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本帖最后由 winning1030 于 2009-5-4 13:36 编辑
Opening statements
The moderator's opening remarks
The moderator's opening remarks
Jul 8th 2008 | Mr Matthew Bishop
Our debate on the future of work begins today. Judging by past debates, and our extremely controversial topic, expect the argument to be lively.
It's the jobs, stupid! For years, a growing popular dislike of globalisation in rich countries has been driven by fear that their workers—initially, the low-skilled sort, but lately also the white-collar sort—will not be able to compete with all those billions of hungry, cheap Chinese, Indians, Mexicans and so forth. As first manufacturing, then back-office processing, and more recently innovation, have increasingly been done in emerging economies, politicians and the media have screamed about the loss of "our" jobs, and proposed solutions ranging from better education to protectionism.
But how valid are these fears? Are workers in rich countries doomed to become ever less competitive, as our proposition suggests? Or can something be done to improve their competitiveness? More fundamentally, is the fear wholly misplaced, whipped up by populist politicians with a weak grasp of economics who play on the rich-world public's worries rather than try to calm them?
Jacob Funk Kirkegaard of the Peterson Institute for International Economics fears the worst for the rich-country worker, thanks to three forces: first, the ready availability of once scarce financial capital in the emerging economies; second, the relative decline in education in rich countries, due to better education in emerging economies and educational stagnation in most rich countries. "Baby-boomers in the United States and Germany will soon retire, but have neglected to ensure that their children replacing them are on average better educated than themselves." Third, the impact of these changes is being accelerated by the rapid pace of technological change, which makes it much easier to move work to where it can be done most competitively. As a result, gloomily predicts Mr Kirkegaard, "while there will always be plenty of jobs in the services sectors of the West, most will no longer provide access to the middle class."
Lynda Gratton, a professor at London Business School, is optimistic. Focusing on the low costs and increasingly high levels of education of individual workers in emerging economies is too simplistic. What really counts is the ability of countries to foster entrepreneurship and manage the growth of big successful companies. Rich countries still have the edge there, as they do in their ability to foster cultures of co-operation between workers, essential to success in today's fast-growing knowledge-based industries. Besides, the belief that rich-country workers are now lagging behind those of emerging countries is exaggerated, to say the least. India may educate a relatively high number of graduates in some disciplines studied by knowledge workers (engineering, computing sciences), but not in others (design, biochemistry, media). And throughout the emerging economies, as a percentage of the total population these educated workers are still significantly lower than in many rich countries such as Finland or the United States. Hence, rather than being in permanent competitive decline, workers in rich countries seem "rather well placed for the increasingly knowledge based economies".
Let battle commence.
The proposer's opening remarks
Jul 8th 2008 | Mr Jacob Funk Kirkegaard
A spectre is haunting the Western world. The spectre of fear. Fear that the middle classes are losing out, and while their economies may still be growing, the rising tide no longer lifts the majority of boats.
Such anxieties are well-founded, as the unique circumstances that brought the West's broad middle classes their standard of living have ended.
Today, everyone is a capitalist and correspondingly the competition faced by Western middle class workers for a well paying job and that $145 barrel of oil is just that much more intense than a few decades ago. It was only after 1978 that political leaders representing the majority of the world's population in China, India, Russia and elsewhere gradually let their subjects enter into free-market economic competition with the West, rather than a struggle of ideological slogans (口号,标语)and nuclear warheads(弹头). Before this ending of the "plan economy" in the developing world, Western middle classes faced competition from themselves only.
Now the world economy is finally truly global and the implicit protection for Western workers from the self-imposed economic exile (流放,放逐)of billions of potential competitors is irreversibly(不可逆转地) gone. Unshackled from the earlier wealth-destroying policies of their own governments, workers across the developing world can now aspire to Western middle class living standards. They may not demand democracy tomorrow, but none will ever renounce capitalism again. Because it is through the embrace of capitalism that the developing world masses for the first time have the opportunity by means of their own talents — and by working far more than 35hours a week — to enter into the affluence of middle class life.
Previously protected Western middle classes will find this global marketplace an increasingly egalitarian place. It rewards the core virtues of capitalism — industriousness, entrepreneurship, hard work and investing in the future. All individual characteristics that Western populaces do not monopolize, and that billions more now have the opportunities to exploit.
