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本帖最后由 thatll 于 2009-7-30 09:23 编辑
【阅读+写作 The Economist Jul 9th 2009】
China's future
Enter the dragon
---The West hopes that wealth, globalisation and political integration will turn China into a gentle giant. A new book argues that this is a delusion
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When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World. By Martin Jacques. Allen Lane; 592 pages; £25. To be published in America by Penguin Press in November.
THERE have been many rivals for America’s crown as the world’s greatest power. In the 1950s the Soviet Union threatened its military hegemony; in the 1980s Japan challenged its economic might. These days the pretender(One who sets forth a claim, especially a claimant to a throne.) is China. 【这一小节说和美国争当the world's greatest power的一直存在,threaten its military hegemony; challenge its economic might这两个同义替换我们要学】The evidence of America’s decline seems obvious. The limits of its military power were exposed after the invasion and occupation of Iraq, and the flaws of its capitalist system were revealed by the global financial crisis that started on Wall Street. 【这一小节说了美国在军事和经济这两方面出现的问题,一个exposed, 一个reveal同义替换】The West now looks to China to prop up(prop: sustain, strengthen —often used with up<a government propped up by the military>) its financial system, and to the Chinese consumer to stimulate the global economy. 【这一小节这西方国家将指望着中国去拯救他们,look to, prop up】
Is the long era of Western dominance, first by European powers and then by America, finally coming to an end? For Martin Jacques, a British commentator and recently a visiting professor at universities in China, Japan and Singapore, the answer is clear. The title of his book says it all: “When China Rules the World”. 【这一段从上面的描述中引出了一个问题,那就是这个最初由欧洲后来由美国主宰的西方列强的长期时代是否来到了末期,然后引出了本文所要介绍的一本书,就是《当中国同志世界的时候》】
He begins by citing the latest study by Goldman Sachs, which projects(To calculate, estimate, or predict (something in the future), based on present data or trends: projecting next year's expenses.) that China’s economy will be bigger than America’s by 2027, and nearly twice as large by 2050 (though individual Chinese will still be poorer than Americans). Economic power being the foundation of the political, military and cultural kind, Mr Jacques describes a world under a Pax Sinica. (前面半句独立主格结构economic power being...,是作为右面主句的一个解释,或者说是附加说明)The renminbi will displace the dollar as the world’s reserve currency; Shanghai will overshadow New York and London as the centre of finance; European countries will become quaint relics of a glorious past, rather like Athens and Rome today; global citizens will use Mandarin as much as, if not more than, English; the thoughts of Confucius will become as familiar as those of Plato; and so on.(这一整节的描述是在憧憬中国的美好未来,人名币取代美元成为世界reserve currency:Currency kept in reserve by a government for the paying of international debts. 上海盖过纽约和伦敦成为金融中心,overshadow这个词很好To make insignificant by comparison,欧洲国家将成为辉煌过去的遗迹,就如今天的希腊和罗马,全球的民众将使用汉语至少和英语一样多,儒家思想将变得和柏拉图一样盛行。)
注:
Pax Sinica (Latin for "Chinese Peace") is the time of peace in East Asia, maintained byChinese hegemony, usually the period of rule by the Han Dynasty, Tang Dynasty, early Song Dynasty, Yuan Dynasty, Ming Dynasty and early Qing Dynasty. These periods were characterised by the dominance of the Chinese civilization in East Asia due to its political, economic, military and ]cultural power.
quaint:
1, a: marked by skillful design <quaint with many a device in India ink — Herman Melville> b: marked by beauty or elegance
2, a: unusual or different in character or appearance : odd <figures of fun, quaint people — Herman Wouk> b: pleasingly or strikingly old-fashioned or unfamiliar
Mandarin The official national standard spoken language of China, which is based on the principal dialect spoken in and around Beijing. Also called Guoyu, Putonghua.
All this makes for an interesting parlour game(: a game suitable for playing indoors). Yet there is something too deterministic (deterministism:The philosophical doctrine that every state of affairs, including every human event, act, and decision is the inevitable consequence of antecedent states of affairs.)about Mr Jacques’s economic and political extrapolations. The author does not allow for uncertainty, chaos and error. He predicts that history is about to restore China to its ancient position of global power. But might it not equally push China back into self-destructive upheavals such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution? After all, the same Communist Party remains in power and, as Mr Jacques puts it, the Chinese state has never shared authority with anyone. He accords little importance to the thousands of protests in China, most of them against corruption and the loss of land. In his dense recitation of data, there is hardly a mention of the demographic crisis facing China, which means that the country could well become old before it becomes rich. He sees little risk of instability from ethnic unrest in Tibet or Xinjiang.
