☆☆四星级☆☆Economist Debate阅读写作分析----Assertive Russia

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基本完成



前言：

红色：生词和生词组
橙色：好句子和好结构
蓝色：自己的分析和课外资料

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结构：
1# about the debates & 介绍
2# background reading
3# opening statements
4# guest
5# guest
6# rebuttal statements
7# guest
8# guest
9# closing statements
10# decision
11# comments
12# comments
13# comments
14# comments
15# 汇总

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About this debate

Russia’s incursion into neighboring Georgia has Western governments worried about renewed Russian assertiveness.  The diplomatic frost between America and Russia remains at a level not seen since the cold war, leading to predictable results: Russian/NATO（北约） joint military exercises canceled, private energy co-operation agreements withdrawn, foreign ministers returned home. Is Russia’s intention to upset the current international order, or is it responding directly to the widening sphere of American influence in former Soviet countries (for example, the promise of eventual NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia)? Can the European Union speak with one voice and take the diplomatic lead? Or must America protect the world order by standing up to （勇敢面对）Russia to prove that any form of aggression comes at a cost? Finally, are we witnessing the dawn of a second cold war, in which the West should resist the lure of appeasement（绥靖）?

Representing the sides

Defending the motion

Ms Anne-Marie Slaughter   

Dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University

The West should be bolder in confronting a newly assertive Russia, but bolder in a way that understands and manipulates the realities of 21st-century politics rather than plunging us back into a 20th-century stalemate.

Against the motion

Mr Dmitri V. Trenin

Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Those who argue that the West should be bolder in its response to a newly assertive Russia are trying to use their memories of the past to deal with a very different present and a highly uncertain future.

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Background reading 1

Tense times

SEVEN weeks after the war between Russia and Georgia began, the situation remains edgy. On September 21st a Georgian policeman was shot dead at a checkpoint close to Abkhazia, the breakaway enclave（飞地） in the north-west—the third policeman to be killed since fighting stopped last month. Two days later the Georgians claimed to have shot down a Russian drone（无人驾驶飞机） over Gori, near South Ossetia, the other enclave.

Systematic destruction, looting（抢劫，掠夺） and ethnic cleansing of Georgian villages continue, both in and beyond South Ossetia proper（加在某城市后面，指市区）. Georgia is also struggling to cope with some 30,000 refugees from the two enclaves（指Abkhazia和Gori两城市）, plus another 30,000 from buffer zones （缓冲地带）round them. The tents housing them in Gori and elsewhere look pitifully inadequate for winter. Resettling them will take time. And Georgia is already home to than 200,000 refugees left from the wars in the early 1990s.
格鲁吉亚在90年代初期就饱受战乱困扰。

1989年以前，南奥塞梯自治政府与格鲁吉亚之间基本上维持和平状态。不过1990年，在格鲁吉亚开始迈出自苏联独立的步伐时，南奥塞梯议会却于该年9月宣布成立南奥塞梯苏维埃民主共和国，脱离格鲁吉亚成为苏联的一部份。格鲁吉亚国会的回应则是宣布取消南奥塞梯的自治地位。格鲁吉亚认为独立运动是苏联所煽动的，目的在于制造干预格鲁吉亚独立的借口，格鲁吉亚警察也与当地百姓爆发冲突，造成了死伤。1991年底冲突扩大，造成约1000人的死亡，与十万名南奥塞梯人逃离家园，其中大部分的人进入了北奥塞梯。1992年1月，南奥塞梯举行全民公投，公投结果显示，绝大多数南奥塞梯居民支持独立。1992年，为了避免与俄国间的冲突进一步扩大，格鲁吉亚与俄罗斯、南奥塞梯三方达成达戈梅斯停火协议，双方暂时停止军事行动。交战双方同意组成俄罗斯-格鲁吉亚-奥塞梯混合维和部队，并于1992年11月6日，由欧洲安全与合作组织派遣一个团队进入格鲁吉亚监督维和任务。自此至2004年中，南奥塞梯大体维持和平状态。2004年6月，局面因格鲁吉亚加强打击走私而再度紧张。一连串的军事行动造成了十数人的伤亡。格鲁吉亚政府也指责俄国的维和部队偏袒南奥塞梯政府，并希望以联合国部队取代之。

The European Union has now sent 300 people to monitor the ceasefire brokered（斡旋） by France’s Nicolas Sarkozy. This will cause further tension, as the EU (backed by the Georgians) insists they should work inside Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Russians will not allow this. Although they are stuck with 28 observers from the Organisation of Security and Co-operation in Europe, they have blocked any new ones. If observers cannot get into the enclaves, they may end up patrolling（巡逻，侦查） their borders, which might seem to imply de facto recognition.

Yet Mikheil Saakashvili, Georgia’s president, has few regrets—as he showed when he addressed the United Nations in New York this week. He is popular: one survey gives him a 76% approval rating. He insists that the economy is strong enough to ride out the war’s impact. Some officials say GDP growth will fall from 10% to 5% this year, but others expect it to be near-zero. Yet reconstruction work and foreign aid should boost the economy next year.

Mr Saakashvili remains adamant that he did not start the war. The Georgians are handing out evidence, including telephone intercepts, to show that large numbers of Russian troops entered South Ossetia through the Roki tunnel on August 7th, long before the Georgians began bombarding （炮击，轰炸）the South Ossetian capital, Tskhinvali. Mr Saakashvili also insists that this bombardment was in retaliation for （为报复） Ossetian shelling of Georgian villages after the Georgians had declared a ceasefire. He says he would welcome an inquiry into how the war began; indeed, he claims to have been the first to call for one.

Yet Western governments remain troubled by the Georgian president. Why were claims of Russian troops moving into South Ossetia not made earlier? Many believe that he walked into a trap, miscalculating that he could take South Ossetia before Russian forces arrived in strength. Although publicly they stick to their April commitment that Georgia (and Ukraine) should both one day join NATO, in private some are having second thoughts. It might take another case of Russian aggression, in Georgia or elsewhere, to win them round. Mr Saakashvili, for one, believes that is highly likely to happen.

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Background reading 2

To end a war

THE French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, smiled happily. His Georgian counterpart, Mikheil Saakashvili, looked an unhealthy shade of grey. Yet his troops were routed（击溃，打垮） in the August war with Russia, so he was in no position to bargain for better terms than Mr Sarkozy had brought from Moscow. At a joint press conference in the early hours of September 9th he thanked Mr Sarkozy fulsomely. Under the circumstances, with Russian forces soon to pull out of parts of Georgia where they had earlier dug in, the deal was not a bad one.

Soon after the conflict moved from tit-for-tat（针锋相对，一报还一报） firing into full-blown war on August 7th, and Russian troops crushed the Georgians in the breakaway enclave of South Ossetia and appeared to menace Tbilisi itself, Mr Sarkozy flew to Moscow and secured a ceasefire. It was full of ambiguities that Russia exploited to allow its forces to create a buffer zone（缓冲地带） around South Ossetia and to remain in Senaki and the port of Poti. Under the new deal, these troops will all go.

“They should get the hell out,” declared Mr Saakashvili. Mr Sarkozy said everything had to be done “step by step”. In truth the new deal is ambiguous and tension remains high (a Georgian policeman was shot dead on September 10th). The deal says that some 200 EU monitors will replace Russians in the buffer zone, and also talks of a separate EU mission whose observers will, says Mr Sarkozy, be able to go wherever they want, including in South Ossetia and in Abkhazia, the other breakaway enclave. Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, angrily disputes this, saying that the observers cannot enter the enclaves. The agreement adds that Russian troops should withdraw to positions they held before the war, and Georgian troops should return to barracks.

This is where what seem like holes might be construed instead as constructive ambiguities. One-third of South Ossetia and the Kodori gorge in Abkhazia were held by Georgian forces before the war. It is inconceivable that the 500 Georgian soldiers who were in South Ossetia, not to mention policemen and refugees, will go back—for now. But so long as Mr Lavrov’s interpretation is rejected, Georgia may in future insist on a right to return. In the meantime, despite the terms of the deal, Russia is sending 7,600 more soldiers to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and plans to keep military bases in both.

It is plain where the biggest problems will arise. The EU’s monitors may be welcomed in the buffer zone around South Ossetia, but they will have trouble getting into the two enclaves. Mr Lavrov has argued that, since Russia has recognised the governments of both, the Europeans should deal with them directly, something they will be reluctant to do.

Georgian minds are now turning to the economy. David Bakradze, speaker of Georgia’s parliament, believes that Russia balked at（畏缩） taking Tbilisi mainly because the morale of Georgians did not collapse in the face of their threat. Their tanks might have run into hundreds of thousands of protesters. Yet it is crucial to sustain the economy’s strong growth, because an economic collapse could, he suggests, be followed by political collapse—in which case Georgia could relapse into Russia’s orbit.

