【CASK EFFECT】0910F阅读全方位锻炼--越障【SCI】 1-16

tuziduiduiUID: 2599524

【CASK EFFECT】0910G阅读能力基础自测（速度、难度、深度、越障、真题、RAM）
https://bbs.gter.net/forum.php?mod=viewthread&tid=910464&highlight

【CASK EFFECT】0910F阅读全方位锻炼--越障【SCI】汇总贴
https://bbs.gter.net/thread-982020-1-1.html

规则：0 u, r. g$ C/ d+ [4 f5 C

我每天贴出1000字左右的一篇文字7 j) N0 Q, Q- ]( V4 E

没有别的要求，只要大家坚持读完就可以

如果你能坚持一个月，你会发现自己的阅读进化了~
[注]9 K7 C8 w4 {" L
1、直接在电脑屏幕面前做，虽然GRE阅读是在纸上考，但是这个过程会遏制你做笔记，同时给你的阅读造成视觉障碍，也就是把难度训练和抗干扰训练同步结合，增加效率（初期会很累，但是既然大家想要成为高手，那么就别对自己太温柔）

Today's Topic: Japan’s return to gold: Turning points in the value of the yen during the 1920s

For politicians and policy-makers throughout the industrialized world, the return to the gold standard following the end of World War I was an article of faith (Eichengreen and Temin, 1997).Despite the historical and emotional appeal of the gold standard, the road back was neither direct nor smooth. Inflationary—and sometimes hyper inflationary—war-time finance, combined with the war’s physical destruction made the return problematic. Countries attempting to return to the gold standard at the prewar parity were forced to undergo substantial deflation, with considerable political and economic cost (e.g., [Temin, 1989], [Eichengreen, 1992], [Simmons, 1994], [Eichengreen and Temin,1997], [Obstfeld and Taylor, 2003], [Wolf and Yousef, 2007]and [Wandschneider, 2008]).

This paper examines the experience of interwar Japan and its efforts to restore gold convertibility throughout the1920s. Japan presents an interesting case study of monetary politics in the interwar period. Economically, Japan seemed to be ready to return to gold at the close of World War I: Japan accumulated foreign assets during the war,becoming a net international creditor for the first time since the Meiji Restoration (Flath, 2005, pp. 44–45). Nonetheless, Japan was the last industrialized country to restore gold convertibility, which it did in January 1930. Thus,given that economic conditions seemed to be suitable for the restoration of gold standard at the end of the war, Japan’s tardiness is puzzling.1
To shed some light on this issue, we undertake an iterative endogenous search for the turning points in the value of the yen and look for coincident events that are likely to have been responsible for them. Using this methodology, we hope to determine what events were found by contemporaries to be turning points in Japan’s path back to the gold standard, which was completed on January 11, 1930. Our approach reveals five statistically robust turning points, two caused by political events and three by diplomatic-military events.

The political turning points are associated with changes of power between the Kenseikai and Seiyukai parties:the value of the yen turned downward—and continued to fall—on April 1927, when the Rikken Seiyukai (Friends of Constitutional Government Party) took the control of the cabinet from the Kenseikai (Constitutional Party), whereas itsoared after July 1929, when Kenseikai regained the cabinet control. These two turning points illustrate the classic notion of “trilemma” which states that policy-makers cannot simultaneously fix the exchange rate, allow free capital mobility, and maintain monetary autonomy (e.g., Obstfeld et al., 2005). Kenseikai favored fiscal restraint, conciliatory foreign policy, and prompt restoration of the gold standard at the prewar parity while Seiyukai opposed these economic and diplomatic policies Metzler (2006). Hence, forward-looking investors, being keenly aware of policy-constraints given by the trilemma, must have anticipated yen appreciation with the Kenseikai in the control of cabinet and depreciation with the Seiyukai in power.

The diplomatic-military events that coincided with yen’s turning points are: (1) the long-awaited troop with drawal following the Siberian Intervention in the summer of 1922, which had drained fiscal resources from the Japanese government for previous three years; (2) the escalation of civil war in China in October 1924; and (3) the Jinan incident of May 1928, in which localized armed conflicts between Kuomintang and Japanese troops in the capital of Shandong led the Japanese government to deploy additional troops in China. These turning points suggest that the Japanese government had a hard time establishing credibility because of its military involvement in Asia (particularly China), the fiscal cost of which was perceived to be inconsistent with full convertibility at the prewar rate. Taken together, the results suggest that Japan’s efforts toward gold convertibility were, in part, impeded by political instability and Japan’s territorial ambitions in China that were not consistent with fixed exchange rate and capital account liberalization.

