自己翻译的一些经济学时评

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我自己从一些主流经济学媒体上摘录些文章翻译出来，贴上来和大家分享，并希望就其中的不当之处(用黑体标出来)，和大家一起讨论，共同提高。

注：英文原文的版权均归其各自的著作权人所有；转载请注明出处，请勿用作商业用途。

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No Rest
未到休息时
Legal torment continues for leading investment firms
对顶尖投资银行的法律煎熬还在继续

These are quiet times on Wall Street—except for lawyers at top investment banks. Even cases that seemed closed refuse to lie down. Three categories of litigation, concerning equity research, Enron and the allocation of initial public offerings (IPOs) during the boom, have had lawyers working all hours.
华尔街现在正处于宁静时期－除了那些顶尖投行的律师们。即使是那些看起来已经了结的案子也不能让人安心。有三个领域的诉讼让律师们穷于应付，它们是：股权研究，安然事件和经济繁荣时期进行的首次公开发行（IPOs）的（股票）分配。

Consider first the charge that Wall Street analysts puffed shares that their investment-banking colleagues were trying to flog. In December, Eliot Spitzer, New York, state’s attorney-general, proudly announced a settlement, worth $1.4 billion, with Wall Street firms. Yet many issues were left unresolved—such as the exact crimes to which the firm would confess. Negotiations have been continuing ever since. The point, for the investment banks, is to limit their exposure to civil suits.
我们先来看看第一项指控：那些华尔街分析员过分鼓吹了其在投行的那些同僚所极力推销的股票。在12月份，纽约州首席检察官Eliot Spitzer骄傲的宣布了一项对华尔街公司价值14以美元的（处罚）决定。但是还有很多事项悬而未决－例如这些公司要承认的确切的罪名。谈判一直还在进行。对于这些投资银行来说，关键是要将他们的曝光限制在民事诉讼范围内。

The latest leaks from the investigation say that Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse First Boston and Citigroup will be found guilty of fraud. If so, it will place a huge burden on their defense in civil case. The investment banks are also attempting to stop Mr. Spitzer publishing all the internal documents he has subpoenaed. These were to have been released in early January, so the banks may have some hope. Mr. Spitzer has offered no reason for the delay. Eager plaintiff attorneys are no doubt pressing for a fast resolution.
调查中最新透漏出来的消息说，美林、瑞信一波和花旗集团将被发现犯有欺诈罪。如果确实如此，这将会给他们在民事诉讼中的辩护带来巨大压力。这些投资银行同时也试图组织Spitzer先生发表所有他调查取证的那些内部文件。这些文件应该在一月份早些时候就公布，所以这些投行还有一些希望。Spitzer没有说明延迟公布的原因。毫无疑问，迫不及待的起诉人律师积极推进此事以求得一个尽快的判决。

The primary target for civil suits will be Citigroup, if only because it has the most money. In an effort to simplify the litigation already filed, a federal judge in lower Manhattan has consolidated 77 lawsuits against Citigroup into nine. They allege that it provided conflicted advice to investors in WorldCom and Global Crossing, among other failed companies.
民事诉讼的主要目标将会是花旗集团，仅仅是因为它的钱最多。为了简化已经登记在案的诉讼，下曼哈顿的一个联邦法官将针对花旗集团的77个案件合并为9个。他们指控花旗集团在世通、环电以及其它倒闭的公司上给投资者提供了自相矛盾的建议。

Second comes Enron. Litigation with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) over investment banks’ involvement with the collapsed energy firm is being sorted out. On February 20th Merill Lynch agreed to pay $80m for its part in two Enron transactions. J.P. Morgan Chase and Citigroup are also said to be nearing a settlement. Each has put aside more than $1 billion to cover Enron-related costs—although, as with the research question, the big costs may come from civil suits.
第二类问题是有关安然的。向证监会（SEC）提出的诉讼指控这些投行卷入了这家倒闭的能源公司，目前这些诉讼情况逐渐明朗。在2月20号美林公司同意为其参与的两项安然公司的交易支付8000万美元的处罚。据说摩根大通和花旗集团也可能会遭到处罚。每一家（投行）都已拨备了超过10亿美元以支付与安然相关的事件的费用－尽管如此，和“股权研究问题”一样，最大的费用可能还是来自于民事诉讼。

Finally there are IPOs. On February 19th, another federal judge ruled that civil suits may proceed against Wall Street firms for their role in the IPOs of 300 technology companies between 1998 and 2000. The banks, wrote the judge, had a “coherent scheme to defraud investors”, which suggests that even higher litigation provisions may be needed. Meanwhile, the SEC is looking at whether several banks, notably J.P. Morgan, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, allocated shares in IPOs in return for promise to buy more shares in the aftermarket－－in effect, to support the price. The case will somehow have to distinguish the proper management of an offering from market manipulation.
最后一项问题是IPO。在2月19号，另一位联邦法官裁定华尔街银行可能会因为他们在1998年到2000年之间的300家高科技公司的IPO中的扮演的角色而接受民事指控。这位法官写到：这些银行“合谋欺骗投资者”，这表明可能需要（适用）更高的诉讼条款。同时，证监会正在调查几家银行，特别是J.P. 摩根、高盛和摩根斯坦利等是否在IPO中分配（接受）股票以作为承诺在二级市场上买入更多股票的回报—买入股票的目的是支持股票价格。在这个案件中必须要区分正当的股票发行运作和市场操纵。

The most perverse outcome of the investigations is its impact on investment research. Top analysts have been leaving Wall street by the dozen, most of them helped through the door with a firm push. Without subsidies from investment-banking fees, research budgets are being crushed; there is little money for stars. Institutions have turned to research boutiques for advice. Unfortunately, these firms rarely cater for retail customers, the supposed beneficiaries of the crusade. Was this really the intended result?

这些调查的最负面的结果是其对投资研究的影响。顶尖的分析员已经在成批的离开华尔街了，他们中的大多数人借助于公司资助来开展工作。没有了投资银行在费用上的资助，研究预算都成了泡影；明星分析员也没有什么钱。大的研究机构变成了研究小作坊。不幸的是，这些公司很少去投合中小投资者的需要，而中小投资者才是这项改革运动预期中的受益者。这真是人们想要的结果吗？

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Optimists—or just Dreamers?
乐观者－还是梦想家?
摘自《英语世界》2003年第2期

Economic forecasters may be deluding themselves if they are counting on a quick, strong recovery.

经济预测家如果在指望经济快速强劲的回复，可能只是自欺欺人。

We need to avoid the nostalgia factor— a longing for the late, lamented economic boom that clouds out vision and corrodes our judgment. People understandably yearn to return to the good old days of the late 1990s. It won’t happen any time soon, and those who suggest it might are engaging in wishful thinking. They’re telling us what we want to hear. There’s a lot of that these days. When economic forecasts are flying furiously, it’s important to grasp their limits.

我们需要避免一种怀旧的因素蒙蔽了我们的视线并影响我们的判断－一种对过去的 、依依不舍的经济繁荣的渴望。人们希望回到上个世纪90年代末的好时光，这是可以理解的。这样的日子不会很快到来，那些抱有这种看法的人也只是心存幻想而已。他们在告诉我们所希望听的。目前关于那些好时光的言论满天飞。当经济预测者说话不着边际的时候，对其言论中的局限之处进行剖析十分重要。

If you believe the conventional wisdom -- which seems reflected in the stock market’s recent rise — the recession is almost over. The Blue Chip Economic Indicators, a news letter, surveys 53 forecasters and finds that about 70 percent think the recession will end no later than April. The latest average forecast predicts 0.4 percent growth in the gross domestic product (the economy’s output) in the present quarter. By the fourth quarter, GDP should expand at a respectable 3.9 percent annual rate. Could happen. But if it does, it will be luck as much as anything else.