It is further, if you want to maintain your privileged income position, necessary to be better equipped for the new economic competition than your rivals. For western workers to remain the most productive, they must remain on average better educated or at least have more investment capital at their disposal (所掌握的)than aspiring workers in the developing world. The opposite is occurring today.
It is obvious from both recent years' rising investment rates in, and the spread of Western financial and investment allocation expertise to, developing countries that workers here are no longer relatively deprived of capital. The fact — while bizarre from a factor endowment (具备生产要素的)point of view — that labor abundant China's exports of heavy industrial goods, like steel and aluminum, have rocketed (迅速上升)in recent years merely underscores that developing nations are now competing successfully against Western workers in even the most capital intensive sectors.
Western workers' declining advantage in human capital and educational attainment, is, however, of greater importance. It is an underappreciated fact that, as Western working classes rose to today's middle class living standards during the 20th century, they did so as the beneficiaries of the world's first — at the time restricted to the West — mass educational effort at the primary, secondary and ultimately tertiary level. It was on the shoulders of the on average by far best educated populations in the world that the West, and especially the United States, achieved its economic prominence1. Today, the world's human capital is increasingly evenly distributed.
Partly this is a result of educational stagnation in the West. Baby-boomers in United States and Germany will soon retire, but have neglected to ensure that their children replacing them are on average better educated than themselves. More significant though is the rapid expansion of education, particularly in developing Asia, during the last decades of the 20th century. The result is today's fast increasing supply of workers in developing countries, who are educationally largely on par with(和。。。一样) Western middle classes. With their relative capital and educational advantages thus eroded, Western middle classes will struggle to sustain their much higher standards of living in an increasingly integrated global economy.
Yet, it is actually not events in the developing world which will have the most profound long-term impact on the possibilities for major parts of Western middle classes to uphold their current income levels. Instead the factor at play is technology, which is now altering labor demand in Western countries far faster than workers here can adapt or hope to upgrade their skills.
It is well established that job generation in both agriculture and the manufacturing sectors at wage levels that will sustain a middle class standard of living have declined dramatically in the West as the result of mechanization. Hence the overwhelming majority of Western middle class jobs are today in the services sectors. However, many of these exist on borrowed time, too, as technology will increasingly automate tasks and make many Western middle class workers redundant.
Any repetitive services task, which can be exhaustively described in rules — say filling out a tax form, evaluating numerical information for a credit score, or executing any standard transaction like buying an airfare — will ultimately be computerized and require human input only from the customer him/herself2. The cheapest labor of all — and far cheaper than at any offshore destination — will increasingly be servers humming anonymously in a warehouse somewhere 24h a day.
Of course, many middle class services jobs — say in sales or in expert or creative positions — do not fit these criteria and can never be automated. However, so many of today's services jobs do fit, that it becomes evident that technological innovation will not long permit the majority of Western workforces be productively employed at middle class wages in the services sectors. Instead, many of today's middle class service sector workers will have to take up non-routine, manual and therefore low-wage services sector employment — as say cleaners, security guards or restaurant workers. While there will always be plenty of jobs in the services sectors of the West, most will no longer provide access to the middle class.
1. Claudia Goldin and Lawrence Katz (2008). "The Race Between Education and Technology". Harvard University Press.
2. Frank Levy and Richard J. Murnane (2005). "The New Division of Labor: How Computers Are Creating the Next Job Market". Princeton University Press.
The opposition's opening remarks
Jul 8th 2008 | Professor Lynda Gratton
Is the competitiveness of workers in today's rich countries in permanent decline? Let's start with the easy answer.
Clearly there are parts of the world often outside of the rich countries where some types of work can be performed more competitively. The outsourcing houses that ring Delhi are a testament to this. Indian graduates are currently much more competitively paid than British graduates — although of course not that much more competitive than Polish graduates. Similarly the garment factories in northern China show the speed with which work flows to areas of comparatively cheap labour. Workers in the today's rich countries cannot compete on cost with Chinese workers — although some, such as Portugal are able to compete on the combination of speed and cost. Never the less, for the majority of the time if we simply take cost as a key factor in competition — then workers in the richer countries will almost always be less competitive compared to those in lower cost economies.
However, beyond this easy answer — the answer I will arrive at is no — that the competitiveness of workers in today's rich countries is not in permanent decline. In arriving at this more considered answer I will argue that whilst the question looks deceptively straightforward, on closer examination it is surprisingly complex.
