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In the late 1920s and 1930s America, which had earlier seen very high rates of immigration, slammed its doors, and then kept immigration rates low for decades (see chart). As the Depression took hold, many foreign workers re-emigrated: some 500,000 left in the 1930s, with many southern Europeans moving back permanently to the old continent. In the same decade the stock of Mexicans in America fell by a dramatic 40%, as they lost jobs and many were deported. Similarly the depression of the 1890s provoked (to provide the needed stimulus for)
a host of(大量) migrant-hostile legislation in Argentina, America and elsewhere, as native-born workers demanded that foreign rivals be kept out.
The International Organisation for Migration (IOM), among others(值得一提的是;除了别的之外), now worries that once again xenophobia will rise as “job competition increases between nationals(国民) and migrants”. Hostility is creeping up(缓慢上升,悄然袭来). Deportations from America are rising fast (a record 361,000 illegal migrants were kicked out in 2008, up from 319,000 the year before). An opinion poll by the German Marshall Fund, in November, suggested that a majority of Americans and Europeans regard migration as a problem, not as an opportunity.
Britons and Americans, in particular, are hostile to foreign workers, with over half of respondents saying that migrants steal jobs and roughly(大体上,(not粗暴地)) two-thirds saying that they bring higher taxes (because of claims on welfare). In turn(相应地,继而) politicians are talking even tougher about migration and, in some cases, such as Britain, are making it harder for outsiders to get legal entry.
Danny Sriskandarajah, until recently of the Institute for Public Policy Research in London, notes another concern about changing public moods. So far anxiety, for example in Britain, has been directed at the government for failing to control the influx(流入) of foreigners. “A more poisonous response is one targeted at the foreigners themselves,” he suggests. That might come about as unemployment rises, especially if some migrants are better able than natives to keep jobs, for example in farm or care work, perhaps because of a willingness to work long hours for low pay.
Elsewhere hostility towards migrants is already becoming substantially more brutal. In Russia, human-rights groups fear that racist attacks against foreigners will soar as the economy slows. In December, as a gang of teenage skinheads(光头党)
was convicted in Moscow of killing 20 migrants, an NGO, Moscow Human Rights Bureau, reported that 113 migrants had been murdered between January and October 2008, nearly twice the rate of the year before. Some 340 migrants were also wounded.
Doomsters (one given to forebodings and predictions of impending calamity) have other reasons to worry, especially about the poor. The past few years have shown how important remittances have become in alleviating poverty and spurring investment in poor countries. In some cases they account for bigger flows of capital(资金) than aid or foreign investment. They spread wealth from rich to poor countries, but now remittances are being squeezed (to reduce the amount of).
In November the World Bank suggested that total remittances to poor countries last year would be at least $283 billion. Known flows have more than doubled since 2002 (partly a result of better measurement). For many small countries they accounted for a large chunk of GDP in 2007, for example in Tajikistan (46%), Moldova (38%) and Lebanon (24%). Choke remittances, and such places will suffer.
Even for larger economies, such as India and China, remittances provide hefty(大量) flows of capital. The World Bank expected India to get $30 billion from its diaspora (the migration of a people away from an established or ancestral homeland) in 2008 and China $27 billion.
The Philippines has some 8m people abroad: their remittances provide about a tenth
of total domestic output. In the first ten months of 2008 the country earned nearly $14 billion from emigrants, substantially more than the year before. But 2009 looks less rosy: the government is cutting high expectations of income from migrants, amid(在…中amidst)
fears that Filipinos who work in IT and finance, especially, will lose jobs.
Elsewhere things are worse already. In November Kyrgyzstan lamented that remittances (mostly from migrants in Russia) were tumbling(暴跌). Tracking such flows is hard, but an estimate by the central bank in Kenya—where migrant money is the biggest source of foreign currency, exceeding tourism—spoke of a sharp drop last year, especially from Kenyans in America.
Remittances had been seen as more resilient in an economic downturn than aid and investment flows, perhaps because the senders of cash have personal ties with the recipients. But the World Bank says some poor countries should expect “outright(完全的,彻底的)decline” in such funds. Flows to Africa, which had earlier boomed, stagnated(停滞) last year; flows to parts of Latin America dropped. In November the head of the UN Conference on Trade and Development, Supachai Panitchpakdi, predicted that 2009 would see remittances to poor countries slide by 6%; but it could be worse.
A second reason to worry is that places with young, expanding populations have got used to exporting surplus labour. Morocco sends young men to Europe; Central Asian countries send them to Russia; Pakistan and other parts of South Asia pack them off(匆忙打发走send away) to labour in the Gulf. If such exporters of humans can no longer do so, they will instead have to absorb millions more themselves: a tall order in a time of general downturn. The risk of social and political upheaval(剧变) may grow.
From slowdown to spasm
A related spasm of social pain could be felt in China, where internal movement plays a big role in the economy. Some of the 140m domestic migrants (mostly rural folk who had gone to cities) risk losing their jobs. Officials know that finding ways to keep them working, or to provide them with welfare, will be essential. In December China’s premier, Wen Jiabao, urged local governments to enact policies to create jobs “especially for migrant workers”.
Is there a bright side from higher rates of migration? Optimists in Europe argue that enlargement of the EU and the freer movement of workers—some 2m east Europeans now live and work in western Europe—may give the continent useful flexibility during a recovery.
Late last year the European Commission suggested that young, well-educated workers will be prepared to move to find jobs. Around 80% of the recent arrivals from eastern Europe are younger than 35, and so are likely to be more mobile than their elders. The commission also suggests that relatively few countries (so far) have seen recent migrants make much use of welfare, beyond schools and clinics.
Unlike previous waves of migrants (like the South Asians who arrived in British factories in the 1950s), eastern Europeans can probably move between jobs. Poles, for example, may be well placed to move from construction to agricultural labour.
In America, too, migrants who are less reliant on welfare may be willing to move from state to state for work, or to opt for lower-skilled employment for the sake of sustaining their incomes. The bad news there, however, is that state crackdowns on unauthorised migrants, along with a border that is getting harder to cross, are making it tougher for migrant workers to flow to where they are needed. As barriers go up, migration’s benefits go down. |
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