谦行天下 comment 记

谦行天下UID: 2797557

19-1【学习】
The rise and rise of English
Top dog
The world's language is Globish
May 27th 2010 | From The Economist print edition

ENGLISH is what matters. It has displaced rivals to become the language of diplomacy, of business, of science, of the internet and of world culture. Many more people speak Chinese—but even they, in vast numbers, are trying to learn English. So how did it happen, and why? Robert McCrum’s entertaining book tells the story of the triumph of English—and the way in which the language is now liberated from its original owners.

The author’s knack for finding nuggets enriches what might otherwise seem a rather panoramic take on world history from Tacitus to Twitter. Take the beginnings of bilingualism in India, for example, which has stoked the growth of the biggest English-speaking middle class in the new Anglosphere. That stems from a proposal by an English historian, Thomas Macaulay, in 1835, to train a new class of English speakers: “A class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinion, in morals, and in intellect.” At a stroke, notes Mr McCrum, English became the “language of government, education and advancement, at once a symbol of imperial rule as well as of self-improvement”. India’s English-speaking middle class is now one of the engines of that country’s development and a big asset in the race to catch up with China.

Bit by bit, English displaced French from diplomacy and German from science. The reason for this was America’s rise and the lasting bonds created by the British empire. But the elastic, forgiving nature of the language itself was another. English allows plenty of sub-variants, from Singlish in Singapore to Estglish in Estonia: the main words are familiar, but plenty of new ones dot the lexicon, along with idiosyncratic grammar and syntax.

Mr McCrum hovers over this point, but does not nail it. English as spoken by non-natives is different. The nuanced, idiomatic English of Britons, North Americans, Antipodeans (and Indians) can be hard to understand. Listen to a Korean businessman negotiating with a Pole in English and you will hear the difference: the language is curt, emphatic, stripped-down. Yet within “Globish”, as Mr McCrum neatly names it, hierarchies are developing. Those who can make jokes (or flirt) in Globish score over those who can’t. Expressiveness counts, in personal and professional life.

The big shift is towards a universally useful written Globish. Spellchecking and translation software mean that anyone can communicate in comprehensible written English. That skill once required mastery of orthographical codes and subtle syntax acquired over years. The English of e-mail, Twitter and text messaging is becoming far more mutually comprehensible than spoken English, which is fractured by differences in pronunciation, politeness and emphasis. Mr McCrum aptly names the new lingo “a thoroughfare for all thoughts”. Perhaps he should have written that chapter in Globish, to show its strengths—and limitations.

谦行天下UID: 2797557

19-2【学习】

Published: May 30, 2010
OP-CHART
The Great Unknowns
By ROBERT M. POOLE and RUMORS

The blessings of war are few, but one hard- won result of the nation’s conflicts is expertise in accounting for the dead. The Revolutionary War, the War of 1812 and the Mexican War together claimed some 58,000 lives, on and off the battlefield. But lax records and hasty on-site burials meant the number of unknown fatalities from those formative American wars remains a mystery.

Record-keeping improved with the Civil War, still the nation’s deadliest conflict. But because the conflict involved millions of men, shifting fronts and hurried burials, the percentage of soldiers who went to their graves without names is astounding: more than two in five were never identified.

Determined to do better, the United States fielded specialty teams to recover and identify its fallen soldiers and sailors from the Spanish-American War, bringing thousands home from Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines for burial. As a result, the percentage of unknowns plummeted. The number of total American deaths from World War I, the first conflict of truly global proportions, shocked the nation: 116,000 deaths in about 18 months of fighting.

In 1921, the unidentified remains of one of those soldiers became the first body interred at Arlington National Cemetery’s Tomb of the Unknown Soldier.

Nevertheless, because of advances in battlefield recovery, better records and the introduction of dog tags, the number of unknowns in our first great war dropped markedly, to about 2 percent, a rate that held through World War II and the Korean conflict.
Thanks to refinements in forensic dentistry and the use of X-rays and CAT scans, the number of unknowns has continued to dwindle with each subsequent war. In 1998, Arlington’s unknown service member from the Vietnam War, who was buried in May 1984, was disinterred and identified as First Lt. Michael J. Blassie, an airman shot down in 1972. With elaborate honors, he was returned to his hometown, St. Louis. His tomb at Arlington remains empty, marking the first 20th century conflict for which there is no unknown warrior.

In the three major wars since — the Persian Gulf war and the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan — there has not been a single unknown soldier, and only one combatant has been listed as missing in action: Capt. Michael Speicher, who was shot down over Iraq in 1991. His remains were recovered from the Iraqi desert in August 2009 and returned to his family.

The sad reality is that there will likely be new recruits for Arlington’s ranks, now 300,000 strong. Though all losses are painful, perhaps we can take some consolation in the knowledge that the names of those who will sacrifice so much are unlikely to go unknown.

谦行天下UID: 2797557

20-1

India’s cantilevered economy
Taking a high road
A strong, well-balanced recovery
Jun 1st 2010 | From The Economist online

cantilever：construct with girders and beams such that only one end is fixed

ATHLETES competing in this year’s Commonwealth Games held in Delhi will travel to the stadium along the Barapullah Elevated Road, one of many transport projects sprouting up in India’s capital city. Half-built sections of the road loom dramatically over the streets below, as if straining to reach the concrete supports on the other side.

India’s economy has taken a similarly elevated route through the global financial turmoil. Its growth never fell below 5.8% (see chart), thanks to a timely fiscal splurge. But just as a cantilever cannot extend too far before it buckles, so an economy cannot place too much weight on a single source of support. India’s merits special caution, its budget deficit topping 10% of GDP in the fiscal year that ended on March 31st.

splurge：an ostentatious display (of effort or extravagance etc.)
buckle：bend out of shape, as under pressure or from heat
merit：be worthy or deserving

The growth figures released on May 31st were therefore doubly welcome. They showed that India’s GDP expanded by 8.6% in the year to the first quarter. And as heartening as the rate of growth was its source: investment in fixed assets (such as elevated roads) accounted for more than half of it; government consumption contributed hardly at all.
doubly：to double the degree
heartening：cheerfully encouraging

By “stepping up” its investments, “industry has shown its confidence in the economic recovery," said Chandrajit Banerjee of the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII). The biggest bets are being placed by India’s mobile-telephone operators, who bid no less than 677.2 billion rupees ($14.6 billion) between them in the government’s recent auction of the airwaves for speedy third-generation (3G) networks. A second auction now under way may raise another 300 billion rupees from firms seeking to offer broadband internet over wireless networks.
step up：speed up

This windfall, far exceeding the government’s target of a total 350 billion rupees, will help it narrow its budget gap this year. But the government’s gain was the telecoms industry’s loss. To compete in the auction, mobile operators have borrowed heavily, some from overseas. Instead of India’s government owing money to sleepy domestic bondholders then, India’s most dynamic companies now owe money to foreign creditors. Whether this helps the economy or not will depend on whether the government spends the auction proceeds better than the telecoms companies would have done.
windfall： sudden happening that brings good fortune (as a sudden opportunity to make money)

If a slowdown in government outlays was welcome, a slowdown in private consumption, which grew by only 2.6% in the year to the first quarter, was not. The CII blamed this weakness on high prices, which have dogged the government’s second term. In a press conference on May 24th, Manmohan Singh, India’s prime minister, singled out inflation as a "matter of deep concern", but pointed to signs of a "moderating trend".
outlay：money paid out
dog：go after with the intent to catch
singled out：select from a group

He’s right to point out that wholesale-price inflation has eased, from over 10% in February to 9.6% in April, compared with a year earlier. But even as the cost of foods (including manufactured foods, such as sugar and dairy) begins to fall, the price of other manufactured goods is gathering some momentum. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI), which has raised interest rates twice this year, still has work to do.