Contained within this simple question are a number of assumptions that are looking increasingly outdated as the world of organisations and the world of work change dramatically. In my argument I will show that the question of a less competitive worker in today's rich countries rests on three assumptions that are outdated in the contemporary world. First it assumes that 'rich countries' can be viewed in isolation; second it assumes that the performance of workers across a country or region is the same; and finally it assumes that it is individual 'workers' who are the drivers of competitiveness.
First, take the assumption that the productivity of workers in 'rich countries' can be observed and measured in isolation from the rest of the world. True when you are measuring the costs of burger flippers in a McDonald in London with a burger flipper in Beijing. Not true for the many value adding goods and services which increasingly rely on partnership and supply chains that cross the world. Take the creation of the latest Nokia phone for example. The software team are in Finland, the design team are in London, the manufacturing sites are in China and the marketing of the phone is handled by a global team. So the question of 'workers in rich countries are less competitive' becomes an overly simplistic notion in a supply chain that has workers contributing from across the world.
Next, the question assumes that all workers in rich countries are somehow the same. This is clearly not the case. In fact, increasingly knowledge based industries (such as banking, pharmaceuticals, telecoms, consulting, and complex manufacturing) employ global cadres(干部)who behave in surprisingly similar ways. An Indian or Brazilian graduate for example is likely to be more similar in their attitudes, work style and aspirations to a Californian graduate than they are to their own parents or fellow country men. These joined up global professional diasporas cross regional and country boundaries and over time have developed shared ways of working and very often remarkably similar rates of productivity — making it difficult and probably inappropriate to use country boundaries as the means of differentiation.
The question of the competitiveness of workers in rich countries highlights a third increasingly outdated assumption — that it is individual 'workers' who are the sources of competition. Our research conducted at London Business School over the last five years shows clearly that value in organisations and business is created not by individual 'workers' labouring away in isolation — but rather by teams, projects groups, task forces and communities working collaboratively together. This is particularly true when the outcome is an incremental or radical innovation. Simply put, the value of companies is held in the relationships between people (be they employees, partners, customers or suppliers) when these relationships are trusting, cooperative and sophisticated. This suggests that the unit of analysis should be the team or community rather than individual worker. Think of Wikipedia — or Linux. Are the contributors who work in France more 'productive or competitive' than those contributors who reside in Delhi? Wouldn't it be more useful to look at the whole community (which of course crosses many country borders) rather than isolate individuals within it on the basis of the passport they carry?
So I will argue that the notion of an isolated 'rich' country' —a homogenous working group within a country and an individual 'worker' are outmoded and unhelpful classifications. So, what would be a more interesting and contemporary way of asking a similar question — and what then would be the response?
The first argument was that the notion of 'isolated' rich countries is outdated and instead value is created in companies that cross the world. So competitiveness would be measured by a country's capacity to create the economic and social context in which multinational companies can emerge and thrive. Taking this as a measure, rich countries such as the USA, Germany and the UK have historically been stronger creators of multinationals than China, India or Brazil — although the gap is rapidly narrowing. Competitiveness would also be measured by the extent to which a country is capable of supporting the generation of innovative entrepreneurial business which have the potential in the longer term to either become multi-nationals or to join the cluster of partnerships that surround multinationals.
The second argument is that homogenous workers within a country are a gross oversimplification of a reality where some will be much more capable of competing in the global markets than others. The measure here would be the extent to which countries or regions create knowledge workers through tertiary education. Here the figures do not follow a simple rich /rest of the world divide. India in particularly educates a higher number of graduates in some disciplines studied by knowledge workers (engineering, computing sciences), though not in others (design, bio-chemistry, media). However, whilst the numbers are high, as a percentage of the total population they are significantly lower than the education levels in many rich countries such as Finland or the USA.
This leaves the final argument, that value is created in well functioning teams rather than through individual endeavour. Here a possible metric is whether a country has a culture that it conducive to teams or which encourages competitive individualism. On this measure the differences between rich countries, is greater than the differences between the rich and the rest of the world. For example, highly cooperative Finland and Sweden score above highly competitive USA and may therefore be national cultures more conducive to the productive team working and cooperation which will be increasingly crucial for value creation through innovation.
So, taking all three measures into consideration (number of multinationals; percentage of the population educated in knowledge working skills, and the extent of national cultures of cooperation) the competitive of the workers in the rich countries is not in permanent decline, but rather is well placed for the increasing knowledge based economies.
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