[1010G]Economist阅读帖--决战2010---by elevenkar

elevenkarUID: 2791267

我的第一次作业哦 呵呵

注释：红色为写作积累词汇

蓝色为难词注释

黄色为经典句型积累

背景黄色为论点论据积累

The mean streets （残酷之街）of Guildford

Spending more on education and private security are cost-effective ways of cutting crime

Apr 8th 2010 | From The Economist print edition

GUILDFORD is a prosperous town in London’s commuter belt and an unlikely setting for a seminar on crime. But one of the best sessions at the recent annual conference of the Royal Economic Society (RES), held at the University of Surrey, teased out （mw的解释：to obtain by or as if by disentangling or freeing with a pointed instrument）two of the big themes on the economics of crime—deterrence （the act or process of dettering,as inhibition of criminal behavior by fear especially of punishment）(what it is that prevents crime?) and incentives (what it is that makes for law-abiding citizens?). （值得借鉴的思维方式）

To start, Philip Cook of Duke University unveiled a new paper, written with John MacDonald of the University of Pennsylvania, on private contributions to public order. Their paper is based in part on a study of Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) in Los Angeles. BIDs are not-for-profit bodies that provide services, such as private security guards and sanitation, on behalf of(=in the interest of) local firms. The marvel of (=the advantage of ,the merit of ,a plus of , a strength of)such public goods is that one firm’s use of them does not make them less useful to others. The flaw(=defect=weakness) is that businesses can benefit even if they do not bear the costs. A change to Californian law in the 1990s addressed this problem by forcing all businesses to join a collective scheme if enough local firms had signed up to it. It helps, too, that the city authority collects the levies that finance the BIDs.

Private security turns out to be a cost-effective way of cutting crime. The study compares crime rates in 30 BIDs set up after 1995 with those in neighboring districts. BIDs tend to be high-crime areas, so the authors adjust for this. They find that each $10,000 spent by an average BID resulted in 3.4 fewer crimes per year.

To work out whether this was money well spent, the authors surveyed the public to put a cash value on each crime prevented. People were asked whether they would vote for a scheme that reduced a particular crime by 10% at a particular cost in tax dollars (the range of “offers” varied from $25 to $225). The authors used the responses to assign a social cost to different crimes. They calculate that preventing a robbery is valued at $263,000, an assault at $79,000 and a burglary （the act of breaking and entering a dwelling at night）at $21,000. Given the reduction they bring about in each sort of crime, every $10,000 spent by the average BID bought some $200,000-worth of crime prevention.

A benefit-to-cost ratio (=PROPORTION=SCALE)of 20 to one is impressive, though it does not tell us whether the schemes directly benefit the firms that pay for them—through increased custom, fatter profits, higher property values, and so on. It is clear, however, that private security is good value for society as a whole. So good, in fact, that one suspects that some of the costs have been left out. Perhaps crime was not stamped out(非正式=vanish) but merely shifted elsewhere. Or perhaps BIDs work so well because they draw on extra support from the police. That is not the case, says Mr Cook. Establishing a BID leads to fewer arrests and so reduces the cost of policing. Nor is there evidence that crime increases in neighboring districts after BIDs are set up, he says. If anything, crime nearby falls.

Why is private security apparently so cost-effective? One reason, says Mr. Cook, is simply that guards are paid less than police officers. Another is they are dedicated to a single district and are directly responsible for making it safe. Guards can specialize. They know which shifty characters to look out for and which policing works best in their area. Unlike policemen, they are not called away to supervise a parade or protect a dignitary.

The research also shows how effective “target hardening” (ie, self-protection against crime) can be. Mr. Cook noted that there were twice as many cars in America in 2008 as in 1989, but fewer car thefts. Steering locks, engine immobilizers and tracking systems have made newer cars harder to steal. In a similar vein, a paper presented by Ben Vollaard of Tilburg University showed that newly built homes are harder to burgle. Mr Vollaard and his co-author, Jan van Ours, reckon that homes put up after a change in the Dutch building code in 1999 were 26% less likely to be broken into than those built beforehand. To comply with the code, builders had to fit high-quality locks and burglar-proof windows and doors. These may not put off a determined thief but are enough to slow down an opportunist(one that practives opportunism), said Mr Vollaard.

elevenkarUID: 2791267

为何有的掉了色有的没掉！！！纠结

elevenkarUID: 2791267

The inflation solution

The merits（上一篇中学到的
可以用marvel替换） of inflation as a solution to the rich world’s problems are easily overstated

（备注：

红色为词汇积累，下划线为内容性好句，蓝色为文章结构联系性好句

所有英英解释均来自韦氏，同义词来自牛津同义词词典，中文解释来自朗文/牛津）

Mar 11th 2010 | From The Economist print edition

It has long been considered a scourge（a cause of wide or great affliction）, an obstacle to investment and a tax on the thrifty(=stingy, frugal).它长久以来一直被视为阻碍投资和税收节俭的洪水猛兽。 It seems strange, then, that inflation is now touted（吹捧，被标榜） as a solution to the rich world’s economic troubles. At first sight the case seems compelling（=convincing/persuasive/strong/forceful/cogent）. If central banks had a higher target for inflation, that would allow for bigger cuts in real interest rates(实际利率) in a recession. Faster inflation makes it easier to restore cost-competitiveness（成本竞争力）
in depressed industries and regions. And it would help reduce the private and public debt burdens that weigh on the rich world’s economies. In practice, however, allowing prices to rise more quickly has costs as well as benefits.

The orthodoxy （正统观念）on inflation is certainly shifting. A recent IMF paper* co-authored by the fund’s chief economist suggests that very low inflation may do more harm than good. Empirical （经验主义的）research is far clearer about the harmful effects on output once inflation is in double digits. So a 4% inflation target might be better than a goal of 2% as it would allow for monetary policy to respond more aggressively to economic “shocks”. If the expected inflation rate rose by a notch or two, wages and interest rates would shift up to match it. The higher rates required in normal times would create the space for bigger cuts during slumps（=recession）.

That argument is often bundled with another: that higher inflation greases（使润滑） the wheels of the economy. Wages should ideally be tied to productivity, but workers are usually reluctant to suffer the pay cuts that are sometimes required to maintain that link（说那么多。。。不就是工资的刚性么）. A higher inflation rate can make it easier for relative wages to adjust. A cut in real wages is easier to disguise with inflation of 3-4% than a rate of 1-2%. If the European Central Bank (ECB) had a higher inflation target, say, then Greece, Ireland and Spain would be able to regain competitiveness more quickly while avoiding unpopular cuts in nominal wages（wages measured in money as distinct actual purchasing power）.

The anxiety about indebtedness（the condition of being indebted） makes inflation seem all the more(更加) appealing. Spending in rich countries, such as America and Britain, will flounder（=struggle） as long as households look to pay down the debts they acquired to buy expensive homes.（没看懂！） A burst of inflation would speed up this process by eroding the real value of mortgages（抵押贷款）. Inflation would work the same magic on government debt. It could also give a fillip（=stimulate 正面意义的刺激，b: a significant and also unexpected development） to revenues. Tax allowances (津贴)and thresholds（临界值） are not perfectly indexed（与。。。紧密挂钩的） and inflation pushes taxpayers into higher income brackets where they face heftier（=large/big/great/substaintial/considerable/extensive/sizeable/bumper/handsome） tax rates. In principle a modest dose of controlled inflation might work wonders. In practice, however, it may be hard to achieve and the benefits may not be quite as obvious. Take public debt. Inflation certainly helped reduce America’s government-debt burden after the Second World War, but far more of the shrinkage came from strong GDP growth and primary budget surpluses. George Hall of Brandeis University and Thomas Sargent of New York University† reckon that less than a quarter of the reduction in America’s debt-to-GDP ratio between 1945 and 1974 came from negative real rates(负实际利率) of return on government bonds（政府债券）.

The Hall-Sargent calculations show that almost all of this inflation tax was borne by those who held bonds with a maturity of five years or more. (That is because investors in short-term bonds could more quickly demand higher interest rates to compensate for inflation.) The trick is harder to repeat today. The average maturity （金融到期）of federal debt was more than seven years in the 1940s. According to Bloomberg, the weighted average maturity of all American public debt is now around five years. Using inflation to stiff investors’ works best when the bulk of borrowing is in the past: governments have an incentive to keep inflation (and thus bond yields) low as long as they are issuing fresh bonds to cover their huge budget deficits（不足额，赤字deficiency 是缺陷，缺点，缺乏
）.

