决战1010精英组Economist阅读汇——by nanfeng25899

nanfeng25899UID：2629871

这是我一次做这种帖子，不足之处请指正~~~~
由于文章很长所以把链接贴上来,看了看还是喜欢以前的一个关于Green Jobs的，下面是链接
http://www.economist.com/debate/overview/167

第二个主题的啦~~~
是一个关于GDP的文章的~~~，下面是链接
http://www.economist.com/debate/overview/171

并且把debate分为几个部分
About this debate
background reading
opening statements7 ?1 i. ?! P  V/ K; j
rebuttal statements2 O( A6 [( x" z3 a3 U6 }
guest0 x: O- c; Y4 [  X4 _# X9 U1 x
closing statements
decision   
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标记符号
好的单词，词组 黑色的解释是普通解释
好的句子和表达
例子






  C8 u6 U& j1 E( Q" K: U& b3 F

nanfeng25899UID：2629871

                                                          about this debate

Fighting climate changemeans transforming the energy infrastructure;transforming such a huge infrastructure requires the labour of a great manypeople; new sources of employment are particularlyappealing in a recession. Bringing together climate policy andemployment policy seems to some to offer a double whammy(n..沉重的打击), with more green jobs in a cleaner economy. But is this more than a cynical（GRE词汇：a.愤世嫉俗的）attempt to repackage(v.重新包装） climate measures that on their own do not appeal to votersand businesses by constraining business and distorting labour markets? Canthe interests of labour, capital and the environment ever really come together?

nanfeng25899UID：2629871

BACK GOUND

Hype about fuel cells

Flower power

A clean-tech start-up(n.创业) generates lots of excitement and a little electricity

Feb 25th 2010 | SAN FRANCISCO| From The Economist print edition

  “WE BELIEVE that we can have the same kind ofimpact on energy that the mobile phone had on communications.” So saysK.R. Sridhar, the boss of Bloom Energy, which on February 24th unveiled what itclaims is a revolutionary fuel cell. Thanks to such grandiose（GRE词汇：a.浮夸的）pronouncements and a vigorous public-relations blitz（n.闪电战）, the “Bloom Box”, as the company’s product has beendubbed, has attracted plenty of headlines. But there are good reasons for skepticisms（n.怀疑论）.

   That Bloom is now being promoted so loudly is hardly surprising. The firm,which has kept its work secret for the past eight years, has attracted a hefty（a.相当多的） $400mfrom venture capitalists, including some who bet on the Segway, a high-tech scooter（n.踏板车） that promised butfailed to change the world. A successfulinitial public offering or a sale to a strategic investor would allow Bloom’sbackers to reap a return on their investment. It would also give a fillip（n.刺激） to the clean-tech sector, at which Silicon Valley’s moneymenhave thrown billions of dollars in the hope of hitting a Google-like payday.

   Mr Sridhar paints a glowing picture of the potential of Bloom’stechnology, which uses a series of discs, made from zirconium oxide(n.氧化锆) and coated in special inks, to induce a chemicalreaction that turns natural gas, among other fuels, into electricity. This is more efficient, and therefore greener, than burninggas to generate electricity in a power plant and then transmitting it throughthe grid. The firm has produced some 100-kilowatt units for corporatecustomers, costing $700,000-800,000. But in five to ten years, Mr Sridhar says,it will be able to make smaller Bloom Boxes, designed to power single homes,for less than $3,000.

  That claim has raised eyebrows (to cause surprise or milddisapproval)
in the fuel-cell industry. Mr Sridhar believes his target is achievable because Bloom will reapeconomies of scale as it ramps (GRE词汇：v.加速) up production and because fuel-cell technology willimprove in leaps and bounds. But a host of other firms have been trying foryears to produce small cells cheaply. Andrew Neilson of Ceramic Fuel Cells,which has deals with several European utilities to develop domestic fuel cellsand has sold a few two-kilowatt units, points out that it is especiallydifficult to shrink all of the components needed to feed air and fuel to thecells and to extract energy from them.

   Generous state and federal subsidies for fuel cells should help Bloom sellto big businesses. Thanks to these, and to savings on its electricity bill,eBay, which is one of several companies that has been trying out Bloom Boxes,reckons its investment in them will pay for itself in three years. But manyfirms, including experienced manufacturers such as General Electric, have their eye on（v.关注） the corporatemarket, too—which helps explain, along with filings from car companies workingon fuel-cell batteries, why patents for fuel cells far exceed those for othersources of green power (see chart). Moreover, the moreoften subsidies are claimed, the less keen on them governments tend to become.

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Green jobs

Back to the City

Britain may get green jobs, but not the sort ministers promise

Jan 7th 2010 | From The Economist print edition

Bloomberg

BRUISED（v.挫伤） by the worst recession since the second world war, and staring glumly（adv.阴沉地） at a megalithic（adj.巨石的） national debt that their children will be repaying decades hence, few Britons are keen for finance to make up as big a slice of the national economy in the future as it has in the past. Politicians from all parties are keen to talk about new ways for Britain to earn a living.

One popular idea is to turn to greenery: Britain (like the rest of the world) must cut its emissions of greenhouse gases in any case, so it makes sense to profit from the endeavor. The claim that greenery is the future goes back to the fiscal-stimulus package launched by the government last year to revive the credit-crunched（adj.信用岌岌可危的） economy. Gordon Brown, the prime minister, was beating the drum (v.鼓吹) again in an interview on January 3rd, claiming that a “strong industrial strategy” would turn Britain into the world’s “leader in low-carbon industry”.

On the face of it（表面上看）, Britain ought to be attractive for budding green industrialists(v词组：培养绿色工业家). There is plenty of rain and wind for renewable-energy firms to play with, and a reasonably well-educated and scientifically literate workforce to build better batteries, turbines（n.涡轮机） and nuclear-power plants. In normal times finance is generally available. And ambitious targets to cut emissions ought to ensure a big market to sell into.

Yet out there in the real world of factories and small businesses, not much seems to be happening. The day after the prime minister’s interview, it emerged that, thanks to a dearth of British suppliers,

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A special report on climate change and the carbon economy

The green slump(GRE词汇：n.暴跌)

Why investors have been deserting clean energy

Dec 3rd 2009 | From The Economist print edition

THE slogan that BP adopted in 2000, “Beyond Petroleum”, was brilliantly unforgettable. It linked the company’s name with the bright, clean future which, the flower/sun logo implied, was to be found on the far side of fossil fuels. But that, as it turned out, was unfortunate, for the company is no longer hurrying towards those fresh green pastures.

