求帮助指证翻译问题及专业问题（Stocks for the long run）

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写在前面：
翻译这本书是因为这本书是YALE的financial marketing的推荐教材，而其中很多东西中文都搞不清楚，能找到的只有英文版，所以试着翻了一下，希望有学金融的同学帮忙指点和纠正一下，多谢了。还没翻完，争取每天弄掉一点。还有，本贴只作学习交流用途，不含任何商业行为，版权归原文作者所有。
第一章
原文

Chapter 1 Stock and Bond Returns Since 1802  
I know of no way of judging the future but by the past.
                    PATRICK HENRY, 1775
"EVERYBODY OUGHT TO BE RICH"
In the summer of 1929, a journalist named Samuel Crowther interviewed John J. Raskob, a senior financial executive at General Motors, about how the typical individual could build wealth by investing in stocks. In August of that year, Crowther published Raskob’s ideas in a
Ladies’ Home Journal article with the audacious title “Everybody Ought to Be Rich.”
In the interview, Raskob claimed that America was on the verge of a tremendous industrial expansion. He maintained that by putting just $15 per month into good common stocks, investors could expect their wealth to grow steadily to $80,000 over the next 20 years. Such a return— 24 percent per year—was unprecedented, but the prospect of effortlessly amassing a great fortune seemed plausible in the atmosphere of the 1920s bull market. Stocks excited investors, and millions put their savings into the market seeking quick profit.
On September 3, 1929, a few days after Raskob’s ideas appeared, the Dow Jones Industrial Average hit a historic high of 381.17. Seven weeks later, stocks crashed. The next 34 months saw the most devastating decline in share values in U.S. history.
On July 8, 1932, when the carnage was finally over, the Dow Industrials stood at 41.22. The market value of the world’s greatest corporations had declined an incredible 89 percent. Millions of investors’ life savings were wiped out, and thousands of investors who had borrowed money to buy stocks were forced into bankruptcy. America was mired in
the deepest economic depression in its history.
Raskob’s advice was ridiculed and denounced for years to come. It was said to represent the insanity of those who believed that the market could rise forever and the foolishness of those who ignored the tremendous risks inherent in stocks. Senator Arthur Robinson of Indiana publicly held Raskob responsible for the stock crash by urging common people to buy stock at the market peak. In 1992, 63 years later, Forbes magazine warned investors of the overvaluation of stocks in its issue headlined “Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds.” In a review of the history of market cycles, Forbes fingered Raskob as the “worst offender” of those who viewed the stock market as a guaranteed engine of wealth.
Conventional wisdom holds that Raskob’s foolhardy advice epitomizes the mania that periodically overruns Wall Street. But is that verdict fair? The answer is decidedly no. If you calculate the value of the portfolio of an investor who followed Raskob’s advice in 1929, patiently putting $15 a month into stocks, you find that his accumulation exceeded
that of someone who placed the same money in Treasury bills after less than 4 years! By 1949 his stock portfolio would have accumulated almost $9,000, a return of 7.86 percent, more than double the annual return in bonds. After 30 years the portfolio would have grown to over $60,000, with an annual return rising to 12.72 percent. Although these returns were not as high as Raskob had projected, the total return of the stock portfolio over 30 years was more than 8 times the accumulation in bonds and more than 9 times that in Treasury bills. Those who never bought stock, citing the Great Crash as the vindication of their caution, eventually found themselves far behind investors who had patiently accumulated equity.
The story of John Raskob’s infamous prediction illustrates an important theme in the history of Wall Street. This theme is not the prevalence of foolish optimism at market peaks; rather, it is that over the last century, accumulations in stocks have always outperformed other financial
assets for the patient investor. Even such calamitous events as the Great 1929 Stock Crash did not negate the superiority of stocks as longterm investments.