Another obstacle to higher inflation is that rich countries have promised themselves price stability. A central bank could not credibly commit itself to a 4% inflation target having broken a pledge to keep inflation close to 2%. Bond investors would demand an interest-rate premium for bearing the risks of a future increase in the target, as well as an extra reward for enduring more variable returns (higher inflation tends to be more volatile（=moody/unpredictable/temperamental）). Moreover, many social-security and health-care entitlements (在此=allowance) are indexed to prices, as is a chunk of public debt, so higher inflation would drive up public spending.

elevenkarUID: 2791267

After UribeSuddenly, a wide-open race among half-a-dozen would-be successorsMar 4th 2010 | BOGOTÁ | From The Economist print edition
FOR months Colombian politics has come down to just one question: would &Aacute;lvaro Uribe, the country’s tough and popular president, succeed in his effort to change the constitution to allow him to run for a third term at a presidential election in May? Such has been Mr Uribe’s sway(n:power) over his country’s institutions that many pundits(critc;expert;luminary) assumed the answer was yes. But when it finally came on February 26th the ruling by the Constitutional Court was a rejection sufficiently emphatic （不容置疑的，明确强调的）as to seem inevitable in retrospect. And with that Colombia finds itself suddenly contemplating （mediate on sth；to view as an contingent <可能发生的>or probable or as an end or intension）a wide-open election.
The court ruled by seven to two that the re-election law would have violated the spirit of the constitution as well as being vitiated(=debase;impair;<to make ineffective>)) by irregularities and “substantial violations of democratic principles”. Their verdict (=judgment;opinion)means that Mr Uribe is barred from ever seeking the presidency again, not just this year. This spirited(=exuberant/lively/animated/vigorous/ebullient/hearty) defence of judicial independence and checks and balances was met by immediate, if emotional, acquiescence(默许) from the president. The important thing, he said, was that his “democratic security” policy, which has beaten back left-wing（左派的） guerrillas（游击队） and demobilised (复员的)right-wing paramilitaries（正规军）, should continue.
Best-placed to do that is Juan Manuel Santos, Mr Uribe’s former defence minister, who immediately announced his candidacy. But without Mr Uribe to unify it, his broad coalition（多党联合政府；union；combination） is already unravelling（解体）. The Conservative Party may or may not support Mr Santos, who was formerly a Liberal, depending on the outcome of a primary （党内初选）to be held on the same day as a new Congress is elected on March 14th. Germán Vargas Lleras, another former uribista, is also running.
An opinion poll（民意调查） taken after the court decision gave Mr Santos 23% at the head of a crowded field of half a dozen plausible candidates, with Gustavo Petro, a moderate leftist（左派支持者） opponent of Mr Uribe, second with 11%. It also suggested that 43% would vote for Mr Uribe’s candidate, whoever that turns out to be (he has not yet explicitly（expressly,definitly）endorsed anyone). So a run-off election is likely. Assuming Mr Santos makes the run-off, much will depend on who his opponent his. The opposition is similarly fragmented(成碎片的).
The picture should clear after the election for Congress, which will show the strength of the parties. As well as the Conservatives, the new centre-left Green Party, involving three former mayors of Bogotá, will hold a primary on that day. Most of the candidates, including some from the opposition, say that they would continue and improve Mr Uribe’s “democratic security” policies. They will compete on issues such as health care and unemployment—as well as on their credibility（公信力） on security. Crime rates have risen again in several big cities over the past year. Colombia is entering a new era, but it is one in which Mr Uribe will continue to cast a long shadow.

elevenkarUID: 2791267

In Memoriam: Lech Kaczynski

The death of Poland's president carries a terrible echo of his country's past

Apr 11th 2010 | From The Economist online

HE WAS a figure from another age. Weekend guests at Lech Kaczynski’s presidential retreat on Poland’s Baltic coast often found the conversation turning to the opposition politics of 1970s Gdansk.

That is indeed a fascinating subject, though not necessarily the most burning one for the head of state of Eastern Europe’s most important country nearly 40 years later. Mr Kaczynski, who died along with 95 others, including many of Poland’s military and political elite, in a plane crash in Russia on April 10th, epitomised （to make or give an epitome of ; to serve as the typical or ideal example of）some of the best and the worst features of Polish politics.

He was a man of unquestioned, almost painful, integrity. In 2005 he moved to the presidential palace not from one of the palatial (of, relating to, or being a palace) homes favored by most mainstream (a prevailing current or derection of activity or influence)Polish politicians, but from the shabby (1clothed with worn or seed garments2contemptible)flat in Warsaw in which he and his wife, Maria, had lived for decades. His values, attitudes, habits and behavior were those of the pre-war Polish middle class: a culture so strong that it survived decapitation and evisceration under Soviet and Nazi occupation, (此处注意survive的用法。Survive decapitation…意味从。。。中存活)and the regime （1 regimen 2 a regular pattern of occurrence or action 3 the characteristic behavior or orderly procedure of natural phenomenon ; mode of rule or management; a form of government;a period of rule ）installed at gunpoint after the war. Obstinate(固执的), old-fashioned, provincial（迂腐的）, gutsy（贪婪的）, rather shy, awkward（缺少灵活性的）, suspicious, pernickety （挑剔的）and scrupulous（一丝不苟的）, the 60-year-old law professor was utterly uninterested in the tactful doublespeak（圆滑之言） usually required of politicians in modern Europe.

He was an unabashed and instinctive Atlanticist. When government ministers tried to haggle with （1=bargain2=dispute）America about a planned missile-defence （导弹防御）base, he undercut them. Poland would be happy to have the installation on any terms（没搞懂）. He took a similar attitude to Lithuania, brushing aside（=ignore） that country’s refusal to allow its ethnic Polish minority （表示某国少数民族的表达法～）to write their names in official documents with letters such as w, ł and ń that are not part of the standard Lithuanian alphabet. Other Polish politicians saw Lithuanian foot-dragging on the issue as deceitful and infuriating; for Mr Kaczynski it was merely a pity. His affection for the Baltic states, Ukraine and other ex-captive nations was palpable（tangible，noticeable，manifest，perceptible）: Had they not suffered, just like Poland? They should stand together.

When Russia invaded Georgia in August 2008, it was Mr Kaczynski who rushed to the rescue, leading a hair-raising（令人恐惧的） trip to Tbilisi with leaders of other sympathetic ex-communist states. He tried to overrule （reject）protests by the presidential plane’s pilot, that the trip into a war zone was unsafe. Mr Kaczynski was furious at what he saw as cowardice（怯懦）; the pilot later got a medal（奖章） for resolutely（admirably purposeful, determined, and unwavering）
putting his passengers’ safety ahead of prestige. Some suspect that Mr Kaczynski repeated that error in the minutes before the disastrous attempt to land the presidential plane at a fog-bound airport on April 10th.

Human error seems the most likely cause of the crash. The Polish presidential plane was an ageing Tupolev 154: old, noisy and thirsty, admittedly, but also robust and reliable. It had been recently renovated（=overhaul） with modern avionics（航空电子设备）. Russian air traffic controllers seem blameless too. They insisted that the fog at Smolensk airport was too thick and had told the plane to land elsewhere.

Mr Kaczynski’s single greatest political mistake was in failing to see that modern Germany, led by Angela Merkel, was a potentially powerful friend for Poland, rather than an adversary that harboured sinister revanchist tendencies. Along with his brother, Jaroslaw, who leads the main opposition Law and Justice party, Mr Kaczynski became a laughing stock in Germany for his dogged hostility and on occasion outright rudeness towards the federal republic. His distrust of Poland’s western neighbour was matched by a visceral hostility towards the Soviet Union and its defenders. To Mr Kaczyński, his brother, and many of their supporters, Russia was still a menace（威胁）, run by the former KGB and with a shameful disregard for the atrocious crimes committed in the past. The complexities of modern Russia were often brushed aside.

His robust attitude to Poland’s enemies, past and present, pleased his supporters. But it was compounded by a pronounced tendency to make gaffes（失礼）, and a staff who frequently seemed overwhelmed by the demands of even daily protocol, let alone strategic thinking. That invited criticism, and sometimes caustic caricature.

elevenkarUID: 2791267

5# elevenkar
用过另一个方法评注。就是把评注的单词先标出来，但是解释和用法在最后给出，那样在复习自己做的评注时不会有影响，也容易测试自己到底记没记住。

The Americans may still go to the moon before the Chinese

Feb 18th 2010 | From The Economist print edition

AP Can you direct me to reception, please?

WHEN America’s space agency, NASA, announced its spending plans in February, some people worried that its cancellation of the Constellation moon programme had ended any hopes of Americans returning to the Earth’s rocky satellite. The next footprints on the lunar regolith were therefore thought likely to be Chinese. Now, though, the private sector is arguing that the new spending plan actually makes it more likely America will return to the moon.

The new plan encourages firms to compete to provide transport to low Earth orbit (LEO). The budget proposes $6 billion over five years to spur the development of commercial crew and cargo services to the international space station. This money will be spent on “man-rating” existing rockets, such as Boeing’s Atlas V, and on developing new spacecraft that could be launched on many different rockets. The point of all this activity is to create healthy private-sector competition for transport to the space station—and in doing so to drive down the cost of getting into space.

Eric Anderson, the boss of a space-travel company called Space Adventures, is optimistic about the changes. They will, he says, build “railroads into space”. Space Adventures has already sent seven people to the space station, using Russian rockets. It would certainly benefit from a new generation of cheap launchers.

Another potential beneficiary—and advocate of private-sector transport—is Robert Bigelow, a wealthy entrepreneur who founded a hotel chain called Budget Suites of America. Mr Bigelow has so far spent $180m of his own money on space development—probably more than any other individual in history. He has been developing so-called expandable space habitats, a technology he bought from NASA a number of years ago.

These habitats, which are folded up for launch and then inflated in space, were designed as interplanetary vehicles for a trip to Mars, but they are also likely to be useful general-purpose accommodation. The company already has two scaled-down versions in orbit.

Mr Bigelow is preparing to build a space station that will offer cheap access to space to other governments—something he believes will generate a lot of interest. The current plan is to launch the first full-scale habitat (called Sundancer) in 2014. Further modules will be added to this over the course of a year, and the result will be a space station with more usable volume than the existing international one. Mr Bigelow’s price is just under $23m per astronaut. That is about half what Russia charges for a trip to the international station, a price that is likely to go up after the space shuttle retires later this year. He says he will be able to offer this price by bulk-buying launches on newly man-rated rockets. Since most of the cost of space travel is the launch, the price might come down even more if the private sector can lower the costs of getting into orbit.