For Mr Jacques (the last editor of a defunct British magazine called Marxism Today), the Communist Party is a benign force, guiding the country through its spectacular boom while avoiding the collapse that afflicted the Soviet Union. He has little truck with(truck: close association or connection <will have no truck with crooks>) the notion that free markets can only work, in the long term, in free societies; that liberty of thought leads more easily to innovation; that democratic states correct their mistakes more easily than authoritarian ones.(这一个排比句式很气势的表达了作者对于此书作者观点的对抗:have little truck with the notion that...这是一个表示对什么基本没概念的很好的表达方式。)
All this is a Western conceit, says Mr Jacques. Democracy and rule of law were not a precondition for the West’s economic power, but a coincidence. This argument is the most interesting (and contentious) part of Mr Jacques’s book, rather than his workaday account of Chinese history or the overlong prose about China being a “civilisation state” rather than a “nation state”.
注:afflict和inflict的区别:
afflict: to distress so severely as to cause persistent suffering or anguish <afflicted with arthritis>
也就是说afflict sb with sth
inflict:To deal or mete out (something punishing or burdensome); impose: inflicted heavy losses on the enemy; a storm that inflicted widespread damage.
也就是inflict sth on sb
The parting of ways between Europe and China came, in his view, not with the Renaissance or the Enlightenment but with the industrial revolution. (这句话表达的真的很地道,一个时刻的到来并不是和什么一起来的而是和什么一起来的,呵呵,也就是这个时刻和什么无关和什么有关)Even so, the West’s success was not preordained. Until 1800, Mr Jacques argues, the most advanced parts of China and Europe had reached comparable levels of development. Indeed, China had built a form of steam engine before James Watt. So why did the industrial revolution begin in Britain and not along the Yangzi river? In large part, it was an accident of history.
注:parting of the ways :A point of divergence, especially one of great moment. Britain, like China then, suffered from a shortage of land. But Britain had coal, which replaced firewood as a fuel, and colonies with slaves providing plenty of farmland and cheap labour. The habit of war “helped to hone the European nation states into veritable fighting machines” and the incorporation of merchant classes into the elites encouraged European rulers to promote capitalism. By contrast, claims Mr Jacques, imperial China’s attachment to Confucian values of harmony meant its main concern was to keep order and social equality within its domains. So it was not the West’s superior values that allowed it to rule the world, but rather its flaws.(这句话道出了本文作者的理由,中国对儒家以和为贵的思想的attachment意味着他主要关心的是如何保持有序和社会平等,所以西方统治世界靠的是他的flaw而不是他的superior values)
If colonisation assisted Western hegemony, the end of the colonial era after the second world war set the stage for the rise of China. Its economic development from 1978 has been “the most extraordinary in human history”, more rapid than that of Europe or America, faster even than that of Japan, South Korea and the other Asian miracles. Conflict of the sort that accompanied the rise of Germany and Japan cannot be ruled out, says Mr Jacques, but there is a good chance that it can be avoided. “China does not aspire to run the world because it believes itself to be the centre of the world,” he writes. Perhaps so. For now China is developing in collaboration with the West. It relies on Western investment and markets, and seeks stability abroad.
The West hopes that wealth, globalisation and political integration will turn China into a gentle giant, a panda rather than a dragon. George Bush senior declared in 1999: “Trade freely with China and time is on our side.” But Mr Jacques says this is a delusion. Time will not make China more Western; it will make the West, and the world, more Chinese.
