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[感想日志] 1006G[REBORN FROM THE ASHES组]备考日记 by kulewy531(为了未来,为了永恒) [复制链接]

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发表于 2009-12-26 02:57:03 |显示全部楼层
75# zhengchangdian
没有啦!我3月7号机考。谢踩,共勉之!

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发表于 2009-12-26 03:51:11 |显示全部楼层
圣诞节和同学三国杀过头,现在作业写不完。杯具啊!

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发表于 2009-12-26 03:55:34 |显示全部楼层
Executive pay

This house believes that on the whole, senior executives are worth what they are paid

好词、难词
好句、难句
About this debate

Over the past few decades executive pay has risen dramatically. Bosses who were once paid ten times as much as shopfloor workers are now sometimes paid as much as 300 times as much. This trend was never popular, even during good times. But today it is becoming radioactive (Of or exhibiting radioactivity, booming), as governments step in to rescue failing companies and ordinary people are forced to tighten their belts.

Is the anger justified? Some argue that executive pay is a long-standing disgrace. Pay is often not tethered(To fasten or restrict with or as if with a tether) to performance. Huge rewards for the few demotivate the rest of the workforce. Others are more sanguine. Successful executives, such as Jack Welch, former CEO of General Electric, can add hugely to a firm's profitability, benefiting workers, managers and shareholders alike. The growing pay of executives has to be balanced against the growing difficulty of their jobs, particularly as turnover(The amount of business transacted during a given period of time) in the boardroom increases.

Opening statements

Defending the motion

Steven N. Kaplan Neubauer Family Prof. of Entrepreneurship & Finance, University of Chicago Booth School of Business

In the United States, the United Kingdom and elsewhere, CEOs are routinely criticised for being overpaid.

Against the motion

Nell  Minow Editor and Co-founder, The Corporate Library

Excessive executive compensation of the past decade is both a symptom and a cause of the current economic mess.

The moderator's opening remarks

Oct 20th 2009 |   Adrian  Wooldridge

One of the few things that anti-globalisation campaigners and stock market investors agree upon is that executive pay is out of control.
It is not hard to understand this shared outrage: executive pay has exploded(grow radioactively) since the 1980s. For most of the postwar era executives earned a few multiples of the median pay. But thereafter(From a specified time onward; from then on), starting in America and slowly spreading to the rest of the world, the multiples increased exponentially(成级数增长). Today many American workers earn in a year what their boss takes home in an evening.
Isn't this a disgrace? Critics of executive pay worry that even mediocre bosses are given outsized rewards. Robert Nardelli received a $20m pay-off when he left HomeDepot even though the share price had fallen during his six-yeartenure. Carly Fiorina was $180m better off when she leftHewlett-Packard despite a lackluster(无光彩的) tenure(occupation)
. Defenders of executive pay argue that great bosses such as Louis Gerstner, the former boss of IBM, and Jack Welch, the former boss of General Electric, are worth every penny because they create huge amounts of wealth for both shareholdersand employees.
The debate about executive pay, though never cool, is particularly hot at the moment. Workers have been squeezed by the recession. Unemployment is approaching 10% in the United States and much higher numbers in many other countries. Numerous governments are planning to deal with their rising deficits by freezing public-sector pay. And yet many bosses and bankers continue to make out like bandits—or so lots of people think.
We are lucky to have two of the best people in the business to debate this subject. Steven Kaplan, who proposes the motion, teaches at the University of Chicago's Booth School of Business. Nell Minow, who opposes it, is a long-time share holder activist and chairwoman of the Corporate Library, are search company. (For people who want to know more about her she is also the subject of a profile in a recent issue of the New Yorker.)
Mr. Kaplan starts off by making two fundamental points. CEO pay has not gone up in recent years; indeed, it has been dropping since 2000, particularly in relation to other well-paid groups, such as hedge fund managers, lawyers, consultants and professional athletes. Nor is CEO paid unrelated to performance. Boards are increasingly willing to fire CEOs for poor performance.
Ms Minow focuses heavily on the relationship between pay and the recent credit crunch (crisis). She points out that executive pay helped to create the mess in the first place: Countrywide's CEO, Angelo Mozillo, made more than $550m during his time in office. She also points out that the fact that many companies that were bailed out by the government continue to pay their CEOs huge salaries and bonuses is damaging the credibility of the system.
Such bold opening statements raise questions galore (In great numbers; in abundance). Is Mr. Kaplan justified in starting his account in 2000 rather than 1980, when executive pay exploded? And is Ms Minow right to concentrate so heavily on the financial sector? These are only a couple of the questions that we need to thrash out in the coming days.


The proposer's opening remarks
Oct 20th 2009 |   Steven N. Kaplan

In the United States, the United Kingdom and elsewhere, CEOs are routinely criticised for being overpaid. Critics argue that boards do not respond to market forces, but, instead, are dominated by or are over-generous to their CEOs. Boards are criticised for not tying CEOs' pay to performance. These criticisms have been exacerbated by the financial crisis and the desire to find scapegoats.
I argue below that the critics are wrong and that there are many misperceptions of CEO pay. While CEO pay practices are not perfect, they are driven by market forces and performance. Contrary to public perception, CEO pay has not gone up in recent years. In fact, the average CEO pay (adjusted for inflation) has dropped since 2000, while the pay of other groups has increased substantially. Similarly, the view that CEOs are not paid for performance is wrong. In fact, the opposite is true and board sincreasingly fire them for poor performance. And, most recently,consistent with market forces driving pay, the US and UK governments each hired a new CEO (of AIG and the Royal Bank of Scotland) for pay exceeding that of the median large company CEO.
It is useful to understand how CEO pay is measured. It includes three components: salary, bonus and stock-based pay. It is usually measured in two ways. The first is the sum of salary, bonus, restricted stock and the expected value of stock options. I call this expected pay. Expected pay measures what boards believe they awarded the CEO. This is the best measure of what a CEO is paid each year. Note that the CEO does not actually walk away with this money. The second measure replaces expected stock option values with values actually realized and realized pay measures what CEOs walk away with.
The first graph shows average and median expected CEO pay for S&P 500 CEOs since 1994 (adjusted for inflation). It shows that median CEO pay has been stable since 2001; it has not increased. Andaverage pay has declined substantially. In fact, average CEO pay in2008 is below the average in 1998.


While average CEO pay has declined, the pay of other highly paid groups has increased. The second graph shows S&P 500 CEO pay relative to the income of the top 1% of US taxpayers. Relative to those other groups, CEOs are no better off in 2008 than in 1994. Strikingly, relative CEO pay is a half of what it was in 2001, a huge decline.


Which are those groups that have earned increasingly high compensation? Hedge fund, private equity and venture capital investors have increased their assets and fees substantially, translating into high pay. By one estimate, the top three hedge fund managers earned more in 2007 than all 500 S&P 500 CEOs combined. Professional athletes, investment bankers, consultants and lawyers also have benefited greatly. For example, from 2004 to 2008, the inflation-adjusted pay of partners at the top 20 law firms increased by 12% while that of S&P 500 CEOs dropped 12%. Those law firms had over 3,000 partners making an average of $2.4m each.
One can look at the Obama administration for other examples. Larry Summers made $8m (more than the median S&P 500 CEO) giving speeches and working part-time for a hedge fund. Eric Holder made $3.5m as a law partner.
So, while CEOs earn a lot, they are not unique. The pay of people in the other groups has undoubtedly been driven by market forces; all are compensated in arm's-length markets, not by cronies. Technology, globalisation and scale appear to haveincreased the market value of these groups. CEOs have not done better and, by some measures, have done worse. Those who argue CEOs areoverpaid have to explain how CEOs can be overpaid and not subject tomarket forces, when the other groups are paid at least as well and aresubject to market forces.
Why is the pay of these other groupsrelevant for CEOs? Top executives regularly leave to work for privateequity firms and hedge funds. Law partners and consultants leave towork for public companies as general counsels and executives. Relativepay matters and all these groups are paid according to market demand.Markets are the driving force for senior executives in all theseindustries and talented people jump across industries, based on marketperceptions of their worth.
Critics also argue that CEO pay isnot tied to stock performance. Again, that is not true. Looking at whatCEOs actually receive—realised pay—Josh Rauh and I found that firmswith CEOs in the top decile of realised pay earned stock returns 90%above those of other firms in their industries over the previous fiveyears. Firms with CEOs in the bottom decile of realised payunderperformed by almost 40%. The typical CEO is paid for performance.
Thiswas reinforced in 2008, when average realised CEO pay declined by 25%(according to S&P's Execucomp). And Equilar, another provider ofCEO pay data, estimated that the typical CEO experienced a net worthdecline of over 40%.
The final myth to bust is that CEOs controltheir boards and earn high pay through this control and notperformance. In fact, CEO tenure has declined, from ten years in the1970s to six years today, and boards have got tougher on theirexecutives when they do not perform.
In sum, market forces governCEO compensation. CEOs are paid what they are worth. Talentedindividuals, who are perceived to be valuable, can move betweenindustries to be compensated well. The clearest example of this is thateven governments have to pay highly for talented executives. Recently,the Royal Bank of Scotland (under UK government control) hired a CEOwith a package worth up to $16m; AIG (under US government control)hired a CEO with a package worth up to $10.5m. For these critical jobs,both of these executives received compensation exceeding the pay of themedian S&P 500 CEO.