如果你相信传统的智慧－看起来反映了股票市场最近的上涨－衰退几乎结束。蓝筹股指数，一份新闻组，调查了53个预测家并且发现大约70％的人认为衰退已经结束或者不会晚于四月份结束。最新的平均预测是本季度GDP（经济产出）增长0.4％。到第四个季度，GDP将会显著的增加到年增长率3.9%。如果确实如此，那将是天大的幸事。

Truth be told, most economists don’t really understand this peculiar recession especially well. We know this because most of them didn’t predict it, which wasn’t surprising, because most didn’t understand the preceding boom, either. They constantly underestimated its strength and only belatedly recognized that some of its powerful driving forces – extravagant investment in new technologies, widespread stock-market speculation – were not altogether good. Forecasters’ recent record has been dismal.

老实说，大多数经济学家并没有很好的理解这场不一般的经济衰退。我们知道确实如此，因为他们没有预测到他，这并不奇怪，因为他们也没有预测到此前的增长。持续低估其强度，并且后知的认识到其强大的驱动力－过分的投资于新技术，广泛扩张的股票市场投机－也不好。预测家近期的表现乏善可陈。

Let’s look back, In January 1996 the average Blue Chip forecast was that GDP would increase 2.2 percent that year. The actual increase was 3.6 percent. Here are the January predictions and actual outcomes for the next four years: 1997, 2.3 percent versus 4.4 percent; 1998, 2.5 percent versus 4.3 percent; 1999, 2.4 percent versus 4.1 percent. You might say that these are minor mistakes, just a few percentage points. But the ecomomy usually grows between 2 and 4 percent a year. To have value. a forecast must be closer to the actual numbers. Forecasters were missing GDP growth by as much as 48 percent.

让我们回顾一下。在1996年1月平均的蓝筹预测事当年GDP将会增长2.2％。实际的增长是3.6％。以下是接下来四年的一月份预测和当年的实际结果：1997年，2.3% 对应于4.4％；1998年，2.5％对应于4.3%；1999年，2.4%对应于4.1%；2000年，3.6%对应于4.1%。你也许会说这是很小的错误，只是几个百分点而已。但是一年的经济增长通常在2%和4%之间。为了得到这个值，经济预测家必须更接近于实际数字。预测家大约错失（低估）了多达48%的GDP增长。

If you didn’t understand the boom, why would you better understand the bust? No obvious reason.

如果你不理解经济增长，你又如何能更好地理解经济崩溃呢？没有明显的理由。

A year ago, the Blue Chip consensus saw 2.6 percent GDP growth fore 2001. The actural figure will be about 1 percent or maybe less. But if Semptember 11 – something no economist could have predicted – caused the recession, don’t forecasters have an excuse? This defense sounds better than it is. Although September 11 worsened the economy, the recession had already started. The National Bureau of Economic Research  (a group of academic economists) dates the onset to early spring.

一年以前，蓝筹一致预测2001年GDP增长为2.6％。实际数字是大约1％或者更少。但是如果是911—一些经济学家无法预测的事情—导致经济衰退，预测家不是有了接口了吗？这个辩护的借口听起来比他更好。虽然911使经济状况恶化，但是实际上衰退已经开始了。国家经济研究局（一个学术经济学家的团体）认为开始从春天早些时候就开始了。

All this suggests that you should treat the present recovery forecasts with skepticism. The standard post-World War II recession has followed a familiar pattern: (a) while the economy is expanding, inflation rises; (b) to dampen inflation, the Federal Reserve increase interest rates; (c) as the economy slows, businesses develop unwanted inventories (excess supplies of unsold goods); (d) to reduce inventories, companies cut production and lay off workers; (e) higher inventories and unemployment cause price and wage increases – a.k.a. inflation – to subside; (f) the Fed then trim the interest rate and the economy recovers. The process usually takes less than a year. Since World War II, the average recession has lasted 11 months.

所有这些都说明你都应该用怀疑主义的态度来对待当前的经济恢复预测。标准的战后衰退通常有着下面熟悉的模式：（a）经济扩张时，通货膨胀增加；（b）为了降低通胀，联邦储备委员会提高利率；（c）当经济增长放慢时，商业发展不需要存货（未售货品的多余供应）；（d）为了减少存货，公司削减生产和裁减员工；（e）更高的存活和失业率，因为价格和薪酬增加－又叫通胀－平息；（f）联储降低利息并且经济开始复苏。这个过程通常不到一年时间。自从第二次世界大战以来，衰退过程平均为时11个月左右。

By this schedule, the recession must nearly be over. It stared almost a year ago. Time fore recovery. Unfortunately, this recession didn’t follow the familiar pattern. True, inflation did rise (very slightly) in 1999 and 2000, and the Fed did increase interest rates beginning in mid-1999. But the economy’s main problems weren’t – and aren’t – inflation and excess inventories, which could be speedily remedied.

根据这个时间表，衰退过程已经接近尾声。它大约从一年前开始。复兴时间。不幸的是，这场衰退并不遵循熟悉的模式。实际上，通胀的确在1999年和2000年上升了（非常轻微），并且美联储的确自从1999年中增加了利率。但是经济的主要问题－通胀和过多的存货－没有—现在还没有得到解决，这些问题本应该被快速的解决。

The economic euphoria of the late 1990scaused consumers to go on a spending spree and businesses to go on an investment binge – and the rest of the world fed off the American boom. Consumers spent by skimping on savings borrowing heavily or cashing in stock profits. At year-end 2001 consumer debt payments were a near-record 14.3 percent of disposable personal incomes, according to Moody’s Investors Service. Similarly, excessive corporate investment has left enormous unused factory capacity. According to the Fed, the surplus is greater than at any time since 1983.

1990年代末的经济辉煌导致消费者持续的消费奢靡和商业在投资上的无节制－世界的其他部分无法消化美国的经济热潮。消费者通过节俭存储、大额贷款和套现股票利润进行消费。根据穆迪投资者服务的统计数据，到2001年底，消费者应付帐款达到了接近记录的可支配个人收入的14.3％。相似的，无节制的公司投资留下了巨大的无用的加工能力。根据美联储的统计，剩余能力超过了1983年以来的任何时候。

What’s now occurring is a period of “payback”. Corporate investment dropped during 2001. In early 2000 consumer spending grew at an annual rate of 5.9 percent; by the third quarter of 2001 the gain was a meager 1 percent. This twin retrenchment represents a huge drag on the economy that spills into other sectors. Corporate profits have already plunged. State and local government spending will suffer at tax revenues falter. Nor is the rest of the world helping. Japan is in recession; Europe is in ore near one. Argentina just defaulted on its debt; many developing economies are weakening.

现在所发生的是一种“偿债”。公司投资在2001年期间回落。在2000年早些时候，消费者话费以5.9％的年率增加；到2001年第三季度末，收获为微不足道的1%。这个孪生节省的表明了一个巨大的对经济的拖动滑入了其他部分。公司利润已经跳水。联邦和本地政府开支将受累于税收的减少。世界的其他部分也无能为力。日本正处于衰退；欧洲也是或者接近于衰退。阿根廷正深陷于债务泥塘，很多发展中经济也正在变得衰弱。

It’s easy to sympathize with forecasters. So many unfamiliar forces are now tugging at the economy that a coherent outlook is hard, maybe impossible. No one truly knows what will happen – especially, how long it will take consumers and business to recover from their recent frenzied spending, and how the economy will react to the Fed’s interest-rate in 2001.