未来的中国:龙行天下
西方期望财富、全球化和政治一体化等因数可以将中国转变成一个温柔的巨物。新出版的一本书则认为这只是西方的一种妄想。
《When China Rules
the
World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World》(注:书名,参见亚马逊:http://www.amazon.co.uk/When-China-Rules-World-Kingdom/dp/0713992549)作者Martin Jacques。Allen Lane出版社(注:企鹅出版集团(Penguin Books)是一个在1935年于英国创立的出版社,创始人是艾伦·莱恩(Allen Lane),主要出版纸版书籍,是英国、纽西兰、澳大利亚和印度的主流出版商。其ISBN注册号为0-14。);592页;定价£25。将在11月由美国企鹅出版社出版发行。
在美国成为世界超级大国的过程中,有过许多的竞争对手。在20世纪50年代,苏联曾经威胁过其军事霸权地位;在20世纪80年代,日本挑战过其经济地位;而现在,中国则是一个觊觎者。美国衰退的迹象是很明显的。入侵和占领伊拉克后,暴露了其军事力量的弱点,同时从华尔街开始蔓延的全球金融危机,也揭露了其资本主义制度的缺点。现在西方期待中国来支撑其金融体系,也寄希望于中国的消费者来拉动全球的经济增长。
首先由欧洲诸强继而由美国为首,长期以来西方主导整个世界的时代要走向终结了吗?这对Martin Jacques来说,答案是很明显的。他是一位英国的评论员,最近也在中国、日本、新加坡等国大学任客座教授。他这本书的标题就说明了一切:“当中国主宰世界的时候”。
他开篇引用高盛的研究报告,这份报告指出:中国的经济规模将在2027年超过美国,并在2050年达到美国的2倍左右(尽管人均还是比美国低)。经济实力是政治、军事、文化的基础。Jacques先生描述了一个中国主导的世界秩序形态:人民币将取代美元成为世界贮备货币;上海将取代纽约和伦敦成为世界的金融中心;欧洲诸国将会像雅典和罗马那样,成为辉煌过去的历史遗留;普通话将会和英语一样广泛地使用,或许比英语更流行;孔子的儒家学说将会像帕拉图的学说一样盛行等等。
所有的这一切造成了一个有趣的室内游戏。但是,Jacques先生关于经济和政治的推断未免太过绝对。作者没有考虑局势不稳定、混乱甚至错误等因素。他预言历史将恢复中国昔日世界强国的地位。但是,难道历史就不能同样地将中国推向另一边,比如说像“大跃进”、“文革”那样自毁性的大动荡吗?毕竟,正如Jacques先生所说的那样,共产党仍然掌握着权力,而且中国政府从来也不会与他人分享权力。他认为中国数以千计的反腐败和反对剥夺土地的抗议并不那么重要。在他列举的大量数据中,几乎没有提到中国正面临的人口危机,这意味着中国将未富先老。他也没有意识到西藏或新疆的民族骚乱带来的不稳定局势的危险性。
在Jacques先生(他曾经是已停刊的英国《今日马克思主义》的最后一名编辑)看来,共产党是一个很好的统治力量,它引导整个国家惊人的繁荣发展的同时避免了重蹈苏联的覆辙。自由市场只能在自由社会长久的运行;思想的自由使创新更加地容易;民主国家会比独裁国家更容易改正他们的错误,他并不认同这些观点。
Jacques先生认为这一切都是西方的自负。民主和法制并不是西方世界经济实力的先决条件,仅仅是一种巧合。相比于关于中国历史流水账似的讲述及冗长单调地论述中国会成为一个“文明国家”而非“民族国家”,(译者注:引用自tzigane的眉批:“原文的“civilisation state”,应是指建基於共同文明凝聚力的国家,而“nation state”就是指由单一民族组成的国家。这里的译法意思大致和原文相同,但我看到的时候不禁想到官样文章中的文明社会、国家民族之类的东东,所以还是建议解释清楚一点,免致中文读者误会”。)
这一部分的讨论将是这本书最精彩的部分(存在争议)。
他认为中国和欧洲的分道口不是文艺复兴或启蒙运动,而是工业革命。即使是这样,西方的成功也不是历史注定的。Jacques先生认为,直到1800年,中国和欧洲比较发达的地方都是在类似的同一水平上的,实际上,中国创造了一种类似蒸汽机的东西的时间比瓦特还要早。那么,为什么工业革命发生在英国而不是在中国的长江流域呢?历史的意外是部分原因。
当时的英国和中国一样土地短缺。但是英国有煤,可以取代木材作为燃料。同时有着大量奴隶的殖民地也为英国提供了大量的农场和廉价的劳力。好战的习性“有助于将欧洲国家打造成真正的战争机器”,而且,商人阶层的某些组织逐渐融入社会精英阶层促使欧洲统治阶级推行资本主义。相反地,Jacques先生说,处在帝国时期的中国更倾向于推崇儒家学说的和谐价值观,这意味着它主要关心的是维持其疆域内的秩序稳定和社会平等。这样看来,使其得以统治世界并不是由于西方价值体系中的精华部分的作用,而恰恰是其中的糟粕部分。
如果说殖民化有助于西方霸权的形成,那么二战后殖民时代的终结则为中国的崛起提供了舞台。中国从1978年来的经济发展是“人类历史上最惊人的”,比欧洲和美国快,甚至比日本、韩国、新加坡等“亚洲奇迹”还要快。Jacques先生认为,类似德国和日本崛起时所伴随产生的那种冲突是没法排除的,但是有很好的机会可以避免。他在书里写到:“中国并不渴望统治世界,因为她认为她就是世界的中心。”或许如此吧。现在中国正在与西方在合作中发展,他依赖西方的资本和市场,并寻求外部环境的稳定。
西方期望财富、全球化和政治一体化等因数可以将中国转变成一个温柔的巨物,是一只熊猫而非一条龙。老布什曾在1999年声称:“与中国自由贸易吧,时间会站在我们这一边。”但Jacques先生则认为这只是一种妄想罢了。时间不会使中国更西化,相反它会使西方或整个世界更中国化。
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