclear programme must be limited in scope, so that serious damage can be achieved with a single blow. This is the essence of a pre-emptive military strike, as opposed to action that could easily become the prelude to war. In addition, predictions of the likely response of the attacked state must be taken into account by the attacking state, and assessed to be either of a very low probability, or entailing a minimal and/or acceptable degree of damage.

At the current stage of the international community's dealings with Iran, these conditions no longer exist. Military action will not eliminate the problem. With nuclear facilities spread throughout the country and Iran having prepared itself for years for this scenario by building up fortifications and defences, such a strike could at the very best delay the pace of its progress towards the bomb for a few years. And it would come at a relatively high price in terms of Iran's expected reaction; beyond the military response itself, it would open an account between Iran and whoever attacked it that would be very difficult to settle. Moreover, whether it was the United States or Israel that attacked Iran, the other would surely be implicated by Iran.

But there are additional reasons to reject the military approach. In conceptual terms, the major drawback of military attack as a tool of non-proliferation is that it focuses on denying capabilities, rather than altering states' motivations. Regardless of how successful a particular attack might be, it is less likely to become the basis for a long-term solution to the challenge posed by a determined proliferator than would be a negotiated bargain. We saw this in the case of Iraq. Israel's June 1981 attack on Osirak caused considerable damage and a serious setback to Iraq's nuclear programme, but did little to alter Iraq's basic motivation to acquire a military nuclear capability. Indeed, in the 1991 Gulf war it was revealed that Iraq was on the verge of achieving a military nuclear capability; in other words, its nuclear programme was delayed, but it remained motivated to achieve its goal, and continued working in that direction.

Tactically speaking, use of military force in the case of Iran could also backfire. While the goal of the attack would be not only to cause a setback in its programme, but to pressure Iran and put it on the defensive, Iran could easily use a limited attack on its facilities to advance its case. Because Iran consistently denies that it is working towards a military nuclear capability, if attacked it would use this in order to turn on the international community. Iran would accuse the United States and/or Israel of carrying out senseless acts of aggression when it is doing everything possible to cooperate with the international community.

Finally, there is an additional question of who would bomb? Would it be the United States? Israel? Practically speaking, there are no certain candidates for this job. Barack Obama has clarified that military action is not a realistic option, even though he continues to provide lip service to it by saying from time to time that all options are on the table. And while Israel might be more willing to carry out an attack on Iran's facilities, it is not clear whether it has the capability to do so, or whether it could or would act without a green light from the United States.

The reason military action might be considered for Iran at the present stage is that the diplomatic process has been unsuccessful. The problems encountered have been due both to Iran's demonstrated ability to consistently avoid serious discussion of its nuclear ambitions while gaining valuable time to press its nuclear program forward, and also to the lack of clear triggers for determined international action in the light of Iran's lack of compliance. Years went by without any meaningful response to Iran's defiance because international actors were skeptical of taking action before they identified a "smoking gun". With all the evidence now gained of Iran's military nuclear ambitions, the major players that have taken it upon themselves to intervene—from 2006 this has referred primarily to the P5+1 (US, Russia, France, UK and China, plus Germany)—are still not on the same page as far as their assessment of Iran. There are still different views of the stage Iran has achieved, the nature of the threat that it poses and to whom, and the best way to respond. Ongoing lack of unity and resolve on the part of the members of the international team facing Iran has played to its clear advantage.

Despair over the unsuccessful diplomatic efforts to curb Iran's nuclear ambitions so far has raised the perceived value of military action, but the best way to proceed is still diplomacy. What the diplomatic option needs, however, is a serious makeover. The United States needs to take the lead in this process and demonstrate its unwavering resolve, rather than allow Iran to dictate the pace and even content of the talks. The challenge for the United States is to move from simply embracing diplomacy to devising a coherent and focused strategy for carrying out what will no doubt be a difficult negotiation with Iran. But a negotiated settlement has the best prospect of improving regional conditions over the long term.