The pace of rate hikes will be governed by two imponderables: the monsoon, which is now sweeping up the coastal state of Kerala, and the squalls on world financial markets, which have swept outwards from Greece. If the monsoon lives up to expectations, the prospect of a good summer harvest will help to quell food inflation. That will, in turn, lower inflation expectations, making the RBI’s life easier. By the same token, bad financial weather may keep interest rates low around the globe. If so, the RBI will be wary of raising its own rates too far ahead of other central banks.

The RBI worries that higher rates could invite heavier inflows of foreign capital. This would push up the rupee, damaging India’s exporters. Overseas investors traditionally flee emerging markets in periods of global financial angst. But an economy growing at 8.6% may look a safer bet than the moribund markets of Europe and America. Rohini Malkani of Citigroup points out that Indian companies were able to borrow $4.3 billion overseas in March, the most they have in two years. Prominent among the companies raising money were India’s infrastructure firms and its telephone operators.

angst：an acute but unspecific feeling of anxiety; usually reserved for philosophical anxiety about the world or about personal freedom

That leaves India’s policymakers with a big strategic decision. They could rebuff this foreign capital, by tightening caps, regulations and other restrictions on foreign investment. Or they could take advantage of it, betting that a stronger rupee is a worthwhile price to pay for faster telecoms networks and elevated roads over India’s congested city streets.
rebuff：reject outright and bluntly

谦行天下UID: 2797557

20-2

OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR
Israeli Force, Adrift on the Sea
By Amos Oz
Published: June 1, 2010

FOR 2,000 years, the Jews knew the force of force only in the form of lashes to our own backs. For several decades now, we have been able to wield force ourselves — and this power has, again and again, intoxicated us.
lashes to (用绳等)将…捆到…上
wield：handle effectively
intoxicated：stupefied or excited by a chemical substance (especially alcohol)

In the period before Israel was founded, a large portion of the Jewish population in Palestine, especially members of the extremely nationalist Irgun group, thought that military force could be used to achieve any goal, to drive the British out of the country, and to repel the Arabs who opposed the creation of our state.

Luckily, during Israel’s early years, prime ministers like David Ben-Gurion and Levi Eshkol knew very well that force has its limits and were careful to use it only as a last resort. But ever since the Six-Day War in 1967, Israel has been fixated on military force. To a man with a big hammer, says the proverb, every problem looks like a nail.
as a last resort：万不得已（作为最后手段）


Israel’s siege of the Gaza Strip and Monday’s violent interception of civilian vessels carrying humanitarian aid there are the rank products of this mantra that what can’t be done by force can be done with even greater force. This view originates in the mistaken assumption that Hamas’s control of Gaza can be ended by force of arms or, in more general terms, that the Palestinian problem can be crushed instead of solved.
interception：the act of intercepting; preventing something from proceeding or arriving

But Hamas is not just a terrorist organization. Hamas is an idea, a desperate and fanatical idea that grew out of the desolation and frustration of many Palestinians. No idea has ever been defeated by force — not by siege, not by bombardment, not by being flattened with tank treads and not by marine commandos. To defeat an idea, you have to offer a better idea, a more attractive and acceptable one.

Thus, the only way for Israel to edge out Hamas would be to quickly reach an agreement with the Palestinians on the establishment of an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as defined by the 1967 borders, with its capital in East Jerusalem. Israel has to sign a peace agreement with President Mahmoud Abbas and his Fatah government in the West Bank — and by doing so, reduce the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to a conflict between Israel and the Gaza Strip. That latter conflict, in turn, can be resolved only by negotiating with Hamas or, more reasonably, by the integration of Fatah with Hamas.
edge out：美国英语]以微弱优势击败，险胜

Even if Israel seizes 100 more ships on their way to Gaza, even if Israel sends in troops to occupy the Gaza Strip 100 more times, no matter how often Israel deploys its military, police and covert power, force cannot solve the problem that we are not alone in this land, and the Palestinians are not alone in this land. We are not alone in Jerusalem and the Palestinians are not alone in Jerusalem. Until Israelis and Palestinians recognize the logical consequences of this simple fact, we will all live in a permanent state of siege — Gaza under an Israeli siege, Israel under an international and Arab siege.
covert：secret or hidden; not openly practiced or engaged in or shown or avowed

I do not discount the importance of force. Woe to the country that discounts the efficacy of force. Without it Israel would not be able to survive a single day. But we cannot allow ourselves to forget for even a moment that force is effective only as a preventative — to prevent the destruction and conquest of Israel, to protect our lives and freedom. Every attempt to use force not as a preventive measure, not in self-defense, but instead as a means of smashing problems and squashing ideas, will lead to more disasters, just like the one we brought on ourselves in international waters, opposite Gaza’s shores.
woe：intense mournfulness

谦行天下UID: 2797557

21-1

June 1, 2010, 9:00 pm
Is Steve Jobs Big Brother?
斯蒂芬·乔布斯（苹果电脑的首席执行员）

By ROBERT WRIGHT

Steve Jobs is in the running for two trophies: comeback of the decade and villain of the year.
Last week Apple’s market capitalization surpassed Microsoft’s — something that seemed impossible 10 years ago and really impossible 14 years ago, when Jobs returned from corporate exile to resume leadership of a down-and-out Apple. And some people think Apple’s best years lie ahead; iPads are selling like — well, like iPhones.

villain： a wicked or evil person; someone who does evil deliberately
market capitalization：an estimation of the value of a business that is obtained by multiplying the number of shares outstanding by the current price of a share
down-and-out：被击垮的，穷困潦倒的
lie ahead：即将来临

Meanwhile, though, Jobs stands accused of what in Silicon Valley is a capital crime: authoritarian【独裁主义】 tendencies. He’s long played hardball【采取强硬态度】 with journalists who reveal details about forthcoming products, and now he’s deciding what content people can view on the iPhone and iPad. Apps featuring even soft-core porn are verboten【forbidden】, and some kinds of political commentary don’t make the cut. Apple recently rejected an app from a political cartoonist — and then, embarrassingly, had to reconsider after he won the Pulitzer Prize.
//Jobs forbid people from revealing details of forthcoming products.

Jim Wilson/The New York Times Steve Jobs during the introduction of the iPad in January. Apple controls which applications are available on both the iPad and the iPhone.

Put these two Jobs profiles together — emerging infotech hegemon and congenital control freak — and you get a scary scenario: growing dominance of our information pipelines by a guy who likes to filter information. No wonder Jobs’s detractors[critics] have been making ironic reference to Apple’s famous 1984 Super Bowl ad, the one that implicitly cast the IBM-Microsoft alliance as Big Brother.
infotech：信息技术
hegemon：有至高无上权力的霸权主义者(或国家等)
congenital：present at birth but not necessarily hereditary; acquired during fetal development
control freak ：喜欢控制一切的人；对控制上瘾者

One tech journalist puts the fear this way: “I don’t want a single, Wal-Mart-like channel that controls access to my audience and dictates what is and is not acceptable material for me to create.” It’s not a crazy fear, given that some industry analysts think Apple wants to become “the Internet’s cable TV company” — turning its iMachines into the dominant distributors of print, video and audio.
dictate say out loud for the purpose of recording

Still, it’s an unwarranted fear. The nature of the digital landscape makes it hard to be both a control freak and a global hegemon. And Jobs’s history suggests that he’ll choose control over power.