So far Georgia’s economy seems to be holding up, but it will be essential to maintain the flow of foreign direct investment. David Lee, who heads MagtiCom, Georgia’s biggest telecoms company (and the biggest American investment in the country), says that present investors have not been deterred, but that those looking for new opportunities might have been. Changing their minds, he says, “is now the battle that must be faced.” That is why the $1 billion in aid promised by the Americans, together with the $750m agreed in principle by the IMF, are so important, says Vladimer Papava, an economist. No doubt it is vital to repair war damage and replace lost foreign investment, but equally important is the symbolic value of this help, reassuring potential investors that Georgia is not being abandoned to Russia. （很不错的句型）

To endow this idea with more political weight, some diplomats think that Georgia might be given the equivalent of the European road maps being followed by Balkan countries, though without (for now) a promise of membership at the end. The Balkan comparison does not stop there. “The long-term implication of the Sarkozy deal,” says one diplomat, citing the pro-Western Serbian president, “is that Georgia has begun to adopt the [Boris] Tadic line（塔迪奇路线，方针）.” That means pledging not to use force to regain lost lands, and focusing instead on EU integration and rebuilding the economy.
鲍里斯·塔迪奇 (Boris Tadic)１９５８年出生于萨拉热窝（现波黑首都）一个大学教授的家庭，大学时期就读于贝尔格莱德大学心理学专业，毕业后曾任贝尔格莱德大学教授。１９９０年，塔迪奇进入政界，成为塞尔维亚民主党成员。２０００年１１月至２００１年７月，塔迪奇任南联盟政府电信部长，后任塞尔维亚和黑山政府国防部长。２００４年２月他出任民主党主席，６月当选为塞尔维亚和黑山的塞尔维亚共和国第四任总统。２００６年６月，塞尔维亚宣布成为主权国家，塔迪奇仍任塞尔维亚总统。２００８年２月３日，塔迪奇在总统选举中成功连任。他是塞尔维亚２００６年成为独立国家以来首位通过选举产生的总统。２００８年５月１１日，根据非官方的选举监督机构“自由选举和民主中心”公布的初步统计结果，塔迪奇领导的“为欧洲的塞尔维亚”竞选联盟在当天举行的塞尔维亚议会选举中获胜。 塔迪奇奉行亲西方的务实政策，他一方面主张维护国家主权和领土完整，另一方面强调在任何情况下都不应偏离加入欧盟的道路。同时，塔迪奇也主张继续发展同俄罗斯的传统友好关系。塔迪奇希望通过落实改革措施，加快塞尔维亚的入盟进程，争取欧盟的经济援助，提高塞民众的生活水平，永远告别２０世纪９０年代动荡、战争、被制裁和被孤立的历史。

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Background reading 3

Europe stands up to Russia

The European Union has wobbled（摇摆）woefully, yet Russia too（也）will pay dearly （付出巨大代价）for its Georgian adventure（一开始没反应过来此句什么意思，too用在这个位置太不习惯了）
IT IS now close to a month since the reckless Georgian effort to retake breakaway South Ossetia by force sparked off （导致）从句的谓语what Russia is now calling its August war. There is no new iron curtain（铁幕，政治名词） descending across Europe, no ideologically based “new cold war”; but there is a deep, wounding division that stretches far beyond wrecked Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. To paraphrase Winston Churchill, from Tallinn on the Baltic to Tbilisi and beyond, the violence of the past month, along with Russia’s assertions of its “privileged interests” in its far-flung neighbourhood, has done more damage to relations between Russia and the West than Russia’s leaders think they need to care about and many Europeans care to admit.

That was the background against which Europe’s squabbling leaders met on September 1st. The talk the day before was that it would be impossible for the hawks (such as Britain and the Baltics) to agree on anything with the gas-swilling Russophiles (such as Italy and Germany). A day later they had united enough to condemn Russia’s actions and produce a punishment of sorts: there will be no talks on a new partnership agreement between Russia and the EU until Russian troops leave Georgia proper and resume their positions of August 6th. Yet a smirking Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev do not seem to be quaking in their boots（不寒而栗）—indeed they think they have triumphed diplomatically as well.

Like a chocolate fireguard
In fact both Europe and Russia have lost. The European response has been weak. No doubt, it was a little tougher than some predicted a week ago, but jump back a month. In early August Mr Putin would not have dared imagine that Russia could invade and partially occupy a neighbour for the first time since the cold war, let alone recognise South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states—and meet such a wobble. It is not just that the partnership talks matter little to the Russians. The Europeans have not even insisted on formal restoration of Georgia’s territorial integrity before they start; merely a withdrawal of troops, which Mr Medvedev promised anyway. EU leaders have in effect condoned Russia’s smash and grab.

Thus the second casualty, after wretched Georgia, is the idea of a common European foreign and security policy. This was supposed to be a morally superior combination of the soft power of Europe’s economic attraction (morally superior, of course, to trigger-happier America) with an occasional harder edge only in the lawless bits of the world beyond Europe’s shores. After Georgia’s folly, not even the United States was proposing to take on Russian tanks as they rolled in. Yet how quickly talk of sending EU troops to uphold the ceasefire that Russia was flouting died away. Instead, civilian EU monitors—not even the paramilitary police Europeans claim to be their speciality and who might protect Georgian villagers from South Ossetian militias—may eventually, if Russia agrees, join those from the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, a body to which Russia belongs.

Such a collective Euro-shrug only stores up trouble, since there are other places where Russia enjoys fomenting bother. NATO needs to reassure all its members, including places like Estonia and Latvia with large Russian minorities, that they are protected by the alliance’s mutual defence guarantees. Harder to help will be Ukraine, genuinely divided over whether its closest ties should be with the West or with Russia, and with plenty of ethnic Russians. But the EU can do more to encourage economic reform and the fight against corruption.

In fact the most useful cure for the Eurowobbles over Russia lies not in diplomacy but in Europe’s internal market: liberalising the EU’s energy markets and where possible connecting up its internal supply lines. It makes economic sense and does not involve picking a needless fight with Russia. As long as governments like Germany’s prefer to cut separate deals with Russia, Europe’s inevitable dependence on Russian oil and gas will always offer a tempting way for an opportunistic Kremlin to exert pressure on this country or that, by turning off the taps（龙头，阀门） for “pipeline repairs”. Recent promises that Russia will remain a reliable energy supplier should be viewed warily.

Imperious follies
Mr Putin once described the collapse of the Soviet Union as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century. That is not a view shared by Georgia, Ukraine, the Baltic states or the Central Asian countries that escaped the Soviet empire to win their independence. Yet his aim is to restore Russia as a great power, not to bring back communism as a global ideology. His officials insist that Russia wants more respect, not more territory. Thus, after what many Russians see as years of slights from the West, NATO’s suspension of co-operation has been swatted aside. So has the unprecedented rebuke（空前的指责） from Russia’s G8 partners in the world’s premier political club.

Yet the limits of Russia’s August “victory” are becoming clear. Its erstwhile friend China, struggling to keep a grip on（控制） its restive regions（动荡不安的地区）, has expressed “concern”. None of Russia’s other friends—bar, belatedly, Belarus and Venezuela—has volunteered support. And while the Georgia adventure may have scared the neighbours, Russia’s support for separatists in South Ossetia and Abkhazia risks emboldening its own would-be breakaway regions, notably in the north Caucasus.

Ordinary Russians will bear the cost. Russia’s stockmarket has taken a knock and the costs of doing business there have shot up. Russian companies seeking to invest or list abroad ought now to face the closer scrutiny of their finances that earlier dodgy ones didn’t, but should have. And Mr Medvedev’s supposed plans for reform and strengthening the rule of law are in about the same shape as Georgia’s beaten army.

But what Russia may come to regret losing most is something Mr Putin longs for: the opportunity to become an accepted European power. He likes to skip over communism’s mistakes and dwell on Russia’s tsarist grandeur. But what did for both was imperial overstretch（帝国的过度扩张）, a rotten economy and, like Russia’s today, a mostly unaccountable ruling caste that led a proud country to disaster.

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Background reading 4

After Georgia
After Georgia’s defeat, the West struggles to deal with a newly belligerent Russia

IN LESS than two weeks—from the first heated discussion about Russia’s push into Georgia that took place between President George Bush and Russia’s prime minister, Vladimir Putin, at the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics, to the supposed start on August 19th of the Russian army’s rifle-dragging withdrawal—the geopolitical map of Europe has been redrawn. Swathes of Georgia, not just the enclave of South Ossetia, the proximate cause of the fighting, are in Russian hands (see article). Surprised and shocked by the outbreak of war over a place few of their citizens had ever heard of, Western governments have scrambled to cover their divisions over how to respond. Yet for all its triumphalist taunts that “Russia is back”, there is no gold medal for the Kremlin for invading a neighbour for the first time since the end of the cold war.

The immediate damage to Russia’s relations with America and Europe is clear from NATO’s decision to suspend co-operation with the Kremlin until its “disproportionate” action ends and its troops are back in the positions they held before the fighting erupted on August 7th. Russia’s president, Dmitry Medvedev, who is Mr Putin’s hand-picked successor, now says this will be done by August 22nd. But it is Mr Putin and the generals who call the shots—and they mutter（低声咕哝，抱怨） that the Georgians have “not given up on their aggressive intentions.”

Mr Bush has already cancelled military exercises with Russia and withdrawn from Congress a civilian nuclear co-operation agreement that could potentially have netted Russia’s atomic industry billions. High-level visits have been put on hold. There is to be a fundamental review of relations with Russia. Beyond that, Russia’s hopes of getting into the World Trade Organisation this year have been dashed: Georgia, among others, would block it. Some, including John McCain, the Republican candidate in America’s presidential election, talk of expelling Russia from the G8 group of rich and supposedly responsible countries; others of diluting its influence by inviting China and others to join.

Some European governments have puffed hot, some cold over all this. But Germany’s Angela Merkel, often in the cautious camp when it comes to dealings with Russia because of her country’s extensive business and energy ties, has spoken with increasing sharpness of Russia’s obligations under the ceasefire agreement that she helped to nail down. Meanwhile the repercussions of this small war in the Caucasus will spread a lot wider.

