【CASK EFFECT】0910F阅读全方位锻炼--越障【SCI】 1-19

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【CASK EFFECT】0910F阅读全方位锻炼--越障【SCI】汇总贴
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规则：0 u, r. g$ C/ d+ [4 f5 C

我每天贴出1000字左右的一篇文字7 j) N0 Q, Q- ]( V4 E

没有别的要求，只要大家坚持读完就可以

如果你能坚持一个月，你会发现自己的阅读进化了~
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1、直接在电脑屏幕面前做，虽然GRE阅读是在纸上考，但是这个过程会遏制你做笔记，同时给你的阅读造成视觉障碍，也就是把难度训练和抗干扰训练同步结合，增加效率（初期会很累，但是既然大家想要成为高手，那么就别对自己太温柔）

Today's Topic: Commuting, congestion tolls and the structure of the labour market: Optimal congestion pricing in a wage bargaining model


Congestion is a serious problem in many large urban areas throughout the world. In the US, for example, the Texas Transportation Institute reports very high increases in traffic congestion over the past two decades (Schrank and Lomax, 2002). In Europe, a comparative study of five urban areas, including London, Amsterdam and Brussels, shows a dramatic decline in average speed over the past decade;marginal external congestion costs have been estimated to exceed 1 Euro per kilometre in the most congested cities (De Borger and Proost, 2001). Economists have suggested a large variety of policy instruments to cope with congestion, andthe use of some form of congestion pricing has gained prominence in the literature (see, among many others, [Arnott et al., 1993], [Verhoef et al., 1995], [Mayeres and Proost, 1997] and [Small and Yan, 2001]).1 Congestion taxes are also high on the political agenda in several countries, and the first examples of actual implementation are available (e.g., Singapore, Trondheim, Stockholm, Oslo and London). In many other cases, road pricing is under serious consideration. In Europe, e.g., this is the case in the Netherlands and Germany. Similarly,several US states, including California, Florida and Texas, are considering congestion pricing.2

The most severe congestion problems are typically associated with the journey-to-work, and there is some concern about the employment effects of congestion taxes. Not surprisingly, several papers have looked into this issue. For example, Parry and Bento (2001) focused on the interaction between congestion taxes and outcomes on the labour market. They analyse the implications of a revenue-neutral congestion tax financed by a reduction in the tax on labour. They show that such a tax reform does not necessarily reduce labour supply owing to the feedback effects of congestion. In fact, at relatively low levels of the transport tax, the employment effects of raising the tax are shown to be positive. Calthrop (2001) extends the model by introducing multiple trip purposes (commuting and non-commuting) and analyses in detail the implications of the complementarity of commuting with labour supply. More recently, Van Dender (2003)developed a detailed numerical model to study optimal labour and transport taxes, allowing for multiple trip purposes and transport modes. He found empirical support for taxing commuting at a lower rate than non-commuting transport. Finally, both Safirova (2002)and Verhoef (2005)develop general equilibrium models of a mono centric city with endogenous labour supply. The former numerically analyzes the implications of agglomeration effects and telecommuting for various second-best policies to cope with congestion; the latter studies the welfare effects of cordon charges and kilometre taxes, and carefully compares results to the first-best.

Although these studies have revealed important new insights, they all assume perfectly competitive labour markets. This is less than desirable, especially in a European context, since in most countries wages and employment levels are the result of an explicit bargaining process between unions and employer organisations (see, e.g., Lockwood and Manning,1993). The purpose of this paper is,therefore, to provide a detailed analysis of optimal transport and labour taxes in a wage bargaining environment.3Indeed, given the close relation between commuting,congestion and the labour market, a relevant question is whether the structure of the labour market itself has implications for the optimal tax treatment of transport and labour markets. For purposes of concreteness, we focus on aright-to-manage setting in which wages are the result of negotiations between firms and a labour union; employment is then determined by the firm,conditional on the negotiated wage. We assume that transport trips consist of both commuting and non-commuting. In this framework, we study the optimal second-best tax problem faced by a budget-constrained benevolent government that cares about the well-being of all its citizens (both the employed and people that, for various reasons, do not work); moreover, it cares about private sector profits. It uses taxes on transport and on labour as the main instruments. We consider both the case where transport taxes cannot be differentiated according to trip purpose, and the case of optimal tax differentiation between commuting and other transport.

We obtain several interesting results. First, using two different (but admittedly highly stylised) labour market settings, we show the relevance of the structure of the labour market for optimal taxation of road transport. Where as competitive labour market conditions produce Ramsey-type taxes, wage bargaining implies that optimal transport taxes strongly depend on union preferences.Second, wage bargaining implies that exogenous increases in congestion levels and in transport taxes raise negotiated wages and reduce employment levels.Third, when taxes cannot be differentiated according to trip purpose, we show that the optimal transport tax positively depends on the impact of congestion on negotiated wages, and negatively on the wage effects of the congestion tax itself. Using a specific but standard specification for union preferences, we find that the transport tax exceeds the marginal external congestion cost to the extent that transport flows include demand by people who are not currently active on the labour market. Finally, if taxes can be differentiated according to trip purpose, commuting subsidies — in the sense of lower transport taxes on commuting trips than on non-commuting transport — may be justified if at least some part of the transport flows are from people that are inactive on the labour market. This allows shifting the tax burden away from the employed. Moreover,in this case the optimal congestion tax on commuters is strictly below the marginal external cost.

This paper is related to several strands of the literature. First, relaxing the assumptions underlying the earlier transport literature (see the references given above) allows us to precisely identify the role of the labour market implications of congestion and congestion taxes for the optimal tax structure.Second, the paper fits in with the growing literature on the implications of externality taxation in bargaining models of the labour market (see, e.g., [Koskela et al., 1998], [Schneider, 1997], [Holmlund and Kolm, 2000], [Bayindir-Upmann andRaith, 2003]and [Schöb, 2005]). Unlike these models, we explicitly allow the externality to affect the outcome of the bargaining process. Third, the paper contributes to the literature on the potential desirability of ‘subsidising’ commuters, in the sense of allowing tax deductibility of commuting expenses.4 Economic arguments in favour include the presence of distortionary or suboptimal labour taxes ([Wrede, 2000] and [Van Dender, 2003]), the mobility of firms and households in a spatial economy (Wrede, 2001), and the distribution of landownership across income classes combined with the location of different income groups in an urban area (Borck and Wrede, 2005). This paper reconsiders the issue in a wage bargaining framework, capturing the close connection between congestion, commuting and employment.

The paper is organised as follows.To set the stage, we start in Section 2 with a very simple optimal tax problem of labour and transport markets in a world without congestion. This allows us to illustrate and intuitively explain the potential importance of the structure of the labour market for the optimal tax structure. In Section 3 we then turn to the basic model analysed in this paper. We study optimal labour and transport taxes in a wage bargaining model; both commuting and non-commuting transport contribute to congestion. The union cares about both its employed and unemployed members, the firm cares about profit. We derive and interpret the optimal tax structure for the case of uniform transport taxes across trip motives. Moreover, we provide a brief comparison of the results with those derived under competitive labour market conditions. In Section 4, we analyse optimal tax differentiation between commuting and non-commuting transport. Section 5 relaxes some of the strong assumptions underlying the model and discusses several extensions. A final section summarises the main findings.

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我终于赶上大部队的进度了。向家家学习～～～

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吃家家豆腐

lghscuUID: 2552043

解决！
这个INTRODUCTION，几次都以为要读完了，
结果下面又冒出this paper...

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哎。。