Rewind the tape to that 1984 ad. It heralded the coming of the Macintosh operating system, which was head and shoulders above[远远超出] anything Microsoft was offering. So why did Microsoft wind up dominating the operating system market? Because Jobs chose not to do what Microsoft did: license his operating system to computer makers. If you wanted Apple software, you had to buy Apple hardware.
Maybe Jobs is just intent on building the perfect product.

The Microsoft approach harnessed positive feedback. The more models of Windows computers, competitively priced, the more people would buy Windows computers. And the more Windows computers people bought, the more programmers would write their software for Windows, not Apple. And the more Windows software there was, the more attractive Windows computers would be. And so on. That’s how Windows wound up[紧张的，兴奋的] with around 90 percent of the desktop operating system market.

With the iPhone, Jobs is again forgoing[放弃] this positive feedback. He’s not licensing the operating system to other handset makers. There’s only one kind of iPhone — love it or leave it.

Meanwhile, Google is following a variant of the Microsoft strategy. It’s backing the Android operating system, which any handset maker is free to use. And lots of them are using it. There are more than a dozen Android models on the market, and in the first quarter of this year total sales of Android phones surpassed iPhone sales. This same logic can play out at the expense of the iPad, once lots of Android-based tablets come online.

All of this explains why some tech observers think that Apple, notwithstanding[尽管] its stunning iPod-iTune
s-iPhone-iPad-based comeback, is approaching its peak.

Why is Jobs choosing the same path that, last time around, kept him from conquering the world? I had puzzled over this for months until I had a conversation with tech-watcher Harry McCracken, who suggested a theory that seemed outlandish at first but is making more and more sense to me: Steve Jobs just isn’t bent on world domination.
outlandish:conspicuously or grossly unconventional or unusual
be bent on：下决心fixed in your purpose
I mean, sure, all other things being equal, he might love to rule the world. So would I. But there are things he won’t sacrifice for that goal.

One is the high profit margins you get from being the only company that sells the hardware linked to a good operating system. But I think there’s something else at work, too, and it’s kind of admirable.
If you ask Jobs why he won’t let other companies build hardware for the iPhone operating system, he’ll say something to the effect that you get a smoother product, with fewer glitches, if one company designs both the hardware and the software.
glitch:
a fault or defect in a system or machine

That’s true, but it was true in the computer market as well, and Jobs’s smoother products confined Apple not just to a fraction of Microsoft’s market share but to a fraction of its market capitalization; his high profit margins didn’t make up for low sales. So what’s the rationale for repeating this exercise?
to a fraction:完全的
Maybe there’s no rationale that makes sense in dollars and cents. Maybe Jobs is just intent on building the perfect product. Yes, he wants to make money, but, beyond a certain point, he’ll trade off money for perfection.
trade off：
an exchange that occurs as a compromise


I say this as someone who doesn’t share his vision of perfection. I own an iPhone, but various things about it annoy me, as I note in this rant. (I may trade it in for a Palm Pre — the ultimate underdog in the cell phone wars, but a thing of beauty.)

underdog ：one at a disadvantage and expected to lose

In the various things I don’t like about Apple products, the unifying theme is the subordination of functional elegance to visual elegance. For example: The iPhone looks real sleek with that curvy metal, but it sure is easy to drop on a screen-shattering slab of sidewalk!
shattering：破碎的
slab ：厚板
In general, I admit, Apple’s functional elegance is impressive. Indeed, it’s a tribute to Jobs that when the functionality falls short, it’s almost always the result of a conscious decision to favor aesthetics — whereas design flaws in Microsoft products often reflect a failure of engineers to put themselves in the shoes of users.
Maybe Jobs is basically just an artist. Maybe he wants above all to create products that are beautiful. And he succeeds, even if it costs him market share, and even if he doesn’t handle the trade-offs between functional and visual beauty as I would.
put ...in the shoes of换位思考
Some would say calling Jobs an artist is just a euphemistic way of calling him a control freak. And certainly an artistic temperament is a fussy temperament.

Still, being this kind of control freak is different from being the kind of control freak who wants to amass as much power as possible over information flow and then use it to stifle expression. That kind of control freak would follow the Microsoft strategy to maximize market share and thus maximize the number of machines whose apps menu he could then satanically control.
stifle ：impair the respiration of or obstruct the air passage of
satanically ：恶魔般的
Of course, maybe Jobs isn’t an artist at heart, and maybe he isn’t deeply driven to create the perfect product. Maybe he just thinks having a small market share but high profit margins is the way to make the most money — and his finicky design aesthetic is a byproduct【副产品】 of this strategy.
finicky ：exacting especially about details
In either event, the world is safe from him. Apple’s information pipeline won’t be the only one, and it won’t be the biggest one. Whether for temperamental or strategic reasons, Jobs is too intent on control to wind up in a position to control us

谦行天下UID: 2797557

22-1

Yukio Hatoyama resigns
Leaderless Japan
It used to be the envy of the world; now the hope is that things have got so bad that reform is finally possible
Jun 3rd 2010 | From The Economist print edition