BP insists that the role of renewable energy in its strategy has not changed, but admits that investment in it will fall from $1.4 billion in 2008 to between $500m and $1 billion this year. The company is selling some of its renewable-energy assets, including three wind farms in India, and has cut its solar-cell manufacturing capacity in Spain and America. The one renewable-energy source it still seems to be serious about is biofuels.

Shell, which also took a sizeable punt(n. the monetary pound of Ireland) on renewable energy, admits that its strategy has changed. Earlier this year its then chief executive, Jeroen van der Veer, said of wind, solar and hydrogen, “I don’t expect them to grow much at Shell from here.” Further investments in renewable energy, he said, would focus on biofuels. Linda Cook, who resigned in May as head of Shell’s gas and power business, said that wind and solar “struggle to compete with the other investment opportunities we have in our portfolio”.

Whereas policymakers have been scurrying from conference to conference to urge the world on towards a green future, investors have been walking away from it. For one businessman the attendance at the World Business Summit on Climate Change in Copenhagen in May said it all. “There was the usual raft of bigwigs (n. an important person)on the panel, but the audience was just hangers-on—journalists, PR people and so forth. There were no serious delegates there.”

The clean-energy business has had a hard year. Investment in the sector tanked in late 2008, as did share prices (see chart 2). Private equity and venture capital held up a little better, but not much. The beginning of 2009 was “scary”, according to Michael Liebreich, chief executive of New Energy Finance, a consultancy.

The industry suffered particularly badly in the credit crunch. Almost by definition, renewable energy sources have low running costs but high up-front (n.预先) costs. And because they are regulated assets with long-term pre-defined revenue streams, they are particularly suited to debt finance, and therefore tend to have high debt-to-equity ratios（n债务对股本比率）(typically 80-20). “When the project finance disappears, you’ve got a problem,” says Robert Clover, director of alternative-energy equity research at HSBC. He points out that some of the banks that suffered worst during the crisis—RBS, Lehman Brothers, Washington Mutual and Fortis—were also among the biggest in clean-energy finance.

As the flow of finance to electricity generators dried up, so did the orders to equipment manufacturers. Mr Clover reckons that wind-turbine manufacturers’ order books so far this year are down by 55-60% on the same period in 2008.

But the problem was not just the shortage and cost of capital. The credit crisis also revealed a basic problem with the clean-energy business. Fossil fuels are, in terms of the energy they store, remarkably inexpensive to get out of the ground and sell. That makes dirty industrial processes irresistibly cheap—so long as they are not required to cover the costs of the pollution they cause. Companies cannot be expected to abandon them unless they get a clear signal from consumers or governments that it is in their financial interest to do so. And they are not getting such a signal.

Public awareness of global warming picked up significantly about three years ago. Now most consumers claim to be concerned about it, and public concern is one reason why companies have been branding themselves green. Energy companies boasted of their diversification out of fossil fuels. Businesses with small carbon footprints, such as banks and retailers, promised to go carbon-neutral.

But consumers’ commitment to greenery is rather doubtful. There is a big market for organic products (though it has got smaller since the recession), but shoppers are more concerned about their families’ health than about the planet, and few are prepared to pay premium prices for green products. BA, for instance, has been offering carbon offsets with its flights for the past four years, but finds that only around 3% of customers buy them.

In the absence of pressure from consumers, governments need to give businesses a shove(GRE词汇：v 野蛮地或猛烈地推). That was the idea behind the Kyoto protocol, which aims to cut greenhouse-gas emissions by getting countries to accept binding targets with timetables attached. It divided the world into developed countries, which are required to cut their emissions, and developing countries, which are not. When rich countries ratify the protocol, they have to commit themselves to reducing their emissions by a certain percentage below a date of their choosing (mostly 1990)—Britain by 12.5%, Japan and Canada by 6%, and so on. The idea is that in order to meet these targets governments should introduce policies that send price signals to businesses to shift investment away from dirty products and processes to cleaner ones.

Global carbon-dioxide emissions have risen by 20% since the protocol was signed in 1997, so the plan has evidently not worked all that well. There are three main reasons for that. First, rich countries have exported some of their dirty industry to the developing world. Steel, cement, cars, fridges, computers, toasters, kettles and all the paraphernalia（n. 随身用品；贴身用品）of modern life the production of which used to cause pollution in developed countries are now made in China and other developing countries where emissions are not capped (v. 胜过，超过)—and have risen partly as a result of that shift.

Second, the world’s biggest emitter when Kyoto was signed, America, has not ratified the protocol, and the biggest polluter per person among countries with significant emissions, Australia, did so only two years ago.
It might reasonably be argued that the blame should fall on those countries’ governments, rather than on the treaty itself; but a treaty in which the most important parties play no part cannot be said to be a success.

Third, some countries have failed to cut their emissions as promised. In 2007 Canada’s emissions were 29% above their 1990 level and Spain’s 57%. But there is no need for them to miss their targets, thanks to the countries of the former Soviet Union. Their dirty industries collapsed during the 1990s, so they are awash（GRE词汇：被海水淹没的） with carbon credits that can be bought for a small consideration. Countries in danger of failing to meet their Kyoto targets can simply buy what is known in the industry as “Russian hot air”. As the 2012 deadline for meeting Kyoto targets approaches, there is a growing appetite for those meaningless credits.

Even in countries that have cut their emissions substantially, business is not always getting the right signals. Britain’s apparently creditable performance, for instance, is less the result of a well-designed policy than the “dash for gas” in the 1980s, spurred （v.刺激，激励）by the hostility to the coal industry of its then prime minister, Margaret Thatcher. Attempts to get a renewable-energy industry going have flopped（v.惨败）.

Britain is not alone in finding it hard to work out how to send business the right signals. Policies that are effective, efficient and politically palatable （GRE词汇: a. 美味的，愉快的） have proved elusive（GRE词汇：a. 逃避的，难捉摸的） everywhere.

nanfeng25899UID：2629871

Leaders

Wanted: green engineers

The world needs more of them, notes Oliver Morton

Nov 13th 2009 | From The World in 2010 print edition

Getty Images Isambard's kingdom to come

Regardless of the outcome of the Copenhagen conference in December 2009, one of the most pressing anti-climate-change needs will be the ability to get things done in 2010 and beyond. The commitments already made by some large economies require an extremely large capacity to get new energy systems in place quickly. That includes making sure that there are the people around to design and build them.