The (dis)honours are shared. Georgia’s youthful president, Mikheil Saakashvili, made a terrible mistake in ordering attacks on civilian targets in South Ossetia on August 7th. NATO has set up a special commission with Georgia to oversee reconstruction and to help the country eventually fulfil its aspirations for membership, which Russia fiercely opposes. Yet Mr Saakashvili’s actions have made Georgia’s path longer and steeper. Once Russian troops go, the anger of ordinary Georgians at the catastrophe that has befallen their country may yet turn on the man who got them into this mess.

Mr Putin would count Mr Saakashvili’s scalp as another victory. Polls suggest that Russia’s leaders have popular backing at home. But Russia has also miscalculated by marching its troops into Georgia proper. That has lost it the propaganda war abroad, with the television pictures conjuring up（召唤）memories of Prague in 1968（指“布拉格之春”） and, more recently, of Chechnya（车臣）.

1968年，捷克斯洛伐克共产党中央第一书记杜布切克发起了布拉格之春改革，在苏联认为，其有脱离苏联控制倾向。为了实行统一的“苏联体制”，苏决定对捷进行武装干涉。６月下旬，华沙条约组织在捷境内举行军事演习，演习结束后迟迟方撤。７月之后，局势有所缓和。８月３日在捷签署联合声明，危机似乎已经过去了。８月２０日晚１１时，布拉格机场接到一架苏联民航机信号“机械事故，要求迫降”没有理由不同意。客机一降落，数十名苏军“暴风”突击队冲出机舱迅速占领机场。几分钟后，苏第２４空军集团军巨型运输机开始降落，一分钟一架。１小时后，一辆苏联大使馆的汽车引路，苏军克隆士兵直扑布拉格。２１日拂晓，苏军占领布拉格，逮捕杜布切克。在进攻开始６小时后，苏军控制了捷克全境。几十万捷军被全部缴械，北约也没来得及作出任何反应。
布拉格之春是一次有重大意义的国际政治事件，标志着华约内部的裂痕已经渐渐显现，可视为东欧剧变的前奏与导火索。

Russia’s interests will not go unscathed. Ukraine, another NATO candidate some day, far from being cowed by Georgia’s fate, promptly offered America and the Europeans access to its air-defence radars. Belarus, usually tightly allied with the Kremlin, took almost two weeks to declare its support; other neighbours have stayed stumm. Behind the cover of the Olympic celebrations, it will not have gone unnoticed in Beijing that China’s ally at the United Nations in opposing “interference” in a sovereign country’s affairs has just worryingly stepped over the line.

The new low in Russia’s relations with the West is one of a dispiriting series. Russia’s failed attempts to shape the outcome of Ukraine’s presidential election in 2004, followed by the orange revolution there (after Georgia’s rose revolution in 2003), hit a nerve with Mr Putin. Resentment that simmered at the continued expansion of NATO, and America’s plans to site parts of its missile defences in the Czech Republic and Poland, then boiled over after the announcement at NATO’s summit in Bucharest in April that both Georgia and Ukraine could one day join the alliance, albeit only when they were ready. Both Russia and Georgia were left itching for a fight.

That it came to one only makes difficult things harder. One is the effort to keep Europe, America, Russia and China united in the face of Iran’s defiance of UN calls for a suspension of its suspected nuclear activity. Another is the bid to resurrect an amended Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty. Russia stopped co-operating with CFE limits on troop movements last year. Shortly before the Georgia crisis, it came up with suggested troop limits that it could live with. The new chill will also kill Mr Medvedev’s proposed Treaty on European Security, an idea that a British official says now looks “slightly absurd”.
Efforts to overcome Russia’s objections to missile defences in eastern Europe will also suffer. It has slammed America’s new agreement with Poland and frozen its own links with NATO. It might have done this anyway, but the shape of a deal to address some of Russia’s fears about the system was in sight, argues Rose Gottemoeller of the Carnegie Moscow Centre. Now the next American president will find it harder to make the compromises needed to get Russia involved.

Indeed, in the run-up to the inauguration（就职仪式） of a new American president in January, scores of think-tanks, commissions and working groups have been beavering away on advice for the next incumbent of the White House. Democrats in particular have been looking for ways for an Obama presidency to broaden relations with Russia, which they argue have been neglected, except in narrow nuclear matters, by the Bush administration. There is much nuclear work still to be done, including agreeing upon a new round of cuts in strategic arsenals. But they are now scratching their heads（抓脑袋）. How to take account of Russia’s interests, when its idea of respect from the outside world is based on fear?

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Opening statements

The moderator's opening remarks

Sep 9th 2008 | Mr Robert Lane Greene

First of all, our thanks to Anne-Marie Slaughter of Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School and Dmitri Trenin of the Carnegie Moscow Centre for participating in this debate on shorter notice than usual.

Recent events have made talking about Russia more urgent than anyone was expecting two months ago.

Our participants agree on a key premise: historical analogies are likely to mislead us when we think about Russia. This is no time for the Truman doctrine（杜鲁门主义）, because it is not 1947, and Vladimir Putin's Russia is not Joseph Stalin's Soviet Union. It is also not 1938, 1956, 1968 or any of the other years in which the Western allies froze in their tracks, unsure of what to do about blatant aggression by one European state against another. Analogies often mislead as much as they illuminate. It is 2008, and much has changed.

第二次世界大战后，德、意、日三个法西斯国家彻底失败，而英、法的力量也严重削弱，只有美国依仗其在战争中发展起来的经济、军事实力，在资本主义世界取得了统治地位。1947年2月21日，英国照会美国国务院，声称由于国内经济困难，3月31日之后，英国无法再给希腊和土耳其以经济和军事的援助，希望美国继续给予援助。3月12日，美国总统杜鲁门在国会两院联席会议上宣读了后来被称为“杜鲁门主义”的国情咨文，发表了敌视社会主义国家的讲话。国会两院经过辩论后，分别于4月22日和5月8日通过关于援助希腊、土耳其的法案，拨款4亿美元援助希腊和土耳其政府，帮助它们镇压人民革命运动。“杜鲁门主义”是对别国内政的干涉，被学者认为是美苏之间“冷战”正式开始的重要标志。
杜鲁门主义实质：遏制共产主义，干涉别国内政，加紧控制其他国家的纲领和政策。以杜鲁门主义为起点，美国在经济方面推行了援助西欧的马歇尔计划，在军事方面建立了北大西洋公约组织。

Mr Trenin says that Russia is now "authoritarian", but not "totalitarian", a distinction American thinkers made much of during the cold war (when, incidentally, America frequently supported authoritarian dictators against totalitarian Soviet communism). Ms Slaughter seems to agree that the distinction matters. In a totalitarian state, the state, party, economic and social leaderships are fused. An authoritarian state is undemocratic, but there are players (business elites, regional leaders and so forth（第一次见这个词组，等于and so on)) that can be prized apart.

That is why Ms Slaughter says that sanctions（制裁） should not merely target Russia as if it were a unitary state, but should go after those individuals who are close to power to influence the Medvedev-Putin team's behaviour. Mr Trenin anticipates this argument. He says that most of the sanctions that have been proposed would be either symbolic and useless, or with costs that would probably be greater than the benefits.

But what, then, is to be done? Mr Trenin does not acknowledge clearly that Russia's behaviour is a problem. Perhaps he can clarify this. Is the invasion of South Ossetia, Abkhazia and even Georgia proper an understandable response to Georgian behaviour? Yes, Mikhail Saakashvili, Georgia's president, has antagonised Russia irresponsibly in recent years. And yes, the war was precipitated by Georgian shelling of South Ossetia. But the Russian response showed that Russia was not merely content to protect its clients in South Ossetia, but to dominate its near abroad, toppling（推翻，颠覆） their troublesome leaders as in the good old days. Is this acceptable behaviour? If not, does Mr Trenin favour any response at all?

Meanwhile, Ms Slaughter wants to tread boldly but judiciously, doing nothing that would weld Russia and China into joint leadership of an anti-Western block of authoritarian capitalist states. This makes sense. But calibrating exactly how much Russia can be pushed before it seeks to form such a block（主语） is going to be tricky. Too little, and there is no change in behaviour. Too much, and it is the new cold war no one wants.