The ultimate aim of all his investment, Mr Bigelow says, is to get to the moon. LEO is merely his proving ground. He says that if the technology does work in orbit, the habitats will be ideal for building bases on the moon. To go there, however, he will have to prove that the expandable habitat does indeed work, and also generate substantial returns on his investment in LEO, to provide the necessary cash.

If all goes well, the next target will be L1, the point 85% of the way to the moon where the gravitational pulls of moon and Earth balance. “It’s a terrific dumping off point,” he says. “We could transport a completed lunar base [to L1] and put it down on the lunar surface intact.”

There are others with lunar ambitions, too. Some 20 teams are competing for the Google Lunar X Prize, a purse of $30m that will be given to the first private mission which lands a robot on the moon, travels across the surface and sends pictures back to Earth. Space Adventures, meanwhile, is in discussions with almost a dozen potential clients about a circumlunar mission, costing $100m a head.

The original Apollo project was mainly a race to prove the superiority of American capitalism over Soviet communism. Capitalism won—but at the cost of creating, in NASA, one of the largest bureaucracies in American history. If the United States is to return to the moon, it needs to do so in a way that is demonstrably superior to the first trip—for example, being led by business rather than government. Engaging in another government-driven spending battle, this time with the Chinese, will do nothing more than show that America has missed the point.

+fetish
#n.神物被盲目崇拜之物, 迷恋物〈心〉恋物

+plough into
#n.用犁把…犁入土中积极投入工作冲入; 冲到对…进行投资

+subsidy
#n.补贴, 津贴, 补助金

+grave
#adj.(指情况)严重的严肃的, 庄重的
#n.坟墓死亡

+constellation
#n.星座一群杰出人物

+lunar regolith
#n.月壤

+earth orbit
#n.环地轨道

+cargo service
#n.货运业务

+launcher
#n.发射者,运载火箭,发射台

+beneficiary
#n.受益者; 受惠者

+interplanetary
#adj.行星间的,太阳系内的

+orbit
#n.轨道
#vt. & vi.在…轨道上运行, 环绕轨道运行

+astronaut
#n.宇航员, 太空人

+rated
#adj.定价的,额定的

elevenkarUID: 2791267

About this debate

What is the right role for government in spurring innovation? The outlines of this age-old debate will be familiar to many. One side argues that governments inevitably get it wrong when they get too involved in innovation: picking the wrong technology winners, say, or ploughing subsidies into politically popular projects rather than the most deserving ones. The other rebuts that given the grave global challenges we face today—in the 1960s America thought it was the Soviet race into space, today many countries worry about climate change and pandemic threats—governments need to do much more to support innovation.


Representing the sides Defending the motion Amar Bhidé   


Visiting Scholar, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
The techno-fetishist view of innovation and the kind of government support it demands fails to appreciate the enormous variety of innovations that we need.


Against the motion David Sandalow


Assistant Secretary for Policy and International Affairs, US Department of Energy
Governments spur innovation. Governments shape innovation. Many of the most important innovations in recent decades grew from the work of governments.


The moderator's opening remarks

Mar 22nd 2010 | Mr Vijay V. Vaitheeswaran  
What is the right role for government in spurring innovation? （这其实是辩论的真正题点）The outlines of this age-old debate will be familiar to many. One side argues that governments inevitably get it wrong when they get too involved in innovation: picking the wrong technology winners, say, or ploughing subsidies into politically popular projects rather than the most deserving ones. The other rebuts that given the grave global challenges we face today—in the 1960s America thought it was the Soviet race into space, today many countries worry about climate change and pandemic threats—governments need to do much more to support innovation.
Happily for us, gentle reader, the two sides in the Economist's latest debate are moving beyond such platitudes to novel arguments. Arguing in favour of the motion that innovation works best when government does least is Amar Bhide, a professor at Harvard and author of "The Venturesome Economy". His opening statement roundly denounces the visions of home-grown Silicon Valleys that dance in the heads of bureaucrats worldwide as "a dubious conception of paradise"(这句话太棒了！他的开篇陈述直接揭示出当今世界范围内许多官僚主义所抱有的“建造本国硅谷”的愿望是臆想的伊甸园). California's bloated government is bankrupt and Japan's once formidable MITI agency is in tatters,
（可以用作对政府干涉经济的不良作用的写作事例）he observes, but market-minded Hong Kong is flourishing (and its hyper-commercial denizens far richer than their coddled Japanese counterparts).
He adds for good measure that the "techno-fetishist" view of innovation represented by the top-heavy Japanese model pales in comparison with a robust, bottom-up version of innovation that harnesses the creativity and enterprise of the many, including the "venturesome consumers". 他另外还说到，被不稳固的日本模式所代表的技术崇拜革新观点在与强健而自底向上的革新观念——利用许多企业的创造性包括冒险主义客户的对比中显得逊色 He does acknowledge that governments have a role to play: "Doing the least doesn't mean doing nothing at all." However, his advocacy of a least is best policy, though conceptually elegant, seems a bit slippery and is probably unhelpful in practice. In future postings, perhaps he will explain how exactly governments should decide whether they are doing too little or too much to help innovation.
*（下面是对反方观点的总结）
David Sandalow, author of "Freedom from Oil" and a senior official in America's Department of Energy, presents a robust defence of government. He does make the familiar points about the need for governments to invest in education and fundamental research. He also adds slightly more controversial arguments about why government policies are required to overcome market failures (such as the recent financial crisis, which unfairly sapped innovators of credit) and misaligned incentives that hold back the adoption of worthwhile innovations (like energy-saving technologies with speedy paybacks).
More striking is Mr Sandalow's linkage of the global trend towards open innovation, which means companies increasingly rely on ideas from outside their own research laboratories, with the need for greater government spending on innovation. He argues that open innovation will get technologies faster to market, but at the expense of fundamental research of the sort that AT&T Bell Labs or Xerox Parc used to do. He insists that "without government support for such research, the seed corn for future generations would be at risk". That is a clever point, but it does not answer the obvious rebuttal that governments would inevitably invest in the wrong sorts of research (think, to stick with his analogy, of the money spent by the American government subsidising corn ethanol, an environmentally questionable but politically popular fuel).
Are you waiting for further rounds of jousting to decide which side to support? Don't be a mugwump, sitting on the fence with your mug in one hand and your wump on the other(天，用到了拆分词的手法，好棒啊). Cast your vote now.

词语注释：
subsidy
n.补贴, 津贴, 补助金
plough into
n.用犁把…犁入土中积极投入工作冲入; 冲到对…进行投资
platitude
n.陈词滥调
venturesome
adj.(人)好冒险的, 胆大的(行动)有危险的, 冒险(性)的
bureaucrat
n.官僚, 官僚主义者, 官僚作风的人
bloated
adj.膨胀的, 肿胀的得意忘形的
formidable
adj.可怕的, 令人畏惧的令人惊叹[钦佩]的难以克服[对付]的
coddle
vt.悉心照料, 娇惯
fetish
n.神物被盲目崇拜之物, 迷恋物〈心〉恋物
for good measure
n.额外的量, 外加的项目
top-heavy
adj.头重脚轻的,不稳定的
slippery
adj.光滑的; 滑溜的
misaligned
adj.线向不正的,方向偏离的,不重合的,未对准的
hold back
n.阻碍, 阻止控制; 抑制隐瞒, 保留犹豫不决
linkage
n.连接; 结合; 联系联动装置
subsidise
vt.给…津贴或补贴; 资助或补助…
ethanol
n.乙醇,酒精
joust
n.(骑士)骑着马用长矛打斗
vi.(骑士)骑马用长矛比武
mugwump
n.〈美〉(政治上的)超然派,骑墙派,(论争中的)中立者,大人物,首脑,(印第安人的)酋长
sit on the fence
v.骑墙,中立