The infrastructure needed to make a large dent in the world’s emissions is daunting (GRE: a. 令人气馁的). What is unusual is not the scale of investment, but that much of it has to be spent on new capabilities. With the use of coal worldwide expected to double by 2030, for example, carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies will be crucial. The amount of pipelining（n. 管道；（信息）渠道）, geological surveying and chemical engineering needed for this is not unprecedented （GRE： a. 前所未有的） compared with what already exists in the oil, gas and mining industries. But it is vastly larger than today’s CCS capacity, and the people needed cannot just be borrowed from the current fossil-fuel industry.

The nuclear industry is also
bedeviled （v. 使痛苦）
by labour-force issues, at all skill levels. For the past few decades very few Western countries have been producing nuclear engineers; if the nuclear industry is to expand again, over the next decade it will need thousands of engineers who are at present nowhere to be found. And if the supply of expert engineers is tight for builders and operators, it will be tight for regulators, too—regulators who will be sorely (a. 剧烈地) needed if a new generation of nuclear-power plants is to enjoy, and deserve, public confidence.

Renewables do not face these issues in quite so pressing a form; the solar and wind industries reap the benefits of the production line in ways that nuclear and carbon-capture technologies, with their large installations, do not. This is one of the reasons that governments like renewables: they provide jobs. Retrofitting（v. 翻新，改进） homes for greater energy efficiency also offers this advantage on a large scale (which makes one wonder why it is not a higher priority). Even so the renewables sector will also be competing for designers and engineers.

To a large extent this is a market problem that markets can solve; if the demand is created, companies will find ways to get the work done. But there are some specific things that governments can do to help. One is to fund research with a strong emphasis on energy engineering and science. New breakthroughs, however welcome, are not the point here; though new technologies will be a boon （GRE：a .恩惠） in the 2030s and 2040s, the realities of large-scale change mean that, for the moment, energy transformation is a come-as-you-are party. But breakthroughs are not the only thing research produces. Nuclear engineers are scarce in part because there has been little ongoing research to captivate students.

The people needed cannot just be borrowed from the fossil-fuel industry

Another smart policy will be to re-examine the extent to which governments subsidize high-tech jobs in other industries, notably defense, tying up talent. There are a lot of opportunities in green technology for laid-off missile designers. A third idea, for those who can afford it, is to reap the benefits of the educational successes of other countries by importing people from places where many aspire to become, and qualify as, engineers.

Who wants to be an engineer?

And it would be nice to find ways to spread that aspiration more widely. In a number of countries (Britain is an example) engineering does not carry much cultural cachet（n. 优良品质）. A pride in the engineered past—remember Isambard Brunel—is accompanied by apathy towards the engineering of the present. It is neither fruitful nor desirable for governments to meddle（GRE: v.干涉） in broad cultural attitudes. But leaders of the environmental movement, and politicians, who aspire to such leadership, might do well to encourage the young to apply their idealism to their choice of career path.

It’s all very well to recycle, pester（v. 纠缠） your parents about fuel efficiency and aspire to holidays that need no flights. But the best thing a bright young person can do to help rid civilization of fossil fuels is get an education in engineering.

nanfeng25899UID：2629871

Business

Asia's green-tech rivals

Clean-energy competition in the region will be intense

Nov 13th 2009 | From The World in 2010 print edition
By Kenneth Cukier

The battle lines are being drawn in Asia over green technologies, as governments adapt their tradition of state influence on industry for an era in which eco-friendly products may spell export success. In China, Japan, South Korea and elsewhere, a big portion of fiscal-stimulus measures is dedicated to green projects. It is seen as a way to create new jobs, cut carbon emissions at home—and sell products abroad.

Globally, governments have budgeted as much as $500 billion for “Green New Deal” projects, estimates HSBC, a bank. Asia accounts for more than three-fifths of the total. Around 20% of this will have been spent by the end of 2009, with most of the rest to be lavished in 2010. Private capital is also pouring in.

Yet where the money is going varies across the region. Some countries are emphasising particular sectors (like solar power) or early-stage technology (such as fuel cells) with an eye towards building a future market. Other initiatives simply apply current technology to reduce domestic emissions (carbon-capture at power plants, for example). Only 15% of the spending is aimed at R&D, notes New Energy Finance, a market-research group.

China, by some measures, has the most ambitious policy. It has dedicated around $220 billion, or one-third of its overall fiscal stimulus, to projects such as wind, solar, hydropower and clean-coal technologies. This will help the country achieve its target of increasing the share of renewable energy to 10% by 2010.

In 2010 a generous subsidy will become available for low-emission cars in 13 big cities, including Beijing, Shanghai and Dalian. China will also subsidise 50-70% of the cost of large solar-power projects.

The emphasis on solar energy is as much a lifeline for floundering（GRE:V.挣扎） Chinese firms as it is an effort to reduce emissions. Without subsidies, solar is about four times more expensive than energy from the coal-powered grid. But Chinese firms have emerged as the biggest solar-panel producers in the world—almost all of it exported—just as the industry faces a massive supply glut（GRE: n .供大于求） that is forcing firms to close. By boosting domestic demand, China’s programme has the added goal of absorbing the excess supply, and helping the firms to live.

South Korea has made green technology a cornerstone(n.奠基石) of national policy. The budget, about $60 billion to be spent by 2012, is smaller than China’s but represents a whopping（a.巨大的） four-fifths of South Korea’s total stimulus package. In 2010 tax incentives, subsidies, credit guarantees and spending programmes will begin to be showered on everything from hybrid cars to fitting buildings with energy-efficient LED lighting.

The country plans to spend around 2% of its GDP on green tech through to 2013, to reduce emissions and spur（GRE: v.刺激，激励） a new export industry. Sandwiched（v.夹在中间） between China (with lower costs) and Japan (with superior technology), Korean manufacturers have much catching up to do in green-tech products. Bureaucrats hope to increase South Korea’s global market share in these technologies from 2% to 8% by 2013.

Japan has long been a green-tech pioneer. It has set aside $35 billion of its stimulus, about 6%, for green tech, in areas such as subsidies for residential solar projects. Its green stimulus is smaller than its neighbours’ as it already pours in funds from the regular budget: $22 billion for the environment and conservation in 2009, of which $7 billion was for clean energy including nuclear power. The new government has set ambitious targets for reducing carbon emissions. It also promises new spending in 2010 for low-emission cars and energy-efficient appliances.