FINANCIAL MARKET RETURNS FROM 1802
This chapter analyzes the returns on stocks and bonds over long periods of time in both the United States and other countries. This two-century history is divided into three subperiods. In the first subperiod, from 1802 through 1870, the United States made a transition from an agrarian to an industrialized economy, comparable to the transition that the “emerging markets” of Latin America and Asia are making today. In the second subperiod, from 1871 through 1925, the United States became the foremost political and economic power in the world. The third subperiod, from 1926 to the present, contains the 1929 to 1932 stock collapse, the Great Depression, and the postwar expansion. The data from this period have been analyzed extensively by academics and professional money managers and have served as benchmarks for historical returns. The story is told in Figure 1-1. It depicts the total return indexes for stocks, long- and short-term bonds, gold, and commodities from 1802 through 2006. Total return means that all returns, such as interest and dividends and capital gains, are automatically reinvested in the asset and allowed to accumulate over time.
F I G U R E 1–1
Total Nominal Return Indexes, 1802 through December 2006

It can be easily seen that the total return on equities dominates all other assets. Even the cataclysmic stock crash of 1929, which caused a generation of investors to shun stocks, appears as a mere blip in the stock return index. Bear markets, which so frighten investors, pale in the context of the upward thrust of total stock returns. One dollar invested and
reinvested in stocks since 1802 would have accumulated to over $12.7 million by the end of 2006. This sum can be realized by an investor holding the broadest possible portfolio of stocks in proportion to their market value and is calculated to include those companies that do not survive. By extension, the above analysis indicates that $1 million invested
and reinvested during these more than 200 years would have grown to the incredible sum of $12.7 trillion by the end of 2006, nearly threequarters the entire capitalization of the U.S. stock market!
One million dollars in 1802 is equivalent to roughly $16.84 million in today’s purchasing power. This was certainly a large, though notoverwhelming, sum of money to the industrialists and landholders of the early nineteenth century. But total wealth in the stock market, or in
the economy for that matter, does not accumulate as fast as the total return index. This is because investors consume most of their dividends and capital gains, enjoying the fruits of their past saving. It is rare for anyone to accumulate wealth for long periods of time without consuming part of his or her return. The longest period of time investors typically hold onto assets without touching the principal and income occurs when they are accumulating wealth in pension plans for their retirement or in insurance policies that are passed on to their heirs.
Even those who bequeath fortunes untouched during their lifetimes must realize that these accumulations are often dissipated in the next generation or spent by the foundations to which the money is bequeathed. The stock market has the power to turn a single dollar into
millions by the forbearance of generations—but few will have the patience or desire to endure the wait.