elevenkarUID: 2791267

The proposer's opening remarks
Mar 22nd 2010 | Amar Bhidé

Innovation now attracts innumerable worshippers but their prayers are often quite narrow and sectarian. Silicon Valley or possibly the Israeli high-tech industry is the promised land: a wondrous combination of private high-tech enterprise underpinned by government-financed universities and research labs.
This is, alas, a dubious conception of paradise. For all the high-tech prowess
of Silicon Valley, the economy of California is on the edge of disaster. Unemployment in eight counties now tops 20% and the government pays its bills in IOUs. And in spite of its extraordinary concentration of scientific and engineering talent and entrepreneurship, Israel's GDP per head in 2009 was lower than of Cyprus, Greece and Slovenia.
Or remember Japan's omnipotent, visionary MITI working hand and glove with the likes of NEC, Hitachi and Fujitsu? Put aside fiascos such as the ten-year Fifth Generation Computer Systems Project, by standard measures the overall level of Japanese engineering and scientific performance, either because of or in spite of（哈哈，原来可以这样用，学到了） government subsidies, is impressive.
（用来证明政府对高新技术创新的高投资不带来高回报的NB反面例子） More tellingly, Hong Kong's GNP per head is nearly 30% higher than Japan's, 24% higher than Germany's and 505% higher than Israel's. Yet Hong Kong's government and private businesses pay scant attention to cutting-edge scientific and technological research.
（用来证明政府对高新技术创新的高投资不带来高回报的NB正面例子）
The techno-fetishist view of innovation and the kind of government support it demands fails to appreciate the enormous variety of innovations that we need.
The measure of a good economy lies in the satisfaction it provides to the many, not a few, not in the wealth or accomplishment of a few individuals or organisations. And these satisfactions go beyond the material or pecuniary rewards earned: they include, for instance, the exhilaration of overcoming challenges. Indeed they go hand in hand: a good economy cannot provide widespread prosperity without harnessing the creativity and enterprise of the many. All must have the opportunity to innovate, to try out new things: not just scientists and engineers but also graphic artists, shopfloor workers, salespersons and advertising agencies; not just the developers of new products but their venturesome consumers. The exceptional performance of a few high-tech businesses, as the Silicon Valley and Israeli examples show, is just not enough.（本段论点：某俩个冒尖儿的公司是不够的，评论好的经济是要全体性的）
This widely diffused, multifaceted form of innovation entails a circumscribed role for governments: they should not to put their finger on the scale bribing people to do basic research instead of, say, the kind of graphics design that has made Apple such an iconic company. Mandating more math and science in high schools when most of us never use trigonometry or calculus in our working lives takes away time from learning skills that are crucial in an innovative economy: how to listen and persuade, think independently and work collaboratively, for instance.（转到政府干涉大学课程的设置上来了）
Yes, there is a problem with global warming, but that is best solved by innumerable tinkerers taking their chances with renewable energy and resourceful conservation, not by throwing money at projects that a few savants have determined to be the most promising. The apparent duplication of autonomous initiative isn't a waste: no one can foretell what is going to work. Even the most successful venture-capital companies have more misses than hits. Therefore putting many independent experiments in play raises the odds that one will work. When government gets into the game of placing bets, for instance, on new battery technologies, innovators who don't have the savvy, credentials and connections with politicians or the scientific establishment are at a severe disadvantage. Yet history shows that it is often the nonconformist outsiders who play a pivotal role. Would Ed Roberts have been able to secure a government grant to build the world's first personal computer, a virtually useless toy when it was introduced in 1974?
Of course a government doing the least doesn't mean a government doing nothing at all. Moreover, the least is a moving and ever expanding target（学习**是在不断变化甚至扩大的目标
的用法）. The invention of the automobile, for example, necessitated driving rules and a system of vehicle inspections. The growth of air travel required a system to control traffic and certify the airworthiness of aircraft. Similarly, radio and television required a system to regulate the use of the airwaves.（需要政府干涉的三个好例子）
Modern technology created new forms of pollution that did not exist in agrarian economies. Governments had to step in, in one way or the other, to make it unrewarding to pollute. Likewise, antitrust laws to control commercial interactions and conduct emerged after new technologies created opportunities to realise economies of scale and scope—and realise oligopoly or monopoly profits. These opportunities were largely absent in pre-industrial economies.（承接上段，继续说咱们还是需要政府的。由于现在技术地影响，使得咱们更需要政府了：反托拉斯法中政府的必要性）
（下面几段就开始说关于“doing least”的度的问题了）But the principle of the least is best remains a true compass. New technologies not only create the need for desirable new rules, they but also generate more opportunities for unwarranted meddling and a cover for rent-seeking. It is one thing for the Federal Aviation Administration to manage the air traffic control system, quite another for the Civil Aeronautics Board (b. 1938, d. 1985) to regulate airfares, routes and schedules. The construction of the interstate highway system may have been a great boon to the US economy, for example, but it did not take long for Congress to start appropriating funds for bridges to nowhere.
Entrepreneurial leaps into the dark are best sustained by great caution in expanding the scope of government intervention; the private virtue of daring can be a public vice. The US chief justice has often repeated the maxim: "If it is not necessary to decide an issue to resolve a case, then it is necessary not to decide that issue." Similarly, if it is not necessary to intervene to promote innovation, it should be considered necessary not to intervene. The government should focus on things that private enterprise simply cannot provide and stay away from promoting activities that would allegedly be undersupplied. If nothing, this maxim frees up resources for crucial public goods. So traffic police, emission rules and carbon taxes: absolutely. Subsidising networks of hydrogen pumps and new engine or battery technologies: no thanks.

innumerable
adj.无数的, 数不清的
sectarian
adj.宗派的, 派系的
promised land
n.上帝允许给亚伯拉罕的地方;乐土,福地,希望之乡(来自《圣经》)
wondrous
adj.出色的; 完美的
underpin
vt.用砖石结构等从下面支撑(墙等); 加固(墙等)的基础为(论据、主张等)打下基础; 加强; 巩固
prowess
n.勇敢; 勇猛高超的技艺; 非凡的才能
omnipotent
adj.全能的, 权力无限的
visionary
adj.有眼光的, 有远见的空想的, 幻想的, 不切实际的
fiasco
n.彻底失败, 惨败
scant
adj.不足的; 缺乏的
pecuniary
adj.金钱的, 金钱上的
exhilaration
n.令人高兴,愉快
circumscribe
vt.在…周围画线划定…范围; 限制, 限定
mandate
n.(选民对选出的代表、议会等的)授权(上级官员对下级官员下达的)正式命令
vt.将(某地)委托某国管理授权(某人)根据委托统治权(做某事)
trigonometry
n.三角法
savant
n.博学之士, 学者, 专家
+foretell
vt.预言; 预示
pivotal
adj.作为支点的, 枢轴的中枢的, 关键的
necessitate
vt.使…成为必要, 需要
+airworthiness
n.耐飞性
agrarian
adj.农业的, 土产的
antitrust law
n.反独占法;反托拉斯法
oligopoly
n.求过于供的市场情况
monopoly profit
n.垄断[专卖]利润
meddle
vi.干涉, 干预(他人事务)
airfare
n.飞机票价
Civil Aeronautics Board
n.(美国)民间航空局;民用航空局
entrepreneur
n.〈法〉企业家主办人
maxim
n.格言; 座右铭

elevenkarUID: 2791267

The opposition's opening remarks
Mar 22nd 2010 | David Sandalow

Governments spur innovation. Governments shape innovation. Many of the most important innovations in recent decades grew from the work of governments.
In 1965, a US government employee named Bob Taylor had an idea about how computers could communicate. He took the idea to his boss Charles Herzfeld, head of the Pentagon's Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), who invested government funds in exploring it. That investment led to the ARPAnet and, in turn, to the internet, without which so many things (including this online debate) would not be possible.（这个例子举的很好的。证明政府资助的inovation起到的良好作用）
An isolated example? Hardly. Among the innovations that grew directly from government funding are the Google search engine, GPS devices, DNA mapping, inexpensive mass data storage and even Teflon. （一带而过的方法，证明确实有很多这样的例子）
Why is government important to innovation? First, because the private sector under invests in fundamental research. That is natural. Time horizons in many businesses are short. Few companies are in a position to capture benefits from fundamental research they might fund on their own.（说到点子上了！） In many fields; fundamental research requires resources available only to governments and the largest companies. As Professor Henry Chesbrough documents in his book "Open Innovation", the big corporate research labs of decades past have given way to more distributed approaches to innovation. That gets many technologies to market faster, but at the expense of fundamental research. Without government support for such research, the seed corn for future generations would be at risk.
Second, because innovation depends on an educated workforce, which is a job for governments. Biomedical research requires medical technicians. Energy research requires engineers. Computer research requires programmers. Although private companies often provide specialised training, an educated workforce is the essential starting point. Primary and secondary education is a vital precursor to much innovation. That is a job for governments everywhere. And universities play a central role, with training of promising young innovators often made possible by government funding.
Third, because market failures stifle innovative technologies. The recent financial crisis choked off capital for innovators. Without governments stepping in to provide backstop support, thousands of promising innovations would have been lost due to the unrelated vagaries of failing financial markets. There are many other examples. Lack of capital and information prevents homeowners from investing in energy-saving technologies with very short payback periods. Split incentives between architects, builders, landlords and tenants prevent widespread adoption of similar technologies in commercial buildings. Governments have a central role in overcoming these barriers, and more.
Fourth, because government policies and standards can lay a strong foundation for innovation. Last century, the United States benefited from government policies requiring near universal access to electricity and telephone services, laying the groundwork for a vibrant consumer electronics industry. This century, Finland and Korea (among others) are benefiting from government policies to promote broadband access, helping position each country for global leadership in a vast global market. New technologies require standards that allow them to operate within larger systems. The NTSC television broadcast standard, 110V AC current and FHA housing loans, to pick just three examples, each helped market actors coordinate, encouraging innovation. Or consider Israel, which has a teeming innovation culture in which the Israeli government plays a central role, providing the foundation for startups that commercialise civilian uses of military technologies in materials, semiconductors, medical devices and communications.
Finally, because governments help make sure innovation delivers public benefits. Not all innovation is good. Collateralised debt obligations were an important financial innovation. Yet as the recent financial crisis demonstrated, financial markets cannot be relied upon to self-regulate innovation. As government encourages and promotes innovation, it also has a role in guiding it.
In the academic literature on innovation, the number of patents issued in a country is often used as a proxy for the rate of innovation. Patents are, of course, issued by governments. As this suggests, governments play a central role in innovation. （这段的逻辑我没搞懂。怎么大学文献记录就能推出政府引导革新了呢？）
In his inaugural address, President Obama said, "The question we ask today is not whether our government is too big or too small, but whether it works…" That should guide us in thinking about this motion. The notion that "Innovation works best when government does least" is simplistic and wrong. There may be instances in which government meddling chokes off innovation. (Past US government restrictions on stem cell research come to mind.) Yet governments can and do play a central role in spurring innovation and making sure innovation delivers benefits. We should embrace government's role in innovation, always seeking to refine and improve it, not diminish it with broad generalities.