人们很容易和预测家产生共鸣。所以很多不明的力量正拖拉于经济使得连续性的预测变得困难，也许是不可能。没有人能真正知道会发生什么－特别是，需要多久消费者和商业才能从他们狂热的消费后果中恢复过来，以及经济将会对美联储2001年的利率削减计划作出怎样的反应。

But the forecasters crank out their numbers, and there’s tendency to see the recession simply as a brief and unpleasant interruption to unspoiled prosperity。 This may be too glib。 The central reason economists misinterpreted the 1990s boom was that they assumed that the economy would follow historical patterns。 It didn’t. If economists repeate their error – and they may be doing just that – then they will be surprised, probably unpleasantly, by the pattern of recession and recovery. And that could be bad news for us all.

但是预测家迅速的说出他们的数字，并且有一种倾向将衰退简单的视为一个短暂的不受欢迎的对没有受到损害的繁荣的一个小插曲。这可能是太不严肃的。经济学家未能解释1990年代经济繁荣的中心原因是他们假定经济将会遵循历史的图案。它没有。如果经济学家重复他们的错误，－并且他们可能正在那样做－那么到衰退和复兴完成的时候，他们将会感到吃惊，也许是不快。而这对我们大家都是一个坏消息。

bleazersUID: 131627

支持,看了很有益处

paisleyUID: 64183

WOW! thank you so much !!!!

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McCurrencies

麦当劳货币

原文出处：The Economist April 26th, 2003, page 67

Hamburgers should be an essential part of every economist’s diet
汉堡包应该是每一个经济学家饮食的基本组成部分。
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The past year has been one to relish for fans of burgernomics. Last April The Economist’s Big Mac index flashed a strong sell sign for the dollar: it was more overvalued than at any time in the index’s history. The dollar has since flipped, falling by 12% in trade-weighted terms.
过去的一年令汉堡包经济学的拥护者十分高兴。去年四月份《经济学人》杂志的巨无霸汉堡指数曾显示了强烈的沽出美元的信号：美元比该指数历史上的任何时期都要高估了。之后美元果然开始跳水，按照贸易加权（汇率）口径下跌了12％。

Invented in 1986 as a light-hearted guide to whether currencies are at their “correct” level, burgernomics is based on the theory of purchasing-power parity (PPP). This says that, in the long run, exchange rates should move toward rates that would equalise the prices of an identical basket of goods and services in any two countries. To put it simply: a dollar should buy the same everywhere. Our basket is a McDonald’s Big Mac, produced locally to roughly the same recipe in 118 countries. The Big Mac PPP is the exchange rate that would leave burgers costing the same as in America. Comparing the PPP with the actual rate is one test of whether a currency is undervalued or overvalued.
汉堡包经济学发明于1986年，（最初是）作为一种轻松的指导（来评价）货币是否处于其“正确”的水平，汉堡包经济学是基于购买力平价（PPP）理论。该理论指出，在一个较长的时间段内，任何两国之间的汇率应该朝着某一方向移动，从而使得在两国购买等量的货物和服务的价格相等。简而言之，一美元在任何地方应该能够买到同样的东西。我们的计量单位就是麦当劳的巨无霸汉堡包，它在118个国家均本地化生产，其配方大致相同。巨无霸购买力平价是一种能够让（某国的）汉堡包与美国的价格相同的汇率。将该PPP与实际汇率进行比较，可以检验一国汇率是否被高估或者低估。

The first column of the table shows local-currency prices of a Big Mac. The second converts them into dollars. The average price of a Big Mac in four American cities is $2.71. The cheapest burgers are in China ($1.20); the dearest are in Switzerland ($4.52). In other words, the yuan is the most undervalued currency, the Swiss franc the most overvalued. The third column calculates Big Mac PPPs. Diveding the local Chinese price by the American price gives a dollar PPP of 3.65 yuan. The actural exchange rate is 8.28 yuan, implying that the Chinese currency is undervalued by 56% against the dollar. The average price of a Big Mac in the euro area is now exactly the same as in America. This implies that the euro’s PPP is exactly $1, so at its current rate of $1.10 the euro is 10% overvalued. The British, Swedish and Danish currencies are still significantly overvalued against the euro.
附表的的第一列显示了一个巨无霸在当地的货币价格。第二列将其转换为美元。在美国四个城市的巨无霸的平均价格是$2.71。最便宜的巨无霸在中国（$1.20）；最贵的在瑞士（$4.52）。换句话说，人民币是价值最被低估的货币，瑞士法郎是最被高估的。第三列是巨无霸购买力平价。将中国价格除以美国价格得到1美元的购买力平价是3.65元。而美元的实际汇率是8.28元，这表明中国的货币对美元大约被低估了56％。现在巨无霸在欧元地区的平均价格与在美国的价格完全相同。这表明欧元的购买力评价恰好是1美元，所以以当前$1.10的汇率计算，欧元被高估了10%。英国、瑞典和丹麦的货币对欧元的汇率更是被显著高估。

Among rich economies, the most undervalued currency is the Australian dollar. The Aussie dollar is still 31% below PPP against its American counterpart: its rise over the past year has been largely offset by a fall in the relative price of burgers in Australia. Many emerging-market currencies are undervalued against the dollar by 30-50%. One exception is the South Korean won, which is exactly at its PPP, implying that it is overvalued against other emerging-market currencies.
在富有的经济体中，最被低估的货币是澳元。与美元相比澳元仍然比其购买力平价低了31％：其在过去一年的上涨被相应汉堡包在澳大利亚价格的下降大大抵消了。很多新兴市场国家的货币与美元相比被低估了30-50％。但是南朝鲜的韩元则是一个例外，它（的汇率）正好在其购买力平价上，表明它相对其他新兴市场国家的货币被高估了。

Many readers complain that burgernomics is hard to swallow. We admit its flawed: Big Macs are not traded across borders as the PPP theory demands, and prices are distorted by taxes, tariffs, different profit margins and differences in the cost of non-tradables, such as rents. It was never intended as a precise predictor of currency movements, but as a tool to make exchange-rate theory more digestible. Yet in the early 1990s, just before the crisis in Europe’s exchange-rate mechanism, it signaled that several currencies, including sterling, were markedly overvalued against the D-mark. It also predicted the fall in the euro after its launch in 1999.
很多读者抱怨说汉堡包经济学难以令人接受。我们承认它的确存在瑕疵：巨无霸并不像购买力平价理论要求的那样（可以）跨国交易，并且其价格被税收、关税、不同的利润以及不可贸易成本，例如租金所扭曲。我们从来没有将其作为一个精确的货币运动的标志，而是作为一个使汇率理论更容易理解的工具。尽管如此，在上个世纪90年代早起，就在欧洲汇率体系危机的前夕，它预报了几种货币的（波动），包括英镑对德国马克的显著高估。它也预测了在1999年欧元启动后的下跌。

Academic economists are taking burgernomics more seriously, chewing over the Big Mac index in almost a dozen studies. Now a whole book has been written about the index* by Li Lian Ong, of the International Monetary Fund. She says it has been surprisingly accurate in tracking exchange rates in the long term. But there are some persistent deviations from PPP. In particular, emerging-market currencies are consistengly undervalued.

经济学家更严肃的对待汉堡包经济学，在很多研究中仔细咀嚼这个巨无霸指数的意义。现在，国际货币基金组织的专家Li Lian One 为此专门写了一本书。她说该指数在长期范围内令人惊讶的准确记录了汇率。但是它与PPP之间有一些稳定的偏差。特别是新兴国家市场的货币被持续低估。

Differences in productivity are one explanation of this. Rich countries have higher productivity than poor countries, but their advantage tends to be smaller in non-traderble goods and services than in tradables. Because wages are the same in both sectors, non-tradables are cheaper in poorer countries. Therefore, if currencies are determined by the relative prices of tradables, but PPP is calculated from a basket that includes non-tradables, such as the Big Mac, the currencies of poor countries will always look undervalued. Ms Ong finds that currency deviations from PPP are indeed related to productivity differences relative to America. After adjusting for this, she finds that the Big Mac index performs better in tracking exchange rates.