The opposition's opening remarks
Oct 20th 2009 | Nell  Minow

Excessiveexecutive compensation of the past decade is both a symptom and a causeof the current economic mess. And the post-meltdown awards are all butguaranteed to continue to create perverse incentives that will rewardmanagement and further damage the interests of shareholders and everyother participant in the economy.
Incentive compensation rewardedexecutives for the quantity of transactions rather than the quality oftransactions. It inevitably led to failures like the subprime disasterand the dominoes it toppled as it took the economy down with it. Worstof all, the avalanche of post-bailout bonuses and departure packageslike the $53m Ken Lewis got from Bank of America have severely damagedthe credibility of Wall Street and the American financial markets as awhole. The billions of dollars of losses do not come close to thereputational hit to American capitalism, which will increase the costof capital for all US companies.
Panglossian observers willalways be able to find some metric to justify any level of pay. But theresults speak for themselves. The decisions that led to the meltdownwere made by executives who knew that they would be paid tens, evenhundreds of millions of dollars no matter how successful theconsequences of those decisions.
Let us look at ground zero ofthe subprime mess, Countrywide, where Angelo Mozilo made more than$550m during his time as CEO. When the compensation committee tried toobject to his pay levels, he hired another compensation consultant,paid for by the shareholders, to push them into giving him more. Healso pushed for, and was given, shareholder subsidies, not just for hiswife's travel on the corporate jet but for the taxes on the imputedincome from that travel. Instead of telling Mr Mozilo that he had nobusiness asking the shareholders to subsidise his taxes, the boardmeekly signed off on it, making it clear to everyone in the executivesuite that the pay-performance link was not a priority.
By theend of 2007, when Countrywide finally revealed the losses it hadpreviously obscured, shareholders lost more than 78% of theirinvestment value. Meanwhile, in early 2007 Mr Mozilo sold over $127m inexercised stock options before July 24th 2007, when he announced a$388m write-down on profits. Before the bailout, Countrywide narrowlyavoided bankruptcy by taking out an emergency loan of $11 billion froma group of banks. Mr Mozilo continued to sell off shares, and by theend of 2007 he had sold an additional $30m in exercised stock options.There is the definition of outrageously excessive compensation.
Countrywideresponded to a shareholder proposal that year asking for a non-bindingadvisory vote on its pay plan by urging shareholders to oppose itbecause "Countrywide has been an outstanding performer" and because"The Board's Compensation Committee has access to the best informationon compensation practices and has a thorough process in place todetermine appropriate executive pay." They could hardly have doneworse. And it is likely that some market feedback on the structure ofthe pay plan could have given compensation committee members Harley W.Snyder (chair), Robert J. Donato, Michael E. Dougherty and Oscar P.Robertson worthwhile guidance.
Michelle Leder of theindispensable Footnoted.org website discovered that Frank A. Keating,Charles T. Maxwell and Frederick B. Whittemore, the compensationcommittee at Chesapeake Energy, not only paid the CEO, AubreyMcClendon, $100m, a 500% increase as the stock dropped 60% and theprofits went down 50%, they spent $4.6m of the shareholders' money tosponsor a basketball team of which Mr McClendon owns a 19% stake, theypurchased catering services from a restaurant which he owns just undera half of, and they took his collection of antique maps off his handsfor $12.1m of the shareholders' money, based on a valuation from theconsultant who advised Mr McClendon on assembling the collection. Theboard justified this by referring to Mr McClendon's having to sell morethan $1 billion worth of stock due to margin calls, his havingconcluded four important deals and the benefit to employee morale fromhaving the maps on display in the office. A market-based response wouldbe: (1) that was his risk and it is inappropriate to the point ofmisappropriation to force the other shareholders, already substantiallyout of pocket with their own losses due to his poor leadership of theorganisation, make up for his losses (2) if the deals are good ones, hewill be adequately rewarded when the benefit of those deals isreflected in the stock price; and (3) you have got to be kidding. Ifthis is pay for performance, what exactly is the performance we arepaying for?
These may be anecdotes, but they are illuminatingones. The numbers and details may be at the extreme, but the underlyingapproaches are representative. Even as outliers, they still demonstratethe failure of the system to ensure a vigorous, arm's-length system fordetermining pay and the inability of the system to require an effectiveincentive programme with a genuine downside as well as an upside.
Inmy comments, I will discuss the seven deadliest sins of executivecompensation, the two key elements that are essential for any plan thatmerits support from investors and the only metric that matters inlooking at pay.(待续!)

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发表于 2009-12-27 02:10:11 |显示全部楼层
Executive pay

This house believes that on the whole, senior executives are worth what they are paid

好词、难词
好句、难句
About this debate

Over the past few decades executive pay has risen dramatically. Bosses who were once paid ten times as much as shopfloor workers are now sometimes paid as much as 300 times as much. This trend was never popular, even during good times. But today it is becoming radioactive (Of or exhibiting radioactivity, booming), as governments step in to rescue failing companies and ordinary people are forced to tighten their belts.

Is the anger justified? Some argue that executive pay is a long-standing disgrace. Pay is often not
tethered
To fasten or restrict with or as if with a tether to performance. Huge rewards for the few demotivate the rest of the workforce. Others are more sanguine. Successful executives, such as Jack Welch, former CEO of General Electric, can add hugely to a firm's profitability, benefiting workers, managers and shareholders alike. The growing pay of executives has to be balanced against the growing difficulty of their jobs, particularly as turnoverThe amount of business transacted during a given period of time in the boardroom increases.

Opening statements


Defending the motion

Steven N. Kaplan Neubauer Family Prof. of Entrepreneurship & Finance, University of Chicago Booth School of Business

In the United States, the United Kingdom and elsewhere, CEOs are routinely criticised for being overpaid.

Against the motion

Nell  Minow
Editor and Co-founder, The Corporate Library

Excessive executive compensation of the past decade is both a symptom and a cause of the current economic mess.

The moderator's opening remarks

Oct 20th 2009 |  
Adrian  Wooldridge

One of the few things that anti-globalisation campaigners and stock market investors agree upon is that executive pay is out of control.
It is not hard to understand this shared outrage: executive pay has
exploded
grow radioactively since the 1980s. For most of the postwar era executives earned a few multiples of the median pay. But thereafterFrom a specified time onward; from then on, starting in America and slowly spreading to the rest of the world, the multiples increased exponentially(成级数增长). Today many American workers earn in a year what their boss takes home in an evening.
Isn't this a disgrace? Critics of executive pay worry that even mediocre bosses are given outsized rewards. Robert Nardelli received a $20m pay-off when he left HomeDepot even though the share price had fallen during his six-yeartenure. Carly Fiorina was $180m better off when she leftHewlett-Packard despite
a lackluster(
无光彩的) tenureoccupation
. Defenders of executive pay argue that great bosses such as Louis Gerstner, the former boss of IBM, and Jack Welch, the former boss of General Electric, are worth every penny because they create huge amounts of wealth for both shareholdersand employees.
The debate about executive pay, though never cool, is particularly hot at the moment.

Workers have been squeezed by the recession.
Unemployment is approaching 10% in the United States and much higher numbers in many other countries. Numerous governments are planning to deal with their rising deficits by freezing public-sector pay. And yet many bosses and bankers continue to make out like bandits—or so lots of people think.
We are lucky to have two of the best people in the business to debate this subject. Steven Kaplan, who proposes the motion, teaches at the University of Chicago's Booth School of Business. Nell Minow, who opposes it, is
a long-time share holder
activist and chairwoman of the Corporate Library, are search company. (For people who want to know more about her she is also the subject of a profile in a recent issue of the New Yorker.)
Mr. Kaplan
starts off
by making two fundamental points. CEO pay has not gone up in recent years; indeed, it has been dropping since 2000, particularly in relation to other well-paid groups, such as hedge fund managers, lawyers, consultants and professional athletes. Nor is CEO paid unrelated to performance. Boards are increasingly willing to fire CEOs for poor performance.
Ms Minow focuses heavily on the relationship between pay and the recent
credit crunch (crisis). She points out that executive pay helped to create the mess in the first place: Countrywide's CEO, Angelo Mozillo, made more than $550m during his time in office. She also points out that the fact that many companies that were bailed out
by the government continue to pay their CEOs huge salaries and bonuses is damaging the credibility of the system.
Such bold opening statements raise questions
galore (In great numbers; in abundance)
. Is Mr. Kaplan justified in starting his account in 2000 rather than 1980, when executive pay exploded? And is Ms Minow right to concentrate so heavily on the financial sector? These are only a couple of the questions that we need to thrash out in the coming days.


The proposer's opening remarks
Oct 20th 2009 |  
Steven N. Kaplan

In the United States, the United Kingdom and elsewhere, CEOs are routinely criticised for being overpaid. Critics argue that boards do not respond to market forces, but, instead, are dominated by or are over-generous to their CEOs. Boards are criticised for not tying CEOs' pay to performance. These criticisms have been
exacerbated
by the financial crisis and the desire to find scapegoats.
I argue below that the critics are wrong and that there are many misperceptions of CEO pay. While CEO pay practices are not perfect, they are driven by market forces and performance. Contrary to public perception, CEO pay has not gone up in recent years. In fact, the average CEO pay (adjusted for inflation) has dropped since 2000, while the pay of other groups has increased substantially. Similarly, the view that CEOs are not paid for performance is wrong. In fact, the opposite is true and board sincreasingly fire them for poor performance. And, most recently,consistent with market forces driving pay, the US and UK governments each hired a new CEO (of AIG and the Royal Bank of Scotland) for pay exceeding that of the median large company CEO.
It is useful to understand how CEO pay is measured. It includes three components: salary, bonus and stock-based pay. It is usually measured in two ways. The first is the sum of salary, bonus, restricted stock and the expected value of stock options. I call this expected pay. Expected pay measures what boards believe they awarded the CEO. This is the best measure of what a CEO is paid each year. Note that the CEO does not actually
walk away
with this money. The second measure replaces expected stock option values with values actually realized and realized pay measures what CEOs walk away with.
The first graph shows average and median expected CEO pay for S&P 500 CEOs since 1994 (adjusted for inflation). It shows that median CEO pay has been stable since 2001; it has not increased. Andaverage pay has declined substantially. In fact, average CEO pay in2008 is below the average in 1998.


