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Climate-change politics
Cap-and-trade's last hurrah(排放限制最后的欢呼)
The decline of a once wildly popular idea
Mar 18th 2010 | From The Economist print edition
Gaia lent an unhelpful hand
IN THE 1990s cap-and-trade—the idea of reducing carbon-dioxide emissions(排放) by auctioning off(拍卖) a set number of pollution permits, which could then be traded in a market(通过拍卖许可排放一定量的污染物的权益来减少二氧化碳的排放,这种排放权益可以在市场上交易)—was the darling of the green policy circuit. A similar approach to sulphur(硫磺???) dioxide emissions, introduced under the 1990 Clean Air Act, was credited with having helped solve acid-rain problems quickly and cheaply. And its great advantage was that it hardly looked like a tax at all, though it would bring in a lot of money.
The cap-and-trade provision expected in the climate legislation(法律法规) that Senators John Kerry, Joe Lieberman and Lindsey Graham have been working on, which may be unveiled(揭露) shortly, will be a poor shadow of that once alluring(诱人的) idea. Cap-and-trade will not be the centrepiece of(最引人注目的部分) the legislation (as it was of last year’s House climate bill, Waxman-Markey), but is instead likely to apply only to electrical utilities, at least for the time being. Transport fuels will probably be approached with some sort of tax or fee; industrial emissions will be tackled with regulation(以规章制度来处理) and possibly, later on, carbon trading. The hope will be to cobble together(迅速筹集) cuts in emissions similar in scope to those foreseen under the House bill, in which the vast majority of domestic cuts in emissions came from utilities.
This composite approach is necessary because the charms of economy-wide cap-and-trade have faded badly. The ability to raise money from industry is not so attractive in a downturn(工业区). Market mechanisms have lost their appeal as a result of the financial crisis.(由于财政紧缺,市场机制失去了它的吸引力) More generally, climate is not something the public seems to feel strongly about at the moment, in part because of that recession, in part perhaps because they have worries about the science (see article), in part, it appears, because the winter has been a snowy one.
The public is, though, quite keen on(热衷于) new initiatives on energy, which any Senate bill(参议院议案) will shower with incentives and subsidies(刺激和衰落,起幅???)
whether the energy in question be renewable, nuclear, pumped out from beneath the seabed or still confined to research laboratories. So the bill will need to raise money, which is why cap-and-trade is likely to remain for the utilities, and revenues(收入) will be raised from transport fuels. A complex way of doing this, called a linked fee, would tie the revenues to the value of carbon in the utility market; a straightforward carbon tax may actually have a better chance of passing.
Energy bills have in the past garnered(囊括)
bipartisan support, and this one also needs to. That is why Senator Graham matters. He could bring on board both Democrats and Republicans. Mr Graham’s contribution has been to focus the rhetoric(修辞学) not just on near-term jobs, but also on longer-term competitiveness. Every day America does not have climate legislation, he argues, is a day that China’s grip on the global green economy gets tighter.
He also thinks action on the issue would be good for his party. While short-term Republican interests call for opposition, the party’s long-term interests must include broadening its support. Among young people, for example, polling suggests that the environment, and the climate, matter a great deal.
Unfortunately for this argument, tactics matter, and young voters are unlikely to play a great role in the mid-term election. Other Republicans may think it better to wait before re-establishing the party’s green credentials(绿色资格). Lisa Murkowski of Alaska, for example, is happy to talk about climate as a problem, and talks about the desirability of some sort of carbon restriction—perhaps a tax, or some version of Maria Cantwell’s “cap-and-dividend” scheme. But she expresses no great urgency about the subject. And she has introduced one of two measures intended to curtail(限制) the power the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) now has to regulate carbon, on the ground that that is a matter for legislation sometime in the future.
The EPA’s new powers undoubtedly make the charms of legislation greater. Some industrial lobbies may decide that the bill will provide the certainty they need to decide about future investment, and get behind it. The White House has been supportive of late, inviting senators(参议员) over to talk. But it remains an uphill struggle(山上的挣扎,极尽努力), and the use of reconciliation to pass health care could greatly increase the gradient of the hill(增加山的梯度,引申为增加事情的难度?), as Mr Graham has made abundantly clear.
If the bill does not pass, it will change environmental politics in America and beyond. The large, comparatively business-friendly environmental groups that have been proponents(提方案) of trading schemes will lose ground(失利), with organizations closer to the grassroots(基层), and perhaps with a taste for civil disobedience(非暴力反抗), gaining power. Carbon-trading schemes elsewhere in the world have already been deprived(剥夺) of a vast new market—Waxman-Markey, now dead, would have seen a great many carbon credits bought in from overseas—and if America turned away from cap-and-trade altogether they would look even less transformative than they do today. And as market-based approaches lose relevance(关联), what climate action continues may come to lean more heavily on the command-and-control techniques they were intended to replace.
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