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The proposer's opening remarks

Sep 9th 2008 | Ms Anne-Marie Slaughter

The West should be bolder in confronting a newly assertive Russia, but bolder in a way that understands and manipulates the realities of 21st-century politics rather than plunging us back into a 20th-century stalemate.（表明观点，提携全文）

A bold Western response should have three components: letting the European Union take the lead, albeit with close coordination with the United States; splitting Russia off from（从……分离） its incipient partners in a global G5 (with China, India, Brazil and South Africa); and using networks of economic, religious, social and cultural actors below the surface of traditional geopolitics（地缘政治） to bring home the true costs of Russia's actions.（用传统地缘政治下的经济，宗教，社会和文化因素构成的网络把俄罗斯行为的真正代价带回家？？）

地缘政治学是一种探讨个人、组织或团体，因为空间分布等的地理因素，经营政治的手段及方法。目前用于军事、外交等战略分析方面较多。常常以地理因素为底，经济，社会，军事，外交，历史，政治等为面进行分析。中国战国时代的纵横家，是中国古老的地缘政治学。“地缘政治”发端于瑞典地理学家克节伦，意指“国家所处的地理环境与国际政治的关系”，它根据各种地理要素和政治格局的地域形式，分析和预测世界或地区范围的战略形势和有关国家的政治行为。20世纪以来，由于全球的政治、经济和军事的发展，出现了各种地缘政治理论，并成为各国制订国防和外交等政策的一项重要依据。A.T.马汉强调海权对国际政治的影响，认为谁能控制海洋，谁就能成为世界强国，而控制海洋的关键在于对世界重要海道和海峡的控制。 H.J.麦金德则提出陆权论，认为随着陆上交通工具的发展，欧亚大陆的心脏地带成为最重要的战略地区。50年代，A.de塞维尔斯基根据空军在战略中的重要作用和美、苏空军控制范围重叠的地区，提出北极地区对美国争夺制空权十分重要的理论，被称为空权论。各种地缘政治理论的研究虽然都是以地理环境作为基础，但依据重点有所不同，过去多从历史、政治、军事等方面考虑，而近年来对经济、社会等方面的作用日益重视。

First, however, a word on why it is important to make absolutely clear that Russia's decision to solve its problems with Georgia by force, to engage in its own crude and brutal attempt at regime change, was a serious mistake and miscalculation. Dr Fareed Zakaria has done an excellent job of explaining all the reasons why the West should not have been surprised by Russia's move; as a great power, Russia cannot be expected to have an ally that it continues to perceive as an adversary move to its very borders. He argues, rightly in my view, that the West must avoid overreacting; that Russia has already made a strategic blunder.（战略错误） Less noticed, however, has been the centuries-old Russian tradition of creating external enemies to deflect domestic attention from（引开注意力）problems at home. Although Russia's coffers（金库）are flush with petrodollars, （石油美元）the resulting wealth is held by a tiny elite, just as in the age of the tsars. （沙皇）As popular as Vladimir Putin and his party are, they are delivering a heady nationalist brew rather than actually providing badly needed economic and social benefits to the population at large. It is that domestic political equation that the West must counterbalance by making clear that the diplomatic, political and economic costs of external adventures outweigh the domestic benefits.

The right-wing response in the United States has been essentially to confirm Putin's narrative of an aggressive United States bent on（下决心） humiliating（羞辱） Russia by ratcheting up our rhetoric and threatening a new cold war. In such a world, we would go back to a game of Europe in the middle, working hard to lower tensions that hurt its economy and its energy supply. A far better response is to let the EU take the lead, as Nicolas Sarkozy did immediately as EU president in the first week after Russian troops rolled into Georgia. Let the EU make clear to the Russians that they cannot drive a wedge between（使产生分歧或不和） us and Europe; rather, Russia's actions have strengthened transatlantic unity and resolve and bolstered the incentives for further European defence and foreign policy integration. That is not a trend that Russia wants to continue.

The most important aspect of the West's response is to avoid pushing Russia closer to China and to other emerging powers. China, Russia, India, Brazil and South Africa met for the first time as a G5 immediately in the wake of（尾随，紧跟）the collapse of the Doha round. Some Chinese scholars have called for such a group instead of the expansion of the G8 to the G13. Yet China has been appalled（惊骇） by the Russian invasion of Georgia, particularly during the Olympics; the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, in which China and Russia play the predominant roles, notably refused to support Russia's action and instead called for a non-violent solution to the ethnic issues in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The last thing China wants is violence on the Russian perimeter, or, for that matter, a newly assertive military power in Asia. Here lies the greatest danger of a bold response as traditionally framed, relying on diplomatic isolation with veiled military threats and a claim that we are seeing a new global division between capitalist democracies and capitalist dictatorships. That division, in my view, is nonsense; China is closer in many ways to the United Sates than to Russia in its economy and its search for ways to increase popular participation in government to shore up（支持） the latter's legitimacy. The point here is that a bold response to Russia must be directed at Russia, not at any larger category of states.

Finally, a bold response would not just target Russia, as a unitary state, but would also apply pressure to powerful individuals in Russia's government, economy and society. We should compile a list of 100-500 individuals who have the ability to influence Russian policy, either through direct communication with Mr Putin and Dmitry Medvedev or through direct appeals to the Russian people, and figure out precisely how to pressure or persuade each one to see the costs of using force in Russia's near abroad and the benefits of both non-violent solutions and increasing integration with the West and the world at large. Increasingly dense economic, political, cultural and religious networks are the distinguishing feature of the 21st-century world; we should be identifying and using these networks as conduits of communication and response. The message we send should be one of incentives as well as deterrents（威慑）, holding out the prospect of a new and more respectful NATO-Russian relationship and renewed recognition of Russia as essential for reaching solutions to problems in the Middle East and globally.

In sum, a Russian use of force against Ukraine would be disastrous, essentially confronting the world with the spectre of a nation rebuilding an empire by military means, rampaging and killing as it likes. Were the next step to be a Baltic state, the world could find itself plunged into nuclear war just when the cold-war generation assumes we have escaped that particular nightmare scenario for good（永久地）. We must respond boldly, but not in a traditional sense. Let Europe take the lead; avoid redividing the world with Russia on some artificial authoritarian side; and use the new tools of 21st-century networks to offer a choice between painful isolation and renewed integration.

slaughter教授认为应该对西方应该对俄罗斯更大胆一些，但要以一种理性的方式，具体包括三点内容：一是欧盟在处理俄格问题上应该是领导者；二是防止俄罗斯与中国等成为一个阵营；三是用21世纪的工具--网络。

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The opposition's opening remarks

Sep 9th 2008 | Mr Dmitri V. Trenin   

Those who argue that the West should be bolder in its response to a newly assertive Russia are trying to use their memories of the past to deal with a very different present and a highly uncertain future.（这个句子有感觉）

They see the danger in an authoritarian state which they often confuse with its totalitarian predecessor and see as a sworn enemy of democracy. They fear Russia's revived imperialist vocation, which should pose a mortal threat to its weaker neighbours. They are concerned that Russia is using its energy resources much as the Soviet Union had used its military power: to beat others into submission. Finally, they see Moscow at pains trying to construct something like an Authoritarian International to rally the enemies of the West on the world scene.

The problem with that view is not that it is all wrong, but that it is clearly biased and woefully incomplete. Without question, Russia is authoritarian; it does see itself as a great power and has engaged in power competition with those whom it sees as its rivals; it does insist on preserving links and influence in the former imperial borderlands turned independent states; it looks at oil, gas and other natural resources as its few real assets before its economy is modernized and diversified; it does have a global view, rejects US world domination and openly seeks to build what it calls a multipolar world order. True, Russia is not a post-modern player when it comes to international relations: it is a nationalistic, sovereignty-conscious, and does not shy from wielding hard power but apart from the European Union, no country is. Today, Russian people are freer and more affluent than they have ever been: capitalism is transforming Russian society on a daily basis. Yet even as Russia becomes progressively more Western inside, it has ceased to be pro-Western（亲西方的） in its foreign policy.

Some of Russia's critics are those who once hoped to foster and domesticate post-Soviet Russia as a ward of the West, to turn it into a version of Germany or Japan. When Russia's harsh circumstances confuted（驳倒） their high expectations, or their advice turned out to be futile or worse, they went from enthusiastic acclamation to angry disapprobation（不赞成）. Others had never believed Russia would change for the better; it could only grow weaker, and that moment should be used to create new realities on the ground that would keep Russia in its place when and if it recovered. In other words, the two prevailing models of the 1990s and the early 2000s were a democratic and dependent Russia; or a weak Russia that did not matter much. Most practitioners, of course, held less strident views than either group, but they walked away from Russia as a serious issue for the West as soon as they could, happy to be able turn to other business.

Now, after years of mismanagement and neglect, people have woken up to a mildly recovered and seemingly resurgent Russia. In response, they propose to isolate it and thus bring pressure on the economy, the population and ultimately the regime. In principle, sanctions can be imposed, and some can work. Some Russian assets abroad can be frozen, and some wealthy people, no doubt in good standing with the regime, can be made to suffer. Blacklists could be drafted, air traffic between London and Moscow would become much less heavy, and some boarding schools would get new vacancies. （空缺）Yes, Europe's energy dependency on Russia may be eventually reduced, but diversification of sources and alternative energy are basically sound policies in any event, and should be seen as a precautionary measure, rather than a reaction to a worsening relationship with a supplier.

One could surely take away the 2014 Sochi Olympics or the 2012 APEC summit in Vladivostok, but those are symbolic steps devoid of real impact. A freeze on the WTO membership and the perpetuation of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment would do little in the short term, and potentially harm both sides in the future. It is a pity that the nuclear co-operation agreement between Russia and the United States will not be enacted, but both sides will share the opportunity loss. Kicking Russia out of the G8 would bring some satisfaction to some, if only others agreed on that, and would exclude an important country from an exercise in global governance, which will be an insult to the former and an injury to the latter. One might terminate the NATO-Russia Council, in the situation where the only area for bilateral co-operation could be Afghanistan; or put a new agreement between the EU and Russia into a deep-freeze, and downgrade the overall relationship, but only to the effect of reducing the EU's diplomatic leverage, its internal unity and its outside role. It is not that Western sanctions would not hurt Russia, as Kremlin propagandists claim; it is that they are double-edged swords.

There are things, of course, that would make a difference: putting Georgia and Ukraine on a fast track to NATO membership, for example. One needs, however, to study the Georgia case a bit more closely to understand why the Georgian attack on South Ossetia was prevented last month, as several others had been before. One needs also to give deeper thought to the consequences of allowing an unstable authority to push a country towards NATO membership when only a fifth of the population supports it, and over half strongly oppose the move. Having gone through the crisis in Ossetia, one needs to be more careful with Crimea. Or so it would seem. Arming the Baltic states may be safer, but the real security problem there is that several hundred thousand Russophone people in Latvia and Estonia, whatever the reason, still lack citizenship and feel alienated from local democratic governments which they see as ethnocratic.