Other Asian countries have green ambitions. Singapore has a war chest（n.筹措资金） of $450m and in 2010 it will build a 55-hectare (135-acre) clean-tech office park and fund a solar-power research institute. Taiwan plans to spend $1 billion over five years developing solar, LED-lighting and renewable-energy technologies.

Any colour you want so long as it’s...

What exactly counts as green technology? The figures include water and waste projects that are green, but not energy-related. Almost $100 billion of China’s stimulus is for energy-efficient rail transport—which may reduce emissions, but is ultimately just a train system.

Still, the focus on green tech is a natural evolution for Asia’s IT industries. LCD screens and semiconductor chips share the same materials and manufacturing processes as solar photo-voltaic（a.电流的，伏特的） cells; many factories have simply been converted from one to the other. The battery technology for electric cars applies the intellectual property that was developed for electronic gadgets.

Whether the bureaucrats can channel（v.引导） the public largesse efficiently is an open question. Since the immediate purpose is to pump-prime（v.刺激） the economy, the emphasis will be on dispensing the money rather than on the return on investment.

nanfeng25899UID：2629871

Solar power's bright future in Japan

Land of the rising subsidy

Japanese makers of solar panels are well placed to endure the present glut（GRE：n.供过于求）

Aug 27th 2009 | KAWASAKI | From The Economist print edition

  UNTIL five years ago Japan made around half of the world’s solar cells, thanks to its thirst for native energy and its expertise in the related fields of computer chips and flat screens for televisions. Sharp, which alone has made a quarter of all the solar cells ever produced, dominated the industry. But as solar technology matured and demand grew, new companies emerged, notably in China and Taiwan, eroding（GRE：v.侵蚀） Japanese firms’ share of the market to around 20%. Sharp slipped to fourth place among manufacturers in 2008, after Q-Cells of Germany, First Solar of America and Suntech of China.

  Factories have mushroomed（v.迅速增长） all over the world in recent years, on the assumption that subsidies and loans for solar power would continue to grow, along with the world economy. Chinese manufacturers’ share grew sixfold from 2004 to 2008, capturing more than one-third of the global market. This prompted fears that Japan’s strength in solar would go the way of computer chips and television screens, in which Japanese firms have lost their dominance over rivals from elsewhere in Asia.

  To avoid this fate, Japanese firms have concentrated on improving their technology and adjusting their business models. They have the most sophisticated kit（n.配套元件）, respected brands and healthy balance-sheets, notes Travis Bradford, president of the Prometheus Institute, a solar advocacy group. All this should spare them the worst amid the present solar glut. The entire industry’s sales are expected to be below 7,000 megawatts this year. That is roughly half of its capacity. The economic crisis has led to the cancellation of many big projects, and subsidies for solar power in Germany and Spain are being reduced.

  Excess supply has forced the prices of solar panels down by more than 40% this year. In Asia factories that recently cropped up（v词组：突然出现） are running at 40% of capacity, with a huge shakeout（n.淘汰） expected, explains Joe Boyce of Gaia Consulting. But Japanese makers are protected because they can manufacture cells less expensively than European firms and have better technology than Chinese ones. They are also sheltered in their home market, where customers prefer domestic products.

  Additionally, Japanese companies are following some American and European rivals into electricity generation. Sharp, for example, is negotiating a deal with Enel, Italy’s biggest power company, under which it will build solar panels for use in Enel’s solar-power plants. Enel will help to finance the panel factory and Sharp will take a stake in the plants. In March Mitsubishi, a large trading company, acquired 34% of Amper Central Solar, a power plant in Portugal. Showa Shell, an oil distributor and panel-maker, plans to enter the generation business with Saudi Aramco, Saudi Arabia’s state-owned oil giant.

  Many Japanese solar firms are in fact expanding. The country’s four biggest—Sharp, Kyocera, Sanyo and Mitsubishi Electric—are investing billions of dollars to double their production, at least, over the next three years. They expect an increase in demand owing to growing subsidies for renewable energy in America and Japan. The Japanese government reintroduced generous handouts for solar power this year. These had stopped in 2006, when it had seemed that the market could support itself. Between April and June domestic sales increased by 80% in volume, while sales elsewhere slumped（GRE:V.暴跌）. Goldman Sachs says solar sales in Japan may double next year if the Democratic Party of Japan, an opposition party with green policies, wins a general election on August 30th, which it is expected to do.

  At the Motosumiyoshi commuter-train station in Kawasaki, a suburb of Tokyo, sleek（a.光泽的） solar panels serve as an awning（GRE: n.遮阳篷，雨篷） over the platform. On a recent sweltering（GRE: a.酷热的） day, they were producing 33 kilowatts of electricity, equivalent to the consumption of 40 homes. The system supplies 15% of the energy used by the station, and avoids many tons of greenhouse-gas emissions annually.
As long as the state’s gravy-train（n.轻易赚大钱的机会） keeps running, solar power’s future is bright in the land of the rising sun.

nanfeng25899UID：2629871

这是最后一次的BACK GROUND 了，终于要进入讨论阶段了。。。

Clean energy in the Midwest

Greening the rustbelt（n.工业衰退地带）

In the shadow of the climate bill, the industrial Midwest begins to get ready

Aug 13th 2009 | TOLEDO, OHIO | From The Economist print edition

   XUNLIGHT CORPORATION, a small manufacturer of solar panels, sits on a quiet street in Toledo. It has a professor as its president, about 100 employees on its payroll—and a lot of bigwig（n.大亨） visitors. In October 2008 Sarah Palin, then the Republican vice-presidential candidate, used Xunlight as the setting for a speech on energy policy. Other guests have included Ohio’s governor, two senators and a congresswoman. And no wonder: the firm provided evidence to support a seductive hope, that the green economy can help to revive the suffering rustbelt.

   As the battle over a cap-and-trade（n. 总量管制和交易） bill continues in Congress, the industrial Midwest finds itself playing an awkward role. The climate bill offers two big opportunities, to reduce global warming and boost the green economy in the process. And nowhere are green jobs more loudly promoted than in the rustbelt. On August 5th Barack Obama and Joe Biden, his vice-president, travelled to Indiana and Michigan, two ailing swing（GRE: n.摇摆） states, to announce new grants to develop electric cars. But hopes for those new green jobs are matched by fears that traditional ones will be lost. With the Senate due to debate a cap-and-trade bill next month, the rustbelt and its politicians are at the heart of the battle.