生产力之间的差异是对此的一个解释。富国比穷国具有更高生产力，但是他们在不可贸易货物和服务上的优势比起在可贸易的上面要小。因为，在上述两个领域工资水平是相同的，而不可贸易货物在穷国更便宜。因此，如果货币是由可贸易货物与服务的相对价格来决定的，但是由于购买力平价是根据单位不可贸易货物，如巨无霸来计算的，穷国的货币显得总是被低估了。Ms Ong发现，货币与PPP之间的偏差实际上与相对美国的生产力差异相关。在调整了这一项之后，她发现巨无霸指数能够更好的记录汇率。

The Big Mac index suggests that the dollar is no longer overvalued against the euro. But having overshot PPP, the dollar may well now undershoot, because American’s huge current-account deficit is becoming harder to finance. Without stronger domestic demand in Japan and Europe to help trim the deficit, the dollar will have to take more of the strain. What are this year’s other hot tips? The Australian dollar is likely to see the biggest gain. The pound will fall further against the euro. And China will come under increasing pressure to revalue the yuan.

巨无霸指数暗示了美元对欧元已经不再被高估了。实际上由于其购买力平价已经得到了提升了，美元可能已经被大大的低估了，因为美国已经开始难以承担数额巨大的经常帐户赤字。如果没有日本和欧洲更强的国内需求来填平这个赤字的话，美元可能会承受更大的（升值）压力。今年还有哪些其他的热点呢？澳元似乎会成为最大的赢家。英镑对欧元将会进一步下跌。而中国面临逐渐增加的重新估值（升值）压力。

二师兄UID: 118950

When Globalization Suffers, The Poor Take The Heat
当全球化受阻时，穷人将会首当其冲

By Gary S. Becker , From Business Week, April 21, 2003, Economic Viewpoint

（Gary S. Becker，1992年诺贝尔经济学奖得主，在芝加哥大学任教，胡佛经济研究所高级研究员，《商业周刊》专栏作家）

LESS HELP: As hostilities hinder trade, investment, and foreign students’ ability to study abroad, living standards could plummet
于己无益：随着反对力量阻止贸易、投资和外国的学生出国学习，他们的生活水平可能会一落千丈

The War on terrorism – and the rupture in the Western alliance produced by the Iraqi war – might sharply slow down the international movement of capital and people for an extended period. This will please the more extreme critics of globalization and immigration, but it will greatly reduce the opportunities fore poor nations to grow out of poverty.

对恐怖主义的战争－以及由于伊拉克战争而导致的西方国家联盟的破裂－可能会急剧的减缓扩张时期国际资本和人员的流动。这可能会让那些对全球化和移民持批评态度的人感到高兴，但是它同时也会减少穷国摆脱贫穷的机会。

The expansion in trade and the movements of people among nations was unusually rapid during the past half-century. World trade in goods and services grew by over 5% per year, the international flow of capital also accelerated, and the number of students from poor nations studying in the U.S., Europe, and Japan grew remarkably.

在过去半个世纪中，贸易的扩张和国家之间的人员流动异乎寻常的快。世界货物与服务贸易以每年5％的速度增长，国际间资本流动也在加速，同时穷国在美国、欧洲以及日本留学的人数也有显著增长。

As a result of this movement toward an integrated world economy, global income grew at its fastest rate in recorded history. World population more than doubled from 1950 to the end of the 20th century. Yet real per capita income grew, on average, by about 2% per year around the world.

作为这项世界经济紧密结合的结果，全球收入以历史上最快的速度增长。从1950年到20世纪结束，世界人口增长了超过一倍。但是，全球人均实际收入仍然以平均每年2％的速度增长。

Not all poor nations had much growth over this 50-year period; many of the African nations, the ex-communist bloc, and some Asian nations lagged far behind. But on the whole, the per capita gross domestic product of poorer nations grew about as fast as that of richer nations, while populations in the less developed world grew much more rapidly.

不是所有的穷国在过去50年中都有这么高的增长；很多非洲国家，前共产主义国家和一些亚洲国家被远远的甩在了后面。但是整体看来，穷国的GDP增长速度与富国相当，但是其人口增长则要快得多。

Economist Xavier Sala-i-Martin of Columbia University has shown that inequality in world incomes declined sharply since the mid-1970s. The decline in income inequality among individuals was much faster than among countries, in part because China and, to a lesser extent, India—two nations with about a third of the world’s population – grew very rapidly. But there was also a narrowing of world inequality beyond the impressive performance of these huge nations.

哥伦比亚大学的经济学家Xavier Sala-i-Martin（的研究）显示，自二十世纪七十年代以来，世界上收入之间的不平等已经大大降低了。个人之间收入不平等下降的速度比国家之间的要快的多，这部分是因为中国、稍微次要一点的是印度－这两个国家的人口大约占世界人口的三分之一－收入增长的非常快。但是在这些表现令人印象深刻的大国之外，世界上仍然还存在收入不平等（，虽然其范围正在缩小但仍未消除）。

Without carefully examining the statistics, some critics of the effects of globalization on the world’s poor claim that the number of families living on less than $1 or $2 a day basically remained the same during the past 50 years .Yet it is harder than often recognized to measure the well-being of the world’s poorest, since most of them live on farms and get much of their incomes from the food they grow, the clothing they make, and the houses they build themselves. Still, using official data from the World Bank and the U.N., Sala-i-Martin’s study shows that the fraction of the world’s population living at less than $2 a day fell by about 20 percentage points during the past three decades.

有一些批评家在谈及全球化对世界贫穷的影响的时候并没有仔细的检查统计数据，他们宣称：在过去五十年中，日收入在1美元或者2美元的家庭数目并没有减少。并且，衡量世界上最贫穷的人的福利比通常想象的要更为困难：因为他们居住在田庄里，并且其主要收入来自于他们自己种植的食物、制作的衣服以及建造的房屋。尽管如此，Sala-i-Martin还是利用世界银行和联合国官方的数据进行了研究，其结果表明，在过去三十年中，世界上日收入在2美元以下的家庭人口数量下降了大约20个百分点。

Income measures do not do full justice to the extent of the improvement in the world’s poor, for they take no account of advances in life expectancy and general health. Populations in the less developed world grew fast mainly because they used knowledge gained from the West to produce rapid declines in mortality. As a consequence, the world gap in life expectancy narrowed considerably, despite the raging AIDS epidemic in Africa. My study with two colleagues shows that world inequality declined even more rapidly after national income accounts are adjusted for the greater declines in mortality rates in poorer nations.

从收入水平来衡量并不能完全公允的反映在消除世界贫穷上所取得的进步，因为他们没有包括预期寿命和日常健康上所取得的进步。（现在）在欠发达地区人口迅速增长，因为他们利用了从西方学习到的知识大幅度降低了死亡率。其结果就是，世界上（不同国家之间的）预期寿命差距大大缩小，这并不包括在非洲流行的艾滋病。我和两个同事的研究表明，如果在国民收入帐户上考虑修正穷国的死亡率大幅降低的因素，世界上的不平等减少的幅度更大。

It is telling evidence of the benefits of globalization that not a single poorer nation that was isolated from the global economic community, including the Soviet Union and China while they had rigid communist regimes, raised their per capita incomes very much during that time. The poor nations that benefited from the world division of labor initially concentrated production on a few simple goods, which they traded for the high-quality goods that are produced by advanced nations.