While average CEO pay has declined, the pay of other highly paid groups has increased. The second graph shows S&P 500 CEO pay relative to the income of the top 1% of US taxpayers. Relative to those other groups, CEOs are no better off in 2008 than in 1994. Strikingly, relative CEO pay is a half of what it was in 2001, a huge decline.


Which are those groups that have earned increasingly high compensation? Hedge fund, private equity and venture capital investors have increased their assets and fees substantially, translating into high pay. By one estimate, the top three hedge fund managers earned more in 2007 than all 500 S&P 500 CEOs combined. Professional athletes, investment bankers, consultants and lawyers also have benefited greatly. For example, from 2004 to 2008, the inflation-adjusted pay of partners at the top 20 law firms increased by 12% while that of S&P 500 CEOs dropped 12%. Those law firms had over 3,000 partners making an average of $2.4m each.
One can look at the Obama administration for other examples. Larry Summers made $8m (more than the median S&P 500 CEO) giving speeches and working part-time for a hedge fund. Eric Holder made $3.5m as a law partner.
So, while CEOs earn a lot, they are not unique. The pay of people in the other groups has undoubtedly been driven by market forces; all are compensated in arm's-length markets, not by cronies. Technology, globalisation and scale appear to have increased the market value of these groups. CEOs have not done better and, by some measures, have done worse. Those who argue CEOs are overpaid have to explain how CEOs can be overpaid and not subject to market forces, when the other groups are paid at least as well and are subject to market forces.
Why is the pay of these other groups relevant for CEOs? Top executives regularly leave to work for private equity firms and hedge funds. Law partners and consultants leave to work for public companies as general counsels and executives. Relative pay matters and all these groups are paid according to market demand. Markets are the driving force for senior executives in all these industries and talented people jump across industries, based on market perceptions of their worth.
Critics also argue that CEO pay is not tied to stock performance. Again, that is not true. Looking at what CEOs actually receive—realised pay—Josh Rauh and I found that firms with CEOs in the top decile of realised pay earned stock returns 90% above those of other firms in their industries over the previous five years. Firms with CEOs in the bottom decile of realised pay underperformed by almost 40%. The typical CEO is paid for performance.
This was reinforced in 2008, when average realised CEO pay declined by 25%(according to S&P's Exec comp). And Equilar, another provider of CEO pay data, estimated that the typical CEO experienced a net worth decline of over 40%.
The final myth to bust is that CEOs control their boards and earn high pay through this control and not performance. In fact, CEO
tenure
has declined, from ten years in the 1970s to six years today, and boards have got tougher on their executives when they do not perform.
In sum, market forces
govern
CEO compensation. CEOs are paid what they are worth. Talented individuals, who are perceived to be valuable, can move between industries to be compensated well. The clearest example of this is that even governments have to pay highly for talented executives. Recently, the Royal Bank of Scotland (under UK government control) hired a CEO with a package worth up to $16m; AIG (under US government control)hired a CEO with a package worth up to $10.5m. For these critical jobs, both of these executives received compensation exceeding the pay of the median S&P 500 CEO.


The opposition's opening remarks
Oct 20th 2009 |
Nell  Minow

Excessive executive compensation of the past decade is both a symptom and a cause of the current economic mess. And the post-meltdown awards are all but guaranteed to continue to create perverse incentives that will reward management and further damage the interests of shareholders and every other participant in the economy.
Incentive compensation rewarded executives for the quantity of transactions rather than the quality of transactions. It inevitably led to failures like the subprime disaster and the dominoes it toppled as it took the economy down with it. Worst of all, the avalanche of post-bailout bonuses and departure packages like the $53m Ken Lewis got from Bank of America have severely damaged the credibility of Wall Street and the American financial markets as a whole. The billions of dollars of losses do not come close to the
reputational hit to American capitalism, which will increase the cost of capital for all US companies.
Panglossian
sanguine observers will always be able to find some metric to justify any level of pay. But the results speak for themselves. The decisions that led to the melt down were made by executives who knew that they would be paid tens, even hundreds of millions of dollars no matter how successful the consequences of those decisions.
Let us look at ground zero of the subprime mess, Countrywide, where Angelo Mozilo made more than $550m during his time as CEO. When the compensation committee tried to object to his pay levels, he hired another compensation consultant, paid for by the shareholders, to push them into giving him more. Heal so pushed for, and was given, shareholder subsidies, not just for his wife's travel on the corporate jet but for the taxes on the imputed income from that travel. Instead of telling Mr. Mozilo that he had no business asking the shareholders to subsidies his taxes, the board
meekly(
温顺地)signed off on it, making it clear to everyone in the executive suite that the pay-performance link was not a priority.
By theend of 2007, when Countrywide finally revealed the losses it had previously obscured, shareholders lost more than 78% of their investment value. Meanwhile, in early 2007 Mr Mozilo sold over $127m in exercised stock options before July 24th 2007, when he announced a$388m write-down on profits. Before the bailout, Countrywide narrowly avoided bankruptcy by taking out an emergency loan of $11 billion from a group of banks. Mr Mozilo continued to sell off shares, and by the end of 2007 he had sold an additional $30m in exercised stock options. There is the definition of outrageously excessive compensation.
Countrywide responded to a shareholder proposal that year asking for a non-binding
advisory vote on its pay plan by urging shareholders to oppose it because "Countrywide has been an outstanding performer" and because "The Board's Compensation Committee has access to the best information on compensation practices and has a thorough process in place to determine appropriate executive pay." They could hardly have done worse. And it is likely that some market feedback on the structure of the pay plan could have given compensation committee members Harley W.Snyder (chair), Robert J. Donato, Michael E. Dougherty and Oscar P.Robertson worthwhile guidance.
Michelle Leder of the indispensable Footnoted.org website discovered that Frank A. Keating, Charles T. Maxwell and Frederick B. Whittemore, the compensation committee at Chesapeake Energy, not only paid the CEO, Aubrey McClendon, $100m, a 500% increase as the stock dropped 60% and the profits went down 50%, they spent $4.6m of the shareholders' money to sponsor a basketball team of which Mr McClendon owns a 19% stake, they purchased catering services from a restaurant which he owns just undera half of, and they took his collection of antique maps off his hands for $12.1m of the shareholders' money, based on a valuation from the consultant who advised Mr McClendon on assembling the collection. The board justified this by referring to Mr McClendon's having to sell more than $1 billion worth of stock due to margin calls, his having concluded four important deals and the benefit to employee morale from having the maps on display in the office. A market-based response would-be: (1) that was his risk and it is inappropriate to the point of misappropriation to force the other shareholders, already substantially out of pocket with their own losses due to his poor leadership of the organisation, make up for his losses (2) if the deals are good ones, he will be adequately rewarded when the benefit of those deals is reflected in the stock price; and (3) you have got to be kidding. If this is pay for performance, what exactly is the performance we are paying for?
These may be anecdotes, but they are illuminating ones. The numbers and details may be at the extreme, but the underlying approaches are representative. Even as outliers, they still demonstrate the failure of the system to ensure a vigorous, arm's-length system fordetermining pay and the inability of the system to require an effective incentive programme with a genuine downside as well as an upside.
In my comments, I will discuss the seven deadliest sins of executive compensation, the two key elements that are essential for any plan that merits support from investors and the only metric that matters in looking at pay.


Comments:
The proposer’s remarks endeavor to defend for CEOs by three reasons. They start off claiming that CEOs’ salary is lower than other high-paid classes, such as lawyers and hedge fund managers. However, they failed to prove that these high-paid persons deserve what they receive. As a worldwide trend, the gap between the rich and the poor are becoming wider and wider. Secondly, the proposers tried to prove that CEOs are not assigned by crony, using the evidence that the tenure of CEOs is shorter than before, which is not closely related to the topic.
In the whole section, CEOs are only compared to other high-paid jobs and the former condition, but are not compared to those workers. This point is the main weakness.

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发表于 2009-12-28 01:21:00 |显示全部楼层

Rebuttal(反驳) statements

The moderatorarbitrator's rebuttal remarks
Oct 23rd 2009 | Adrian Wooldridge  
不理解的句子

好词好句

生词
It seems that experts are just as passionate on the subject of executive pay as the general public.
Mr Kaplan argues that the most powerful criticism of executive pay-that bosses get upside and no downside-is simply false. He points out that three of the most malignedspeak evil of bosses in the financial services sector, Vikram Pandit of Citigroup, John Mack of Morgan Stanley and Kenneth Lewis of Bank of America, all lost small fortunes in 2008. CEOs as a group lost roughly 40% of their wealth in 2008.
Ms Minow argues that her rebuttal is being written by the headlines. Financial service companies are once again paying huge bonuses despite the fact that their companies have been proppedsupport up by public money. She points out that CEOs enjoy the unique privilege of being able to appoint the people who decide their pay. She also reiteratesrepeat the point that there are plenty of devices such as golden parachutes that cannot possibly be justified by performance.
In his
expert evidence
Rakesh Khurana tries to focus on fundamental questions such as what the purpose of compensation is. He argues that the market for CEOs is a highly distorted one because CEOs themselves can influence the process and performance is hard to measure. He suggests that extreme pay differentials can damage companies by attracting the wrong sort of bosses and demotivating the rank and file. He also worries about the legitimacy of the system. One survey suggests that only 13% of people trust what CEOs say.
So far the voting is going heavily against the motion.
But I wonder how far this is driven by emotion rather than a reasoned assessment of the evidence. I would urge the participants to pay close attention to the wording of the motion-particularly the key phrases ‘one the whole' and ‘deserve'. We need to focus more on the overall picture, around the world as well as in the United States, rather than on a few attention-grabbing anecdotes. And we need to think more closely about the word ‘deserve'. Mr Kaplan's best chance of turning the voting around is to demonstrate that outstanding bosses can boost the performance of the organisations that they head, not only earning their pay but also benefitting workers, shareholders and consumers.