   The industrial Midwest has long been in need of a renaissance（GRE:n.复兴）. Its factories have been losing jobs for decades, since long before the recession hit. Michigan, home to America’s biggest carmakers, had a 15.2% unemployment rate in June, compared with a national average of 9.5%.

   Green investment presents new hope. The University of Massachusetts, Amherst, and the Centre for American Progress, a think-tank, estimated in June that the federal stimulus package and a climate bill would spur（GRE: v.刺激，促进） about $150 billion in spending on clean energy each year for the next decade. That spending, in turn, would create an estimated 2.5m jobs, from academic researchers to factory workers making wind turbines. “This is an opportunity for American ingenuity to renew the manufacturing base,” argues Phyllis Cuttino of the Environment Group at the Pew Charitable Trusts.

   There are already signs of activity. The Great Lakes Wind Network, based in Ohio, helps local firms sell goods to the wind business. Toledo remains one of the best examples of a town moving from the old economy to a newer one. It has been a hub（GRE: n.中心） for the glass manufacturing since the 19th century. Thanks to innovations in solar technology at the University of Toledo, it is now home to a cluster of firms such as Xunlight. State grants continue to help the university hatch（GRE: v.孵化，这里引申为培养） companies. The Regional Growth Partnership, a local business group, provides venture capital.

   In Michigan despair has bred particularly bold action.
In the past five years Jennifer Granholm, the Democratic governor, has dangled（GRE: v. to hold out as an inducement）
more than $1 billion to attract alternative-energy firms, with about $700m in tax credits to develop electric-car batteries. Impressively, Michigan had the third-highest number of clean-tech patents from 1999 to 2008, behind only California and New York, reckons Pew. That number may rise. Last year Michigan passed a requirement for power companies to boost efficiency, along with an order that renewable sources account for 10% of the state’s electricity by 2015. Investments from the federal stimulus will help too. In the share-out on August 5th, Michigan won more grants for electric cars than any other state.

   Nevertheless, the clean-energy economy remains small. Though green jobs are increasing in number, they accounted for only 0.6% of jobs in Ohio in 2007, according to Pew. The shares in Michigan and Indiana were even smaller, at 0.4% and 0.5% respectively. Manufacturing, for all its troubles, is a behemoth(n.巨物) in comparison, accounting for 14% of employment in Ohio, 15% in Michigan and 18% in Indiana in 2007. And it is a dirty giant, dependent on cheap coal. The Midwest emits an outsize share of carbon, according to a report from the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Indiana is one of the worst offenders, spewing（v.喷出） out 4% of America’s carbon emissions in 2007 though it is home to only 2% of its population.

The fear is that a cap-and-trade bill may expand a promising new sector but devastate a struggling, larger one. Mitch Daniels, the Republican governor of Indiana, has worked hard to maintain his state’s manufacturing base. A price on carbon, he argues, would threaten it.

   The version of cap-and-trade passed in June by the House was meant to appease（GRE：v平息，安抚） such critics. It includes help for manufacturers eager to retool for new industries. Allowances would be given away, not auctioned. And at the urging of a congressman from Michigan, the bill would, from 2020, tax imports from countries that do not restrict emissions. But some Democrats are still wary. Three of Indiana’s five House Democrats voted against the bill.

   Now a tough battle looms（GRE:v. 隐约出现 ） in the Senate. A new report from the Energy Information Administration (EIA) forecasts that the House bill would depress industrial shipments by 1% between 2012 and 2030 (see chart). But that assumes a quick expansion of nuclear plants, which is unlikely. In the EIA’s worst-case scenario, shipments would drop 3.2%. “They’re huckstering,” huffs George Voinovich, Ohio’s Republican senator, of the green enthusiasts. He wants more support for nuclear power and fears the House bill will transfer wealth from the heartland. On August 6th ten of Mr Voinovich’s Democratic colleagues, including six from the Midwest, wrote to Mr Obama fretting (GRE: v.（使）烦躁，焦虑，担心) that a bill would cripple manufacturing industry.

   But in Toledo Xunlight’s president, Xunming Deng, looks forward to a cap-and-trade bill. “Of course there is a cost, but this is an investment for our economy, for our future,” he says. There remains a danger, however, that compromise will produce a clunker（n.失败） of a bill—one that does little to slow climate change, little to revive the old economy and little to boost a new one. Much now depends on a handful of the states in the heartland.

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                                      Opening

The moderator's opening remarks

Mar 9th 2010 | Oliver Morton

Given the long-term and in some cases rather intangible benefits of environmental prudence（GRE：n.谨慎）, people arguing for measures that will reduce global warming and bring about other desirable but distant ends tend to look for near-term benefits, too. Unsurprisingly, in a recession and its aftermath, jobs have recently had pride of place on that benefit list. As Nancy Pelosi put it when defending the cap-and-trade bill on greenhouse emissions which passed the House of Representatives last year, the American people should be glad of such legislation for four reasons: "jobs, jobs, jobs and jobs".


Leaving aside(不考虑) the possibility that some Americans might be glad of such legislation because it stands a chance of reducing carbon-dioxide emissions, how much of a real reason for joy are those green jobs?


That government investment, subsidy and regulation can produce green jobs is not in any doubt. No one would have built a solar power industry in Germany on the basis of its sizzling noon-day sun. The fact that Germany now has such an industry, with tens of thousands of people employed in it, is an act of fiat（GRE：n.评语）. So is most, though not all, of the rest of Germany's renewable energy sector, which now employs more than a quarter of a million people. A similar story can be told about Spanish renewable energy. The American renewables energy lobby is endlessly keen to point out how many jobs rely on its turbines, ethanol refineries and the like.

The question is whether those jobs represent a net benefit, or whether they are being created at the expense of other jobs elsewhere in the economy. Green jobs created by government intervention have opportunity costs（n.机会成本）, in that some part of the money used to provide or promote them might otherwise have created jobs in some other sector. There is also the risk of jobs being counted as created by government intervention when they would have been created anyway, thus inflating assessments of the effectiveness of the policy.

These problems should not lead to the conclusion that a green jobs policy is necessarily foolish. It is quite possible for policies to serve different ends at the same time: the creation of the US freeway system in the 1950s and 1960s was to some extent seen as a case in point, providing economic benefits and defence benefits—the ability to move equipment quickly and easily—at the same time (the programme is still known officially as the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways). Synergies(n协同作用) and possibilities for leverage do exist in the world, and policymakers may be able to spot and use them. But those who claim to be doing so have an obligation to explain carefully the evidence for believing that their approach really will produce net benefits.