译文：
Chapter 1 Stock and Bond Returns Since 1802  
I know of no way of judging the future but by the past.
                    PATRICK HENRY, 1775
“每个人都应当富有”
在1929年的夏天，一名叫Samuel Crowther 的记者采访了通用汽车的高级金融管理John J. Raskob，问讯个人怎么通过投资股票来累积财富。在同年八月，Crowther把Raskob的想法发表在了一篇叫Ladies'Home Journal的文章中，并大胆的启用了“每个人应当富有”这个标题。
在采访中，Raskob声称美国正在产业大膨胀边缘。他说如果每月仅仅投入15美元于一支不错的普通股票，投资者可以预期他们的资产将在20多年后稳定地增长到8万美元。这种回报--每年24%--是空前的， 但是这种不劳而获的展望似乎在19世纪20年代的牛市氛围中貌似是可行的。股票刺激投资者和无数人把他们的积蓄投入到这寻求快速财富的市场。
1929年九月3日，在Raskob的看法被提出后没几天，道琼斯工业平均指数达到了历史的最高点381.17。七周后，股市大跌。而接下来的34周见证了美国历史上股票最毁灭性的下跌。
1932年7月8日，当这场灾难终于停止时，道琼斯指数定格在了41.22。世界上最大的公司的市值减少了难以至信的89%。数以百万投资者终生的积蓄被耗尽，并且数以千计的靠借贷来买股票的投资者被迫倒闭。美国陷入了史上最深的经济不景气的泥潭。
Raskob的建议时过境迁后更像是讽刺和批击。它被认为是那些相信市场会永远涨价的人的疯狂和那些忽视隐藏在股票内部巨大危机的人的愚蠢的展现。印第安纳州议员Arthur Robinson公开指责Raskob应为催动百姓在股市最高点买入从而导致了股票危机负责。1992年，63年之后，福布斯杂志在它的以“迷失的大众和疯狂的人群”为题的文章中警告那些高估了股市的投资者。从市场循环的历史角度，福布斯指出Raskob是那些提出股市就是摇钱树见解的人中最糟的罪犯。
舆论认为Raskob的愚蠢建议是典型的时期性的高估华尔街。但是这种裁决是否公平呢？答案当然是不。如果你计算一个在1929年遵从Raskob建议的投资者的资产文件价值，你会发现他的财富累积在不到四年的时间里便会超过那些把相同的钱投入国债的人！到了1949年他的股票资产文件将会累积到9000多美元，7.86%的回报率，是债权的两倍多。在30年后会增长到6万多美元，每年的回报率升至12.72%。虽然这个回报要低于Raskob的估计，30年投资股市的回报是债权的8倍多，是国债的9倍多。那些从来没有买过股票的人拿大衰退当做自己谨慎的最佳实例，却最终发现他们早已落后与那些稳稳当当积累着的投资者。
金融市场自1802的投资回报
这章分析股票及债权长时期在美国和其他国家的回报。这两个世纪的历史会被划分为3段。 第一阶段从1802年到1870年，美国处在从农耕经济向工业经济的转型，就像如今拉丁美洲和亚洲的“新兴市场”。第二个阶段是从1871年至1925年，美国渐渐成为了世界上最重要的政治与经济体。第三个时期是从1926年至现在，包括了1929年至1932年的股市崩盘，大萧条和战后扩张。这个时期的资料被学者和职业理财经理广泛分析并且被当作了一个历史回报的标准。详见图1-1。它描述了自1802年至2006年股票，长短期债券，黄金，国债总体的收益指数。收益指数指所有的收益，像利息，股息和资本收益，是机械的对资产进行再投资和允许资本的一直积累。
FUGURE 1-1

显而易见，公平的支配所有资本，甚至是在灾难性的1929股市崩盘，导致了一个年代的投资者都选择避开股市，也只是股市收益指数中的一个小插曲。让投资者如此害怕的熊市，在股市收益指数如此犀利的背景下也显得苍白无力。从1802年开始，用1美刀的投资股票以及反复的再投资到了2006年末资产积累可达到12，700，000美刀。这个收益可以被一个持有明晰的股票文件投资者兑现其相应的市值，而其这个收益包括了那些没有存活的公司。（存活变差在计算收益中的分析会在20章中进行讨论）
推广而知，以上的分析暗示了1百万美刀的投资和再投资经历200多年，到2006年末将会增长至不可思议的12.7万亿美刀，接近是全美股市的四分之三的资产总额。
1802年的1百万美刀的购买力约合如今的16.84百万美刀。在十九世纪，对于一个企业家或者是地主，这虽然是一笔巨款，但并非无法达到（Blodget，一个19世纪早期的经济学家，估计了当时美国的财富总值是接近25亿美刀，就是说1百万只是其中的0.04%）但是股市，或者是当时的理财项目中的总资产并没有像全收益指数增长的那样迅速。这是因为投资者浪费了大量的红利和资本收益来享受他们过去所累积的成果。
一个人累积长时间的财富而不去花费其中部分回报的情况是很少见的。而典型的一个人能够不动本金及利息的投资莫过于他们正在为退休累积养老金或者是留给下一代的保单。然而即使下一代继承了这些未被挪作他用的财富，这些财富也常常必将被下一代，或者是这笔财富所属的基金会所挥霍（世界上最大的基金会之一，Warren
Buffett留下了他大笔的财富所属的the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation，已经宣布所有资金将会在他们死后50年被消耗殆尽）。股市有能力是1美刀变成1百万美刀，代价是几代人的隐忍，但是几乎没有人有着耐心及意愿来忍受着等待。