The proposer's rebuttal remarks
Oct 23rd 2009 | Steven N. Kaplan

Nell Minow argues that top executive compensation was a major cause of the financial crisis. She bases her conclusion on two "outlier"( one whose domicile lies at an appreciable distance from one's place of business) examples, Angelo Mozillo and Aubrey McClendon, that she calls "anecdotes". The plural of anecdote is data. And the data, that is the pay at a broad sample of financial companies, simply do not support her conclusion. Ironically, neither does her two anecdotes.
Ms Minow makes the following claims. (1) Incentive compensation rewarded top financial executives for the quantity of transactions, not the quality. (2) Top CEOs, like Mr Mozillo, took large amounts of money out of their companies before their companies failed. (3) The CEOs knew they were making bad investments, but did so anyway because they could make more money doing so. (4) CEOs get upside, but no downside. (5) The post-meltdown awards create incentives that reward management, but damage shareholders and everyone else.
These claims are false. As David Yermack of NYU pointed out in a recent piece in the Wall Street Journal, Vikram Pandit of Citigroup, John Mack of Morgan Stanley and Kenneth Lewis of Bank of America:
"all lost small fortunes in 2008. The 2008 compensation of Messrs Pandit, Mack, and Lewis was approximately minus $105 million, minus $40 million, and minus $108 million, respectively, after taking account of the losses on the stock that each CEO owned in his firm. Other CEOs in the financial industry had similarly bad years. Kerry Killinger of Washington Mutual lost more than $25 million before
being ousted(To eject from a position or place; force out) in September, Kennedy Thompson of Wachovia lost more than $30 million before being fired in June, and Jeffrey Immelt of General Electric lost more than $60 million ... These CEOs' financial reversals were part of a robust system of pay-for-performance widely used by most U.S. companies."
Yermack also points out that James Cayne lost most of his billion-dollar fortune when Bear Stearns failed and Richard Fuld of Lehman Brothers lost hundreds of millions of dollars.
The fact is that most financial-company CEOs received the lion's share of their pay
in stock and options(期权). And they kept most of that pay as shares in their companies which they never cashed in. When the crisis hit and their stock prices sank, those CEOs lost a large fraction of their wealth and, in many cases, their jobs.
As I wrote in my first entry, this is true, in general, of the overall CEO market. CEOs earn a lot and their
stock appreciates(涨价) when their companies perform well. CEOs lose large amounts of wealth and their jobs when their companies perform poorly. It is irresponsible to claim that CEOs do not bear any downside risk. In 2008, CEOs as a group lost roughly 40% of their wealth.
In direct contradiction to Ms Minow's conclusion, the financial CEOs were compensated in the end for the quality of their transactions. The CEOs did not
take much off the table. The CEOs had a substantial amount of downside risk. In fact, those CEOs would have been much better off if they had not engaged in the transactions they did.
It is worth adding that David Yermack is a noted researcher on CEO pay who studies large samples over long periods. He has written several articles highly critical of specific CEO pay practices, like corporate jet(公司商务机,公司为商务旅行而购买的专用机型) usage. Nevertheless, his conclusion on the relation of CEO pay to the financial crisis is diametrically (directly) opposed to Ms Minow's (as is his characterization(description) of the CEO market in general).
A study of CEO incentives in a broader group of financial institutions during the crisis by Rudi Fahlenbrach and Rene Stulz of Ohio State (and a former president of the American Finance Association) confirms Yermack's analysis and also clearly refutes Ms Minow's conclusion.
Ironically, even her two anecdotes about Angelo Mozillo of Countrywide and Aubrey McClendon of Chesapeake Energy fail to support her case.
Unlike the other CEOs mentioned above (and most financial-institution CEOs), Mr Mozillo did manage to sell a lot of his stock. Unfortunately for him, the SEC has charged him with securities fraud and insider trading. And it is unlikely to lead to a good outcome for him. If found guilty, he potentially will end up paying three times what he took out. Clearly, he appears to have behaved badly, but he did not get away with it.
As for Mr McClendon, he runs
an energy company. How could he possibly have had anything to do with the financial crisis?
The

preponderance (dominance) of the data and, even Ms Minow's "outlier" "anecdotes," therefore, fail to provide any evidence that top executive compensation had much to do with the financial crisis.
Top executive compensation did not cause the financial crisis. Instead, the crisis was caused by
loose monetary policy, a global capital glut(充斥), over-high leverage at investment banks, mandates from Congress to provide mortgages to people who could not afford them, flawed ratings from the rating agencies and poor incentives at mortgage origination (not the CEO) level. Consistent with this, the financial crisis has spread to financial institutions in other countries with very different pay practices.


The opposition's rebuttal remarks
Oct 23rd 2009 |  Nell Minow

The headlines are writing my rebuttal for me.
Goldman Sachs set aside $16.7 billion for compensation and benefits in the first nine months of 2009, up 46% from a year ago.
While its net income has tripled, its core investment banking business is down 31%. The Toronto Star quotes Goldman’s CFO, David Viniar, using an unforgivable oxymoron(矛盾修饰法)
in a conference call with reporters: "Our competitors are paying people quite well [and are] very willing to pay employees guaranteed bonuses of very high amounts." (emphasis added)
Mr. Viniar also showed that he has a very short memory, arguing that Goldman is operating without any government guarantee, ignoring the reality of the government guarantee that kept the system going just a year ago.
These bonuses have nothing to do with paying for performance. How much of Goldman's bouncing back is due to the government's guarantees and the hundreds of billions of dollars it poured into Goldman, Wall Street, and other subsidies and
outright(openly) welfare payments to the very institutions that came close to bringing down the entire economy? Shouldn't the American people expect some sort of discounted calculation of the bonuses that reflect a market-based assessment of performance? Once again, Wall Street is all about capitalism when it comes to the upside, but all about socialism when it comes to the downside, that is, from each, according to his ability, to each, whatever he can get away with.
Also this week, we had the testimony of Neil Barofsky, the special inspector general for the government's financial rescue program before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. The serial offender AIG has promised $198m in bonus pay to its employees next March, according to the testimony, and there is very little the government or anyone else Cando about it. Because the bonus agreements were entered into before the bailout, the government has no legal authority to stop them.
All Special Master Kenneth Feinberg can do is to ask the company not to pay the bonuses and rattle his saber(以战争恫吓) about the pay he can control going forward, hoping that the threat of clamping down on the 25 executives at each of the covered companies he does have authority over will be enough of an incentive to force a change. In the meantime, once again, pay is uncoupled(disconnect) from performance. Even the company has given up on trying to make that case, relying instead on opportunity costs to justify the bonuses and arguing that these kinds of payments are necessary in order to keep the employees from leaving. Based on their past performance and their unwillingness to tie future pay to genuine measures of sustainable growth, I suggest that the best choice for shareholders is to let them leave.
Mr Barofksy gave the committee a
Treasury Department(财政部) report on the last set of outrageous AIG bonuses. It concluded in part that "Treasury invested $40 billion of taxpayer funds in AIG, designed AIG's contractual(Of, relating to, or having the nature of a contract) executive compensation restrictions, and helped manage the Government's majority stake(股份) in AIG for several months, all without having any detailed information about the scope of AIG's very substantial, and very controversial, executive compensation obligations." If a private entity had been asked for emergency funds, it is unthinkable that any money would have been advanced without establishing some control overcompensation. There are two reasons for this. The first is agency costs. Anyone (other than Secretary Henry Paulson, apparently) putting money at risk will want to ensure that it will not be inappropriately appropriated. The second is the high likelihood that the previous incentive structure was a significant factor in the bad decisions and catastrophic risk management that created the need for the funds in the first place.
And really, that is all the argument one needs.
By definition, the incentive compensation was badly designed, as proved by the results. However, I will respond to some of the points raised by Professor Kaplan.
First, we disagree on the calculations that support the conclusion that CEO play has been declining. Our figures, based not on theoretical pay but on realised pay, are as follows.