It is not for moderators to specify too closely the terms of the debate, but it may be useful to point out that the motion, and in particular its key word "sensible", can be read in a more economic context or a more political context. In terms of economics, the key issue is efficiency: do the policies increase net employment at justifiable costs? Politically, things may be a little less well defined.

Does green investment allow specific sorts of jobs to be created in a way that has social value, for example, in a particular area? Is it right to allow employment outcomes to influence the choice between types of green policy? It would hardly be unreasonable if, given two policy options with equivalent environmental benefits, it might make political sense to go with the one that had clearly defined employment benefits too. But what about the risk that the green jobs associated with a programme might in time come to outweigh its actual greenery? In such cases you can end up with a non-green jobs programme benefiting from unjustified subsidies that are hard to get rid of.


These are some of the issues that I look forward to hearing our debaters, and you their audience, weigh in on over the next few days.

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The proposer's opening remarks

The private sector—not the government—can and must be the main driver in creating green jobs. The scale of the transition to cleaner, lower-carbon energy sources is simply too large for public-sector resources and programmes to tackle alone. Only by a tidal wave of private investment, innovation, invention and entrepreneurship can get the job done.

But that wave will never rise unless the government becomes a constructive partner in the effort. Therefore, it is perfectly sensible for national governments to aspire to create policies that produce green jobs.

After all, John Doerr, a leading light of Silicon Valley who knows a thing or two about innovation and technology, having placed early bets on Sun Microsystems and a little company called Google, has gone so far as to call clean energy "the largest economic opportunity of the 21st century".

The benefits of moving toward clean energy are potentially sweeping(a.广泛的，凶猛的): helping to restore infrastructure, rebuild neighbourhoods, retool factories and ignite innovation. Additionally, energy security, climate stabilization, pollution reduction and expanded economic opportunity are all legitimate aims for policymakers to pursue.

Critics of green jobs recoil（GRE：v （因害怕或厌恶而）退却，退缩）at the notion that governments might somehow tamper(GRE: v. 干预)with the natural energy market to promote renewables. They sniff and generate a host of objections to market-distorting mandates(n.命令) and wasteful subsidies. But energy markets are already the product of policy, mainly those that support incumbent （GRE：adj 有义务的；在职的）energy sources like coal, oil and nuclear power. These incumbent technologies benefit from subsidies, regulatory structures that shut out distributed generation of renewable power and pricing schemes that undervalue the economic contributions of energy efficiency.

The critics conveniently ignore the truth that all forms of energy are heavily regulated and often subsidised. This is because energy is the lifeblood of the economy. The precise mix of energy sources being developed and deployed （GRE：v.部署）within a country is never the result of pure market forces, but always a result of both private and public choices. It reflects a mix of innovation and investment on the one side, and of regulation, taxation and subsidy on the other.

Because we place no value on our atmosphere, the market acting alone cannot achieve the public interest in a stable climate and human health. Therefore, the question is not whether we will pursue policies to shape energy markets, but what sort of energy markets we want to achieve. It is sensible for governments to enact policies that will maximize the use of clean, renewable and low-carbon energy sources within and beyond their borders.

Public policies are now necessary to correct existing market failures and put clean energy on an even playing field with fossil fuels; to establish the market certainty that businesses need to make long-term investment decisions; and to provide stable, long-term support for clean-energy research, development and deployment, just as they have done in the past for the medical, aeronautical and information technology sectors.

Public investment is also required to bring the ageing electrical and transportation infrastructure that powers（v.给。。。提供动力）
our industries and facilitates commerce into the 21st century, and to ramp up
（提高）workforce and manufacturing infrastructure to meet the enormous new demands for goods and services that will result from new clean-energy markets.

Furthermore, governments will need to go beyond a simple cap-and-trade system for global warming pollution. Renewable energy standards and codes for energy efficiency will help build markets. Green banks and new financing tools will use public underwriting（n.保险业） to help unleash（GRE：v.解开，释放） private capital. And public investments in infrastructure will create a platform for innovative businesses to thrive and hire more workers.

In this context, policy is not a restraint on trade. It is a driver of innovation.

Fortunately, this approach has a proud and successful history. We can look to the history of the United States for good examples of what is possible. From the Tennessee Valley Authority and rural electrification, to the interstate highway system, to the telecom revolution, new investments in transformative infrastructure have consistently opened up access and opportunity, and brought more people into the middle class. The internet didn't just create jobs for software engineers; it created work installing fibre optic cable. It created new office jobs in information technology and new career ladders into skilled professions.

Given this aspect of American history, it is ironic that the United States is falling behind in the global race for clean energy. Doubly so, given that the United States invented many of the key technologies that will power future growth, from solar panels, to advanced lithium （n.锂）ion batteries, to the modern wind turbine.

America's economic competitors in Asia and Europe see the opportunity and are driving hard to secure competitive advantage. China by some estimates invested $400 billion of public and private capital in clean energy just last year.

Given the global competition to dominate clean energy production, one need not believe that green jobs are a panacea to believe that pursuing them is smart and sensible.

After all, practically everything that is good for energy independence or the environment will create a job—a green job. Solar panels don't put themselves up. Wind turbines don't manufacture themselves. Homes don't retrofit（v.改进） or upgrade themselves. The smart grid won't install itself, nor will bullet trains lay their own tracks. In many places, trees don't even plant themselves any more.

To argue against green jobs is to argue for government inaction or abdication (n. 退位，辞职)on some of the biggest challenges of our time. That is not acceptable.

Great and mighty labours are required of humanity in the new century. To mitigate climate chaos and avoid economy-wrecking energy shortages, workers must repower, rewire and retrofit whole nations. As men and women step forward to achieve these ends and accomplish these tasks, their hard-hats (n.安全帽)—in many cases—will be green.

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comments
The author mailnly demostrates his opinion in three parts.
Firstly,he express that only with the pubilc support  can those green policies function more efficiently.And public policies are now necessary to correct existing market failures.
Secondly,he cite that governments will need to go beyond a simple cap-and-trade system for global warming pollution.In this way, the policy will be the driver of innovation.
Finally,the fierce competition and the positive prospect of US clear market.By the vivid metaphor in the last paragraph,we can see that he believe this policy is a sensible decision of the government.