SINCE 2006 Japan has had no fewer than five prime ministers. Three of them lasted just a year. The feckless Yukio Hatoyama, who stepped down on June 2nd, managed a grand total of 259 days. Particularly dispiriting about Mr Hatoyama’s sudden departure is that his election last August looked as if it marked the start of something new in Japanese politics after decades of rule by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). His government has turned out to be as incompetent, aimless and tainted by scandal as its predecessors.
Much of the responsibility for the mess belongs with Mr Hatoyama. The man known as “the alien”, who says the sight of a little bird last weekend gave him the idea to resign, has shown breathtaking lack of leadership. Although support for his Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has slumped in opinion polls and the government relied on minor parties, the most glaring liabilities have been over Mr Hatoyama’s own murky financial affairs and his dithering about where to put an American military base. The question for the next prime minister, to be picked in a DPJ vote on June 4th, is whether Mr Hatoyama’s failure means that Japan’s nine-month experiment with two-party democracy has been a misconceived disaster.
The answer is of interest not just within Japan. Such is the recent merry-go-round of prime ministers that it is easy to assume that whoever runs the show makes no difference to the performance of the world’s second-largest economy. Now Japan’s prominence in Asia has so clearly been eclipsed by China, its flimsy politicians are all the easier to dismiss.
But that dangerously underestimates Japan’s importance to the world and the troubles it faces. With the largest amount of debt relative to the size of its economy among the rich countries, and a stubborn deflation problem to boot, Japan has an economic time-bomb ticking beneath it. It may be able to service its debt comfortably for the time being, but the euro zone serves as a reminder that Japan needs strong leadership to stop the bomb from exploding.
What’s more, stability around South and East Asia depends to a large extent on Japan’s 50-year-old security alliance with America, which acts as a counterbalance against Chinese military expansion. The nine-month stand-off between Japan and America over a marine base in Okinawa, a fight which Mr Hatoyama picked himself and has now done for him, is a glaring example of how poor leadership can muddy the waters.
Shogun to Japan’s head
With Mr Hatoyama out of the way, it is tempting to hope that the DPJ will put its problems behind it and quickly rebuild its credibility with the electorate and Japan’s friends abroad. There are two reasons for misgivings, however. The first is the role of Ichiro Ozawa, the Svengali-like figure who stood mischievously behind Mr Hatoyama. The second is the calibre of the candidates to become Japan’s next prime minister.
Mr Ozawa resigned as the DPJ’s secretary-general alongside Mr Hatoyama, but he, unlike his boss, has not promised to bow out of politics. Moreover, he has such influence over the party that he could continue to pull strings from behind the scenes, especially ahead of upper-house elections this summer. That would be inexcusable. Like Mr Hatoyama, Mr Ozawa has been caught up in campaign-funding scandals that have reeked as badly as they ever did under the LDP. He has meddled with good policies and failed to stop bad ones, such as the attempt to roll back the privatisation of the postal system. The “Shadow Shogun” represents the worst side of the old politics. If Mr Ozawa remains influential, he will only undermine any future party leader in the eyes of voters.
Whoever that leader is will have plenty to prove as it is (see article). As The Economist went to press, the most likely replacement for Mr Hatoyama was Naoto Kan, the finance minister. He has shown more financial nous than Messrs Hatoyama and Ozawa in arguing for fiscal reform in Japan. But he has kept so quiet about the DPJ’s failing leadership that it is hard to imagine him putting Mr Ozawa in his place. Other potential candidates, who have stood up more firmly to Mr Ozawa, will be opposed by many in the party who are under the man’s sway. And sadly, none looks like he has enough of the right stuff to restore Japan’s standing in the world.
Look up, Japan
For many voters, this all smacks of Japan’s earlier attempt to escape the LDP’s shadow, in 1993. The coalition government that replaced it—also under Mr Ozawa’s spell—lasted barely 11 months. But a lot has changed since then. Today the LDP has only slightly benefited from the DPJ’s woes, and is itself in danger of splintering. The legacy of two lost decades has left voters with little nostalgia for old habits. Having finally broken the mould of Japanese politics, it is almost inconceivable that they will vote the old lot back into office.
However far-fetched it seems at this sorry juncture, Japan’s leadership crisis presents a chance to progress to a new sort of politics, based more around policies than personalities. Besides its fiscal problems, Japan has an ageing population that will be a draw on the public purse. Its stock of savings is diminishing, and though it is riddled with misgivings about the presence of American troops in Japan so long after the second world war, it can hardly pay for its own defence. Factional politics has failed utterly to deal with these problems. But divisions within the political duopoly have produced splinter parties, some of which have sensible ideas for putting Japan’s economy back on track. The new DPJ leadership, however badly it does in this summer’s upper-house elections, should capitalise on that by forming coalitions with its ideological peers, rather than with the mavericks it has relied on so far. Getting rid of Mr Ozawa would be a sign of real change.
There is hope therefore that things are beginning to get so bad that reform really will appear relatively soon. But the main impression at the moment is of drift. The sad fact is that the world’s second biggest economy, home to companies that have changed industries around the world, is being kept out of dire trouble only by the loyalty of its own savers.

谦行天下UID: 2797557

22-2

South Africa
When the whistle blows
South Africans can be proud about hosting the World Cup. Less so about the state of their nation
Jun 3rd 2010 | From The Economist print edition

KE NAKO! It is time! On June 11th the opening match of the football World Cup takes place at Soccer City near Soweto, a sprawling black township outside Johannesburg. For the past four years South Africa has been preparing to host the world’s greatest sporting event after the Olympics—the first African nation to do so in the tournament’s 80-year history. Sceptics said South Africa would never make it. But, billions of dollars and much heartache later, it is ready. With ten spectacular new or upgraded stadiums, as many new or revamped airports, hundreds of kilometres of expanded highways and city streets, and the continent’s first high-speed train up and running (just), South Africa is rightly proud of its achievement.
And not only in preparing for the World Cup. South Africa boasts private companies, banks, financial markets and auditing standards that are as good as any, anywhere. It is Africa’s largest economy (and the world’s 24th-biggest), accounting for 40% of sub-Saharan Africa’s total GDP. It is also by far the most sophisticated, open and democratic country in the region, with one of the most progressive constitutions anywhere. It is the only African member of the G20 and has just been nominated for a (second) two-year seat on the Security Council, the UN’s decision-making body, starting in January. The country is leader of a continent that has weathered the financial crisis surprisingly well, thanks largely to its fabulous mineral wealth. In some African countries attitudes have slowly begun to shift away from the backing of “big men” towards a more accountable sort of democracy.
Yet South Africa struggles, for all that. As our special report in this issue shows, the threats and flaws it must overcome would make even the bravest reformer quail: rampant corruption and patronage throughout the public sector; the world’s highest unemployment rate, with more than one in three out of work; one in eight of the population infected with HIV/AIDS; public hospitals described as “death traps” by their own health minister; 80% of schools deemed dysfunctional; terrible drug and alcohol abuse; crumbling infrastructure; lethal roads. Thanks to black-empowerment policies, a small new black middle class has emerged, yet more than 40% of the population still lives on less than $2 a day. Tragically, since the end of apartheid inequality in South Africa has grown.
Hospital pass
The African National Congress and its leader, South Africa’s president, Jacob Zuma, did not create this mess, but they will have to sort it out. Just 16 years ago the ANC inherited a country that was virtually bankrupt, riven with racial hostility and wracked by poverty. Although there have certainly been improvements, those living without jobs in shoddy homes in poor black townships need more. Many of the young are getting desperate. Violent protests are spreading.
More than ever the country needs strong political leadership. After one year in office, the polygamous, ever-charming Mr Zuma is doing better than many critics had feared. He has been making all the right noises on things like corruption, crime, poverty and education. But as the coming attacks from within his own faction-ridden party mount, he seems to lack vision and drive. He needs to show he can get things done. Some wonder whether he will even be able complete his five-year mandate. As the anthems draw to a close and the players take their positions to start football’s great tournament, South Africa can allow itself a moment of satisfaction. But a daunting amount of work lies ahead.

谦行天下UID: 2797557

22-1Yukio Hatoyama resigns
Leaderless Japan
It used to be the envy of the world; now the hope is that things have got so bad that reform is finally possible
Jun 3rd 2010 | From The Economist print edition