Clearly actual pay is the better measure of pay effectiveness. I also question the validity of the Equilar survey figures. They are based on the reported total compensation in the summary compensation table, which is even further from reality than the "expected pay", asset is just an accounting cost.
I do not understand why he brings up the net worth of CEOs; that has no relationship whatsoever to their pay, its relationship to performance, or its effectiveness at aligning CEOs' interests with shareholders'.
Second, Professor Kaplan states, "The typical CEO is paid for performance. Boards increasingly fire CEOs for poor performance." The second sentence has no relationship to the first. Boards may fire CEOs for poor performance, but they pay them boatloads of money for that performance on the way out of the door. Just look at Ken Lewis's departure from Bank of America. Disastrous performance that apparently included lying (about what else? bonuses) and an unprecedented vote of no confidence from shareholders that removed him as chairman, may indeed have caused him to be fired (though the board did not use that term). But his $53mretirement package does not feel like pay for performance to me.
Professor Kaplan tries to obscure the point by bringing in law firm partners, athletes and other highly-paid professionals. Partners in law firms are paid according to formulas set by the partnership. As in any other private firm, there are no agency costs to worry about and they can do whatever they like. Athletes, movie stars and recording artists, who have a much greater range and far greater elasticity in compensation, engage in vigorous
arm's length(a distance sufficient to exclude intimacy) negotiations on pay; their pay is not set by boards they appoint, as CEOs' is.
And it is hard for me to understand how anyone could point to the US or UK government authorizing excessive pay as a validation of the system.
As noted above, the government has repeatedly failed as regulator or as provider of capital in curbing outrageously destructive executive compensation.
Here are seven deadly sins found in executive compensation plans. Each of them is conclusive evidence that the system is out of whack.
1.    Making up for losses in stock value with other grants of cash or stock.
2.  
  Imputed years of service to increase retirement benefits.
3.    Setting the performance goals too low or other
phony metrics to trigger bonuses.
4.    Dividends on
unvested stock.
5.    Outrageous departure packages.
6.    Stock options that are not performance-based or indexed.
7.   
Perquisites and gross-ups.

In my next response, I will explain how to do it right.



Comments
Under the circumstance of financial crisis, it is not proper to distribute large sums to the CEOs without a robust set of structure of pay and performance. As the director of a company, a CEO’s responsibility is much larger than anyone else and his incomes should be strictly connected to the welfare of all the company’s stuff. In the proposer’s rebuttal, they only claims that CEO’s suffers from loses and some of them are ousted, which they regard as unfair. But, as the global economy is sinking, the phenomenon is not unreasonable. On the other hand, the dissenter brings out evidence that diametrically points out CEO’s parts of salary that they do not deserve.

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发表于 2009-12-29 01:11:48 |显示全部楼层
Passwords aplenty
Dec 18th 2009 | LOS ANGELES
From Economist.com
生词
好词好句
How to stay saneHaving or showing sound judgment as well as safe while surfing the web
AT THIS time of the year, your correspondent crosses the Pacific to Japan for a month or so. He repeats the trip during the summer. He considers it crucial in order to keep abreast of all the ingenious technology which, once debuggedTo search for and eliminate malfunctioning elements or errors in by the world’s most acquisitive consumers, will wind up in American and European shops a year or two later.

Each time he packs his bags, though, he is embarrassed by having to include a
dog-eared
(卷角的(书等)) set of notes that really ought to be locked up in a safe. This is his list of logonslogin and passwords for all the websites he uses for doing business and staying in touch with the rest of the world. At the last count, the inch-thick list accumulated over the past decade or so—your correspondent’s sole copy—includes access details for no fewer than 174 online services and computer networks.



Alamy
He admits to
flouting
ignore the advice of security experts: his failings include using essentially the same logon and password for many similar sites, relying on easily remembered words—and, heaven forbid, writing them down on scraps of paper. So his new year’s resolution is to set up a proper software vaultTo accomplish something as if by leaping suddenly or vigorously for the various passwords and ditchTo get away from the dog-eared list.

Your correspondent’s one
consolationis that he is not alone in using easily crackable words for most of his passwords. Indeed, the majority of online users have an understandable aversion
to strong, but hard-to-remember, passwords. The most popular passwords in Britain are “123” followed by “password”. At least people in America have learned to combine letters and numbers. Their most popular ones are “password1” followed by “abc123”.

Unfortunately, the easier a password is to remember, the easier it is for thieves to guess. Ironically, the opposite—the harder it is to remember, the harder it is to crack—is often far from true. That is because, not being able to remember long,
jumbled sets of alphanumeric
(混合符号的) characters intersperseddotted with symbols, people resort to writing them down on Post-it notes left lying around the office or home for all and sundry to see.

Apart from stealing passwords from Post-it notes and the like, intruders basically use one of two hacks to gain access to other people’s computers or networks. If time and money is no problem, they can use brute-force methods that simply try every combination of letters, numbers and symbols until a match is found. That takes a lot of patience and computing power, and tends to be the sort of thing only intelligence agencies indulge in.

A more popular, though less effective, way is to use commercial software tools such as “L0phtCrack” or “John the Ripper” that can be found on the internet. These use dictionaries, lists of popular passwords and
rainbow tables
(lookup tools that turn long numbers computed from alphanumeric characters back into their original plain text) to recover passwords.

According to Bruce Schneier, an independent security expert, today’s password crackers “can test tens—even hundreds—of millions of passwords per second.” In short, the vast majority of passwords used in the real world can be guessed in minutes. And do not think you are being smart by replacing the letters “l” or “i” in a password with the number “1”; or the letter “s” with the number “5” or the symbol “$”. Cracking programs check all such alternatives, and more, as a matter of course.

What should you do to protect yourself? Choose passwords that are strong enough to make cracking them too time consuming for thieves to bother.

The strength of a password depends on its length, complexity and randomness. A good length is at least eight symbols. The complexity depends on the character set. Using numbers alone limits the choice to just ten symbols. Add upper- and lower-case letters and the complexity rises to 62. Use all the symbols on a standard ASCII keyboard and you have 95 to choose from.

The third component, randomness, is measured by a concept borrowed from thermodynamics—the notion of
entropy
(the tendency for things to become disordered). In information theory, a tossed coin has an entropy of one “bit” (binary digit). That is because it can come down randomly in one of two equally possible binary states.

At the other extreme, when you set the encryption of a Wi-Fi link, you are usually given the choice of 64-bit or even 128-bit security. Those bit-numbers represent the entropy (or randomness) of the encryption used. A password with 64 bits of entropy is as strong as a string of data comprising 64 randomly selected binary digits. Put another way, a 64-bit password would require 2 raised to the power of 64 attempts to crack it by brute force—in short, 18 billion billion attempts. A 64-bit password was finally cracked in 2002 using brute-force methods. It took a network of volunteers nearly five years to do so.

The National Institute of Standards and Technology, the American government’s standards-measuring laboratory in Gaithersburg, Maryland, recommends 80-bit passwords for state secrets and the like. Such security can be achieved using passwords with 12 symbols, drawn from the full set of 95 symbols on the standard American keyboard. For ordinary purposes, that would seem overkill. A 52-bit password based on eight symbols selected from the standard keyboard is generally adequate.

How to select the eight? Best to let a computer program generate them randomly for you. Unfortunately, the result will be something like 6sDt%k&3 that probably needs to be written down. One answer, only slightly less rigorous, is to use a
mnemonic
A device, such as a formula or rhyme, used as an aid in remembering constructed from the first letters (plus contractions) of an easily remembered phrase like “Murder Considered as One of the Fine Arts” (MCa1otFA) or “To be or not to be: that is the question” (2Bo-2b:?).

Given a robust 52-bit password, you can then use a password manager to take care of the dozens of easily guessable ones used to access various web services. There are a number of perfectly adequate products for doing this. In an early attempt to fulfill his new year’s pledge, your correspondent has been experimenting with
LastPass, a free password manager that works as an add-on to the Firefox web browser for Windows, Linux or Macintosh. Versions also exist for Internet Explorer on Windows and Safari on the Mac.

Once installed and given a strong password of its own, plus an e-mail address, LastPass
encrypts
encrypts all the logons and passwords stored on your computer. So, be warned: forget your master password and you could be in trouble—especially if you have let the program delete (as it urges you to let it do) all the vulnerable logons and passwords on your own computer.

Thereafter, to visit various web services, all you have to do is log into LastPass and click the website you wish to check out. The tool then automatically logs you on securely to the selected site. It will even complete all the forms needed to buy goods online if you have stored your home address, telephone number and credit-card details in the vault as well.

Your correspondent looks forward to using the service while travelling around Japan over the next month or so. To be on the safe side, however, his dog-eared list of passwords will still go with him.


My Comments:
Cryptology has long being studied and its application serve as an essential composition in the modern society where information exerts a crucial influence on economy. For a business man, leakage of commercial secrets can sometimes destroy the whole company. Therefore, logons and codes, as a part of commercial secrets online, should always be well preserved.
However, we human beings are not born with talent in remembering large quantities of various codes. To cater for the need, software like Lastpass comes into being as a manager of logons and codes. This kind of software enables people to keep in mind only one code, facilitating everyday jobs. But, to some extent, it disobeys the rule of “distracting the risk”, which exposes its out dated design concept. As a trend, advanced methods using unique body features like “finger prints” are more and more popular

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发表于 2009-12-30 21:49:42 |显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 kulewy531 于 2010-1-3 14:01 编辑

Passwords aplenty
Dec 18th 2009 | LOS ANGELES
From Economist.com
生词
好词好句
How to stay saneHaving or showing sound judgment as well as safe while surfing the web
AT THIS time of the year, your correspondent crosses the Pacific to Japan for a month or so. He repeats the trip during the summer. He considers it crucial in order to keep abreast of all the ingenious technology which, once debuggedTo search for and eliminate malfunctioning elements or errors in by the world’s most acquisitive consumers, will wind up in American and European shops a year or two later.

Each time he packs his bags, though, he is embarrassed by having to include a
dog-eared
(卷角的(书等)) set of notes that really ought to be locked up in a safe. This is his list of logonslogin and passwords for all the websites he uses for doing business and staying in touch with the rest of the world. At the last count, the inch-thick list accumulated over the past decade or so—your correspondent’s sole copy—includes access details for no fewer than 174 online services and computer networks.