Rather than thinking about bold steps which would fuel nascent confrontation it makes more sense to subject old stereotypes to a reality check, and figure out whether Russia is heading, and what it actually wants. And then perhaps use the present crisis to structure a security relationship in Europe which would include Russia and reassure its wary neighbors. That, incidentally, may come in handy as other crises may jolt（摇动，颠覆） the world: a politico-nuclear meltdown in Pakistan, a Taliban comeback in Afghanistan, Iran's nuclear weapons progress, North Korea's proliferation regression and the like.

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Featured guest（特邀嘉宾）

Mr Marshall I. Goldman

When I was a lad（小伙子）, whenever I asked for something unreasonable, my mother's inevitable response was: "If wishes were horses, beggars would ride."（如果愿望都能实现，乞丐都发财了----愿望不能代替实际）That immediately came to mind when I read the proposition posed in this debate. I agree wholeheartedly with the proposition but find it practically unrealistic. （这句话貌似作文能用上）After Russia's bully-like behaviour in Georgia, the West should certainly be bolder in its response to Russia. But other than wagging a finger（摇手指）（想起了穆大叔） and saying "Naughty, naughty!"I find it hard to think of what else we can do to punish Russia that will be meaningful and something other than words. This is largely because under Vladimir Putin, Russia has emerged as a super-energy power that has transformed it from what was effectively bankruptcy to its status today as an economic superpower with close to $500 billion in currency reserves and something that is even more powerful today than gold,（好长的句子啊） not to mention dollars, large quantities of exportable oil and natural gas.

西方的国家对俄罗斯除了口头上的批评之外，很难去惩罚俄罗斯，因为普京已经让或者变为一个强大富有的国家。

It is hard to think of any measures that the outside world can take today that will bring Russia to heel. During the cold war, the Soviet Union was constrained by "mutually assured destruction"or MAD（前面那个词组的缩写：相互保证毁灭）. They dared not use their nuclear weapons for fear the United States would use its own, and vice versa（反之亦然）. With Russian oil and gas now as its main weapon, however, there is no comparable counter. Europeans often try to reassure themselves by insisting that the Russians need European energy markets as much as the Europeans need Russian oil and gas. But the Europeans are deluding themselves, as demonstrated in January 2006 when the Russians reduced the flow of natural gas to Ukraine, which in turn reduced shipments to Germany. Try as they might, there was nothing the Germans could do. As Ronald Reagan predicted they would, the Germans discovered that natural gas is a particularly effective weapon because it is delivered by pipeline and if that pipeline flow is cut off, there is no standby pipeline available to fill in as a substitute. It is too expensive to have an extra, parallel pipeline just sitting there waiting for an emergency.

此段说明欧洲很多国家依赖俄罗斯的资源。

In the Soviet period when its agricultural sector was in perpetual crisis, on occasion the United States withheld food supplies. But today with an improved economy (Russia actually exports grain nowadays) and its cash hoard, Russia would have no trouble finding food exporters who would choose profit over principle and sell to them. In much the same way, if there were an attempt to embargo（禁运） other exports to Russia, members of the European Union would find it hard to stand together were the Russians with their new wealth to dangle tempting contracts in front of them. Nor will the counter-threat to ban purchases from a rogue country like Russia work because Russia has so little in the way of manufactured goods that are competitive in world markets that the outside world could threaten to boycott. That is one reason why, other than symbolism, excluding Russia from membership in the World Trade Organisation is not much of a punishment.

Ironically it demonstrates how much Russia has changed that one of the few ways to influence Russian behaviour might be to threaten that unless Russia adheres to world standards, foreign investors will refrain from investing in Russia. This might have an impact (if some way can be found to hold foreign investors back) because so many of the Kremlin leaders and their buddies now are major stockholders in most of Russia's leading corporations. Thus when the RTS index of Russian stocks fell by one-third in late August during the fight with Georgia, Russian officials came to understand that they are now affected by the actions of outside investors. That is because Russia has become integrated into the world economy as never before. But while individuals in the leadership may indeed suffer because of Russia's new role as the largest producer of energy products, Russia is nonetheless in a stronger position as a country relative to the rest of the world, especially Europe, than it has ever been in its history, Tsarist or Soviet. That is why it would be nice to adopt a bolder stance towards Russia, but it is not realistic to think that the non-Russian world, whether individuals or nations, would be selfless（无私的） or united enough to confront and punish Russia for its misbehaviour.

Goldman认为采取更大胆的措施惩罚俄罗斯是好的，但是不切实际。

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Featured guest

Mr David Axe   

In the wake of last month's brief but intense fighting over Georgia's breakaway province of South Ossetia, should the West step up efforts to contain Russian aggression?

Absolutely not. It is wrong to read the South Ossetia conflict as Russian aggression, and it is equally wrong to conceive of the West's reactions—and planned reactions—as containment. We have been reading South Ossetia all wrong since the beginning, and the consequences are enormous and potentially tragic.

The bottom line: Russia's incursion into South Ossetia was justified, both in the particulars of Russia's relationship to Georgia, and in light of（按照） Russia's evolving, but troubled, relationship with Europe and the United States.

作者觉得双方西欧应该理解俄罗斯，接下来论证的是俄罗斯入侵格鲁吉亚是被迫的。

First, Georgia started the South Ossetia conflict by attacking Russian peacekeepers and civilians in the largely pro-Russian province. It was a highly premeditated move by Tbilisi, presaged（预示） by Georgia's major military exercises in July that left forces in place for an attack. That Russia was equally prepared does not change the fundamental fact that Georgia started it.（主语从句）

Second, the government, in collusion with（勾结） the Bush administration, exacerbated （恶化）tensions between Georgia and Russia by encouraging NATO expansion right up to Russia's borders. Beyond the imminent threat Georgia posed to Russians in South Ossetia, it also posed a major threat to Russia proper by way of an ever-expanding, increasingly aggressive NATO. (Consider that NATO is engaged in active combat in Afghanistan, a country bordering a former Soviet republic.) Russia would have been foolish not to respond to this antagonism once threats and words had turned into artillery and gunfire.

提到北约东扩对俄造成威胁

We must make a better effort to understand Russia. She is a state whose dominant personality trait is, frankly, paranoia. That paranoia is in part an extension and result of decades of police rule. But it is equally a reaction to a long history of devastating（破坏） foreign invasions. The lingering trauma （经久不消的创伤）很不错的比喻of the second world war, even six decades later, cannot be overstated. Russia eyes an encroaching West with fear born of millions of deaths.

For that reason, we must deal with Russia with care and respect, informed by one crucial fact: for all the overwhelming force Moscow displayed in dealing with Georgia, Russia's military is still quite backward: hamstrung by antiquated equipment and tactics, a shaky industrial base and a continuing reliance on conscripts rather than Western-style professional soldiers. For all its bluster, Russia truly is not nearly as great a military threat to the West as the West is a military threat to Russia.

Do not punish Russia for its past, and for its reaction to Georgian antagonism. Instead, talk to Russia, understand Russia, and—for God's sake—end NATO's eastward expansion.

The potential long-term consequence of casting Russia as some imminent threat is another Cold War. Or worse, an actual shooting war. There's no good reason for either.

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Rebuttal statements

The moderator's rebuttal remarks

Sep 12th 2008 | Mr Robert Lane Greene   

Dmitri Trenin and Anne-Marie Slaughter are working their way towards finding where they disagree, slowly and admirably politely.

The disagreement is over the nature of Russia's behaviour itself. Mr Trenin did not quite respond to my prompting:（提示，暗示） does he think Russia is behaving badly and should it be induced to do（被诱导去做）otherwise?

Ms Slaughter obviously thinks it is. Part of this is geographic: in tsarist times, Russia expanded until (history has a sense of irony, it seems) it was so big it could never be secure. The sprawling country has always been hard to run, its people hard to make rich, so ginning up enemies on all sides has always been a tempting distraction. For a time after 1991, European and Asian neighbours were not sure how to react to Russia. Friend? Rival? Failed state? Now, she proposes "letting the Europeans communicate that Russia's invasion of Georgia had the effect of uniting rather than dividing them [and] isolating Russia not from the West but from its newfound fellows in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation". （欧洲与俄罗斯就俄入侵格鲁吉亚的问题沟通会使他们团结起来，不是将俄罗斯从西方而是从上海合作组织孤立出来）Many of the commentators seem to assume she wants a more aggressive American role (and bring up Iraq). She is very much saying that Russia's neighbours （指欧盟）know it best, and should take the lead.

Mr Trenin does not seem to agree that there is a behaviour problem at all. "The principal problem with my opponent's recommendations is the hallowed centuries-old view of Russia as an imperialist aggressor bent on territorial aggrandisement. All countries, it seems, change over time," he complains, but analysts never update their views of Russia. "This stale view (I am sorry) leads to equally unhelpful analysis: Russia is bent on（下决心要） imperial restoration, and Georgia is likely to be followed by other victims, Ukraine, the Baltic states and possibly others: another domino theory."