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The opposition's opening remarks

Governments should not try to choose technological winners and losers and so they should not promote "green" (or "red" or "purple") jobs. Instead, we should leave that to the marketplace. Here's why.

No clear definition of "green"

While the phrase "green jobs" evokes organic farmers and wind turbine repairmen, there is no clear, common definition of what a "green" job is. Without one, special-interest lobbying will transform even well-intentioned programmes. Consider corn-based ethanol, a technology with no redeeming（a.补偿的） features. Corn-based ethanol is bad for the environment, placing unsustainable demands on water supplies and increasing harmful farming practices. It is bad for people, raising corn prices for some of the world's poorest people. It provides little, if any, environmental benefit, with a net energy gain often close to or even below zero (the exact amount depends on the weather during the growing season, among other things). Yet corn-based ethanol has received billions in taxpayer support and continues to be favoured in so-called "green" energy legislation.

The ethanol problem is no accident. Such programmes draw special interests as picnics draw ants. Beneficiaries of federal largesse, such as Archers Daniels Midland, lobby to divert public money for their benefit while Iowa corn interests ensure that presidential candidates pledge fealty(GRE: n.效忠) to ethanol before the Iowa caucuses. This support comes at a high price for ordinary Americans: a Cato Institute study found that every dollar of ADM's ethanol profits costs taxpayers $30. Despite these problems, federal policy has promoted ethanol as a "green" technology for years. Many environmentalists now disclaim corn-based ethanol but, because it has been promoted as an example of the federal government's ability to pick green technology, they bear the burden of showing why their current proposals will not yield the same results. Before we can be sure that a "green" jobs proposal is going to improve environmental quality, we need to know how those promoting it plan to avoid the problem of politics diverting public resources into corporate welfare.

There are also deep disagreements over definitions that need to be settled in order to have a rational allocation of public resources. For example, is nuclear power "green"? If you care about greenhouse gas emissions, it is one of the best technologies available for power generation. If you worry about the long-term disposal of radioactive waste, it isn't. Which concern is more important? Who decides? Green jobs proponents are all over the map on this. The Obama administration is currently promoting certain nuclear subsidies as a "green" investment; the US Conference of Mayors counts existing nuclear facilities as "green" but not new ones; most environmental groups do not consider nuclear power "green" at all. These questions are not just theoretical.

Proponents want to allocate billions in public resources based on someone's categorisation of some things as "green" and some as not. The most basic principles of transparency in government, a theme in Barack Obama's campaign for president, require that we settle such issues before we turn over the keys to the Treasury.

Proponents haven't done their homework

Physicians follow a principle of "First, do no harm". Governments would do well to follow the same. Before governments act on the scale that green jobs proponents propose, we need evidence that the action at least won't hurt the economy. I'd give an "F" mark to all of the major studies supporting green jobs programmes if a student turned them in for an undergraduate economics class. They do not conform to the basic principles of policy analysis.

First, virtually none of the analyses supporting green jobs programmes make calculations of net jobs. Shifting power generation from coal to solar undoubtedly boosts employment in solar energy but it also reduces employment in coal industries. Since solar power is more costly than coal power, the increase in energy prices wipes out jobs in other industries. If their employment effects are a reason to support these programmes, we need to know that the expenditures will actually create more new jobs than they destroy.

Second, most proponents use a technique called input-output analysis. This technique requires three assumptions: (1) constant factor prices; (2) constant coefficients production; and (3) a jobs multiplier greater than one. Neither of the first two applies to disruptive technological changes like shifting the mix of energy production and radically changing energy prices. There is almost no evidence to support the third and many reasons to doubt its validity. I have written at length elsewhere about these methodological flaws, but the point is essentially "garbage in, garbage out". We cannot trust the estimates of the benefits because they were done incorrectly. Just as you would not make an investment based on the calculations of an accountant who cannot add, we should not spend billions of dollars based on economic predictions from forecasters who do not know their craft or practise it with sleights of hand.

Let the market decide

We know how to improve energy efficiency, develop new technologies and create new jobs: unleash entrepreneurs and take advantage of markets to solve what the Nobel Prize winning economist Friedrich Hayek called "the knowledge problem". Put simply, Hayek's point, on this issue, is that we do not know enough to plan on the grand scale green jobs that proponents propose.

Consider energy. In 1870, coal heated people's homes, natural gas provided light, electricity had little practical application and gasoline was a waste product from kerosene（n.煤油）
refining. The great energy policy debates of that era were concerned with whether the world would run short of coal. No one in 1870 would have predicted that coal would become almost entirely an industrial fuel in plentiful supply, that natural gas would be used primarily to generate electricity and provide residential heat, that electricity would be in widespread use in homes and industry, or that gasoline would become an expensive commodity. We know as little about our energy future as our predecessors did about theirs and so we must put a premium（n.奖金） on strategies that can adapt to new information, circumstances and ideas. That is what entrepreneurs do best. We should let them do it.

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Audience participation

Comments from the floor.

Featured guest

Robert N. Stavins

In the January 12th 2009 issue of The New Yorker, Elizabeth Kolbert wrote an article called "Greening the Ghetto: Can a Remedy Serve for Both Global Warming and Poverty?"  The following passage appeared in the article:

When I presented [Van] Jones's arguments to Robert Stavins, a professor of business and government at Harvard who studies the economics of environmental regulation, he offered the following analogy: "Let's say I want to have a dinner party. It's important that I cook dinner, and I'd also like to take a shower before the guests arrive. You might think, well, it would be really efficient for me to cook dinner in the shower. But it turns out that if I try that I'm not going to get very clean and it's not going to be a very good dinner. And that is an illustration of the fact that it is not always best to try to address two challenges with what in the policy world we call a single policy instrument.

That brief quote generated a considerable amount of commentary on the internet, much of it negative and some of it downright hostile. This surprised me, because I didn't consider the proposition（n.论点，主张） to be controversial, and I had chosen my words carefully, simply stating that "it is not always best to try to address two challenges with … a single policy instrument". Two activities, each with a sensible purpose, can be very effective if done separately, but sometimes combining them means that one does a poor job with one, the other, or even both.

In the policy world, such dual-purpose policy instruments are sometimes a good, even great idea (gasoline/petrol taxes are an example), but other times, they are not. Whether trying to kill two birds with one stone makes sense depends upon the proximity of the birds, the weapon being used and the accuracy of the stoner. In the real world of important policy challenges, such as environmental degradation and economic recession, these are empirical questions and need to be examined case by case, which was my point in the brief quote above.