Teflon
n.特氟纶，聚四氟乙烯（商标名称）
time horizon
n.时间范围
precursor
n.先驱; 先行者; 先兆, 前兆初期形式
stifle
vt.镇压; 遏制
vt. & vi.(使)窒息; (使)窒闷
choke off
n.中止做; 使放弃做批评; 责备
backstop
n.守场员, 外场手守场员(接手)的位置增援, 加强
vagary
n.异常行为; 难以预测的情况
broadband
n.宽带
teeming
adj.丰富的
semiconductor
n.〈物〉半导体
collateral
adj.相关的
n.附属担保品，不动产
proxy
n.代表权; 代理权(尤指投票)代理人, 代表
patent
adj.专利的, 特评的公开的, 明显的
n.专利, 专利权专利品
vt.获得…专利, 给予…专利权
inaugural
#adj.就职的, 就任的
generality
n.概括性的话一般性, 通(用)性概括性, 笼统性大多数, 主要部分

elevenkarUID: 2791267

Climate-change politics
Cap-and-trade's last hurrah
The decline of a once wildly popular idea
Mar 18th 2010 | From The Economist print edition
Gaia lent an unhelpful hand
IN THE 1990s cap-and-trade—the idea of reducing carbon-dioxide emissions by auctioning off a set number of pollution permits, which could then be traded in a market—was the darling of the green policy circuit. A similar approach to sulphur dioxide emissions, introduced under the 1990 Clean Air Act, was credited with having helped solve acid-rain problems quickly and cheaply. And its great advantage was that it hardly looked like a tax at all, though it would bring in a lot of money.
The cap-and-trade provision expected in the climate legislation that Senators John Kerry, Joe Lieberman and Lindsey Graham have been working on, which may be unveiled shortly, will be a poor shadow of that once alluring idea. Cap-and-trade will not be the centrepiece of the legislation (as it was of last year’s House climate bill, Waxman-Markey), but is instead likely to apply only to electrical utilities, at least for the time being. Transport fuels will probably be approached with some sort of tax or fee; industrial emissions will be tackled with regulation and possibly, later on, carbon trading. The hope will be to cobble together cuts in emissions similar in scope to those foreseen under the House bill, in which the vast majority of domestic cuts in emissions came from utilities.
This composite approach is necessary because the charms of economy-wide cap-and-trade have faded badly. The ability to raise money from industry is not so attractive in a downturn. Market mechanisms have lost their appeal as a result of the financial crisis. More generally, climate is not something the public seems to feel strongly about at the moment, in part because of that recession, in part perhaps because they have worries about the science (see article), in part, it appears, because the winter has been a snowy one.
The public is, though, quite keen on new initiatives on energy, which any Senate bill will shower with incentives and subsidies whether the energy in question be renewable, nuclear, pumped out from beneath the seabed or still confined to research laboratories. So the bill will need to raise money, which is why cap-and-trade is likely to remain for the utilities, and revenues will be raised from transport fuels. A complex way of doing this, called a linked fee, would tie the revenues to the value of carbon in the utility market; a straightforward carbon tax may actually have a better chance of passing.
Energy bills have in the past garnered bipartisan support, and this one also needs to. That is why Senator Graham matters. He could bring on board both Democrats and Republicans. Mr Graham’s contribution has been to focus the rhetoric not just on near-term jobs, but also on longer-term competitiveness. Every day America does not have climate legislation, he argues, is a day that China’s grip on the global green economy gets tighter（美国一日没有气候法案，中国就在把全球旅社经济抓得更紧？啥意思）.
He also thinks action on the issue would be good for his party. While short-term Republican interests call for opposition, the party’s long-term interests must include broadening its support. Among young people, for example, polling suggests that the environment, and the climate, matter a great deal.
Unfortunately for this argument, tactics matter, and young voters are unlikely to play a great role in the mid-term election. Other Republicans may think it better to wait before re-establishing the party’s green credentials. Lisa Murkowski of Alaska, for example, is happy to talk about climate as a problem, and talks about the desirability of some sort of carbon restriction—perhaps a tax, or some version of Maria Cantwell’s “cap-and-dividend” scheme. But she expresses no great urgency about the subject. And she has introduced one of two measures intended to curtail the power the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) now has to regulate carbon, on the ground that that is a matter for legislation sometime in the future.
The EPA’s new powers undoubtedly make the charms of legislation greater. Some industrial lobbies may decide that the bill will provide the certainty they need to decide about future investment, and get behind it. The White House has been supportive of late, inviting senators over to talk. But it remains an uphill struggle, and the use of reconciliation to pass health care could greatly increase the gradient of the hill, as Mr Graham has made abundantly clear.
If the bill does not pass, it will change environmental politics in America and beyond. The large, comparatively business-friendly environmental groups that have been proponents of trading schemes will lose ground, with organisations closer to the grassroots, and perhaps with a taste for civil disobedience, gaining power. Carbon-trading schemes elsewhere in the world have already been deprived of a vast new market—Waxman-Markey, now dead, would have seen a great many carbon credits bought in from overseas—and if America turned away from cap-and-trade altogether they would look even less transformative than they do today. And as market-based approaches lose relevance, what climate action continues may come to lean more heavily on the command-and-control techniques they were intended to replace.

senator
n.参议员
alluring
adj.诱惑的, 迷人的
centrepiece
n.置于桌子中央的装饰品(尤指鲜花)(整体中)最引人注目的部分
utilities
n.公用工程
composite
adj.混合成的, 综合成的
mechanism
n.机械装置构造, 机制办法, 技巧, 途径
senate
n.参议院, 上院
pump out
n.抽空
garner
vt.收集并(通常)贮藏(某物)
bipartisan
adj.两党的; 代表两党的
rhetoric
n.雄辩言辞, 虚夸的言辞修辞学
polling
n.投票
credentials
n.资格证书; 国书(任何证明人的能力、资格等的)证书; 资格
dividend
n.红利, 股息被除数
curtail
vt.截断, 缩短
lobby
n.前厅, 厅堂议会休息室游说议员的团体
vt. & vi.向…进行游说[疏通]
uphill
adj.上坡的; 向上的困难的; 费力的
adv.上坡
gradient
n.道路的斜度, 坡度变化程度
proponent
n.(某事业、理论等的)支持者, 拥护者
grassroots
n.基层；基层民众
lean
adj.瘦的; 少脂肪的贫瘠的; 收益差的
vt.倚, 靠; 依赖
vt. & vi.(使)倾斜, 屈身

elevenkarUID: 2791267

Attack of the really quite likeable tomatoes
The success of genetically modified crops provides opportunities to win over their critics
Feb 25th 2010 | From The Economist print edition

IN THE 14 years since the first genetically modified crops were planted commercially, their descendants, relatives and remixes have gone forth and multiplied like profitable, high-tech pondweed. A new report (see article) shows that 25 countries now grow GM crops, with the total area under cultivation now larger than Peru. Three-quarters of the farmland used to grow soya is now sown with a genetically modified variant, and the figures for cotton are not that far behind, thanks to its success in India. China recently gave the safety go-ahead to its first GM rice variety and a new GM maize that should make better pig feed. More and more plants are having their genomes sequenced: a full sequence for maize was published late last year, the soya genome in January. Techniques for altering genomes are moving ahead almost as fast as the genomes themselves are stacking up, and new crops with more than one added trait are coming to market.
Such stories of success will strike fear into some hearts, and not only in GM-averse Europe; a GM backlash is under way in India, focused on insect-resistant aubergines. Some of these fears are understandable, but lacking supporting evidence they have never been compelling. On safety, the fear which cuts closest to home, the record continues to look good. Governments need to keep testing and monitoring, but that may be becoming easier. More precise modifications, and better technologies for monitoring stray DNA both within plants and in the environment around them, mean that it is getting easier to be sure that nothing untoward is going on.
Then there is the worry that GM crops are a way for big companies to take over the livelihoods of small farmers and, in the end, a chunk of nature itself. Seen in this light the fact that 90% of the farmers growing GM crops are comparatively poor and in developing countries is sinister, not salutary; given Monsanto’s dominance in America’s soyabean market, it seems to suggest incipient world domination. It is certainly true that big firms make a lot of money selling GM seeds: the GM seed market was worth $10.5 billion in 2009, and the crops that grew from that seed were worth over $130 billion. But multinationals are not the only game in town. The governments of China (which has increased agricultural research across the board), India and Brazil are also developing new GM crops. In 2009 a GM version of an Indian cotton variety, developed in the public sector, came to market, and a variety engineered by a private Indian firm has been approved for commercialisation. Charities, such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, are also funding efforts in various countries to make crops more hardy or nutritious. GM seeds that come from government research bodies, or from local firms, may not arouse quite so much opposition as those from large foreign companies, especially when they provide characteristics that make crops better, not just easier to farm.
Moreover, where the seeds come from is a separate question from who should pay for them, as Mr Gates points out. As with drugs and vaccines, it is possible to get products that were developed with profit in mind to the people who need them using donor money and clever pricing and licensing deals. In the longer term, if the seeds deliver what the farmers require, the need for such special measures should diminish. After all, the whole idea is not that poor farmers should go on being poor. It is that poor farmers should get a bit richer, be able to invest a bit more, and thus increase the food available to a growing and predominantly urban population.
More than strange fruits
There is another worry about GM technology, though, that should be taken seriously. It is that its success and appeal to technophiles may, in the minds of those who pay for agricultural research, crowd out other approaches to improving farming. Because it depends on intellectual property that can be protected, GM is ripe for private investment. There is a lot of other agricultural research that is less amenable to corporate ownership but still needs doing. From soil management to weather forecasts to the preservation, study and use of agricultural biodiversity, there are many ways to improve the agricultural systems on which the world’s food supply depends, and make them more resilient as well as more profitable. A farm is not a just a clever crop: it is an ecosystem managed with intelligence. GM crops have a great role to play in that development, but they are only a part of the whole.
likeable
adj.可爱的,令人喜爱的
genetically modified
n.转基因的
remix
vt.使再混合,再搅拌
soya
n.〈英〉大豆,黄豆
sown
n.sow的过去分词
maize
n.玉米
genome
n.基因组,染色体组
stacking up
n.堆垛
trait
n.人的个性, 显著的特点, 特征
backlash
n.强烈反应, 对抗性反应后冲, 反撞; 后坐力
aubergine
n.茄子,(茄子般的)紫红色
livelihood
n.生计,谋生
chunk
n.厚厚的一块(某物)相当大的数量或部分
sinister
adj.危险的, 不吉祥的, 凶兆的, 险恶的
salutary
adj.有益的, 效果好的
incipient
adj.开始的, 初期的
multinational
adj.多国的
n.跨国公司
vaccine
n.疫苗; 痘苗
donor
n.捐赠者, 赠与者
licensing
n.许可证发放
technophile
n.技术爱好者
ripe for
n.时机成熟, 准备就绪
be amenable to
v.有义务,顺从,经得起检验