Trenin认为很多分析家对俄罗斯的观念陈旧。

Both Mr Trenin and a few commentators point to what they see as Western actions that have provoked Russia. This includes the expansion of NATO to include former Soviet republics in the Baltics and former satellites in the Balkans, and the prospect of Georgian and Ukrainian membership. JrMor, a commentator, sees a clear causal relationship: "The invasion of Georgia was in many ways a direct response to nascent NATO plans to extend into Georgia and Ukraine." Easterner agrees: "The West should try to understand Russia better and respect it more. It requires very little effort and will pay off in creation of a better, fairer world." Ms Slaughter agrees that the bigger context is important: "Finding out what Russia actually wants and treating Russia and its needs and desires with respect must be part of an ultimate solution." Perhaps she can elaborate on what she thinks Russia might in fact want, and whether it in fact deserves it. If the distance between those two is not too great, we may all be able to relax a bit.

一些人认为俄罗斯入侵格鲁吉亚是被北约东扩激怒了。

Marshall Goldman weighs in with an outside comment. His heart seems to be with Ms Slaughter—the West should indeed be bolder—but his head with Mr Trenin, in doubting that the West has many tools that will work. He points to Russia's energy wealth of late, arguing that it could perhaps more easily punish Europe than the other way round. He even sees a weakness as a strength: "Russia has so little in the way of manufactured goods that are competitive in world markets that the outside world could threaten to boycott." Not much, in his view, to answer the famous Russian question: "Chto delat?"（俄语，怎么办？） What is to be done?

Mr Trenin has yet to answer directly why targeting Russia's elites will not work, saying merely that he thinks it will not. Perhaps Ms Slaughter can tell us what is in Russian heads, fears and hopes that can be influenced by smart sanctions. Specifics, as always, are useful. And perhaps Mr Trenin can answer why they are unable to be swayed. The debate is close run so far: 55% against the proposition at the time of this writing, and 45% in favour.

The proposer's rebuttal remarks

Sep 12th 2008 | Ms Anne-Marie Slaughter

It is not entirely clear where the disagreement between Dmitri Trenin and me lies.

I have not proposed to do most of the things he charges "those who recommend bold measures" against Russia with; I would not deny Russia the Olympics or kick it out of any international organisations. I did suggest targeting sanctions or figuring out other ways to put pressure on prominent Russians from different sectors who could have an impact on Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev; Mr Trenin does not say why this would be a bad idea. And although he argues that many wrongly confuse authoritarian Russia today with its totalitarian predecessor, he never addresses one of my core points, which looks back not to the Soviet but to the tsarist period for the proposition that Russian governments often manufacture foreign enemies and national humiliations to distract the population from domestic problems. Russians may be "freer and more affluent than they have ever been", but my point was that that affluence is going to a very few, even by the standards of an increasingly unequal world, and that the mass of Russians still have tremendous health care, environmental and cost-of-living problems, for which they have little outlet other than nationalist politics.

slaughter认为尽管俄罗斯跟沙皇时代有很大不同，但国内还存在很多问题。

The biggest open question, however, is what exactly Mr Trenin would have us do. I agree with him that the United States should send a special envoy to Russia; we have nothing to lose by engaging Russia directly, and it may well be that in this instance the Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, is not the right person. She is an old cold warrior and she and the Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov are reported to be on very bad terms. Finding out what Russia actually wants and treating Russia and its needs and desires with respect must be part of an ultimate solution. But surely that cannot be the total solution: that the West learn what Russia wants and then acquiesce in whatever that is. Suppose what it wants is to take back（收回，使回忆起） the Crimea（使回忆起克里姆林宫，意思是说要使俄罗斯重现苏联的强国地位）？ Or to install a puppet government（傀儡政府） in Ukraine? Or to carve out Russophone republics in Latvia and Estonia and recognise them as independent?

slaughter认为解决问题必须要了解俄罗斯究竟想要什么。

Assuming that the answer is more than just "Let them", the question becomes how both to engage Russia on the problems ranging from Iran to climate change while simultaneously sending a strong message that using force, even in its near abroad, is a very bad move, with serious consequences. I proposed letting the Europeans communicate that Russia's invasion of Georgia had the effect of uniting rather than dividing them; isolating Russia not from the West but from its new-found fellows in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which in practice means avoiding any move that would put Russia and China in the same category; and applying pressure at the individual level through economic, social and cultural networks. I have not heard a better plan.

Where I do think Mr Trenin makes an important point, however, is his insistence that we in the West abandon the simplistic categories of "a democratic and dependent Russia; or a weak Russia that did not matter much"; or now a revived imperialist and/or authoritarian Russia. Russia has many facets and many assets, as any businessperson can tell you. Our task is to develop a framework for relations that recognises some of what Russia has achieved and acknowledges its role on the world stage, while at the same time making it clear that on that stage there are real costs of not playing by the rules

要让俄罗斯知道不遵守规则的后果。

The opposition's rebuttal remarks

Sep 12th 2008 | Mr Dmitri V. Trenin

My opponent rightly demolishes what she calls the right-wing response in the United States to Russia's policies, which pushes the world towards a new confrontation, with Europe sitting uncomfortably in the middle.

I wholeheartedly agree, and wish that this admonition（警告） will be taken seriously in Washington, not least due to the dangers inherent in such an approach for the United States itself.

I share with Anne-Marie Slaughter her total rejection of the concept of an "authoritarian international". It is just rubbish, reflective more of the Leninist—that is, ideological, black-and-white, damn-the-reality-if-it-disagrees-with-my-views—turn of mind of its US spokesmen than of the realities in today's world. There is too little space to expand on this here. As for（至于） punishing China for Russia, that is the kind of folly（愚蠢） that appears too absurd even to consider.

I also agree that, in this day and age, the European Union should take an active role in creating a secure environment in the entire Euro-Atlantic area, which also includes North America and Russia. France's Nicolas Sarkozy has taken the lead in forging a peace settlement in the Caucasus: a good first for the EU's diplomacy as a whole. Germany, too, is not that far behind; and many others, from Portugal to Italy to Finland, are aroused. Europe is ceasing to be a passive onlooker（旁观者） and is beginning to act, based on its principles, interests and experience. Good luck to it.

I am somewhat jarred, however, by Ms Slaughter's somewhat patronising approach towards the Europeans ('let them take the lead"; "let the EU make clear to the Russians that they cannot drive a wedge between us and Europe"). Over the past millennium or so, European nations have had very rich and varied relations with Russia, and they know their neighbour as well as anybody in this world. I also think that the Europeans will be doing what they think is best in their own interests, and that now that they are whole and free, it is natural to expect that, over time, they will also emerge as an independent strategic actor. That will be good for the world, including, of course, the United States.

A united Europe which speaks its own mind with one clear voice and can effectively act on its own will be very good news for Russia. Moscow's problem is not that Europeans at times disagree with its actions; it is, rather, that eastern and central Europeans feel closer to Washington than to Brussels, and that the UK, under the current Labour government, has forfeited London's traditional and highly useful role as a mediator between the United States and continental Europe, on the one hand, and Washington and Moscow, on the other. As to wedge-driving, no single event recently divided the Europeans more than the US invasion of Iraq. It is also prominent US voices, from Don Rumsfeld to Bob Kagan, who contrasted "new Europe" to "old", or a European Venus to an American Mars. Also, for practical purposes, the White House and the State Department use their special relations with individual European countries in an effort to get NATO or the EU to act in a particular way. In that sense, little has changed since Kissinger's days in power.

Having agreed with Ms Slaughter on so many counts, I will disappoint readers if I fail to politely disagree with her on a point or two.

The principal problem with my opponent's recommendations is the hallowed centuries-old view of Russia as an imperialist aggressor bent on territorial aggrandisement. All countries, it seems, change over time, and largely for the better, including China (which has deserved a nice passage in her opening statement), but "good/bad old Russia" stays essentially the same. This stale view (I am sorry) leads to equally unhelpful analysis: Russia is bent on imperial restoration, and Georgia is likely to be followed by other victims, Ukraine, the Baltic states and possibly others: another domino theory.

As we used to joke in Soviet days about Solzhenitsyn's and other dissidents' books, taunting the official propaganda, "I would never read that stuff, but I disagree with it." I am not sure my opponent has given enough thought to the fact of the Georgian attack on the South Ossetian town, and the numerous civilian deaths it produced; or to the sudden death of dozens of Russian peacekeepers, killed by Georgian forces, which included fellow Georgian peacekeepers. Would she take pause and try to give a serious answer to the following questions. How could it happen that, given the heavy US presence and involvement in Georgia, including its military establishment, it did not know about Mikheil Saakashvili's plan of attack? Or could it be that, having got wind of （得知，风闻）the imminent military move, it was unable to restrain the Georgian firebrand, as it had done so many times before? And, finally, why did the United States fail to use the last opportunity at the night-time UN Security Council session to stop the Georgian action, which was killing civilians, before the Russians moved in? This could be stuff for investigative reporting, Bob Woodward-style.

But maybe not. There is simply no constituency in favour of, in Ms Slaughter's words, a "more respectful relationship with Russia", in contrast to China. The range of views on Russia as it exists is between an old-style cold war approach and new-style "creative punishment". Pressuring some of the 100-150 influential Russians to make them feel the costs of Moscow's policies could certainly be done, but whether it will reach the desired goal is questionable. If anything, it is more likely to produce a new generation of Russian leaders more impervious（不为所动的） to outside pressure.

To sum up: fantasising about Russia impairs the American ability to successfully navigate the 21st- century world; a knee-jerk punishment reflex in a crisis reveals a diminished capacity for rational action and a reluctance to pause and think, "What have we done wrong?" is a recipe for more mistakes, and failures, along the way.

