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本帖最后由 zhangxiaohang1 于 2010-7-16 13:10 编辑
GRE words new words good expression Proper Noun or Questions
6-1
BanyanDammed if they do
China's hydropower plans are a test of its avowed good neighbourliness Jul 8th 2010
IN YUNNAN in south-west China the biggest floods in a dozen years have ended a long, brutal drought. For months here in Xishuangbanna, a glassy Mekong【湄公河】 had merely sauntered【stroll,漫步】 towards the border with Laos. River trade came to a halt as vessels ran aground【搁浅】. But for two or three weeks now the Mekong has been back to its usual roiling brown, and the cargo boats throw up a huge bow wave as they inch upstream【逆流】.
Full rivers are good news for everyone, but especially for China’s dam-builders【大坝建设者】. They have huge ambitions for hydropower from the three great rivers—the Salween, the Mekong and the Yangzi—that come roaring out of the Tibetan plateau and tumble【跌倒,翻滚】 down through northern Yunnan in steep parallel gorges, each a mountain ridge apart. The rivers then wend their separate ways before reaching the sea in very different places: the Salween in Myanmar, the Mekong in southern Vietnam and the Yangzi near Shanghai. In Yunnan these rivers and their valleys form one of the world’s most remarkable hotspots【热点】 of biodiversity【生物多样性】.
To the engineers who dominate China’s leadership, the rivers’ wildness must seem an impertinence. On the Mekong alone China has planned or built eight dams. In Xishuangbanna the new Jinghong dam has just started operating. Further up, Xiaowan dam will be finished by 2013. It will be the highest arch dam in the world, and China’s biggest hydropower project after the Three Gorges on the middle Yangzi. The reservoir【蓄水池】 behind it is already filling up.
On the Salween are proposals for 13 dams【水坝】. Unusually vociferous protests【强烈反对】 about their social and environmental costs led the prime minister, Wen Jiabao, to call a halt. Yet many locals have already been resettled, and it is surely a matter of time before at least some of the proposals are dusted off[ To restore to use].
In general, scrutiny of China’s water projects is scant[Barely sufficient], and the government is in a hurry. It wants to add electricity-generating capacity, lest China’s breakneck growth be impeded. Giant hydropower companies, with impeccable political connections, add their own layer of secrecy. Risks attend those who question the lack of transparency[透明物]. Perhaps 500,000 locals, mainly ethnic minorities, are being displaced and forcibly resettled. Those who protest are threatened with less compensation, if not jail.
The Chinese press steers clear of dams with a barge-pole[?]. Academics and NGO representatives who oppose the dam-building on social or environmental grounds do not want their names published. In private even academics in favour of hydropower development complain that nearly all relevant information, even the amount of rain that reaches them, is treated as a state secret. (Though, they add, at China’s meteorological[气象学的] and rivers bureaus【气象和水利部门】, even state secrets can be imparted if the price is right.)
Until recently China was no less communicative towards downstream neighbours, who have seen a sharp drop in Mekong levels in recent years. Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam complain that China neither consults nor informs them about what it is up to. For all that it preaches【宣扬】 harmony and good neighbourliness, China comes across as a regional bully, with its foot on the Mekong’s throat. The Mekong basin is the greatest inland fishing region in the world. Distraught【发狂的】 Thai, Laotian and Cambodian fisherman and farmers blame Chinese dams for killing off fish stocks, cutting irrigation and disrupting livelihoods. Recently a Bangkok Post editorial accused China of “Killing the Mekong”.
In March China broke its silence over dams, denying that it was responsible for reducing the Mekong’s flow reaching downstream neighbours. It blamed instead the drought, from which China has suffered as much as anyone. The truth lies somewhere in between. Less than one-sixth of the total Mekong catchment is in China, but that upstream flow is crucial to neighbours during the dry season. China has held some of the dry-season flow back.
The monsoon rains of the past month will help draw some of the criticism’s sting. So too, perhaps, will a possible easing of Chinese secrecy. In April China defended itself (another first) at the Mekong River Commission, the inter-governmental body supposed to resolve disputes. And last month China took officials from Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam to view both Xiaowan and Jinghong dams. Banyan had less luck. Near Jinghong nervous policemen ordered him to leg it before he got so much as a glimpse of the structure.
Still, the shift in public diplomacy may mark a slightly broader approach towards what China perceives to be in its national interest. At the very least, the countries resentful of China’s dams are also those to which it hopes to sell the electricity. But a cynic might further conclude that to the extent that upriver dams smooth a flow’s seasonal extremes, China’s upriver projects actually make ones in downstream countries more feasible, too. There are nearly a dozen plans to dam the lower Mekong, and Chinese state construction companies want to be involved.