Alamy
He admits to
flouting
ignore the advice of security experts: his failings include using essentially the same logon and password for many similar sites, relying on easily remembered words—and, heaven forbid, writing them down on scraps of paper. So his new year’s resolution is to set up a proper software vaultTo accomplish something as if by leaping suddenly or vigorously for the various passwords and ditchTo get away from the dog-eared list.

Your correspondent’s one
consolationis that he is not alone in using easily crackable words for most of his passwords. Indeed, the majority of online users have an understandable aversion
to strong, but hard-to-remember, passwords. The most popular passwords in Britain are “123” followed by “password”. At least people in America have learned to combine letters and numbers. Their most popular ones are “password1” followed by “abc123”.

Unfortunately, the easier a password is to remember, the easier it is for thieves to guess. Ironically, the opposite—the harder it is to remember, the harder it is to crack—is often far from true. That is because, not being able to remember long,
jumbled sets of alphanumeric
(混合符号的) characters intersperseddotted with symbols, people resort to writing them down on Post-it notes left lying around the office or home for all and sundry to see.

Apart from stealing passwords from Post-it notes and the like, intruders basically use one of two hacks to gain access to other people’s computers or networks. If time and money is no problem, they can use brute-force methods that simply try every combination of letters, numbers and symbols until a match is found. That takes a lot of patience and computing power, and tends to be the sort of thing only intelligence agencies indulge in.

A more popular, though less effective, way is to use commercial software tools such as “L0phtCrack” or “John the Ripper” that can be found on the internet. These use dictionaries, lists of popular passwords and
rainbow tables
(lookup tools that turn long numbers computed from alphanumeric characters back into their original plain text) to recover passwords.

According to Bruce Schneier, an independent security expert, today’s password crackers “can test tens—even hundreds—of millions of passwords per second.” In short, the vast majority of passwords used in the real world can be guessed in minutes. And do not think you are being smart by replacing the letters “l” or “i” in a password with the number “1”; or the letter “s” with the number “5” or the symbol “$”. Cracking programs check all such alternatives, and more, as a matter of course.

What should you do to protect yourself? Choose passwords that are strong enough to make cracking them too time consuming for thieves to bother.

The strength of a password depends on its length, complexity and randomness. A good length is at least eight symbols. The complexity depends on the character set. Using numbers alone limits the choice to just ten symbols. Add upper- and lower-case letters and the complexity rises to 62. Use all the symbols on a standard ASCII keyboard and you have 95 to choose from.

The third component, randomness, is measured by a concept borrowed from thermodynamics—the notion of
entropy
(the tendency for things to become disordered). In information theory, a tossed coin has an entropy of one “bit” (binary digit). That is because it can come down randomly in one of two equally possible binary states.

At the other extreme, when you set the encryption of a Wi-Fi link, you are usually given the choice of 64-bit or even 128-bit security. Those bit-numbers represent the entropy (or randomness) of the encryption used. A password with 64 bits of entropy is as strong as a string of data comprising 64 randomly selected binary digits. Put another way, a 64-bit password would require 2 raised to the power of 64 attempts to crack it by brute force—in short, 18 billion billion attempts. A 64-bit password was finally cracked in 2002 using brute-force methods. It took a network of volunteers nearly five years to do so.

The National Institute of Standards and Technology, the American government’s standards-measuring laboratory in Gaithersburg, Maryland, recommends 80-bit passwords for state secrets and the like. Such security can be achieved using passwords with 12 symbols, drawn from the full set of 95 symbols on the standard American keyboard. For ordinary purposes, that would seem overkill. A 52-bit password based on eight symbols selected from the standard keyboard is generally adequate.

How to select the eight? Best to let a computer program generate them randomly for you. Unfortunately, the result will be something like 6sDt%k&3 that probably needs to be written down. One answer, only slightly less rigorous, is to use a
mnemonic
A device, such as a formula or rhyme, used as an aid in remembering constructed from the first letters (plus contractions) of an easily remembered phrase like “Murder Considered as One of the Fine Arts” (MCa1otFA) or “To be or not to be: that is the question” (2Bo-2b:?).

Given a robust 52-bit password, you can then use a password manager to take care of the dozens of easily guessable ones used to access various web services. There are a number of perfectly adequate products for doing this. In an early attempt to fulfill his new year’s pledge, your correspondent has been experimenting with
LastPass
, a free password manager that works as an add-on to the Firefox web browser for Windows, Linux or Macintosh. Versions also exist for Internet Explorer on Windows and Safari on the Mac.

Once installed and given a strong password of its own, plus an e-mail address, LastPass
encrypts
encrypts all the logons and passwords stored on your computer. So, be warned: forget your master password and you could be in trouble—especially if you have let the program delete (as it urges you to let it do) all the vulnerable logons and passwords on your own computer.

Thereafter, to visit various web services, all you have to do is log into LastPass and click the website you wish to check out. The tool then automatically logs you on securely to the selected site. It will even complete all the forms needed to buy goods online if you have stored your home address, telephone number and credit-card details in the vault as well.

Your correspondent looks forward to using the service while travelling around Japan over the next month or so. To be on the safe side, however, his dog-eared list of passwords will still go with him.


My Comments:
Cryptology has long being studied and its application serve as an essential composition in the modern society where information exerts a crucial influence on economy. For a business man, leakage of commercial secrets can sometimes destroy the whole company. Therefore, logons and codes, as a part of commercial secrets online, should always be well preserved.
However, we human beings are not born with talent in remembering large quantities of various codes. To cater for the need, software like Lastpass comes into being as a manager of logons and codes. This kind of software enables people to keep in mind only one code, facilitating everyday jobs. But, to some extent, it disobeys the rule of “distracting the risk”, which exposes its out dated design concept. As a trend, advanced methods using unique body features like “finger prints” are more and more popular

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发表于 2010-1-1 00:51:55 |显示全部楼层
来督促下kulewy~~嘿嘿,新年快乐~~

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发表于 2010-1-1 09:11:14 |显示全部楼层
哈哈,新年快乐~
走别人的路,让别人无路可走

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发表于 2010-1-1 11:58:13 |显示全部楼层
串门串门~~~新年快乐~~~
横行不霸道~

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发表于 2010-1-3 13:57:24 |显示全部楼层