SINCE 2006 Japan has had no fewer than five prime ministers. Three of them lasted just a year. The feckless Yukio Hatoyama, who stepped down on June 2nd, managed a grand total of 259 days. Particularly dispiriting about Mr Hatoyama’s sudden departure is that his election last August looked as if it marked the start of something new in Japanese politics after decades of rule by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). His government has turned out to be as incompetent, aimless and tainted by scandal as its predecessors.
Much of the responsibility for the mess belongs with Mr Hatoyama. The man known as “the alien”, who says the sight of a little bird last weekend gave him the idea to resign, has shown breathtaking lack of leadership. Although support for his Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has slumped in opinion polls and the government relied on minor parties, the most glaring liabilities have been over Mr Hatoyama’s own murky financial affairs and his dithering about where to put an American military base. The question for the next prime minister, to be picked in a DPJ vote on June 4th, is whether Mr Hatoyama’s failure means that Japan’s nine-month experiment with two-party democracy has been a misconceived disaster.
The answer is of interest not just within Japan. Such is the recent merry-go-round of prime ministers that it is easy to assume that whoever runs the show makes no difference to the performance of the world’s second-largest economy. Now Japan’s prominence in Asia has so clearly been eclipsed by China, its flimsy politicians are all the easier to dismiss.
But that dangerously underestimates Japan’s importance to the world and the troubles it faces. With the largest amount of debt relative to the size of its economy among the rich countries, and a stubborn deflation problem to boot, Japan has an economic time-bomb ticking beneath it. It may be able to service its debt comfortably for the time being, but the euro zone serves as a reminder that Japan needs strong leadership to stop the bomb from exploding.
What’s more, stability around South and East Asia depends to a large extent on Japan’s 50-year-old security alliance with America, which acts as a counterbalance against Chinese military expansion. The nine-month stand-off between Japan and America over a marine base in Okinawa, a fight which Mr Hatoyama picked himself and has now done for him, is a glaring example of how poor leadership can muddy the waters.
Shogun to Japan’s head
With Mr Hatoyama out of the way, it is tempting to hope that the DPJ will put its problems behind it and quickly rebuild its credibility with the electorate and Japan’s friends abroad. There are two reasons for misgivings, however. The first is the role of Ichiro Ozawa, the Svengali-like figure who stood mischievously behind Mr Hatoyama. The second is the calibre of the candidates to become Japan’s next prime minister.
Mr Ozawa resigned as the DPJ’s secretary-general alongside Mr Hatoyama, but he, unlike his boss, has not promised to bow out of politics. Moreover, he has such influence over the party that he could continue to pull strings from behind the scenes, especially ahead of upper-house elections this summer. That would be inexcusable. Like Mr Hatoyama, Mr Ozawa has been caught up in campaign-funding scandals that have reeked as badly as they ever did under the LDP. He has meddled with good policies and failed to stop bad ones, such as the attempt to roll back the privatisation of the postal system. The “Shadow Shogun” represents the worst side of the old politics. If Mr Ozawa remains influential, he will only undermine any future party leader in the eyes of voters.
Whoever that leader is will have plenty to prove as it is (see article). As The Economist went to press, the most likely replacement for Mr Hatoyama was Naoto Kan, the finance minister. He has shown more financial nous than Messrs Hatoyama and Ozawa in arguing for fiscal reform in Japan. But he has kept so quiet about the DPJ’s failing leadership that it is hard to imagine him putting Mr Ozawa in his place. Other potential candidates, who have stood up more firmly to Mr Ozawa, will be opposed by many in the party who are under the man’s sway. And sadly, none looks like he has enough of the right stuff to restore Japan’s standing in the world.
Look up, Japan
For many voters, this all smacks of Japan’s earlier attempt to escape the LDP’s shadow, in 1993. The coalition government that replaced it—also under Mr Ozawa’s spell—lasted barely 11 months. But a lot has changed since then. Today the LDP has only slightly benefited from the DPJ’s woes, and is itself in danger of splintering. The legacy of two lost decades has left voters with little nostalgia for old habits. Having finally broken the mould of Japanese politics, it is almost inconceivable that they will vote the old lot back into office.
However far-fetched it seems at this sorry juncture, Japan’s leadership crisis presents a chance to progress to a new sort of politics, based more around policies than personalities. Besides its fiscal problems, Japan has an ageing population that will be a draw on the public purse. Its stock of savings is diminishing, and though it is riddled with misgivings about the presence of American troops in Japan so long after the second world war, it can hardly pay for its own defence. Factional politics has failed utterly to deal with these problems. But divisions within the political duopoly have produced splinter parties, some of which have sensible ideas for putting Japan’s economy back on track. The new DPJ leadership, however badly it does in this summer’s upper-house elections, should capitalise on that by forming coalitions with its ideological peers, rather than with the mavericks it has relied on so far. Getting rid of Mr Ozawa would be a sign of real change.
There is hope therefore that things are beginning to get so bad that reform really will appear relatively soon. But the main impression at the moment is of drift. The sad fact is that the world’s second biggest economy, home to companies that have changed industries around the world, is being kept out of dire trouble only by the loyalty of its own savers.

谦行天下UID: 2797557

22-2South Africa
When the whistle blows
South Africans can be proud about hosting the World Cup. Less so about the state of their nation
Jun 3rd 2010 | From The Economist print edition

KE NAKO! It is time! On June 11th the opening match of the football World Cup takes place at Soccer City near Soweto, a sprawling black township outside Johannesburg. For the past four years South Africa has been preparing to host the world’s greatest sporting event after the Olympics—the first African nation to do so in the tournament’s 80-year history. Sceptics said South Africa would never make it. But, billions of dollars and much heartache later, it is ready. With ten spectacular new or upgraded stadiums, as many new or revamped airports, hundreds of kilometres of expanded highways and city streets, and the continent’s first high-speed train up and running (just), South Africa is rightly proud of its achievement.
And not only in preparing for the World Cup. South Africa boasts private companies, banks, financial markets and auditing standards that are as good as any, anywhere. It is Africa’s largest economy (and the world’s 24th-biggest), accounting for 40% of sub-Saharan Africa’s total GDP. It is also by far the most sophisticated, open and democratic country in the region, with one of the most progressive constitutions anywhere. It is the only African member of the G20 and has just been nominated for a (second) two-year seat on the Security Council, the UN’s decision-making body, starting in January. The country is leader of a continent that has weathered the financial crisis surprisingly well, thanks largely to its fabulous mineral wealth. In some African countries attitudes have slowly begun to shift away from the backing of “big men” towards a more accountable sort of democracy.
Yet South Africa struggles, for all that. As our special report in this issue shows, the threats and flaws it must overcome would make even the bravest reformer quail: rampant corruption and patronage throughout the public sector; the world’s highest unemployment rate, with more than one in three out of work; one in eight of the population infected with HIV/AIDS; public hospitals described as “death traps” by their own health minister; 80% of schools deemed dysfunctional; terrible drug and alcohol abuse; crumbling infrastructure; lethal roads. Thanks to black-empowerment policies, a small new black middle class has emerged, yet more than 40% of the population still lives on less than $2 a day. Tragically, since the end of apartheid inequality in South Africa has grown.
Hospital pass
The African National Congress and its leader, South Africa’s president, Jacob Zuma, did not create this mess, but they will have to sort it out. Just 16 years ago the ANC inherited a country that was virtually bankrupt, riven with racial hostility and wracked by poverty. Although there have certainly been improvements, those living without jobs in shoddy homes in poor black townships need more. Many of the young are getting desperate. Violent protests are spreading.
More than ever the country needs strong political leadership. After one year in office, the polygamous, ever-charming Mr Zuma is doing better than many critics had feared. He has been making all the right noises on things like corruption, crime, poverty and education. But as the coming attacks from within his own faction-ridden party mount, he seems to lack vision and drive. He needs to show he can get things done. Some wonder whether he will even be able complete his five-year mandate. As the anthems draw to a close and the players take their positions to start football’s great tournament, South Africa can allow itself a moment of satisfaction. But a daunting amount of work lies ahead.