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Featured guest

Dr Steven J. Blank

Neither in Georgia nor in Yugoslavia have we seen the "hour of Europe". In Georgia, the European Union leadership could neither negotiate a clear, coherent, and viable ceasefire instrument, nor make Russia observe it. Then it refused to undertake any serious concerted action against Russia lest （连词--担心，唯恐）an angry Russia reduce energy supplies to its best customer and only terminus of its pipelines. Yet Brussels"irresolute（优柔寡断的） and craven （胆小的）policy of accommodation has achieved nothing. Since provoking Georgia's reckless attack on South Ossetia, Russia has violated its own ceasefire, expanded its occupation zone, looted Georgian territories, demanded an arms embargo（武器禁运） and regime change in Georgia, unilaterally recognised South Ossetia and Abkhazia, issued repeated ultimatums to America not to rearm （重新武装）Georgia and to stop providing humanitarian assistance, threatened to suspend co-operation with America against Iranian nuclear proliferation and send Iran S-300 anti-air missiles, threatened retaliation（报复） against Turkey for opening the Straits to those shipments, threatened Poland with nuclear strikes, announced the Nazi-like doctrine that it has the right to protect ethnic Russians and Russian "citizens"beyond Russian borders, and claimed a sphere of influence encompassing the CIS, eastern Europe and the Middle East. Russia has also violated Russo-American agreements on not deploying tactical nuclear weapons on ships in the Baltic Sea. Clearly this regime is consumed by imperial fantasies and seeks a totally free hand in world politics. Brussels"accommodating policy has only reaped further threats and contempt.

对比了欧盟的孱弱（因为对俄资源上的依赖）和俄罗斯的强硬。

Europe has again shown it cannot defend itself. America must reformulate a coherent Russian policy and then persuade its allies to support it as it has previously failed to do. This entails the following actions. The West must rebuild Georgia, provide humanitarian assistance and restore Georgia's capacity for self-defence. It must uphold Georgia's integrity and internationalise the peace regime in Georgia's provinces, return to the status quo ante, and then vigorously negotiate a settlement for those provinces. It must uphold Georgia's exclusive right to decide upon its government. The EU must also reorient its energy policies away from Russia and support Turkey's right to open the Straits to humanitarian intervention as long as necessary, as stipulated in the Montreux treaty, and its unimpeded access to energy.
指出欧盟需要做出一些强硬的措施。

NATO and the EU must offer Ukraine and other post-Soviet states a clear road to membership and help them achieve it while holding them accountable for fulfilling their responsibilities. Sanctions must be imposed on Russia for violating the Helsinki Treaty and forcibly altering European borders. If Russia cuts energy supplies to Europe it only reduces its own income and harms itself. Furthermore, since Russia refuses to let foreigners invest on an equal basis in Russia the EU should stop allowing Russian IPOs in their markets. Finally, it should, without compromising intelligence sources and methods, expose Russia's active measures to buy influence in European energy corporations, banks, media, political parties and other strategic sectors. Only when such concerted US and European action occurs can we believe in the reality of a common European foreign and security policy. Hitherto there has been ambition but not policy. That ambition should be made of sterner stuff.

欧盟需要强硬。

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Featured guest

Mr Edward S Verona

US-Russian relations since the collapse of the Soviet Union have been buffeted by political tensions on more than one occasion. NATO military action in Bosnia and Kosovo, the Iraq invasion and Russian technical assistance to the Iranian nuclear programme are notable examples of episodic or persistent stress in the bilateral relationship.（美国和俄罗斯关系紧张） Throughout the post-Soviet era, however, economic and commercial relations between the two countries have continued to expand, with only a temporary interruption due to Russia's sovereign-debt default and subsequent ruble devaluation（卢布贬值）in 1998. In a sense, business has served as a stabilising factor during difficult times, providing an avenue for co-operation and a force for positive economic and social change within Russia.

We hope business activity will continue to exert a moderating influence between the two countries in this period of heightened tensions, certainly the worst that we have seen since the end of the cold war. Serious political differences between the two countries exist and will likely defy resolution in the near or intermediate term; and this will undoubtedly have economic repercussions. Already we have seen a setback in the prospects for co-operation in the area of civilian nuclear technology following the administration's withdrawal this week of the US-Russian Nuclear 123 Agreement from the congressional docket. While that decision was as much an acknowledgement of domestic political reality as it was a signal to Russia, it is unfortunate that co-operation in so crucial an area as the peaceful use of nuclear power has been lost, at least for the time being.

The administration's announcement on September 8th that it will not take unilateral punitive actions against Russia was commendable（值得表扬的）. If action is deemed necessary it should follow close consultation and co-ordination with our friends and allies. Otherwise, its impact will be little more than symbolic. Unilateral economic sanctions would likely be ineffective and potentially cause greater harm to our own business interests than to the intended target. The US embargo on the sale of oil and gas equipment to the Soviet Union in 1982 had little effect on the Russians"ability to construct gas pipelines to Europe, nor did it dissuade the Europeans from signing long-term gas purchase contracts. The most serious damage caused by that embargo was to the reputation of US manufacturers throughout the world as reliable suppliers.

Any official action against Russia should be weighed against the possible unintended consequences. Western trade and investment has exerted a generally healthy influence on Russian corporate governance and transparency, and enabled the emergence of a consumer-oriented middle class that is a catalyst for civil society and—one hopes—for eventual political reform. Business has engaged by and large with the more progressive elements of Russian society and politics. There is a risk that economic sanctions could inadvertently undermine those elements and reinforce the more reactionary ones.

As business advocates it is not our place（工作） to say whether or not strong political measures are warranted. However, we believe it is important to point out the risks of using economic and commercial means to accomplish political aims.

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closing statements

The moderator's closing remarks

Sep 17th 2008 | Mr Robert Lane Greene

It took three rounds, but we have now the clearest statements possible from Anne-Marie Slaughter and Dmitri Trenin on what to do about Russia.

And we have discovered why they think differently. What you think about Russia's actions will determine whether you think the West must be "bolder".

Mr Trenin is now on the record: "the person who bears the bulk of responsibility for what happened in 2008 is Mikheil Saakashvili." He thinks Russia's response to the Georgian shelling on South Ossetia is not only parallel to, but more restrained than, America's attacks on Yugoslavia over Kosovo in 1999. So there is no reason to be bolder with Russia, because the behaviour of others is at the root of the August war.

应该负责的是格鲁吉亚总统萨卡什维利，而不是俄罗斯。

Ms Slaughter obviously disagrees, calling Russia's invasion of Georgia a "very disproportionate response" to Mr Saakashvili. So she clarifies what she thinks should be done, saying that she would "exercise every lever possible in the Russian business community, which very much wants to be integrated with the West, to make clear the costs of this kinds of activity—freezing assets, curbing travel for family members, [and] freezing invitations to international conferences... No one has explained why these won't work." Mr Trenin's response: "One can certainly get Putin even angrier at his Western critics, and one can probably succeed in turning some oligarchs into better Russian patriots, but I cannot see how this can help the Western cause."

Steven Blank, from the US Army War College, weighs in by laying an ugly charge-sheet（案情记录） at Russia's feet (including less-reported measures like threatening to send anti-air missiles to Iran). Given what he sees as hugely dangerous Russian behaviour, he says the Western response must be made of "sterner stuff". This would include offers of "a clear road to membership" in NATO for Ukraine and "other post-Soviet states". He says that Western countries should expose Russian influence-buying in European energy firms, and that Russia should be denied IPOs in European markets. That would be stern indeed, and certainly goes beyond what our main Pro-ponent（支持者）, Ms Slaughter, suggests. A few commenters, among them Olya Naumova and ObservantW, are disturbed by Mr Blank's line of thinking.

David Axe, a freelance war correspondent, agrees in his guest commentary with Mr Trenin. Georgian behaviour, he writes, as well as the provocative NATO expansion to Russia's border, explains Russia's "paranoia": "Russia would have been foolish not to respond to this antagonism once threats and words had turned into artillery and gunfire" from Georgia. Like many commenters against the proposition, and indeed like Ms Slaughter, he thinks that the West must do a better job of understanding what Russia wants.

Comments have been fast and furious; the subject is obviously raising strong emotions out there. To the benefit of all, many of the commenters seem to be Russians themselves. Most comments have clearly pro- or con- positions. Several on both sides dust off the Hitler analogy, something that is strongly discouraged in all debates. (Neither Mr Saakashvili nor Mr Putin is Hitler, who was quite unique.) Perhaps one of the more pleasingly nuanced（微妙的） comments comes from Shulah, both kind and wary towards Russia: "Though the transition from a close-to-bankruptcy nation to an almost super-power has been a fantastic one, Mr Putin's Russia should have taken some time off and taken a leaf from（学某人的样子） China's rise to power."

Ms Slaughter seems to have won some voters to her side; as of this writing, the Pro position has turned a small deficit into a small lead. She writes more in sorrow than in anger, hoping to see "a Russia that is less chronically insecure about its joint status as a European and an Asian nation, and about its intellectual and cultural contributions to the world, beyond its natural resources." But she thinks there must be sticks as well as carrots to get it there. Mr Trenin, for his part, sees her suggestions as "plain ludicrous". They have had their final words, but final comments, and the final vote are yet to come.

The proposer's closing remarks

Sep 17th 2008 | Ms Anne-Marie Slaughter

Let me begin by agreeing with Varske, who offers the helpful clarification that the nature of this debate for many participants turns on "what you mean by bolder: bolder in the sense of stronger reactions rather than weaker, or bolder in the sense of more imaginative and/or creative to get out of the old stereotypes."