Those in glassy waters shouldn’t throw stones
Such plans suggest that though China is getting all the brickbats[criticism], downstream countries should face much closer scrutiny too. China, says a water expert at the Asian Development Bank, is not to blame for all their woes[calamity,misfortune]. For instance, the alarming salinisation[盐化] of the Mekong delta, Vietnam’s rice-basket, appears to be happening not because of China, as some Vietnamese claim, but at least in part because of Vietnam’s own hydropower projects nearby. Laos is expected soon officially to announce its intention to build at least one Mekong dam, with potentially devastating consequences for the migratory fish species that, among other things, provide essential protein for many Cambodians. Pity the poor wild rivers and their amazing diversity: dammed if the riparian【Of, on, or relating to the banks of a natural course of water.】 neighbours fail to co-operate, and damneder if they do.
Economist.com/blogs/banyan
6-2
Another twist
Jul 15th 2010, 13:48 by The Economist online | PARIS
EACH day seems to bring yet another twist in what French call the Bettencourt affair. This is a party-donations and alleged tax-evasion【逃税】 scandal centred on Liliane Bettencourt, billionaire heiress to the L’Oréal【欧莱雅】 cosmetics empire, which has been gripping the country for the past month. Sure enough, on July 15th, the affair took a fresh turn when the police brought into custody【羁押】 four figures: Patrice de Maistre, Mrs Bettencourt’s wealth manager; François-Marie Banier, a society photographer who received gifts worth nearly ?1 billion ($1.3 billion) from Mrs Bettencourt; Fabrice Goguel, her former tax lawyer, and Carlos Vejarano, manager of a Seychelles island of obscure ownership.
The four will be questioned as part of a preliminary inquiry into tax evasion. Mr de Maistre has already confirmed the existence of two Swiss bank accounts, holding ?78m, which had not been declared to the French tax authorities. The island in the Seychelles also appears to have been overlooked, although it is not clear who owns this. Mrs Bettencourt has said that she intends to put all her tax affairs in order, and declare all foreign assets.
An affair which began as a dynastic lawsuit[诉讼], brought by Mrs Bettencourt’s estranged daughter against Mr Banier for “abuse of frailty”, has since become a political affair too, with a trail that could reach to the heart of French power. The heiress was a (legal) donor to the ruling UMP party, but her ex-accountant, Claire Thibout, alleges that she gave ?150,000 ($190,000)—way over the legal limit—to help finance Nicolas Sarkozy’s 2007 presidential campaign. Mr de Maistre denies this, as does Eric Woerth, the UMP party treasurer[司库], who allegedly received the money on Mr Sarkozy’s behalf. Mr Woerth is currently labour minister (and in charge of a controversial pension reform, which was passed by the cabinet on July 13th).
To add to the mesh of connections, Mr Woerth's wife, Florence, was employed by Mrs Bettencourt as an investment manager, though she has since resigned and also denies knowing anything about his former employer's tax affairs. This week, Mr Woerth said he would quit his job as party treasurer, but denies that he has done anything wrong. An internal inquiry by the tax inspectorate[检察人员] did indeed clear him, but only of “ordering, thwarting or orienting”[?] any tax audit【An examined and verified account.】 of Mrs Bettencourt.
In a bid to defuse the political crisis, President Sarkozy went on prime-time television this week for an hour-long interview. He denounced as “calumny【流言蜚语】 and lies” the allegations against him and Mr Woerth. He had indeed, he said, dined at Mrs Bettencourt’s mansion in Neuilly, the posh Paris suburb where for many years he was mayor. But he described as “slander【诽谤】” the idea that he ever left with an envelope of cash to help his political career. Mrs Bettencourt’s ex-accountant, who first made this claim, has since retracted[收回] it—under pressure, says her lawyer—insisting that she never said Mr Sarkozy “regularly” collected money, and never saw money change hands. Even so, the affair has hurt the president's approval ratings.
Many questions, however, remain unanswered. For one thing, Mr Sarkozy was not asked during his interview about the alleged ?150,000 donation, nor about meetings he is said to have held with Mrs Bettencourt while president. For another, it is unclear under what conditions Mrs Woerth was hired by Mr Bettencourt, given that at the time Mr Woerth was budget minister【预算部长】 and leading a campaign against tax evasion. Mr Sarkozy implicitly acknowledged the potential for a conflict of interest by this week advising Mr Woerth to quit his job as party treasurer, and by calling on parliament to clarify the rules governing conflict of interest in public life.
Much hangs now on the judicial investigations: three separate ones are currently underway into various aspects of the affair. There is some concern that the presidency is uncomfortably close to Philippe Courroye, the public prosecutor in the case. Mr Courroye told Le Monde this week that he was acting with strict impartiality. Pressure to do so may have mounted thanks to the close scrutiny the case has drawn, in France and beyond.
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