谦行天下UID: 2797557

23-1

A special report on South Africa
The price of freedom
Since embracing full democracy 16 years ago, South Africa has made huge strides. But, says Diana Geddes (interviewed here), not everything has changed for the better
Jun 3rd 2010 | From The Economist print edition

SPORT matters in South Africa. In his new year’s address to the nation, President Jacob Zuma described 2010 as “the most important year in our country since 1994”. To outsiders, playing host to this year’s football World Cup seemed perhaps a less momentous event than holding the country’s first fully democratic elections that established a black-majority government 16 years ago—especially when the national team, Bafana Bafana, may be knocked out in the first round. But with the kick-off on June 11th, just days after the country’s 100th birthday on May 31st, the world’s eyes will be on Africa’s leading economy for the next few weeks.

Can the “miracle” nation, which won plaudits around the world for its peaceful transition to democracy after centuries of white-supremacist rule, conquer the bitter divisions of its past to turn itself into the “rainbow nation” of Nelson Mandela’s dreams? Or will it become ever more mired in bad governance, racial tension, poverty, corruption, violence and decay to turn into yet another African failed state? With Zimbabwe, its neighbour to the north, an ever-present reminder of what can happen after just a couple of decades of post-liberation single-party rule, many South Africans, black and white, worry that their country may be reaching a tipping point.

Western fans arriving in South Africa for the World Cup could be forgiven for thinking that they were still in the rich world. Much of the infrastructure is as good as you will find anywhere—particularly those parts that have been given multi-million-dollar facelifts in preparation for the tournament. Ten spectacular stadiums have been newly built or upgraded at a cost of 15 billion rand (see box for currency conversions). Visitors arriving at O.R. Tambo, the main international airport, will be whisked into Johannesburg by the Gautrain, Africa’s first high-speed rail link (pictured above). And many of the country’s hotels and restaurants are world-class, including Bushmans Kloof hotel, three hours’ drive from Cape Town, recently voted the world’s best by Travel + Leisure website, and Cape Town’s La Colombe, ranked 12th in this year’s S.Pellegrino list of the best restaurants.

Not as rich as it looks
But in reality South Africa is no more than a middle-income developing country with a GDP per person of around $10,000 (at purchasing-power parity), a quarter of the American figure. On a per-head basis, it is the seventh-richest country in Africa by some measures. The average hides huge disparities. Under apartheid, whites were encouraged to believe they were part of the Western world. It was only when they had to start sharing their streets, goods and services with their darker-skinned compatriots that they began to wonder whether they really were. Many now complain about falling standards. Yet most whites have done rather well since apartheid ended—better, in fact, than most blacks. They still enjoy a good life, helped by cheap domestic help and first-class private medical care and schools.

For the majority of South Africa’s blacks, however, the living is not so easy. Although many of the poorest now get some kind of government support, it is only a pittance. Most blacks still live in shoddy shacks or bungalows without proper sanitation in poor crime-ridden townships outside the main cities. Their schools and hospitals are often in a dire state. And, in a country where there is little public transport, most blacks do not own a car. Although it has the world’s 24th-biggest economy, South Africa ranks a dismal 129th out of 182 on the UN’s Human Development Index (and 12th in Africa).

The country’s constitution, adopted in 1996, is one of the most progressive in the world. It enshrines a wide range of social and economic rights as well as the more usual civil and political freedoms. Discrimination is banned not only on the grounds of race, gender, age and belief, but also of pregnancy, marital status, sexual orientation and culture. Every one of the country’s 49m people—79% black, 9% white, 9% coloured (mixed race) and 3% Asian/Indian—is guaranteed equal protection under the law. Freedom House, a Washington-based research foundation, gives South Africa a respectable rating of 2 in its “freedom in the world” index, where 1 is completely free and 7 totally unfree.

South Africa is a land of contrasts. It has fabulous mineral wealth, with 90% of the world’s known platinum reserves, 80% of its manganese, 70% of its chrome and 40% of its gold, as well as rich coal deposits; yet 43% of its population live on less than $2 a day. It has just announced plans to develop a satellite programme (with India and Brazil) and is the leading candidate to host the world’s biggest science project, the Square Kilometre Array radio telescope; yet in international maths, science and reading tests it performs abysmally. It has sky-high unemployment yet at the same time suffers from crippling skills shortages. It was the first country to perform a heart transplant, and some of its doctors are still among the best anywhere; yet its people’s health record is among the world’s worst. And, leaving aside war zones, it is one of the most violent and crime-ridden countries on the planet. This special report will look at South Africa the way that most of its people see it. The results are often harsh.

The bright side
Yet there are some encouraging signs that the contrasts are getting less stark. South Africa has recently cut its murder rate in half; virtually eradicated severe malnutrition among the under-fives; increased the enrolment in schools of children aged seven to 15 to nearly 100%; provided welfare benefits for 15m people; and set up the world’s biggest antiretroviral treatment programme for HIV/AIDS.

What about race? South Africa remains obsessed by it. That is hardly surprising after 350 years of racial polarisation, including nearly half a century of apartheid, when inter-racial sex was a criminal offence and non-whites were even banned from using the pavements. The subject waxes and wanes. Only last August Mr Zuma was warning his compatriots against reviving the race debate. But the murder in April of Eugene Terre’Blanche, leader of a white-supremacist group, and the racist outbursts by Julius Malema, the leader of the powerful Youth League of the ruling African National Congress (ANC), have brought it to the fore again.

谦行天下UID: 2797557

23-2


The future of the tablet computer
Not written in stone
The iPad is a success, but other tablets may not be
Jun 3rd 2010 | From The Economist print edition

THE iPad, Apple’s latest gadget, seems to have lived up to its maker’s lofty expectations: 2m of them have been sold in two months, with more presumably to follow after the device’s debut outside America on May 28th. But will the iPad’s success trigger explosive growth for other sorts of “tablet” computers, a category that had previously been seen a sideshow, much as the iPhone did for smart-phones?

The answer appears to be yes, if the proliferation of tablets at Computex, a trade show held this week in Taiwan, is anything to judge by. The exhibition floor was teeming with prototypes, especially from Taiwanese firms such as Acer and Asustek. Dell, an American rival, had unveiled its offering, Streak, a few days earlier. Even Google and One Laptop per Child, a charity, have tablets in the works.

Yet the flurry of activity is deceptive. Not all the computer-makers rushing to produce tablets are convinced they will be a huge success; they are simply hedging their bets after their failure, in many cases, to predict the popularity of netbooks (no-frills laptops), which shot to success in 2008. Tellingly, most of the new devices will not hit the stores before the end of the year, if not later.

It is still unclear what people will use tablets for, says Jeff Orr of ABI Research. They are unlikely to edge out established devices such as televisions, personal computers, games consoles and smart-phones. Most buyers so far have been habitual early-adopters of new gadgets. But tablets may find a niche, he believes, as portable video players and magazine racks.

Much will depend on price. The cheapest iPad costs $499. For tablets to become a mass-market product like DVD players, analysts reckon, the price must fall to $100 at most. Some iPad clones are to be sold at this level, but they lack many of its most attractive features. Fancier tablets could become cheaper, however, if mobile-telecoms operators were to subsidise them, as they do with handsets.

This points to another barrier. To maximise their usefulness, tablets need a fast wireless-internet connection. But so far only a third of American households have Wi-Fi, reckons ABI Research. And mobile-data services are not getting cheaper, at least for heavy users. On June 2nd AT&T ditched its all-you-can-eat plan for iPads, which cost $30 a month, and replaced it with tiered rates.