elevenkarUID: 2791267

第一次debate作业（2）
Rebuttal
The moderator's rebuttal remarks
Mar 24th 2010 | Mr Vijay V. Vaitheeswaran  
Our online debate on the role of government in fostering innovation is off to a fiery start. Both sides are now offering their rebuttals, and, despite minor gestures ofconciliation,it is clear that neither debater is really willing to concede much ground.（两方都不愿意妥协的很好说法）
Amar Bhidé, arguing in favour of the proposition, takes on the favourite example offered up in defence of government funding of innovation: the creation of ARPAnet, the precursor to today's internet. Yes, he accepts, government funding did play an essential role in this example. But he then points to Minitel, a French government network that also had grand ambitions, cost billions but ultimately proved a turkey. Indeed, it held France back from embracing the internet, the obvious winner of that technology race. "Should we have a few decision makers with no skin in the game（不能很好的理解） placing bets on their favoured technologies rather than many independent innovators staking their time and money?", he asks.
Arguing against the proposition, David Sandalow offers a robust defence of government's role in fostering innovation. It is not only classical governmental functions such as patent protection, education and basic research that he defends. He takes on the charge that government must not pick technology winners, insisting that the American government's efforts to spur investments in battery technology are justified in part because of the externalities associated with energy use are not recognised by the market framework. Not only is government intervention required to internalise those social costs, he insists, but only can the wise hand of the state "guide innovation toward socially beneficial purposes".
The battle lines are drawn. Our combatants are intellectually clear on their differences, and not afraid to attack the other side's weaknesses. Which side do you believe has the upper hand? Cast your vote now.
The proposer's rebuttal remarks
Amar Bhidé
Mr Sandalow's assertion that Google's search engine "grew directly from government funding" is puzzling. I was once a satisfied user of Alta Vista search. In 1999 I switched to Google mainly because its interface was much cleaner and to some degree its results were better related to my queries. In what way did the government fund the idea of the cleaner interface? And as my friend Jim Manzi, a contributing editor at National Review, and a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute puts it, which Federal Department of Critical Insight caused Google co-founders, Larry Page and Sergey Brin to think about the "page rank" algorithm?
The Google case in fact underlines the importance of decentralised innovation that is not directed by the government. Alta Vista was on the surface a perfectly satisfactory search engine. Two graduate students figured out on their own how to make it better in aesthetic and non-technical ways without having to curry favour with funding agencies.
Mr Sandalow is on firmer ground in pointing out that the internet evolved from the Pentagon-funded ARPAnet. But think of France's grand Minitel scheme. Starting in 1982, the state-owned telephone company gave away millions of free Minitel terminals, which could be used to make online purchases and train reservations, trade stocks, look up phone numbers and chat. Just like the internet. Except it wasn't quite as good or versatile. Worse, Minitel held back the adoption of the internet and France's entry into the information age, as Lionel Jospin, French prime minister, pointed out in 1997. Yet by then Minitel had acquired a life of its own: in 2000 France Telecom poured money as never before into a publicity campaign to promote a service widely recognised to be obsolete.
What accounts for the difference between the success of the internet and the failure of Minitel? It seems unlikely that it is because the French are worse at managing large publicly funded projects. Compared with the Train à Grande Vitesse (TGV), Amtrak's Acela is a bad dream.
It could be bad luck, since all innovative projects are a gamble. But then do we want the government to be gambling with taxpayers' money? Should we have a few decision-makers with no skin in the game placing bets on their favoured technologies rather than many independent innovators staking their time and money on a chance that their offering will beat the status quo?
The difference between ARPAnet's and Minitel's ambitions also is noteworthy. ARPAnet was not a grandiose scheme to create a ubiquitous national network. Rather the project involved a small number of players and was undertaken to advance the Pentagon's mission. Very likely this helped limit the risks of overreach.
Now of course the Pentagon's mission of ensuring national security is vital and cannot be outsourced to private enterprise. And technology is a paramount ingredient of modern defence. It is inevitable, therefore, that the Pentagon is an important high-tech buyer and (like any large customer) helps shape the new technologies it wants. Which is as it should be, and not at all inconsistent with the principle of limited government. Conversely debacles like Minitel are likely to occur when governmental bodies go beyond their assigned, essential roles.
And although ARPAnet's contribution was valuable, it is far from certain that without Pentagon funding, there would have been no internet. The telephone network was in its time every bit as revolutionary. Yet Alexander Bell invented the telephone and Theodore Vail created a nearly universal nationwide network with no military or other developmental grants. Similarly Thomas Edison became the most prodigious inventor in American history without a receiving penny in research subsidies.
History also shows that unlike say national defence or air traffic control, a significant governmental role is not essential even for fundamental research. Revolutionary advances occurred even when government funding for scientific research was minimal. Darwin's research on evolution, Michael Faraday's work on electromagnetism and electro-chemistry, Newton's discoveries of calculus and the laws of motion were all done without government grants. In 1905 Albert Einstein produced four path-breaking papers—on the photoelectric effect, Brownian motion, special relativity and the equivalence of matter and energy—while employed as an examiner at the Swiss patent office.
A common argument made in favour of government subsidies for fundamental research is that contributions that the likes or Darwin, Faraday, Newton and Einstein might make on their own are not enough. Mr Sandalow asserts, for instance, that the private sector naturally under-invests in fundamental research because profit-seeking businesses cannot fully capture the returns. First off, the private sector is not all for-profit. A great deal of basic research is done through private resources (such as foundations) that do not seek to maximise financial return.
And who is to say how much and what kind of investment in basic research is right? There is a vast range of valuable knowledge whose returns accrue more to society as a whole than to the producers of the knowledge. In medicine, creating routines to ensure that surgeons wash their hands before they operate is no less valuable a public good than decoding the genome. IBM's development of a professional sales process, which was then adopted throughout the high-tech industry, was as vital to the diffusion of information technology as the discovery of the transistor principle. Virtually every day I turn to the internet to learn about how to solve computer problems that other users have discovered and share it at no charge.
Of course these different kinds of knowledge are rarely perfectly in balance. Sometimes fundamental science runs ahead of concrete user-generated knowledge, for instance, and sometimes it is the other way round. But that is not an argument for turning to government. If the brightest and the best economists at the Fed continue to assert that a large nationwide housing bubble was unrecognisable, which government agency can we charge with identifying and correcting these subtle knowledge imbalances? Why not trust the autonomous, competing judgements of for- and not-for profit innovators seeking fame, fortune or excitement while the government focuses on those activities that only it can perform?