A special report on entrepreneurship

Global heroes

Mar 12th 2009 From The Economist print edition

好词好句

生词
Despite the downturn, entrepreneurs are enjoying a renaissance the world over, says Adrian Wooldridge
IN DECEMBER last year, three weeks after the terrorist attacks in Mumbai
(孟买)
and in the midst of the worst global recession since the 1930s, 1,700 bright-eyed Indians gathered in a hotel in Bangalore for a conference on entrepreneurship. They mobbed business heroes such as Azim Premji, who transformed Wipro from a vegetable-oil company into a software giant, and Nandan Nilekani, one of the founders of Infosys, another software giant. They also engaged in a frenzy of networking. The conference was so popular that the organisers had to
erect a huge tent to take the overflow. The aspiring entrepreneurs did not just want to strike it rich; they wanted to play their part in forging a new India. Speaker after speaker praised entrepreneurship as a powerful force for doing good as well as doing well.
Back in 1942 Joseph Schumpeter gave warning that the bureaucratisation of capitalism was killing the spirit of entrepreneurship. Instead of risking the turmoil of “creative destruction”, Keynesian economists, working hand in glove
(勾结) with big business and big government, claimed to be able to provide orderly prosperity. But perspectives have changed in the intervening decades, and Schumpeter’s entrepreneurs are once again roaming(流浪) the globe.
Since the Reagan-Thatcher revolution of the 1980s, governments of almost every ideological stripe have embraced entrepreneurship. The European Union, the United Nations and the World Bank have also become evangelists(布道者). Indeed, the trend is now so well established that it has become the object of satire. Listen to me, says the leading character in one of the best novels of 2008, Aravind Adiga’s “The White Tiger”, and “you will know everything there is to know about how entrepreneurship is born, nurtured, and developed in this, the glorious 21st century of man.
This special report will argue that the entrepreneurial idea has gone mainstream, supported by political leaders on the left as well as on the right, championed by powerful pressure groups, reinforced by a growing infrastructure of universities and venture capitalists and embodied by wildly popular business heroes such as Oprah Winfrey, Richard Branson and India’s software kings. The report will also contend (oppose) that entrepreneurialism needs to be rethought: in almost all instances it involves not creative destruction but creative creation.
The world’s greatest producer of entrepreneurs continues to be America.
The lights (elite) may have gone out on Wall Street, but Silicon Valley continues to burn bright. High-flyers (people with ambitions) from around the world still flock to America’s universities and clamour to work for Google and Microsoft. And many of them then return home and spread the gospel.
The company that arranged the oversubscribed conference in Bangalore, The Indus Entrepreneurs (TiE), is an example of America’s pervasive influence abroad. TiE was founded in Silicon Valley in 1992 by a group of Indian transplants who wanted to promote entrepreneurship through mentoring, networking and education. Today the network has 12,000 members and operates in 53 cities in 12 countries, but it continues to be anchored in the Valley. Two of the leading lights at the meeting, Gururaj Deshpande and Suren Dutia, live, respectively, in Massachusetts and California. The star speaker, Wipro’s Mr Premji, was educated at Stanford; one of the most popular gurus, Raj Jaswa, is the president of TiE’s Silicon Valley chapter.
The globalisation of entrepreneurship is raising the competitive stakes for everyone, particularly in the rich world. Entrepreneurs can now come from almost anywhere, including once-closed economies such as India and China. And many of them can reach global markets from the day they open their doors, thanks to the falling cost of communications.
For most people the term “entrepreneur” simply means anybody who starts a business, be it a corner shop or a high-tech start up. This special report will use the word in a narrower sense to mean somebody who offers an innovative solution to a (frequently unrecognised) problem. The defining characteristic of entrepreneurship, then, is not the size of the company but the act of innovation.
A disproportionate (
不成比例) number of entrepreneurial companies are, indeed, small start-ups. The best way to break into a business is to offer new products or processes. But by no means all start-ups are innovative: most new corner shops do much the same as old corner shops. And not all entrepreneurial companies are either new or small. Google is constantly innovating despite being, in Silicon Valley terms, something of a long-beard.
This narrower definition of entrepreneurship has an impressive intellectual pedigree(血统) going right back to Schumpeter. Peter Drucker, a distinguished management guru(大师)
, defined the entrepreneur as somebody who “upsets and disorganises”. “Entrepreneurs innovate,” he said. “Innovation is the specific instrument of entrepreneurship.” William Baumol, one of the leading economists in this field, describes the entrepreneur as “the bold and imaginative deviator from established business patterns and practices”. Howard Stevenson, the man who did more than anybody else to champion the study of entrepreneurship at the Harvard Business School, defined entrepreneurship as “the pursuit of opportunity beyond the resources you currently control”. The Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, arguably the world’s leading think-tank on entrepreneurship, makes a fundamental distinction between “replicative” and “innovative” entrepreneurship.
Five myths
Innovative entrepreneurs are not only more interesting than the replicative sort, they also carry more economic weight because they generate many more jobs. A small number of innovative start-ups
account for a disproportionately large number of new jobs. But entrepreneurs can be found anywhere, not just in small businesses. There are plenty of misconceptions about entrepreneurship, five of which are particularly persistent. The first is that entrepreneurs are “orphans and outcasts”, to borrow the phrase of George Gilder, an American intellectual: lonely Atlases battling a hostile world or anti-social geeks inventing world-changing gizmos in their garrets. In fact, entrepreneurship, like all business, is a social activity. Entrepreneurs may be more independent than the usual suits who merely follow the rules, but they almost always need business partners and social networks to succeed.
The history of high-tech start-ups reads like a roll-call of business partnerships: Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak (Apple), Bill Gates and Paul Allen (Microsoft), Sergey Brin and Larry Page (Google), Mark Zuckerberg, Dustin Moskovitz and Chris Hughes (Facebook). Ben and Jerry’s was formed when two childhood friends, Ben Cohen and Jerry Greenfield, got together to start an ice-cream business (they wanted to go into the bagel business but could not raise the cash). Richard Branson (Virgin) relied heavily on his cousin, Simon Draper, as well as other partners. Ramana Nanda, of Harvard Business School (HBS), and Jesper Sorensen, of Stanford Business School, have demonstrated that rates of entrepreneurship are significantly higher in organisations where a large number of employees are former entrepreneurs.
Entrepreneurship also
flourishes in clusters. A third of American venture capital flows into two places, Silicon Valley and Boston, and two-thirds into just six places, New York, Los Angeles, San Diego and Austin as well as the Valley and Boston. This is partly because entrepreneurship in such places is a way of life—coffee houses in Silicon Valley are full of young people loudly talking about their business plans—and partly because the infrastructure is already in place, which radically reduces the cost of starting a business.
The second myth is that most entrepreneurs are just out of short trousers. Some of today’s most celebrated figures were indeed astonishingly young when they got going: Bill Gates, Steve Jobs and Michael Dell all dropped out of college to start their businesses, and the founders of Google and Facebook were still students when they launched theirs. Ben Casnocha started his first company when he was 12, was named entrepreneur of the year by Inc magazine at 17 and published a guide to running start-ups at 19.
But not all successful entrepreneurs are kids. Harland Sanders started franchising Kentucky Fried Chicken when he was 65. Gary Burrell was 52 when he left Allied Signal to help start Garmin, a GPS giant. Herb Kelleher was 40 when he founded Southwest Airlines, a business that pioneered no-frills discount flying in America. The Kauffman Foundation examined 652 American-born bosses of technology companies set up in 1995-2005 and found that the average boss was 39 when he or she started. The number of founders over 50 was twice as large as that under 25.
The third myth is that entrepreneurship is driven mainly by venture capital
(风险投资者). This certainly matters in capital-intensive industries such as high-tech and biotechnology; it can also help start-ups to grow very rapidly. And venture capitalists provide entrepreneurs with advice, contacts and management skills as well as money.
But most venture capital goes into just
a narrow sliver of business: computer hardware and software, semiconductors, telecommunications and biotechnology. Venture capitalists fund only a small fraction of start-ups. The money for the vast majority comes from personal debt or from the “three fs”—friends, fools and families. Google is often quoted as a triumph of the venture-capital industry, but Messrs Brin and Page founded the company without any money at all and launched it with about $1m raised from friends and connections.
Monitor, a management consultancy that has recently conducted an extensive survey of entrepreneurs, emphasises the importance of “angel” investors, who operate somewhere in the middle ground between venture capitalists and family and friends. They usually have some personal connection with their chosen entrepreneur and are more likely than venture capitalists to invest in a business when it is little more than a budding idea.
The fourth myth is that to succeed, entrepreneurs must produce some world-changing new product. Sir Ronald Cohen, the founder of Apax Partners, one of Europe’s most successful venture-capital companies, points out that some of the most successful entrepreneurs concentrate on processes rather than products. Richard Branson made flying less tedious by providing his customers with entertainment. Fred Smith built a billion-dollar business by improving the delivery of packages. Oprah Winfrey has become America’s richest self-made woman through successful brand management.
The fifth myth is that entrepreneurship cannot flourish in big companies. Many entrepreneurs are sworn enemies of large corporations, and many policymakers measure entrepreneurship by the number of small-business start-ups. This makes some sense. Start-ups are often more innovative than established companies because their incentives are sharper: they need to break into the market, and owner-entrepreneurs can do much better than even the most innovative company man.
Big can be beautiful too
But many big companies work hard to keep their people on their entrepreneurial toes. Johnson & Johnson operates like a holding company that provides financial muscle and marketing skills to internal entrepreneurs. Jack Welch tried to transform General Electric from a Goliath into a collection of entrepreneurial Davids. Jorma Ollila transformed Nokia, a long-established Finnish firm, from a maker of rubber boots and cables into a mobile-phone giant; his successor as boss of the company, Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo, is now talking about turning it into an internet company. Such men belong firmly in the pantheon of entrepreneurs.
Just as importantly, big firms often provide start-ups with their bread and butter. In many industries, especially pharmaceuticals and telecoms, the giants contract out innovation to smaller companies. Procter & Gamble tries to get half of its innovations from outside its own labs. Microsoft works closely with a network of 750,000 small companies around the world. Some 3,500 companies have grown up in Nokia’s shadow.
But how is the new enthusiasm for entrepreneurship standing up to the worldwide economic downturn? Entrepreneurs are being presented with huge practical problems. Customers are harder to find. Suppliers are becoming less accommodating. Capital is harder to raise. In America venture-capital investment in the fourth quarter of 2008 was down to $5.4 billion, 33% lower than a year earlier. Risk, the lifeblood of the entrepreneurial economy, is becoming something to be avoided.
Misfortune and fortune
The downturn is also confronting supporters of entrepreneurial capitalism with some awkward questions. Why have so many once-celebrated entrepreneurs turned out to be crooks
(骗子)? And why has the free-wheeling culture of Wall Street produced such disastrous results?
For many the change in public mood is equally worrying. Back in 2002, in the wake of the scandal over Enron, a dubious energy-trading company, Congress made life more difficult for start-ups with the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation on corporate governance. Now it is busy propping up failed companies such as General Motors and throwing huge sums of money at the public sector. Newt Gingrich, a Republican former speaker of America’s House of Representatives, worries that potential entrepreneurs may now be asking themselves: “Why not get a nice, safe government job instead?”
Yet the threat to entrepreneurship, both practical and ideological, can be exaggerated. The downturn has advantages as well as drawbacks. Talented staffs are easier to find and office space is cheaper to rent. Harder times will eliminate the also-rans and, in the long run, could make it easier for the survivors to grow. As Schumpeter pointed out, downturns can act as a “good cold shower for the economic system”, releasing capital and labour from dying sectors and allowing newcomers to recombine in imaginative new ways.
Schumpeter also said that all established businesses are “standing on ground that is crumbling beneath their feet”. Today the ground is far less solid than it was in his day, so the opportunities for entrepreneurs are correspondingly more numerous. The information age is making it ever easier for ordinary people to start businesses and harder for incumbents to
defend their territory. Back in 1960 the composition of the Fortune 500 was so stable that it took 20 years for a third of the constitutent companies to change. Now it takes only four years.
There are many reasons for this. First, the information revolution has helped to unbundle
(分类定价) existing companies. In 1937 Ronald Coase argued, in his path-breaking article on “The Nature of the Firm”, that companies make economic sense when the bureaucratic cost of performing transactions under one roof is less than the cost of doing the same thing through the market. Second, economic growth is being driven by industries such as computing and telecommunications where innovation is particularly important. Third, advanced economies are characterised by a shift from manufacturing to services. Service firms are usually smaller than manufacturing firms and there are fewer barriers to entry.
Microsoft, Genentech, Gap and The Limited were all founded during recessions. Hewlett-Packard, Geophysical Service (now Texas Instruments), United Technologies, Polaroid and Revlon started in the Depression. Opinion polls suggest that entrepreneurs see a good as well as a bad side to the recession. In a survey carried out in eight emerging markets last November for Endeavor, a pressure group, 85% of the entrepreneurs questioned said they had already felt the impact of the crisis and 88% thought that worse was yet to come. But they also predicted, on average, that their businesses would grow by 31% and their workforces by 12% this year. Half of them thought they would be able to hire better people and 39% said there would be less competition.