没有一个独立于全球经济的国家，包括共产主义政体下的苏联和中国，在当时大幅了提高他们的人均收入，这（从反面）证明了全球化的好处。从世界劳动分工中获益的穷国一开始是生产一些简单的货物，并以此与发达国家生产的高质量货物进行贸易。

These undeveloped nations also imported large amounts of capital to help their agriculture and their expansion of industrial production. Many of these nations also sent large numbers of students to the U.S. and else where to study science, engineering, medicine, and other technical subjects. Some of these students stayed abroad to work and often to prosper, but many came back with the knowledge they gained in the advanced nations.

这些发展中国家也吸收了大量资本来改善其农业状况和扩张工业生产力。很多发展中国家还派遣大量学生前往美国和其他地方学习科学、工程、医药以及其他技术。这些学生中有些人留在了国外工作并取得了（人生的）成功，但是很多也带着他们在发达国家学习到的知识回国。

It is the international movement of people and of capital that is put in greatest jeopardy by events of the past few years. Owners of capital are reluctant to invest in developing nations when there is great uncertainty caused by war and terrorism. Rich countries are less willing to admit young make students and immigrants to study and work, especially those from Muslim nations or other countries with known hostility and resentment toward the U.S. and other Western nations.

过去两年发生的事件将国际间人员和资本的流动置于最危险的境地。当发展中国家存在着由于战争和恐怖主义导致的不确定性的时候，资本拥有者就不愿意在当地投资。富国也不大愿意允许（国外的）年轻人入境学习和工作，特别是那些来自于穆斯林国家或者其他对于美国等西方国家怀有敌意和怨恨的国家。

The anti-globalization movement may get its wish for a breakdown in the world economic order because of sharp reductions in the international movement of capital and people due to terrorism and a more divided West. But the biggest losers will be not the relatively rich members of the G7 countries but rather the nations that want to extricate the mass of their populations from extreme poverty and disease.

反对全球化的运动可能会得偿所愿，这是因为，恐怖主义和西方世界阵营的分化使得国际间资本和人员的流动大为减少，而这将导致世界经济秩序的崩溃。但是最大的输家不是G7工业国中相对较富的国家，而是那些想将其众多人口从贫穷和疾病中解脱出来的国家。

二师兄UID: 118950

在上文的标题中，Heat应该是“压力”、“不好的后果”的意思。

M-W Collegiate说：
Heat:
2 a : intensity of feeling or reaction : PASSION  b : the height or stress of an action or condition *in the heat of battle*

另外，Heat作为俚语也有“警察”的意思。

Al Pacino和 Robert Del Nino主演的Heat(《盗火线》)，是我最喜爱的影片之一。其中有场景是一个劫匪训斥他的同伴：你...将会引来更多的警察(extra heat)。

二师兄UID: 118950

索性多翻几篇，其实比较潦草,主要目的是增强自己对英文的理解能力。
有些句子用黑体标出来是我对原文的意思把握不准的地方，大家给点指导吧！ :-)

二师兄UID: 118950

Finding your niche

找准你的位置

The Economist March 1st 2003 p70


When developing countries turn to economists for advice on trade, they are usually pointed towards David Ricardo. According to his law of comparative advantage, formulated some 190 years ago, countries should specialize in whatever they are best at producing, leaving their trading partners to provide everything else. In Ricardo’s illustrative model, the answers were clear: Portugal, blessed with a fine climate, should cultivate wine; England, blessed with capitalists, should manufacture cloth. The Portuguese gained from importing English cloth (even if they could make it more efficiently) because it freed them to concentrate on wine. As for the English, even the most ardent mercantilist would rather they left viniculture to others.

当发展中国家向经济学家寻求关于贸易的建议的时候，他们通常都会想到大卫 李嘉图。根据李嘉图190年前阐述的的相对优势定律，一个国家应该专注生产于他们做的最好的一种物品，而将所有其他的物品留给其贸易伙伴来做。在李嘉图描述的模型中，答案非常清楚。具有得天独厚的好气候的葡萄牙，应该从事酿酒；而资本充足的英国应该专注于织布。葡萄牙能从进口英国布匹中获益（即使他们自己做的效率更高），因为这使他们能够专心酿酒。至于英国，即使是最热心的重商主义者也宁可将葡萄种植和酿造留给别人。

But if a country’s God-given advantages were clear to Ricardo, they are less so in modern practice. Capital is mobile across borders, and the gifts of nature count for little now that manufacturing eclipses agriculture in world trade. A country’s place in the global economy seems neither predestined nor predictable. As Ricardo Hausmann and Dani Rodrik, two economics at Harvard University, put it in a recent paper*, economic development is a haphazard process of  “self-discovery”. Comparative advantage is almost impossible to spot in advance.

如果说一个国家的先天优势在李嘉图看来还是很清楚的，那么在现代实践中则不尽如此。现在资本可以跨国流动，并且由于工业的重要性大大超过了农业从而使得自然禀赋显得不那么重要。一国在全球经济中的地位既无法事先注定也不好事先预测。正如哈佛大学的两位经济学家Ricardo Hausmann 和Dani Rodrik在其最近的一篇论文中写道的：经济发展是一个“自我发现”的偶然过程。（我们）几乎无法事先察觉（一国的）比较优势。

Bangladesh, for example, is good at exporting hats, having sold $175m-worth to American in 2000. At one level this is not surprising. Bangladesh is overcrowded and underserved by capital; much of its arable land is periodically under water. As any economist could tell you, it therefore has a comparative advantage in labour-intensive manufactures. But why does Bangladesh specialize in hats rather than, say, bed-sheets? And why did Pakistan, a country with a similar mix of land, labour and capital, export $130m-worth of bed-sheets to America in 2000 but a mere $700,000-worth of that?

以孟加拉为例，她擅长于出口帽子，在2000年对美国出口的帽子价值为1.75亿美元。从某种程度上来说，这合乎情理。孟加拉人口稠密，资金匮乏；其很多可耕地周期性遭洪水淹没。正如很多经济学家可以指出的那样：孟加拉因而在劳动密集型制造业上具有相对优势。但是为什么孟加拉专事于帽子而不是别的物品呢，比如说，床单？为什么土地、劳动力和资金情况大致相似的巴基斯坦，在2000年的时候对美国出口了大约1.3亿美元的床单而只出口了70万美元的帽子呢？

Mr. Hausmann and Mr. Rodrik cite many examples of countries that have happened upon a lucrative export niche – cut flowers from Colombia, software from India, footballs from Pakistan – to which raw factor endowments give only the roughest of guides. Nothing written by Ricardo, or by anybody theorizing since, could have told a budding Bangladeshi entrepreneur to make hats rather than bed-sheets.

Hausmann和Rodrik引用了很多碰巧在某些方面有出口优势的国家的例子，例如哥伦比亚的鲜花收割，印度的软件，巴基斯坦的足球，她们的原料要素禀赋都只能提供一个再粗略不过的原因解释。李嘉图，或者自从该理论形成以来的任何人都不能够解释为什么还在萌芽状态的孟加拉企业家选择了制造帽子而不是床单。

Sometimes governments try to force the issue. In 1896 Japan’s rulers deemed that their country should have a steel industry to match the best in Europe. Imperial say-so substituted for economic know-how, but met with little success. The government went to great lengths to replicate European technology, importing German engineers, machines and designs. Only after a steel mill had been built did it become apparent that German mills could not run on Japanese coke.