In 1990, when the US Congress sought to cut sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions from coal-fired power plants by 50% to reduce acid rain, Senator Robert Byrd (West Virginia) argued against the proposal for a national cap-and-trade system, because it would displace Appalachian coal-mining jobs through reduced demand for high-sulphur coal. He recommended instead a national requirement for all plants to install scrubbers（n.an apparatus for removing impurities）, which would have increased costs nationally by $1 billion per year in perpetuity.

Fortunately, the late Senator Ted Kennedy (Massachusetts) recognised that these two problems (acid rain and displaced miners) called for two separate policy instruments. Simultaneous with the passage of the Clean Air Act amendments of 1990, which established the path-breaking SO2 allowance trading programme, Congress passed a job training and compensation initiative for Appalachian coal miners, at a one-time cost of $250 million. Acid rain was cut by 50%, $1 billion per year in perpetuity(n,永久) was saved for the economy, and sensible and meaningful aid was provided to the displaced miners. Two different policies were used to address two different purposes. Sometimes that is the wisest course.

What about two current challenges: concern about the environment, in particular global climate change, on the one hand, and the need to revitalise economies, on the other hand? Can "green jobs" be the answer to both?

Will economic stimulus packages, properly designed, lead to job creation in the short term? Yes, but to some degree this will be by moving forward in time the date of job creation, as opposed to creating additional jobs in the long run. Of course, at a time of recession and high unemployment, that can be a sensible thing to do. So, by expanding economic activity, an economic stimulus package can surely create jobs, green or otherwise, in the short term.

But will a stimulus package, such as subsidies for renewable energy, create net jobs from the change in the nature of economic activity? The key question here is whether the encouraged economic activities in green sectors are more labour-intensive than the discouraged economic activities in other sectors, such as with a shift to renewables from fossil fuels.

This is considerably less clear, but there are cases where it is likely to be valid. Solar rooftop installation, for example, is labour-intensive. And the greatest consistency between economic stimulus and greening the economy is within the energy-efficiency realm, in particular, activities such as the weatherisation of homes and businesses (President Obama's cash-for-caulkers initiative comes to mind). Such projects are highly labour-intensive, can be done relatively quickly and will save energy. (Note, however, that the US Department of Energy is having considerable trouble spending the stimulus money fast enough.) And, importantly, they will reduce the long-term cost of meeting climate objectives.

But some other areas, such as new green infrastructure, will happen much more slowly, partly because of NIMBY ("not in my backyard") problems, and so are much less consistent with the purpose of economic stimulus. An example of the challenge is presented by the current interest in expanding and improving the US electricity grid.

A more interlinked and better grid is needed for increased reliance on renewable energy sources, which will be needed to address climate change. First, greater use of renewable resources will require an expanded grid just to transmit electricity from wind-power sources in the Great Plains, for example, to cities with high demand for power. And, second, this will also require the use of a so-called "smart grid", so that greater reliance on intermittent（GRE: a.间歇的） sources of electricity, such as from wind farms, can be balanced with cuts in consumer demand when power is scarce.

But the timing of grid expansion, important for the use of renewables and achieving climate goals, is not coincident with the appropriate timing of the economic stimulus. As was reported in an article last year in the New York Times ("Hurdles (Not Financial Ones) Await Electric Grid Update," January 7th 2009, p. A11), the CEO of the American Transmission Company, which operates in four midwestern states, said that the firm's most recent major project, a 200-mile transmission line from Minnesota to Wisconsin, took two years to build, but eight years prior to that to win the necessary permits.

Likewise, an article by Peter Behr in Climate Wire ("Green Power Express line gets derailed（a.出轨的） by patchwork grid rules", February 12th 2009, p. 1) focused on the dilemma facing ITC Holdings, the nation's largest independent electric transmission company, which has been seeking permission from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to build a line to bring wind power from the Great Plains to the Midwest and East. The company's chairman and CEO, Joseph Welch, indicated that a greater hurdle than the necessary money or "even the ever-present citizen opposition to new transmission projects" is a set of rules for interstate transmission lines that effectively prohibits projects that are not immediately required to maintain the grid's reliability. A project intended to provide future green power does not meet the test.

These are just two examples of the unpleasant reality of the pace of investment and change in this important category of green infrastructure frequently talked about in the context of quick economic stimulus. Surely, economic recovery, increased reliance on renewable sources of energy and a smarter, interconnected grid are all important. But that does not mean they are best addressed with a single policy instrument: the economic stimulus package.

So, the strongest support for green job creation is with regard to economic expansion, as opposed to changes in the economy (which is why China is able to "green its economy" as it rapidly expands). Of course, the key economic question remains whether even more jobs would be created with a different sort of expansion. In any event, while we seek to expand economic activity through economic stimulus, it can make sense to try to reduce any tendency to lock in new capital stock that would make it more difficult and costly to achieve long-term environmental goals. But that is very different from claiming that all substitution of green activities for brown activities creates jobs in the long term.

As governments use economic stimulus to expand economic activity, they can and should tilt（GRE：v.倾斜） the expansion in a green direction. But rather than a "broad-brush green painting of the stimulus", this may call for some careful, selective, and well thought through "green tinting（v.着色）".

Addressing the worst economic recession in generations calls for the most effective economic stimulus that can be devised, not some stimulus that is diminished in effectiveness through excessive bells and whistles meant to address a myriad of other (legitimate) social concerns. And, likewise, getting serious about global climate change will require the enactment and implementation of meaningful, dedicated climate policies. These are two serious but different policy problems, and they call for two serious, carefully crafted（v.手工制作） policy responses.

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Commentary:
    This article is well-presented and well-reasoned by the metaphors, detailed examples and its  logical statement.
    At the beginning of this guest’ statement, we can clearly see that his view to this topic, from the vivid metaphors about dinner party and hunting issue, is that it’s really unwise to address the two different and serious problems by one policy.
    Then, he gives us an illustration about in1990 the solution of the SO2 and unemployment, which is to large extent similar to current dilemma, to show that the two specific policies to tackle two problems are sometimes wiser.
     By this example, the guest gives rise to the question: can the “green jobs” answer to the both? No. In order to strengthen his claim, two precedents are cited , the electricity grid and ITC Holdings’ dilemma.
     In the end, he comes into the conclusion that the strongest support for green job creation is with regard to economic expansion, as opposed to changes in the economy, and the key question is still whether we can create more jobs finally.