What is more, tablets are less about hardware than about the software and services that run on them. Users of iPads can already download more than 5,000 applications from Apple’s online store. Such variety is a distant prospect for owners of tablets powered by other operating systems, such as Google’s Android. Yet the more competition there is among operating systems and devices, the more common tablets are likely to become.
Some of the most muscular players in the industry are still in the locker room. Hewlett-Packard is said to have killed the Slate, which was to be based on Microsoft’s Windows, and is now reportedly working on a tablet using an operating system from Palm, the smart-phone maker that HP recently bought. Microsoft will certainly re-enter the fray, although none of its operating systems seems a good fit for tablets. Nokia, too, has yet to unveil its plans.

ABI Research thinks only 8m will be sold worldwide this year and that they will not become a mass-market device before the middle of the decade, by which time it foresees annual sales of 57m. Even this would be less than the number of netbooks expected to be sold this year. And it is not even a third of the global market for smart-phones in 2009.
But tablets may still have a big impact, argues Carolina Milanesi of Gartner, another research firm. Television-makers, for instance, may introduce more interactive features and computer-makers launch app stores in response. All very gratifying for tablet manufacturers, no doubt, but not exactly a money-spinner

谦行天下UID: 2797557

24-1

The state and the economy
Re-enter the dragon
Two books ask how far China’s model of “state capitalism【国家资本主义】” will spread
Jun 3rd 2010 | From The Economist print edition

IN MAY 2009 the Chinese consulate【领事】 in New York invited Ian Bremmer to take part in a small seminar on “the current financial crisis”. The diplomat who organised the event was the very embodiment of the new China—sporting a well-tailored suit and speaking only lightly accented English—and he began the discussion with a bold question: “Now that the free market has failed, what do you think is the proper role for the state in the economy?”
embodiment：a concrete representation of an otherwise nebulous concept

Twenty years ago the state was on the defensive across most of the world. Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan had smashed the post-war consensus. Soviet Communism had collapsed. And the World Bank and the IMF were preaching the “Washington consensus” of privatisation and liberalisation.
Margaret Thatcher：撒切尔夫人，英国保守党人，1979年至1990年任英国首相。1982年和1984年曾两次以首相身份访华，1984年12月访华时同中国政府总理正式签署了中英关于香港问题的联合声明。
Ronald Reagan ：罗纳德·里根（美国前总统）

China was the most conspicuous standout against this trend. The Communist Party greeted the global revolution by adopting what it termed the “bamboo policy”—bending with the wind rather than standing straight and eventually snapping. The party bent with the wind by abandoning central planning. But it only embraced capitalism in so far as it could be used as an instrument of state power.

China has been transformed from a standout into a global model. The recent financial crisis was clearly a turning-point. The Chinese relished the fact that the Americans had been forced to prop up not just their banks but also industrial companies such as General Motors.

relish：derive or receive pleasure from; get enjoyment from; take pleasure in
prop up ：support by placing against something solid or rigid

Even before the crisis the Chinese felt that history was moving in their direction. Russia’s experiment with laissez-faire had proved to be a debacle. Financial problems had emerged with sickening regularity. And throughout this turmoil China had succeeded in combining an astonishing rate of growth with social stability. Now it is using its $2.3 trillion in foreign reserves to help prop up America’s profligacy.

laissez-faire ：the doctrine that government should not interfere in commercial affairs
debacle：a sound defeat

From Latin America to the Middle East authoritarian governments are imitating China’s model of “state capitalism”. They are not only using state companies to shore up their power at home, they are directing those companies to reap the fruits of global capitalism. State-controlled manufacturers sell goods on the global market and buy up natural resources. Sovereign-wealth funds invest the profits from all of this activity in global markets.

The rise of this new hybrid has led to a dramatic change in the balance of power between the state and the market. State oil companies control three-quarters of the world’s crude oil【原油】 reserves. Three of the four largest banks by market capitalisation are state-controlled. The biggest mobile- phone operator, China Mobile, is also a state company. A nice example of the changing balance of power occurred in the same month that Mr Bremmer attended his seminar in New York: America’s largest bank, the Bank of America, was forced to sell its 9% stake in the Construction Bank of China just to stay afloat.

Two books focus on this fascinating subject. Mr Bremmer’s is the better read; he provides a wide-ranging account of the rise of state capitalism and he litters his prose with apposite examples and acute insights. Nobody with a serious interest in the current dilemma should pass it by. “The Beijing Consensus” by Stefan Halper, an American academic at Cambridge University, is narrower. He seems to have spent too much time chewing the fat with his fellow policy intellectuals and not enough getting his boots dirty.

But he does provide a valuable supplement to Mr Bremmer’s book. Mr Halper supplies chapter and verse on the way the Chinese are spreading their influence across much of the developing world, by coughing up no-strings-attached loans, for example, rather than trying to meddle in other countries’ internal affairs in the manner of the World Bank and the IMF. He also serves up by far the best anecdote about the real workings of state capitalism. In the same month that Mr Bremmer was attending his seminar the Chinese Communist Party ordered local officials in Hubei province to smoke nearly a quarter of a million packs of Hubei-branded cigarettes in order to boost the local economy and stave off lay-offs. Official cigarette monitors roamed the province making sure that people hit their cigarette targets and fining those who dared to smoke other brands.

How serious a threat does state capitalism pose to the market model of capitalism? Messrs Bremmer and Halper are actually less bullish about the new authoritarianism than the titles of their books might suggest. Mr Bremmer, the president of the Eurasia Group, a political-risk consultancy, points out that state capitalism’s fate is bound up with【与……有密切关系】 the fortunes of some very unpleasant political cliques, such as the Saudi royal family and the Russian oligarchy. Mr Halper demonstrates that China is casting its lot with a number of nasty regimes. Both authors might also have made more of the fact that there is a lot of evidence to suggest that state companies are less productive and innovative than their private-sector competitors. Much of the dynamism of the Chinese economy comes from private companies rather than bloated state firms. There are good reasons for thinking that state capitalism will eventually collapse as a result of what Marxists used to call its internal contradictions. But at the moment it looks as if eventually may be some way off.

AdelineShenUID: 2630498

来看看 继续加油 有分析的话更好~

谦行天下UID: 2797557

25-1

Buttonwood北美悬铃树
Time for a rent cut
Controlling the finance sector’s excess returns
Jun 3rd 2010 | From The Economist print edition

WHY do people who work in finance earn more than most other people? It is a question that concerns politicians, as they debate reform of the industry. It ought also to worry those millions who, as savers and borrowers, are consumers of the industry’s products.
Something has clearly changed within the past 40 years. Banking and asset management used to be perceived as[regarded as] fairly dull jobs, which did not attract a significant wage premium.
But after 1980, financial wages started to climb much more quickly than those of engineers, another profession that ought to have benefited from technological complexity.

Around the same time, banks became more profitable. Andrew Smithers of Smithers & Co, a firm of consultants, points out that the return on equity[股本回报；股权收益；净资产收益率] achieved by British banks averaged around 7% between 1921 and 1971; since then it has averaged around 20%.
Such a sustained rise suggests that the finance sector has been able to extract “rents”, a term that economists use to explain excess profits. But that suggestion only raises another question; why haven’t those rents been competed away?