有时候政府试图对这些事务施加影响。1896年日本统治者认为他们的国家应该拥有钢铁工业好与当时欧洲最强的国家并驾齐驱。皇室意志取代了经济上的专门技术（的地位），但是鲜有成功。政府花了大力气来复制欧洲的技术、进口德国的工程师、机器和设计。在轧钢机被造出来之后，人们才恍然大悟的发现：日本的煤炭燃料并不适合于德国的轧钢机。

Performing the hat-trick

大玩“帽子戏法”

Neither economists nor emperors can be relied upon to pick winners. The best bet is entrepreneurial trial and error. Messrs Hausmann and Rodrik build a theoretical model in which businessmen in a poor country can choose either to invest in a traditional domestic industry or to diversify into a modern industry in which there is no local history of expertise. The costs of production in the traditional industry are well-known; costs in the new industry are not. Entrepreneurs discover these costs only after they have sunk money into the project. Their investments are, in effect, industrial-scale experiments. Profitable or not, they reveal a country’s strengths and weaknesses.

在决定发展哪种行业上经济学家和皇帝陛下都靠不住。最好的抉择还是靠企业来尝试（和犯错误）。Hausmann和Rodrik两位先生建立了一个模型，在这个模型中，一个穷国的企业家可以选择投资在传统行业或者多元化投资到历史上没有过的专有技术上。传统行业的生产成本是很清楚的，而新行业的成本则未可知。企业家只有在这个项目中已经投入了部分资金之后才能知晓。他们的投资实际上都是产业规模的实验。这样，其盈利与否就能揭示一国的强项和弱项。

The authors think that entrepreneurs in developing countries may lack sufficient incentives to invest in new industries. Businessmen will take the risk of innovation only if they have a chance of creating some sort of monopoly. They may be helped by patents, trademarks or copyright; if not, they will have an edge only until rivals catch up. In poor countries, the chances are that patents and so on will help less than in rich ones, largely because investors are trying out technology that already exists abroad. So the entrepreneur who first decides to export cut flowers from Colombia to America, for example, cannot hope to stay ahead of imitators for long. His fellow countrymen will rush to copy his business model, poach his staff and encroach upon the ground he has broken.

作者认为发展中国家的企业家也许缺乏足够的激励来投资于新行业。商人只有在其有可能创造某种程度的垄断的时候才愿意冒创新的风险。（受到保护的）专利、商标和著作权也许能帮他们的忙；否则他们在竞争对手赶上以后就失去了优势。在穷国专利提供帮助的机会要比富国小。打个比方说，第一个决定将鲜花收割技术从哥伦比亚出口到美国的无法指望其能长期领先于模仿者。他本国的同行将会复制其商业模式，挖走其员工并蚕食其开拓的市场。

To create a greater incentive to experiment in new industries, say the authors, there may sometimes be a case for governments to protect companies in infant industries from unfettered competition. This does not mean tariffs, which protect all domestic companies to the same extent; rather, it implies finding ways to help innovators against domestic imitators. The trouble is that this is a much harder trick to pull off in practice than it looks in theory. Latin American development banks used to reserve preferential credit for the first domestic entrant in any industry—raising the potential profits available to innovators. Under such policies, Latin America became a veritable hothouse of industrial diversification. Unfortunately, governments did not weed out failed industrial experiments, instead keeping them alive alongside thriving ones.

作者说，为了鼓励在新行业进行实验，政府有时应该保护出于婴儿时期的行业，避免无序竞争。这并不是指关税，关税只对国内所有企业提供相同程度的保护；而是说要找到一些方式保护创新者免受模仿者的损害。其麻烦在于，说起来容易做起来难。拉美开发银行过去常常为国内任何行业的先行者提供优先贷款，－以提高创新者潜在可获得的利润。在这样的政策下，拉丁美洲变成了一个真正的产业多元化的温室。不幸的是，政府没有剪除那些失败的工业试验，相反在保留繁荣行业的产业的同时也把这些失败的产业保留了下来。        

Even successful policies can have damaging side-effects. Messrs Hausmann and Rodrik point to South Korea’s willingness, during its drive for industrialization from the 1960s, to use control of bank credit to reward successful companies and penalize poor performers. Yet by the 1990s the channeling of credit to favored companies had wrought huge damage to the Korean financial system. Devising industrial policy, like diving comparative advantage, is a matter of trial and error. Many governments have tried; most have erred.

即使是成功的政策也可能具有损害性的副作用。Hausmann和Rodrik指出，南朝鲜在二十世纪六十年代出于发展工业的目的，控制银行信贷以奖励成功的公司而惩罚失败者。而到了九十年代，这些对偏好的公司的源源不断的贷款给韩国的金融系统造成了极大的危害。制定产业政策与研究相对优势相似，是个不断试验的过程。很多政府都尝试了；而大多数都失败了。

* “Economic development As Self-Discovery”. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, Number 8952, revised November 2002. Available on the internet at: http//ksghome.havard.edu/~.drodrik.academic.ksg/selfdiscrev2.pdf

*“自我发现的经济发展”。国民经济研究局 工作报告 编号8952，2002年11月，可以从Internet上下载：http//ksghome.havard.edu/~.drodrik.academic.ksg/selfdiscrev2.pdf

goldenbinUID: 31382

二师兄好牛，狂顶兼加精。。。呵呵

二师兄UID: 118950

McKinsey’s election battle

麦肯锡的选举之争

The Economist March 1st, 2003, p61

Can Ian Davis or Michael Patsalos-Fox restore Mckinsey to its former glory?

Ian Davis或者Michael Patsalos-Fox能为麦肯锡重振昔日雄风么？

As elections go, the process of choosing a new managing partner for Mckinsey, the world’s best-known management consultancy, is particularly rum. For one thing, it is a studiedly polite affair. The candidates – there were seven, but now just two remain – issue no manifestos. Canvassing is considered to be bad form and is therefore counter—productive. This makes knowing what particular individuals stand for rather tricky.

随着麦肯锡选举的进行，这家世界最知名的管理咨询公司挑选一个新管理合伙人的过程变得尤为古怪。首先，这是一件刻意的彬彬有礼的事件。所有候选人--本来是七位，现在只剩下两位－都没有发表宣言。游说拉票被认为是不好的形式，只会适得其反。这让每个人的支持对象显得扑朔迷离。

Moreover, the firm (or, as insiders call it, the Firm) is itself at pains to play down the importance of the election. It refuses to talk openly about it, let alone to share insights into personalities or issues. Normally chatty Mckinsey partners clam up when asked about the race. Junior staff know it could harm their careers if they were heard gossiping. So the election takes place in an atmosphere of near-Trappist silence. How on earth do the 280-odd partners who vote make up their minds?

此外，这家公司（或者就像其内部员工称呼的那样：公司）本身也着力将选举轻描淡写。公司拒绝在公开场合谈论它，更不要说发表其对相关人员和事件的看法了。平时喋喋不休的麦肯锡合伙人在被问及这场“赛马”的时候三缄其口。那些年轻的员工也知道，如果他们在这个问题上的八卦被人听见的话，也许会对其职业生涯不妙。所以整个选举过程在一种近乎是“特拉普教派”（注：天主教西多会中一个强调缄口苦修的教派）的气氛中进行。这280多名合伙人脑子里到底在想些什么东东呢？

Decide they must. Next week Mckinsey will announce whether Ian Davis, head of its London office, or Micheal Patslos-Fox, who runs New York, will be its new boss. Both ran three years ago, when Rajat Gupta was eventually re-elected for a third and final term. Mr. Gupta’s long stint saw big changes at Mckinsey, notably greater enrichment of partners relative to up-and-coming associates and a belated rush to join the “new economy” boom. McKinsey is still dealing with the after-effects of a hiring spree in the late 1990s that tested the ability of its culture to absorb large numbers and also created unprecedented tensions when lay-offs followed the pricking of the technology bubble.