Peter Druker(from wiki)
was a writer, management consultant, and self-described “social ecologist.”[1] His books and scholarly and popular articles explored how humans are organized across the business, government and the nonprofit sectors of society.[2] His writings have predicted many of the major developments of the late twentieth century, including privatization and decentralization; the rise of Japan to economic world power; the decisive importance of marketing; and the emergence of the information society with its necessity of lifelong learning.[3] In 1959, Drucker coined the term “knowledge worker" and later in his life considered knowledge work productivity to be the next frontier of management.[4]

Comments
In the first part of article, the author gives a revolutionary but also clear definition of entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurs on whom the market relies should necessarily be innovative to create new occupations. Inferring from this sort of definition, an important point in saving the market from the crisis is to cultivate a flourishing group of a new generation of entrepreneurs to take the responsibility, which, in the end, results in a new period of economy. In this way, the economy takes a “bubble bath”.
In the second part, the writer portrays the characteristics of entrepreneurs by explaining five common misconceptions. In his description, the market becomes more unstable and changeable, facilitating the break in of new-comers. With one’s own innovative ability and the help of others, he can easily become a successful entrepreneur with symbolizes the maturity of the American society.

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发表于 2010-1-3 14:00:20 |显示全部楼层
85# pluka
谢谢! 同乐同乐!

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发表于 2010-1-3 14:02:10 |显示全部楼层
83# 番茄斗斗
番茄组长! 我开始补作业啦! 谢谢提醒!

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发表于 2010-1-3 14:03:21 |显示全部楼层
84# dingyi0311
新年快乐!(这么晚才回大家,惭愧惭愧!)

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发表于 2010-1-3 15:02:45 |显示全部楼层

An evolutionary biologist on religion

Spirit level
Dec 17th 2009
From The Economist print edition

Why the human race has needed religion to survive

Alamy
The Faith Instinct: How Religion Evolved and Why it Endures. By Nicholas Wade. Penguin Press; 310 pages; $25.95. Buy from Amazon.com

好词好句

生词
WHEREVER their investigations lead, all analysts of religion begin somewhere. And in the final lines of his densely but skilfully packed account of faith from the viewpoint of evolutionary biology, Nicholas Wade recalls the place where he first felt sanctity: Eton College chapel(小教堂). (开头很有文气,学习之)

The “beauty of holiness” in a British private school is a far cry(遥远的距离, 大不相同的东西) from the sort of religion that later came to interest him as a science journalist at Nature magazine and then the New York Times. To examine the roots of religion, he says, it is important to look at human beginnings. The customs of hunter-gatherer peoples who survived into modern times give an idea of religion’s first forms: the ecstasy of dusk-to-dawn tribal dances, for example.

Charles Darwin, whose idea of the sacred also came from an English private school, witnessed religion at its most primordial when he went to Australia in 1836. He found it horrifying: “nearly naked figures, viewed by the light of blazing fires, all moving in hideous (repulsive) harmony…”

Whatever Darwin’s personal sensibilities, Mr Wade is convinced that a Darwinian approach offers the key to understanding religion. In other words, he sides with those who think man’s propensity (tendency) for religion has some adaptive function. According to this view, faith would not have persisted over thousands of generations if it had not helped the human race to survive. Among evolutionary biologists, this idea is contested. Critics of religion, like Richard Dawkins (The Selfish Gene的作者
) and Steven Pinker, suggest that faith is a useless (or worse) by-product of other human characteristics.

And that controversy leads to another one. Does Darwinian selection take place at the level only of individuals, or of groups as well? As Mr Wade makes clear, the notion of religion as an “adaptive” phenomenon makes better sense if one accepts the idea of group selection. Groups which practised religion effectively and enjoyed its benefits were likely to prevail over those which lacked these advantages.

Of course, the picture
is muddied by the vast changes that religion went through in the journey from tribal dancing to Anglican hymns. The advent of settled, agricultural societies, at least 10,000 years ago, led to a new division of labour, in which priestly castes(种姓) tried to monopolise(垄断) access to the divine, and the authorities sought to control sacred ecstasy.

Still, the modifications that religion has undergone should not, in Mr Wade’s view, distract from the study of faith’s basic functions. In what way, then, does religion enhance a group’s survival? Above all, by
promoting moral rules and cementing cohesion, in a way that makes people ready to sacrifice themselves for the group and to deal ruthlessly with outsiders. These arguments are well made. Mr Wade has a clear mind and limpid prose style which guides the reader almost effortlessly through 200 years of intellectual history. Perhaps, though, he oversimplifies the link between morality, in the sense of obedience to rules, and group solidarity based on common participation in ecstatic rites.

All religion is concerned in varying degrees with metaphysical ideas, moral norms and mystical experience. But in the great religions, the moral and the mystical have often been in tension. The more a religion stresses ecstasy, the less it seems
hidebound by rules—especially rules of public behaviour, as opposed to purely religious norms. And religious movements (from the “Deuteronomists” of ancient Israel to the English Puritans) that emphasise moral norms tend to eschew the ecstatic.

Max Weber, one of the fathers of religious sociology, contrasted the transcendental feelings enjoyed by Catholic mass-goers with the Protestant obsession with behaviour. In Imperial Russia, Peter the Great tried to pull the Russian Orthodox church from the former extreme to the latter: to curb its love of rite and mystery and make it more of a moral agency like the Lutheran churches of northern Europe. He failed. Russians liked things mystical, and they didn’t like being told what to do.

As well as giving an elegant summary of modern thinking about religion, Mr Wade also offers a brief, provocative history of monotheism. He e
ndorses the radical view that the story of the Jews’ flight from Egypt is myth, rather than history. He sympathises with daring ideas about Islam’s beginnings: so daring that many of its proponents work under false names. In their view, Islam is more likely to have emerged from dissident Christian sects in the Levant than to have “burst out of Arabia”, as the Muslim version of sacred history teaches.

At times, the book stumbles. In describing the interplay between Hellenic and Hebrew culture at the dawning of Christianity, Mr Wade makes exaggerated claims. He says there is no basis for a mother-and-child cult in the religion of Israel. In fact there are many references in the Hebrew scriptures to the Messiah and his mother; the Dead Sea Scrolls
(死海古卷) have made this even clearer. And his micro-history of Christian theology is inaccurate in places.

These objections aside, this is a masterly book. It lays the basis for a rich dialogue between biology, social science and religious history. It also helps explain a quest for collective ecstasy that can take myriad forms. Perhaps his brief autobiographical reference to Eton should have noted the bonding effect not only of chapel, but also of songs like “Jolly Boating Weather”.(不理解)

Clinton Richard Dawkins, FRS, FRSL (born 26 March 1941) is a British biological theorist with a background in ethology. He is a popular science author focusing on evolution.
Dawkins is one of Britain's best-known academics. He came to prominence with his 1976 book The Selfish Gene, which popularised the gene-centred view of evolution and introduced the term meme. In 1982, he further developed the gene-centred view with his book The Extended Phenotype:The Gene as the Unit of Selection, emphasizing that the phenotypic effects of genes are not necessarily limited to an organism's body but can stretch via biochemistry and behaviour into other organisms and the environment. He is well-known as a presenter of the case for rationalism and scientific thinking. His later works continued to expand upon these ideas and their implications.
Dawkins is one of the world's most widely publicised atheists. He is a prominent critic of religion, creationism and pseudoscience. In his 1986 book The Blind Watchmaker: Why the Evidence of Evolution Reveals a Universe Without Design, he argued against the watchmaker analogy, an argument for the existence of a supernatural creator based upon the complexity of living organisms. Instead, he described a dysteleological perspective on the process of evolution by natural selection as "blind", without a design or a goal. In his 2006 million-selling book The God Delusion, he contended that a supernatural creator almost certainly does not exist, writing that such beliefs, based on faith rather than on evidence, qualify as a delusion. He was a co-founder of the Out Campaign, as a means of advancing atheism and freethought.
Dawkins retired from Oxford University in 2008 and remains a writer and public figure.

Comments:

In the article, the author presents a new view of the evolution of religions by clear statements and abundant examples.

One of those facts is that the write consider that Islam orients from dissident Christian sectsin the Levant rather than the out-burst of Arabia. This kind of statement is similar to a believe that the advent of Taoism originally serve as an repulsive force of the invasion of Buddhism. Learning from the history, we can easily discover that both Islam and Taoism have a significant character of revolt. In China, Taoism, more often than not served as the ideology of rebellion of farmers. In Arab, Islam plays an important role in resist the Crusades. These facts may support the author’s opinion.

Possibly, the writer might have been influenced by Richard Dawkins’ famous book “The selfish Genes”. In his book, Dawkins makes a careful and innovative observation on history with the view of biology, which probably inspires the writer. One of his famous conclusions is men are born selfish, because only selfish genes can survive. To support the assertion, he demonstrates the example of Neanderthals, who are stronger and even cleaver than our ancestors. But they are finally defeated probably only because they are not as selfish as our ancestors. Probably the evolution culture is the same.

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RE: 1006G[REBORN FROM THE ASHES组]备考日记 by kulewy531(为了未来,为了永恒) [修改]

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