Previous works (e.g., [Eichengreen, 1992]and [Obstfeld and Taylor, 2003]) argue that the rise of democracy during the interwar period made it more tempting for governments to use discretionary fiscal and monetary policy to maintain employment for newly-enfranchised workers. Interwar Japan provides a good laboratory to assess whether the expansion of suffrage made the promise to return to the gold standard less credible. Universal manhood suffrage was a contentious political issue supported by a small number of liberal-minded Diet members.2 Nevertheless, after a Kenseikai-led coalition, which advocated universal manhood suffrage, won a majority in the Lower House election of May 10, 1924 and subsequently seized control of the cabinet from the aristocratic government, the democratic movement gained momentum. In March 1925, the Diet finally passed the universal suffrage bill,which extended voting rights that had been granted exclusively to males aged 25years or older who paid at least 15 yen in annual tax to all male citizens aged25 years or older.

We detect no turning point associated with electoral victory of Kenseikai-led coalition in May 1924, which led to the passage of the suffrage bill a year later. Although a turning point did coincide with the Diet’s approval of universal manhood suffrage in March1925, this is a positive turning point (i.e., yen appreciation), and furthermore is neither economically important nor statistically robust. Thus,in interwar Japan, democratic institutions do not seem to have been the main cause of credibility problems or, perhaps, that financial market participants did not believe them to have been important. This result mirrors that of (Sussman and Yafeh, 2000) and Sussman and Yafeh, 2006 N. Sussman and Y. Yafeh,Institutional reforms, financial development and sovereign debt: Britain1690–1790, Journal of Economic History 66 (2006), pp. 906–935. View Record in Scopus | Cited By in Scopus (7)(Sussman and Yafeh, 2006), who find that financial markets do not respond immediately to the announcement of institutional changes that are yet to pass the test of time.3

Methodologically, this paper is closely related to a large and active literature that attempts to uncover what contemporaries viewed as turning points based on the movement in asset prices(e.g., Willard et al., 1996, [Frey and Kucher, 2000], [Brown and Burdekin, 2000], [Oosterlinck, 2003], [Burdekin, 2006] and [Waldenstrom and Frey, 2008]). This methodology,although not suitable for explaining the long-run dynamics of asset prices in relation to the underlying economic fundamentals, allows us to uncover turning points in the value of yen and to perform a systematic search for a coincidental event that is likely to have had large and immediate effects on the credibility of Japan’s commitment to return to the gold standard. Such an exercise is important, we believe, given widespread interests among macroeconomists and economic historians in the credibility of fixed exchange rate in general and the gold standard in particular.4

This paper also contributes to are cent literature that uses high frequency asset price/expectation data in an attempt to examine the role of political parties in shaping macroeconomic outcome (e.g., [Santa-Clara and Valkanov, 2003] and [Mukherjee and Leblang, 2007], Snowberg et al., 2007). Our results confirm the non-Downsian view that political party and its overall ideology affect economic policy and outcome.

Finally, this paper complementsthree previous studies on the evolution of macroeconomic policy in Japan duringthe interwar period: (1) a classic study by Patrick (1971) on Japan’s economic difficultyduring the interwar period; (2) Ito et al.’s (1993) event study, whichinvestigates how the Japanese government left the gold standard; and (3) Metzler’s (2006) extensive historiographicalstudy of the gold standard in prewar Japan. To the best of our knowledge, thispaper presents the first systematic attempt to determine what contemporariesfound to be the key political and economic events along the path to Japan’slong-awaited return to the gold standard.

dairymanUID: 2683905

gold standard是金本位制吧？
我开始还以为题目说return to the gold 是说经济恢复了，原来是说恢复金本位制？太神奇了，我不记得日本是金本位制啊

lghscuUID: 2552043

这个INTRODUCTION真长！！

bobo19890313UID: 2622130

看到崩溃、、、

qiushihuiUID: 2625856

小弟新手，楼主可不可以在结构和层次，还有其中一些容易设置问题的detail进行一下剖析，感激不尽