当断必断。下周麦肯锡将会宣布到底是其伦敦办事处的头子Ian Davis，还是纽约办事处的分舵主Micheal Patslos-Fox会成为新的老大。他们都从三年前就开始坐这个位子了，当时Rajat Gupta第三次也是最后一次被选为老大。Gupta先生的连任（终于）到头，这给麦肯锡带来一丝曙光（？？），特别是大大聚集了一些崭露头角雄心勃勃的合伙人，并多少有些晚的要赶上所谓“新经济”热潮。麦肯锡现在还在处理其上个世纪九十年代末疯狂招募的后遗症，那一次的疯狂严重的考验了麦肯锡文化吸收大量新员工的能力，并且又在技术泡沫破灭后大量裁员，给自己带来前所未有的压力。

Whichever man McKinsey chooses, it cannot avoid some awkward questions. One is whether it wants to be a global firm, or is just an American firm with a series of regional outposts. Already some big offices are relatively independent. McKinsey’s successful German arm, for instance, has long cultivated separateness; its French operation has done less well. But at the heart of the tension is America, where over-hiring was greatest and retrenchment has proved most painful. Under Mr. Gupta, an American though originally from India, most of McKinsey’s managers have also been American. But, say insiders, he has proved the adage that good consultants do not necessarily make good managers. One way to make the firm more global would be to reform its management structures, breaking up the New York based cabal and bringing in fresh blood from elsewhere.

不管麦肯锡最后挑中了谁，公司都躲不过一些尴尬的问题。其中之一就是它是否想成为一个全球化的公司，或者仅仅是一个带有一系列地区分舵的美国公司。已经有一些大的分舵开始变得相对独立了。例如，麦肯锡在德国的分舵就很成功，早就开始蠢蠢欲动了；法国的就差一点。但是暴风的中心在美国，这里的超员现象最严重，减员行动也是最痛苦的。Gupta先生（这个老家伙是个美国人，虽然他其实来自印度）治下的大部分经理都是美国人。但是公司内部的人说，“好的咨询师并不一定是好经理”，这句话真不是白说的。有一个法子可以将公司变得更加的全球化，就是改革其管理层，粉碎纽约黑帮并从其他地方带来新鲜血液。

Mr. Davis is an affable Brit who wears his ambition lightly but is deeply committed to the firm’s traditional values, in particular the need to invest in long-term relationships with clients and to nurture the associates who represent the firms’s future. Although it expanded when others did, the London office has escaped the worst of the bad times, in part because Mr. Davis insisted that programmes to train and help associates should not be cut. Were he to win, Mr. Davis could instantly shift the firm’s center of gravity by choosing to run it from his base in London.

Davis先生是个和蔼可亲的英国佬，披着轻松外衣的野心勃勃的家伙，但是他浸淫公司传统价值观多年，特别是要对与客户的长期关系进行投资和培养真正代表公司未来的合伙人这两点。虽然别的分舵扩张的时候他也在扩张，但是伦敦分舵躲过了最坏的一劫，这部分要归功于Davis先生坚持保留了培训和帮助准合伙人的项目。如果他胜出，Davis先生可以以其伦敦分舵为根据地，迅速转换公司的重心。

Mr. Patsalos-Fox, Greek-Australian by origin but also an alumnus of London, is the first non-American to run New York. That is no mean achievement. He landed the job after a stint in New Jersey, having lost out to Mr. Davis for the top job in London. He is harder-charging and more ruthless than Mr. Davis. One of his first steps after taking over in New York was to try to raise poor morale, but not everybody thinks he has succeeded.

Patsalos-Fox，是个希腊－澳大利亚混血后裔，但是也曾经是在伦敦混的小弟，他是第一个掌管纽约分舵的非美国人。这并不是什么骄人战果。他是在新泽西分舵主的位子任满后爬上这个位子的，当时他已经在与Davis先生竞争伦敦分舵主的较量中败北。他比Davis先生更狠，更无情。他接管纽约后的第一件事情就是想鼓舞可怜的士气，但是其效果却褒贬不一。

Perhaps the biggest challenge facing McKinsey is whether it can recapture its mystique – the reputational edge that, to the chagrin of such competitors as Bain and Boston Consulting Croup, once mean it was mentioned in a class of its own. This reputation was arguably at its highest in the 1970s and 1980s when McKinsey was the top strategy consultancy, advising chief executives on big trends, sometimes persuading them to reshape entire industries. However, some observers regard its heyday as the 1990s, when so many former partners occupied top jobs outside that the world sometimes seemed to be run by the Firm.

或许麦肯锡面临的最大挑战是其能否夺回它的“葵花宝典”－其声名赫赫的、让诸如Bain、BCG（这几家公司曾被列为同一级数的高手）赧颜的优势。有人说二十世纪七十年代和八十年代是麦肯锡的颠峰时期，它是当时最顶尖的战略咨询公司，为公司的高层提供大的趋势方面的建议，有时候说服了他们改观了整个行业。另一些（无聊的）家伙说九十年代才是其鼎盛时期，当时麦肯锡的N多前合伙人占据了公司以外最高的茅坑，以至于看起来全世界都是公司的人在跑的。

Over the past decade, the consulting market has changed. Rivals got better at touting strategic advice of their own. And many clients began to care less about hold new initiatives and more about running themselves efficiently, a trend that helped “technology integrators” such as Andersen Consulting (now Accenture). As McKinsey adapted to these changes, so it became less distinctive. Its mystique may not have disappeared, but it certainly diminished.

在过去的十年中，咨询市场风云变幻。麦肯锡的对手们在其战略咨询方面吹牛得更好。而且很多客户逐渐不再关心如何保持新的冲劲，而更关心怎么才能把自己跑得更有效（？？原文看不太懂），这样的趋势对一些“技术集成者”，如安达信咨询（现在叫埃森哲）更有利。由于麦肯锡随大流于这些转变，所以变得不再那么与众不同。麦肯锡的“葵花宝典”也许没有完全消失，但是的确式微了。

Strategist, heal thyself

“战略家”？管好你自己吧！







How to reverse that trend? The market is not helping. Client remain fearful of big decisions of the kind that McKinsey likes to advise on. Instead they want nitty-gritty advice – help with IT or marketing. Big mergers, often favoured by McKinsey in the past, are now seen as too risky by managers concerned to regain the good opinion of their shareholders. So too clever management innovations of the sort urged on Enron, whose ex-McKinsey former chief executive, Jeffrey Skilling, is regarded by some critics as an emblem of what went wrong with McKinsey during the 1990s. McKinsey recently invited George Shaheen, a former boss of Accenture who quit to run Webvan, a failed internet start-up, to address partners. Taking lessons from Mr. Shaheen? That worries those who yearn for more mystique.

如何扭转上述趋势？市场对此无能为力。客户们对麦肯锡所津津乐道的“大”决定仍然敬而远之。相反他们需要一些“干货”－对IT和营销方面的帮助。在经理人们看来，麦肯锡过去偏爱的大型并购风险太大了，他们还指望着能赢回股东的好感呢。所以聪明过头的管理创新促成了安然事件，安然公司的前CEO Jeffery Skilling也是在麦肯锡混过的，有些批评家将其视为二十世纪九十年代被麦肯锡搞秀逗了的人的象征。麦肯锡最近邀请George Shaheen来为自己的合伙人痛陈革命家史，这个倒霉蛋放着好好的埃森哲的老板不做，跑去开了一家Internet公司叫WebVan，果然开不了多久就被放倒了。从Shaheen先生那里吸取教训？这让那些热心于练习“葵花宝典”的人（指离开麦肯锡自己跑公司的人－译者）心里发毛。

The managing partner has limited executive power: as one insider puts it, “there wouldn’t be much scope for a command-and-control approach here.” But he does have influence, through personality and through the committees and task-forces that McKinsey uses for internal governance. By setting the agenda and hand-picking the leading decision-makers, he can play a big part in shaping the firm’s identity. That is why this election is more important than most. Do not be fooled by the polite, low-key tone: next week’s announcement will mark a critical moment in the Firm’s history.