The opposition's rebuttal remarksDavid Sandalow
In his defence of the notion that government should do "least", Amar Bhidé states his support for carbon taxes, emissions rules, pollution rules more broadly, vehicle inspections, air traffic control, aircraft certification, spectrum regulation and antitrust laws. He notes that construction of the US interstate highway system (one of the largest government projects of modern times by some metrics) was a boon to the US economy.
Professor Bhidé and I have common ground.
We have disagreements, to be sure, which I will come to in a moment. But before doing so, it is worth pausing for a moment on the motion, which asks whether "innovation works best when government does least". I applaud Professor Bhidé's recognition of the many benefits government provides, yet note that this might be seen to sit oddly with his call for minimal government.
In fact this is quite typical. Words criticising government seem often to be combined with grateful acceptance of government services. In the United States, this regular part of the political dialogue may have reached its zenith last summer when a man at a town hall meeting in South Carolina told his Congressman to "keep your government hands off my Medicare". Now to be 100% clear, I am not ascribing such views or confusion to Professor Bhidé. But I note that—especially in the United States—there is a deep cultural tendency to denigrate government even as government's many benefits are routinely enjoyed.
This is not harmless. When government is repeatedly cast as the problem without celebrating its many contributions, support for government erodes. Over time, the ability of government to deliver benefits withers. Services that are best or even uniquely provided by government are abandoned. California's public schools, for example, have slid in the past several decades from one of the nation's best to among its worst, the victim of severe limits on the ability of local governments in the state to raise funds for this classic governmental function.
This brings us to Professor Bhidé's argument. He notes that, despite Silicon Valley's high-tech prowess, "the State of California pays its bills in IOUs.” Well, yes, but not because Silicon Valley entrepreneurs failed to create jobs or improve the quality of life, but because state laws limiting the ability of the people of California to fund their government collided with a deep recession and expectations from those same people for continued government services.
Professor Bhidé is on equally shaky ground in his assertions regarding Israel (often praised for its innovation culture) and neighbouring countries. He is wrong in asserting that GDP per head in Israel is lower than in Cyprus or Slovenia, at least according to WTO figures. But more to the point, innovation is of course just one determinant of GDP.
Countries have different comparative advantages, including location, resource wealth and stable legal systems. They may (and often do) adopt growth-limiting policies unrelated to innovation. After flourishing in the 1980s thanks in part to innovations in its manufacturing sector, Japan floundered in the 1990s due in part to problems in its financial sector. Yet the benefits of those innovations were still very real.
A substantial body of economic literature demonstrates that innovation is correlated with GDP growth. Indeed for his work on this topic, Robert Solow won the Nobel Prize. Solow's work suggests that innovation is more important to GDP growth than capital accumulation or increases in the labour market. If governments have it within their power to enhance the rate of innovation, the benefits of doing so would be huge.
And they do. Classic government functions such as basic research, education and patent protection are central to innovation. Would innovation "work best" with less of such things? Quite the contrary.
Government funding of basic research led to the creation of the internet, one of the greatest sources of innovation of all time. Government funding led to DNA mapping, a breakthrough revolutionising medicine. Government funding led to countless other advances in decades past, and could lead to many more in decades to come. Yet that will depend on adequate budgets. It will depend, crucially, on political support. It will depend on government doing more than the "least" to support innovation.
In his essay, Professor Bhidé takes particular aim at government funding for batteries. In one respect, this is tangential to the main argument. One could easily believe that government programmes to promote development and deployment of advanced batteries are misguided, yet agree that innovation overall deserves strong government support. But I happen to believe there is a strong case for government work on batteries, so will take this opportunity to explain why.
Modern energy systems are in many ways a marvel. Yet they impose social costs, which could be reduced by cutting pollution from electricity generation and diversifying the fuel mix in vehicles. Better energy storage technologies would help with both objectives.（现代能源系统在很多方面都是一个奇迹。虽然它带来社会支出，但这个支出是可以通过减少发电污染和多样化机车燃料而减少的。更好的能源储备技术将对以上两个项目有益）
Solar and wind power, for example, can help cut pollution. Yet those technologies are limited by their intermittency: they produce no power when the wind stops blowing or day turns to night. Advances in energy storage could help overcome these problems.
Electric vehicles can help diversify the fuel mix in transport. Yet their advance is limited by high costs and short driving range. Better batteries are the solution.
Government could simply stand back, letting the market decide whether to invest in advances in energy storage. But the market does not recognise the social costs from pollution. It won't fund basic research in adequate amounts. It won't educate children and university students, who form the next generation of innovators. Government is essential to overcome these problems—and more.
What is government's role? To fund basic research. To educate the citizenry. To establish patent protection, helping ensure adequate incentives for invention. To set the regulatory framework, so externalities such as those created by pollution are incorporated into market decisions. To help technologies facing sunk-cost competitors get to market. To guide innovation toward socially beneficial purposes.
For innovation to work best, government needs to do much more than the "least". It must bring its many strengths to the field of play. We should recognise and embrace government's role in innovation.
fiery
adj.燃烧的; 火似的; 火热的激烈的, 易怒的, 暴躁的
conciliation
n.抚慰, 调节
precursor
n.先驱; 先行者; 先兆, 前兆初期形式
externalities
n.外部经济效果
internalise
v.使成为主观
algorithm
n.运算法则
underline
vt.在…下面画线加强, 强调
decentralise
vt. & vi.权力下放; 将(权力等)自中央政府转到地方政府将(工业、工人等)自集中点分散到较大的区域内
curry favour
n.求宠(于人),拍(人)马屁
curry   n. 咖喱食品
vt. 1 用咖喱粉烹调(食物)2 梳刷(马匹)3 讨好； 奉承； 拍某人的马屁
firm ground
n.坚实地面;稳定地基;稳固岩层
minitel
n.可视图文小型终端
status quo
n.现状
noteworthy
adj.值得注意的; 显著的; 重要的
grandiose
adj.庄严的, 壮观的浮夸的, 做作的
overreach
v.走过头;延伸过远,(马)以后蹄踢前蹄
outsource
vt.①外购(指从外国供应商等处获得货物或服务)②外包(工程)
paramount
adj.最高的, 至上的; 首要的, 主要的
ingredient
n.(混合物的)组成部分; 配料
debacle
n.崩溃,溃裂
conversely
adv.相反地, 颠倒地
prodigious
adj.异常的, 惊人的, 奇异的; 巨大的
+subsidy
n.补贴, 津贴, 补助金
accrue
vi.增加, 增长
surgeon
n.外科医生
sales
adj.销售的, 推销的
subtle
adj.微妙的; 难以捉摸的; 细微的狡猾的, 狡诈的敏感的, 敏锐的, 有辨别力的
denigrate
vt.〈正〉诋毁, 诽谤
determinant
adj.决定物的; 决定因素的
n.决定物; 决定因素
ground
n.地面地域, 水域场地建筑物四周的土地或花园; 庭园泥土, 土地理由
vt.将…放在地上
vt. & vi.搁浅; 停飞
flounder
vi.(常指在水中)挣扎
comparative advantage
n.相对优势
correlate with
n.(使)相同于, 符合于, 接近于把…联系起来
tangential
adj.间接相关的; 次要的; 外围的; 略为触及题目的漫射开去的, 表现出分歧的(几何中的)切线的
intermittency
n.间歇现象;间歇性
sunk cost
n.沉入成本,已支付成本,隐没成本
regulatory framework
n.规章制度

elevenkarUID: 2791267

第一次debate作业（3）
Comments from the floor.John Kao  
The proposition on the table carries for me some of the flavour of a medieval theological debate. On the one extreme are those who invoke an invisible market hand that should rule and generate innovations free of interference from government. On the other hand are those who look to knowledgeable, action-oriented government stakeholders to address every one of society's ills.
The truth as always lies somewhere in the middle. And to get at the truth, it is important to distinguish between what I would call a dictionary or enterprise definition of innovation, creativity applied to a purpose to realise value, and what I have recently taken to call "large-scale" innovation, new sources of societal value that emerge from the blended capabilities of public, private and NGO sectors as well as civil society.
We would not want government telling the inventor in their garage what to do (the enterprise model of innovation). However, in my view, government cannot help being involved in innovation at a large scale. In every country I am aware of, government regulates health care, provides for the national defence, influences education policy and pursues societal moonshots—both literally and figuratively.
As an example, a national security agenda taken as a whole requires continuous innovation (we need to be smarter/faster than the other guy). Yet simply picking over the fruits of invisible-hand, market-driven innovation might not have led to the development of stealth technology, Kevlar or even the internet, all fruits from the efforts of DARPA, the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency.
The case of DARPA, which is a part of the US federal government, is instructive because its purpose is to champion the kind of long-range, higher-risk innovation initiatives that might lead to game-changers. One assumption at the heart of DARPA's raison d'etre is that the government mainstream, left entirely to its own devices, might not generate relevant innovation for a variety of reasons (bureaucracy, speed or lack thereof, lack of early-stage funding, inability to go outside its own mindset). The other guiding assumption behind DARPA is that some kind of transmission system with seed investment and talent-scouting capability is needed to identify and bridge with promising technologies and talents outside the national security community.
My larger point should now be clear. Government has an inevitable role in shaping innovation. At the same time, we would
be right not to trust omniscient technocrats who believe they are the sole arbiters of what is worth putting on the agenda. Top-down, ivory-tower government is not what I am talking about: it is government's role in innovation. Modern history is replete with expensive examples of how governments have got it wrong. Think Japan and supercomputers, for example.
I believe that government's appropriate role in innovation is rather as a catalyst, a platform and a convener to enable collaboration among a range of stakeholders from the public, private, NGO and societal sectors. The advent of web 2.0 is a great enabler in fostering such collaboration with multiple vectors: bottom up, top down, inside out, outside in. Government also has a role in identifying the purposes to which innovation should be applied, creating the strategy for addressing them and providing resources as needed. And this, parenthetically, is why it is important for America to have a national innovation strategy, not as a warmed up, top-down version of industrial policy, but as a living, breathing strategic conversation among stakeholders to determine priorities, generate road maps and requirements, and create accountability.
The final point about government's inevitable role in innovation again returns to the optics of the large scale. Many of today's emerging waves of innovation—synthetic biology, alternative energy, health care informatics—will not be addressed by a few Silicon Valley venture capitalists making a few $5 million investments in the ventures of a few passionate entrepreneurs. Rather, they require bets of considerable size across a spectrum of opportunity. This is particularly true when one thinks about a next generation of societal services—health care and education, for example—that consume a significant portion of GDP and that require societal capabilities for prototyping and experimentation, research funding, large amounts of risk capital, human capital strategies and an enabling regulatory environment to progress. Government is everywhere to be seen in this picture, but as a partner, not a dictator.
flavour
n.味; 味道特色, 特性, 气氛
vt.(加入香料、调味品等)给(某物)调味
medieval
adj.中古的, 中世纪的
invoke
vt.援引, 援用; 行使(权利等)祈求救助恳求; 乞求
civil society
n.民权社会
figuratively
adv.比喻地,象征性地
literally
adv.逐字地; 照字面地确实地, 真正地
continuous innovation
n.连续创新
fruits
n.成果
stealth technology
instructive
adj.有益的, 供给知识的, 教育的
mainstream
n.(思想或行为的)主流
talent scout
n.人才发掘者
raison d'etre
n.〈法〉存在的目的或理由
omniscient
adj.无所不知的
top-down
adj.组织管理严密的
ivory tower
n.象牙塔,脱离实际的小天地
replete
adj.饱食的充满的, 供应充足的
catalyst
n.〈化〉催化剂, 触媒促进因素; 有感染力的人, 能激发对方的人
platform
n.台, 平台, 讲台, 舞台, 戏台站台, 月台纲领; 政纲; 宣言
convener
n.会议召集人
NGO
民间团体
parenthetic
adj.插句的,附加说明的
synthetic
adj.合成的, 人造的〈口〉假的, 非天然的; 虚伪的
n.合成物, 合成纤维
informatics
n.信息学,情报学
dictator
n.独裁者, 专制者