Dmitri Trenin and I both agree that "stronger reactions rather than weaker", in the sense of a military or even threatened military response; or pushing NATO even further; or moving in other ways to drive the West even closer to Russia's borders, would at this point be deeply counter-productive. The reason is most succinctly（简洁地） stated by LiveClear11, who writes: "The worst the West could do is to give the ultranationalists in Russia fodder（饲料） to suggest that a new cold war is imminent（即将发生的） and it's Russia against the world." That is exactly right, but that observation also points to the key element of disagreement between Mr Trenin and me.

Mr Trenin accuses me of the "stale" view that Russia is just up to（忙于，直到） its old imperialist tricks. Not so. I did not argue that Russia was imperialist as in tsarist days, but rather that it is an old Russian habit, as with many authoritarian governments, to manufacture an external threat to whip up（激起） nationalist sentiment as a way of distracting the population from domestic problems. Many of the commentators, including a number of Russian participants in the debate, agree with this proposition, noting the miserable quality of life for many ordinary Russians—see Alice in Wonderland's point that pensioners（领养老金者）lived better in Soviet times than they do today—and Marek in Moscow's point that even his very Westernised friends suddenly have a very nationalist reaction when talking about Russian honour and pride.

一直强调俄罗斯向来有 利用国外问题 激起民众爱国情绪从而把他们注意力从国内问题转移出来的传统。

That means that the West faces the following dilemma: How to respond to Russia's very disproportionate（不成比例的） response to Georgia's military action in South Ossetia in a way that will deter（威慑） further such military action in Ukraine or elsewhere in the "near abroad" but that will not inflame a nationalist reaction that would make it easier (or even create incentives) for the government to do just that? Here I return to my starting proposition: the West must have some response; it is not necessary to think that Putin is the reincarnation（化身，转世） of Hitler to realise that the absence of any response is likely to be seen as a sign of weakness or an indication that no consequences will follow further similar action. Here again, I, like the moderator, would ask Mr Trenin whether he is really proposing that the West do nothing?

So here let me be more specific, as our moderator requests. First, I would second（支持，赞同） Hillary Clinton's proposal that we establish an international commission to determine the precise facts of what happened on October 8th and in the days before and after. We should not presume to know those facts and we should give the Russian account of what happened a fair hearing. Second, as I suggested before, the EU and America should jointly designate a high-level envoy to Moscow to find out what Russia wants directly, rather than simply speculating. Third, however, I would exercise every lever possible in the Russian business community, which very much wants to be integrated with the West, to make clear the costs of this kind of activity—freezing assets, curbing travel for family members, freezing invitations to international conferences like the World Economic Forum. No one has explained why these won't work.

Fourth, however, as Walter Smart and others suggested, we must offer carrots as well as sticks, offering Russia a renewed diplomatic role with the EU and America in negotiations, not only with Iran but also with regard to renewed efforts to broker an Israeli-Palestinian settlement, now possibly including Syria. Holding out the possibility of a joint US-Russia non-proliferation（防止核武器扩散） initiative and EU-US-Russia free-trade talks, as Walter Smart suggests, are other possibilities. Overall, as Knowledgeseeker writes, the long-term goal must "be a more integrated Russia—economically and of course into the 'community of nations' where it is less likely to repeat these kinds of actions." I would add also: a Russia that is less chronically insecure about its joint status as a European and an Asian nation, and about its intellectual and cultural contributions to the world, beyond its natural resources.

The opposition's closing remarks

Sep 17th 2008 | Mr Dmitri V. Trenin

I must apologise for apparently ignoring the invitation to discuss Ms Slaughter's sanctions at any length. Frankly, the reason I sought to avoid that was sheer embarrassment with the proposal.

Generally, I find the pro-sanctions talk to be ill-informed, emotional, short-sighted and, above all, cheap. As far as the measures proposed by Ms. Slaughter are concerned, I see them as plain ludicrous. Does Ms Slaughter propose, eg, a travel ban on President Medvedev, as the Russian commander-chief? Could the boycott also be extended to Mr Medvedev as a speaking partner, and if so, does the proposal mean to put the hot line（电话热线） between the White House and the Kremlin off-limits? Whom else would the smart sanctions target: Mr Putin? His ministers? (I skip the generals, who rarely travel abroad or talk to foreigners.)

Does this mean that Ms Slaughter would seek to slash all official contacts between the governments of the West and the Russian government? This was never practiced even during the cold war. If she is thinking more about the oligarchs and corrupt officials, as softer targets, how would that hurt Messrs Medvedev and Putin, or influence their policies? One can certainly get Mr Putin even angrier with his Western critics, and one can probably succeed in turning some oligarchs into better Russian patriots, but I cannot see how this would help the Western cause. And if the Western law-enforcement agencies should have incriminating evidence against free-wheeling Russian tycoons, why not bring it up as a matter of course, rather than saving it for a politically opportune moment? I believe that this proposal, Ms Slaughter's only specific one, illustrates the lack of instruments to achieve the goal she has identified. There is a will, but no way. （where there is a will, there is a way）Unless, of course, someone would suggest kidnapping the Kremlin duo（二人组，二重唱）（指普京和梅德韦杰夫） and sending them to Guantánamo（臭名昭著的关塔那摩监狱）for re-education.

So far, I have seen my job as discussing the likely effectiveness of bolder Western reaction to Moscow's actions in the Caucasus. However, Mr Greene, the moderator, has urged me to discuss the Russian action itself. Let me be plain: I see it in terms broadly similar to the NATO action over then-Yugoslavia in 1999. With important new elements though: (a) while NATO troops went into action when Belgrade failed to respond to their governments' ultimatum, Russia was responding massively to a deadly attack against its peacekeepers, which was part of the Georgian onslaught on South Ossetia, which started the war; (2) NATO was saved from having to launch a land invasion, which would have occupied Serbia and ended the rule of Milosevic, only by the Russian-European diplomatic action, while Russia's invasion of Georgia proper has been limited; (3) whereas it took the West seven years to recognise Kosovo, Russia's recognition of Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence followed within two weeks of the end of hostilities. That said, I sympathise with the Georgian civilians who lost life, limb or property as part of what NATO used to call "collateral damage". I would not want to be in Gori in 2008, as I dreaded to be in Belgrade in 1999. The person for whom I had absolutely no sympathy in 1999 was Slobodan Milosevic. The person who bears the bulk of responsibility for what happened in 2008 is Mikheil Saakashvili.

My central criticism of the Russian government is that they had not managed to resolve the conflicts on Russia's borders. They probably thought that the "freeze" was offering them an instrument to put pressure on Georgia and make it impossible for it to join NATO or host American military bases. That was the only real interest that Russia had; it certainly felt no threat from the Rose revolution（玫瑰革命）—other than the chance that roses would eventually be used for welcoming American military personnel to the Caucasus. However, my much bigger problem is with the sloppiness, or worse, of the current US administration, which failed to prevent Saakashvili's fateful move on Tskhinval, or to cut it short once it started, and thus prevent the massive Russian counter-move. After the recent hearings in the US Senate and the House, one would hope that an investigation into the circumstances that led to the war would give an answer to the question whether this was, on behalf of（代表，为了） the Bush administration, an act of omission (which I hope) or commission.

玫瑰革命是2003年11月在格鲁吉亚发生的反对当时总统谢瓦尔德纳泽及其所领导政府的一系列示威活动，其领导人反对党领袖萨卡什维利每次公开露面都拿一枝玫瑰花，因此被称为玫瑰革命。最终，萨卡什维利领导的反对党获得了胜利，建立了民主选举的政府，其本人当选格鲁吉亚总统，而原格鲁吉亚总统谢瓦尔德纳泽辞职。在2004年03月28日进行的格鲁吉亚议会选举中，萨卡什维利总统领导的政党获得全部150个议席。

Finally, I must confess（承认，供认） I was very struck by the intense emotions evoked by the debate. I was also impressed by the reasonable closeness of the vote, which I take as a sign of the perceived seriousness of the issue, not the voters' indecisiveness. More than a couple of times, however, I have been startled by the complete triumph of emotions over reason, and of prejudice over rational judgment. That Russia is often misunderstood, and worst-case scenarios are at the top of many people's minds, is not particularly surprising, in view of the Soviet Union's history, the cold war and more ancient prejudices. "The Hun" lives on, only now he is known as the Russian bear. (Has anyone noticed that newspaper cartoons usually depict Russia as an animal, while other nations are represented by humans? A minor but interesting point.) What is more revealing, and also sad, is the proliferation of newly-closed minds, too long steeped perhaps in the rites of political correctness.

I have not set myself the task of suggesting ever smarter ways of getting at Russia. For those who yearn to see Russia punished, I will say: do not worry, the markets are doing it for you. For those who absolutely want to "do something", I will say, the steps that you take will haunt you as long way. This is not a good moment, but at some point the West, and in particular America, will need to recognise that its policies towards Russia were profoundly misguided, in the first post-Soviet decade, and mostly non-existent ever since. Russia matters, and there is a penalty for getting it wrong or neglecting it. That NATO expansion policies have now run into a wall（碰壁） is for all to see. There is no need to continue banging one's head against that wall. Instead, give a fresh look to European security, in the light of Kosovo and the Caucasus, and agree with Russia on the rules to live by; negotiate new strategic and conventional arms agreements in place of those already discarded (CFE) or about to expire (START); do not allow Iran to use the US-Russian confrontation to progress toward nuclear weapons; unfreeze the NATO-Russia cooperation on Afghanistan. And, above all, do not stand in the way of Russia's economic integration with the rest of the world. In the age of globalisation, any country's behaviour is best moderated by the forces of the market. Indeed, be bolder. Think out of the cold war icebox.