麦肯锡的管理合伙人权力有限：正如某内部人士指出的，“在这里颐气指使可行不通”。但是管理合伙人的确还是有些份量的，这种影响主要是通过人事安排、委员会以及麦肯锡用于内部管理的“任务驱动”的方法起作用。通过描绘（转型）路线图和挑选主要的决策人，他可以在重塑公司身份的好戏中担当重要角色。这也是为什么这场选举比（麦肯锡历史上的）大多数同类选举更为重要。别被这表面上的客客气气唬住了。悄悄儿告诉你吧：下周宣布结果的时候将是公司历史上的一个极为关键的时间！

wanpUID: 131824

很佩服你认真的态度哦
呵呵，翻译得不错，文章也选择得不错
哪天我能写出这么好的英文就好了
二师兄，努力努力，看来你是适合做学问的

goldenbinUID: 31382

二师兄就是好样的。。。。

二师兄UID: 118950

Specialist help needed
需要“专业人士”的帮助

From:  The Economist April 26th, 2003

对纽约证券交易所核心专业人士的一项调查引起了对华尔街的更多关注

毫不夸张的说，在刚刚过去的一周中，有一束光照进了美国证券行业的某些角落。（Hardly a week goes by without an unflattering light being shone into some corner of America’s securities industry.）现在，聚光灯打在Frank Quattrone的身上，他曾经在瑞士信贷第一波士顿工作，但是在4月23日，他成为第一个因为与近期丑闻有关联而受到犯罪指控的投资银行家。同时受到关注的还有一家处于美国金融市场核心的机构：纽约证券交易所（NYSE）。在4月22日，NYSE发表了一项愤慨的声明以回应某些新闻报道，这些报道说美国政监会正在调查某些交易员的违规行为，－交易员就是在交易大厅里执行交易订单的中间人。

交易员的工作是代表其客户进行买卖操作。他们不允许为自己买入股票，因为这样他们就可以将其转售给客户以谋取利益，通常把这种行为称作“跑先”(“front-running”:D，还是叫“出老千”?)。如果买家的要价比卖家的出价还要高，交易员也不许为自己进行交易赚取差额(are not allowed to trade for themselves and pocket the spread)。他们仅仅应该将买家和卖家带到一起，然后就站在一边－见面，用NYSE拗口的话说，这是他们的“消极责任”。

该等新闻报道说一些交易员正在就其“跑先”行为接受调查。但是NYSE说：不，这些质询是有关消极责任规则的。在大多数人来听来，这两种说法之间的含义大有不同。但是实际上是同一个基本的问题：交易员有没有在事先知道他们可以立即售出而获利的情况下，以较低的价格买入股票？在大多数商业行为中都要求公平竞争，在证券交易规则中尤其禁止这种行为。

有经验的交易员说，如果这些指控属实的话，那么他们未免也太明显了，根本躲不过调查。价格、买家、卖家以及成交时间都在交易票上有记录。有人会这么笨吗？这里面一定还有更多隐藏事实吗？毕竟，卷入这场问题的公司都是些久经沙场之辈：Spear，Leeds&Kellogg，这是一家高盛的子公司；FleetBoston Financial；Bear Wagner，由Bear Stearns部分持有；以及其他两家鲜为人知但是早就在证券交易领域立足的组织，LaBranche和Van der Moolen。

到目前为止，Fleet Boston已经承认将一位交易员停职了，他对通用电气股票的（违规）交易负有责任。Spear Leeds的负责人Todd Christie，原先被提名为NYSE董事会成员，也在三月底被突然解职。其原因未对社会公布，高盛说他的离职与（政监会的）调查无关，并拒绝对追问发表任何评价。

换了别的时代，这种喧嚣可能会很快就过去。交易丑闻又不是什么新鲜事，他们中的大部分很快就被遗忘了。例如在1999年，NYSE针对一项政监会的决定承诺加强对交易员的审查。一名大厅经纪人被禁止从事证券行业，两名管理人员在犯罪指控面前认罪。这项调查涉及到了二十世纪九十年代早期的一些活动，当时NYSE由一名叫做William Donaldson的人领导，最近国会正在审议他作为政监会负责人的提名。

时代不同了。华尔街现在成了野心勃勃的检举人以及寻找私人诉讼业务的律师的目标。假如Donaldson先生自己在NYSE的历史，以及他在政监会的前任Harvey Pitt被发觉在保护其曾经担任律师的公司的事情属实，对这个事情的积极追踪可能会承受政治压力。

另一束不受欢迎之光

无论结果如何，该调查似乎都一定会让NYSE以及交易员如何操作看起来更清楚。这似乎对双方都不太好。交易员如何赚钱似乎从来都说不清楚。他们的义务是创造一个有序的市场。有时候他们似乎不得不因此编制一个求购的股票的目录，否则他们就在买家和卖家之间进行干预。虽然如果要那样做的话，他们不得不赶在其客户之前行动，－这让他们处于一个危险的境地，至少是“跑先”或者说违反了消极责任原则。“交易员知晓投资者的订单流来赚钱”，外国关系委员会的会员Benn Steil说，“这不是什么副产品，这正是证券交易所做的事情。”

Steil先生说，停止违规交易的唯一可靠的办法就是政监会要求改变当前订单的处理方式，坚持一收到订单马上执行。然而，这样就削弱了交易员存在的价值。结果就是整个市场变成完全自动化了。

增加证券交易透明度已经造成了没有预料到的效果，导致了以金融机构为主的交易员的客户的不满。去年生效的规则强制要求交易员披露其订单登记簿，这为客户提供了有关其订单执行的好坏的新信息。有些客户对此感到非常不高兴。当然，只要证券交易所的股票交易费用够便宜，他们还会留在这里。但是根据Elkins/McSherry公司的研究结果表明，在过去四年中，NYSE的股票交易费用已经上涨了30%。现在大厅交易就眼看着新型的电子交易更简便一些，如果这种情况持续下去，电子交易看起来就会吸引力更大一些。

尽管如此，进一步的公开仍然受到欢迎。例如，投资者特别想知道NYSE的主管是如何被选出来的，以及他们（为交易）支付的费用情况。特拉华大学的Charles Elson教授说，对于一个实际上的私营公用事业单位来说，透明度至关重要。最近在NYSE负责人选举上的混乱对于交易所宣称要做保护投资者利益的先锋是一种嘲讽。

在近期离开交易所委员会的还包括以下人物：Linda Wachner，与其关系紧密的一家公司破产了；Martha Stewart，正在接受有关内幕交易的调查；Michael Carpenter，在经历一系列各种丑闻后被换下了花期集团投资银行负责人的职位；Jean-Marie Messier，其对法国媒体王国维旺迪的统治一团糟。三月份，NYSE被迫撤消对花期集团老板Sandy Weill作为委员会中对投资者发言人的提名。另外由于被从Spear Leeds免职，Christie也靠边站了。

这个令人悲哀的名单可能还会加长。4月15号，证券交易商协会签署了一项针对Invemed公司的指控，后者是由另一位NYSE主管Kenneth Langone运营的一家投资银行，指控其在首次公开发行中有不当操作。Langone是一家自助连锁店Home Depot的发起人，其董事会成员则包括了NYSE新近任命的首席执行官Richard Grasso。公司治理机制方面的流行观点对这种互惠的关系难以赞成。不过还有更糟糕的事情：Grasso上一项“杰出的政绩”是在CA公司，这家公司则被可疑的会计操作和管理不当的股票期权问题缠身。或许他相信，只有那些亲身经历了奸诈勾当的人才能最好的保护投资者的利益。