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本帖最后由 七七夕夕 于 2010-3-7 20:20 编辑
Clash of generations
Britain will be rent, not by class warfare, but by an age divide, a newbook argues
Feb 11th2010 | From The Economist print edition
GettyImages The Pinch: How the Baby Boomers Took their Children’s Future—and Why TheyShould Give it Back. By David Willetts. Atlantic; 314 pages;£18.99. Buy from Amazon.co.uk
WITH a general election just a few months away, the class-war trumpets are sounding loudand clear in Britain. From theLabour ranks come tired jibes about Conservative policiesdesigned on the playing fields of Eton. From the Conservative benches a moreinteresting proposition (=proposal) has appeared.(倒装)
In the worry about the shift of resources from theincreasingly workless working classto the increasingly unleisured leisureclass something new and important is being missed, says David Willetts, aTory MP and one of his party’srelatively few acknowledged Deep Thinkers. It is the massive and cripplingshift in resources to retiring baby-boomersfrom the slimmer generation comingafter them. Britain is ever more divided by age.
Altogether Britishpeople are worth about £7 trillion ($10.9 trillion). This can be dividedroughly into £1.6 trillion in personal financial assets (shares, savings), £3.7trillion in housing (£2.5 trillion if you subtract mortgages) and £1.8 trillionin personal and company pension schemes. It is logical that(让步)older people should have accumulated more wealth than younger ones. But(转折) theproportions seem to be shifting sharply in favour of the older cohorts, especially those aged 55 to 65.
Half the populationare under 40 years old but they hold only about 15% of all financial assets.People under 44 own, again, just 15% of owner-occupied housing. Comparing thefinancial and housing wealth of different age groups in 1995 and 2005 the Bankof England found that those aged 25 to 34 had seen their wealth fall, whereasthose aged 55 to 64 had seen theirs triple. It helped that inflation was galloping whenthe older group was borrowing to buy homes, but slowed thereafter (after that).
If pensions are counted, the situation is even more skewed (=asymmetrical)(引导下文). Lushly(=plentifully) funded final- salary schemes are now broadlyclosed to new members, in the privatesector at least. Baby-boomers can chuck(=giveup) the day job at 60 or 65 and head off(=prevent,block) into the perma-tanned(a symbol ofwealth?) sunset(old age)(they will probably prove freakishly long-lived), borrowing against theinflated value of their houses as they do so. Their children must slog(plod) on towards an infinitely receding retirement age, squirrelling away money for their meagre defined-contribution pensions as a growing proportion ofstate spending is devoted to the needsof a massive generation of the elderly.
Young people havelittle chance of building up similar wealth. They are struggling to get on the housing ladder, thoughclose to a fifth of people between 50 and 59 years old own a second home. Jobsfor the young were getting scarcer even before the crash. Yet more and moreolder people are working and earning more, relative to young workers, thanbefore.
Ontop of this(=in addition to), older baby-boomers have dodged two speedingbullets, leaving their descendants squarely(=exactly) in the line of fire. Thefirst is the bill for bailing outthe financial sector; the second, the effect of climate change on the cost ofenergy, water, flood-prevention and thelike. Other countries have ageing populations, but the problem in Britainis especially acute. British baby-boomers tended to believe their houses wereall the piggy bank they needed. They neglectedto make other comparable savings or they borrowed against property to financetheir old age. (One result of rock-bottomsavings rates was that British banks, which did not have the same access to retail depositsas banks in other, more provident (=frugal, saving) countries, gotinto trouble leaning heavily on(=relyon) the volatile wholesale marketsfor their cash.)
Mr Willetts is not theonly writer to worry about baby-boomers crashingthrough society like a flash flood. Nor is this his first take on it. But two things distinguish this book from otherofferings.
The first is theattempt to construct a logically compelling theory of self-interested altruism and reciprocity, enlistinganthropologists, Enlightenment philosophers and today’s game theorists to doso. There is an unvoiced contractthat binds the generations. Parents look after their children, with a view to helping them do at leastas well as they themselves have done, and grown-up children look after theirparents, in the hope that theirchildren will do the same for them one day. But there is now “a breakdown (=disintegration) in the balance between thegenerations”, thanks to (=because of)the colossal(=enormous) size of oneof them. And it has brought social consequences as well as economic ones, includingthe disappearance of trust between unrelated adults and children and a long,messy transition(=change) toindependence for young people today.
The second reason toread this well-written book is the wealth of social detail that Mr Willetts,with his wonderful magpie mind, spreads before the reader. He looks, for example, to(=rely upon) England’s historicallysmallish (=small), nuclear families foran explanation of the country’s early adoption of markets and the rule of law.
Weaving together(=considering both)birth rates and immigration policy, he has an ingenious explanation for why workers from Lodz flock to London,where housing costs are higher than almost anywhere else in the world, whereasworkers from Liverpool on the whole do not. As society becomes more segregated (=seperated) by age, hepoints out, some council estates nowhave ratios of adults to hormone-heavyadolescent males more (typical of violent Yemen or Somalia 插入语?) than of developed Westerncountries. He turns up statisticsshowing that most women, employed or not, spend more time caring for theiryoung children now than they used to, and suggests that most people have become better parents (doing more fortheir own children) but worse citizens (doing less for others). The end notes alone are a feast.
This is not a party-political book. It is, however, apolemic(=disputant). Mr Willetts places a big bet on demography,giving short shrift to otherfactors affecting behaviour, such as technology and religion. This allows himto touch plausibly on(=related to)many hot- button (=controversial) themes—theerosion of social capital, entrenched inequalityand social immobility—but it stops short of a full explanation of them. He is also a little hard(=strict) on theboomers, who have, after all, presidedover economic growth, cloned sheep, become gay-friendly, spent a lot oftime and money looking after their children and grandchildren, and who will notescape the current financial storm unscathed.
Inthe end we are left with a question. Are the baby-boomers a luckygeneration or a selfish one? Mr Willetts, born in 1956, is too prudent toanswer categorically (=absolutely), buthis arguments suggest that if nothing else theyare certainly a careless(=unconcerned)one. Prolonged(=continued) economic growth tends to make people assume that(用在argument里) future generations too will grow richer, andhence to make less provision forthem. Yet the Victorians built railways and city halls for their descendants in what was one of
Britain’s mostoptimistic eras. And the boomers’ descendants may have more cash but they arealso likely to face far highercosts. Mr Willetts cites, approvingly, the waysome American Indian tribal councils used to take decisions in the light of how they would affectthe next seven generations. In Britain, alas, it is painfully hard(=difficult) to see beyond the nextelection. |
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