Barriers to entry are a standard explanation for an uncompetitive market. In the case of banking, these barriers may exist in the form of the implicit[隐含的] subsidy[津贴] provided by government support; this lowers the cost of finance for leading institutions. In March Andrew Haldane, executive director for financial stability at the Bank of England, argued that the effective annual subsidy for the five biggest British banks during the credit crunch was more than £50 billion ($73 billion), roughly equal to the whole industry’s annual profit in the years before the crisis.

credit crunch：信贷紧缩；信贷危机（等于credit crisis）a state in which there is a short supply of cash to lend to businesses and consumers and interest rates are high

As evidence of the industry’s lack of competition, Mr Smithers points to its increasing concentration. The proportion of bank assets held by the three biggest American banks has tripled since 1994. It is far from clear that this concentration is healthy for the rest of the economy; Mr Haldane cites research showing that economies of scale peak when banks have $5 billion-10 billion of assets.

The big banks may have benefited from other factors apart from a lower cost of capital. In market-making, for example, size gives banks an advantage since they have more knowledge of institutional investors’ order flow and can position themselves to benefit.
cost of capital：资本成本

In addition, the growth of the financial industry has coincided with the move to floating exchange rates and market liberalisation【开放】. The result has been the creation of a whole series of instruments, mainly derivatives, designed to deal with the risks of interest-rate and currency movements. The more complex the product, the less transparent it is to customers; that makes it harder to judge the price they are being charged. The surge in trading volumes is also significant; at every stage the finance industry takes a cut in the form of a bid-offer spread, a fee or a commission. This churning is a classic rent-seeking activity.
churning：moving with or producing or produced by vigorous agitation

What to do about it? At the moment, governments are wading in with all kinds of levies and regulations, which will probably have unintended consequences. Rather than tackle the big problem (for example, by breaking up the banks), they waste their time on populist measures like banning short-selling.

It would be far better if the private sector could deal with the problem. Paul Woolley, a former fund manager who set up centres for studying capital-market dysfunctionality at the London School of Economics and the University of Toulouse, has published a manifesto which he believes should be adopted by the world’s biggest public, pension and charitable investment funds. Among other things, he proposes that the funds should adopt a long-term investment approach, cap annual portfolio turnover at 30%, refuse to pay performance fees or invest in alternative assets such as hedge funds and private equity, and invest only in securities traded on a public exchange (so no structured products like the infamous collateralised debt obligations).
manifesto：
a public declaration of intentions (as issued by a political party or government)


Some will argue with the details but the thrust of the argument is simple. If the big funds in effect own the market in aggregate, then frenetic trading activity is fruitless, even before costs. Perhaps they are chasing a chimera: they all wish to be above-average performers. Perhaps they are bamboozled by an asset-management industry that competes not on price but on the basis of (probably unrepeatable) past performance. Whatever the reason, the effect is that the returns that millions of savers hope to earn end up being paid to the finance sector as rents.

谦行天下UID: 2797557

25-2

June 6, 2010, 5:15 pm
Should This Be the Last Generation?
By PETER SINGER

Have you ever thought about whether to have a child? If so, what factors entered into your decision? Was it whether having children would be good for you, your partner and others close to the possible child, such as children you may already have, or perhaps your parents? For most people contemplating reproduction, those are the dominant questions. Some may also think about the desirability of adding to the strain that the nearly seven billion people already here are putting on our planet’s environment. But very few ask whether coming into existence is a good thing for the child itself. Most of those who consider that question probably do so because they have some reason to fear that the child’s life would be especially difficult — for example, if they have a family history of a devastating illness, physical or mental, that cannot yet be detected prenatally.
contemplate：think intently and at length, as for spiritual purposes
prenatal：
产前的，婴儿出生前的


胎儿期的，孕期的


All this suggests that we think it is wrong to bring into the world a child whose prospects for a happy, healthy life are poor, but we don’t usually think the fact that a child is likely to have a happy, healthy life is a reason for bringing the child into existence. This has come to be known among philosophers as “the asymmetry” and it is not easy to justify. But rather than go into the explanations usually proffered — and why they fail — I want to raise a related problem. How good does life have to be, to make it reasonable to bring a child into the world? Is the standard of life experienced by most people in developed nations today good enough to make this decision unproblematic[不成问题], in the absence of specific knowledge that the child will have a severe genetic disease or other problem?

If there were to be no future generations, there would be nothing for us to feel to guilty about. Is there anything wrong with this scenario?
The 19th-century German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer held that even the best life possible for humans is one in which we strive for ends that, once achieved, bring only fleeting satisfaction. New desires then lead us on to further futile struggle and the cycle repeats itself.

Schopenhauer’s pessimism has had few defenders over the past two centuries, but one has recently emerged, in the South African philosopher David Benatar, author of a fine book with an arresting title: “Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence.” One of Benatar’s arguments trades on something like the asymmetry noted earlier. To bring into existence someone who will suffer is, Benatar argues, to harm that person, but to bring into existence someone who will have a good life is not to benefit him or her. Few of us would think it right to inflict【造成】 severe suffering on an innocent child, even if that were the only way in which we could bring many other children into the world. Yet everyone will suffer to some extent, and if our species continues to reproduce, we can be sure that some future children will suffer severely. Hence continued reproduction will harm some children severely, and benefit none.

Benatar also argues that human lives are, in general, much less good than we think they are. We spend most of our lives with unfulfilled desires, and the occasional satisfactions that are all most of us can achieve are insufficient to outweigh these prolonged negative states. If we think that this is a tolerable state of affairs it is because we are, in Benatar’s view, victims of the illusion of pollyannaism. This illusion may have evolved because it helped our ancestors survive, but it is an illusion nonetheless. If we could see our lives objectively, we would see that they are not something we should inflict on anyone.

pollyannaism：Pollyanna——
[美国英语]遇事老是过分乐观的人；以主观善良愿望看待事物的人[源出于波特小说中的女主角]


Here is a thought experiment to test our attitudes to this view. Most thoughtful people are extremely concerned about climate change. Some stop eating meat, or flying abroad on vacation, in order to reduce their carbon footprint. But the people who will be most severely harmed by climate change have not yet been conceived. If there were to be no future generations, there would be much less for us to feel to guilty about.

So why don’t we make ourselves the Last Generation on Earth? If we would all agree to have ourselves sterilized then no sacrifices would be required — we could party our way into extinction!

Of course, it would be impossible to get agreement on universal sterilization, but just imagine that we could. Then is there anything wrong with this scenario? Even if we take a less pessimistic view of human existence than Benatar, we could still defend it, because it makes us better off — for one thing, we can get rid of all that guilt about what we are doing to future generations — and it doesn’t make anyone worse off, because there won’t be anyone else to be worse off.

Is a world with people in it better than one without? Put aside what we do to other species — that’s a different issue. Let’s assume that the choice is between a world like ours and one with no sentient beings in it at all. And assume, too — here we have to get fictitious, as philosophers often do — that if we choose to bring about the world with no sentient beings at all, everyone will agree to do that. No one’s rights will be violated — at least, not the rights of any existing people. Can non-existent people have a right to come into existence?

I do think it would be wrong to choose the non-sentient universe. In my judgment, for most people, life is worth living. Even if that is not yet the case, I am enough of an optimist to believe that, should humans survive for another century or two, we will learn from our past mistakes and bring about a world in which there is far less suffering than there is now. But justifying that choice forces us to reconsider the deep issues with which I began. Is life worth living? Are the interests of a future child a reason for bringing that child into existence? And is the continuance of our species justifiable in the face of our knowledge that it will certainly bring suffering to innocent future human beings?