whiteoutUID: 2699068

赞啊~把单词和词组单独拿出来列在后面  看起来又方便又清晰~~

佩服佩服~~好认真！

elevenkarUID: 2791267

第一次debate（4）

Closing

The moderator's closing remarks
Mr Vijay V. Vaitheeswaran  
Our debate on the government's role in innovation is drawing to a close, and it is running neck and neck. The side in favour of the motion started off on the back foot, but has gained enough ground to keep this an unusually close affair. The side opposite has lost a bit of the initial starting advantage, but remains just as well positioned to pass the post first. （不懂）Both debaters have ginned up their final arguments in hopes of emerging the winner.
Amar Bhidé, arguing in favour of the proposition, insists that "a minimising, no more than necessary standard, is crucial in maintaining widespread, decentralised innovation". He brings out the big guns, invoking the hero of free marketers ("Friedrich Hayek pinpointed why centralised control was an economic dead end") and the bête noire of freedom during the last century (the Soviet Union). Quirkily, he also takes aim again at the side opposite's support for advanced battery technologies, demanding to know when his uber-green bicycle is going to earn him government subsidies.
Arguing against the motion, David Sandalow offers a closing statement that is sure to please fans of government-supported innovation. With as much gusto as his rival mustered up for attacking batteries, he jumps on the Google example cited earlier by his opponent. Mr Sandalow goes back to original writings by the founders of the firm to show that, in fact, this paragon of seeming free-market virtue in fact got government money from several sources during its early uncertain days. Government, he insists, "has unique capabilities and a full toolbox for helping spur the innovative process". It must, he suggests, steer money towards innovations that serve social goals.
The hour is late, but the clouds have cleared. You must now choose which good guru you will follow on the innovation trail. Cast your vote now, as this debate promises to be a nail biter.
neck and neck
n.并驾齐驱
start off
n.开始旅行以…开始迅速跑开
quirkily
adv.诡诈地,离奇地
gusto
n.热情, 乐趣, 津津有味
rival
n.竞争对手
vt.与…竞争, 与…匹敌
muster up
n.召集; 振作
paragon
n.模范
steer towards
n.驾(船)驶向…把…引向…

The proposer's closing remarks
Amar Bhidé
Minimal government does not equal no government or even government of unchanging size. New technologies, as I argued in my opening statement, often demand new rules. Nevertheless, a minimising, no more than necessary standard, is crucial in maintaining the widespread, decentralised innovation that undergirds our prosperity.
Many who oppose the standard, such as David Sandalow, seem to argue that if some government is good then a lot must be great. For instance, they extrapolate from the value of the government's role in providing a high-quality basic education for all to demand tax subsidies for the advanced training of a few in fields that they somehow know will have large social returns.
They see no evidence of governmental overreach in California's soaring unemployment and empty public coffers. California's government does not spend too much or do too much; it is just pesky laws passed by ornery voters that prevent it from raising the taxes it needs, suggests Mr Sandalow.（哈哈，好有型，米国人就是大胆哈 敢这么写）
But if California has it right, then governments in most other states must be too small. Why then has California chronically lagged behind in employment and income growth, long before the current crisis?
The current crisis itself owes much to governmental overreach. Politicians from both parties used the tax code and loan guarantees to pump up the construction industry and housing prices, drawing resources away from innovators in other sectors and turning those who could not afford it into reckless speculators. The boom was channelled through securities issued by two governmental agencies, marginalising traditional decentralised lending by loan officers.
Nearly 70 years ago, Friedrich Hayek pinpointed why centralised control was an economic dead-end. The decision of what to plant and when was best left to farmers who knew their soil and local weather conditions. The best judge of the product mix of an industrial enterprise was the person who was in constant touch with customers. Central planners who thought they knew better, didn't. Indeed the inability of planners to match the supply and demand for the most basic goods helped bring down the Soviet Union.
Now comes the alternative energy and battery brigade, which is confident that it can make top-down plans work with advanced and dynamic technologies. Mr Sandalow, for instance, has offered a detailed plan to end the United States' oil addiction. This is certainly a worthwhile goal both on national security grounds and in light of the grave risks of global warming. The plan sensibly proposes a gasoline/petrol tax. Unfortunately it does not stop there; that would be too minimalistic. The plan, for instance, proposes an $8,000 tax credit for buying plug-in hybrids, a ten-year extension of the ethanol tax credit and (truly) a federal battery guarantee corporation, which would underwrite insurance on batteries used in hybrid vehicles.
Now plug-in hybrids have become popular in recent years—Mr Sandalow reportedly owns one too—but before that few experts thought they held any promise. All-electric was supposed to be the technology of the future. The auto industry more or less stumbled into hybrids by chance. And who can tell whether plug-ins are really the answer? Could they be like Alta Vista's search engine to some Google-like technology that a couple of graduate students might be hacking away on? And if we don't know, why entrench plug-ins?
What about my favoured form of transportation, bicycles? They are even greener than plug-in hybrids, especially the old-fashioned non-battery-enhanced kind. A tax credit would increase ridership (and I would trade in my clunker). Better tyre and gear technologies and bicycle pumps might help too, so why not subsidise that research?
There is in fact no limit to the number of ways in which individuals and businesses could reduce the consumption of fossil fuels: reducing commuting distances, smaller homes, better insulation, sweaters and solar panels to name just a few. In the minimalist view, what we need is a simple, even-handed incentive, such as a gasoline/petrol or carbon tax, leaving specific choices to those best positioned to make them. Setting up a Soviet-style apparatus to select and promote a particular set of solutions is not the answer.
And more than technical efficiency, the right mix of energy conservation choices is at stake.
The government has a unique capacity to demand compliance. We must all pay taxes, send our children to school and obey traffic laws. Preserving the legitimacy of its coercive powers, however, requires the government to limit its use to situations where the public interest is clear and widespread support has been secured. This does not preclude the use of public funds for investments whose payoffs are intangible and long-term, in museums, public art or the study of dark matter. But taxpayers whose money is used to pay must be persuaded of the merits of such investments. Obviously this imposes limits on what is financed from the public purse.
Conversely, expansive interventions unilaterally decided by experts pervert incentives in fundamental ways. Americans are unusually idealistic and optimistic, believing that that the game is not stacked in favour of the powerful. This belief encourages the pursuit of initiatives that contribute to the common good rather than the pursuit of favours and rents.
To sustain these beliefs, people must see their government play the role of an even-handed referee rather than be a dispenser of rewards or even a judge of economic merit or contribution. Picking winners—this technology or that developer—which is an inevitable consequence of expansive schemes such as Mr Sandalow's, makes us all losers.
For the record, Mr Sandalow's asserts that I am "flat out wrong in asserting that GDP per head in Israel is lower than in Cyprus or Slovenia". The very first item that comes up in a Google search of "per capita/head GDP" is a Wikipedia page. The first column of data on this page contains the IMF's 2009 estimates of GDP per head (adjusted, as is conventional, by purchasing power parity). Cyprus ranks 26th from the top on the list, Slovenia 30th and Israel 31st.

extrapolate
vt.(由已知资料对未知事实或价值)推算, 推断
chronically
adv.慢性地,习惯性地,长期地
lag behind
n.落后逾期付款落后于
speculator
n.投机倒把者, 投机商
reckless
adj.轻率的; 鲁莽的; 不顾危险的
in light of
adv.按照,根据
minimalist
adj.极简抽象艺术的; 极简派音乐的
n.极简抽象派艺术家; 极简派音乐家
ethanol
n.乙醇,酒精
underwrite
vt.在(保险单, 尤指船舶保险单)下方签署并承担责任(承保损失或损坏之责)(按商定的价格)认购(某公司)的全部剩余证券; 包销(证券)同意资助(某事业)
hybrid
n.杂交生成的生物体, 杂交植物(或动物); 杂种, 混血儿
stumble into
n.同…相碰;无意中卷入;偶尔走入;犯(错误,罪等)
tyre
n.轮胎
compliance
n.服从, 听从, 顺从
coercive power
n.强制力
preclude
vt.阻止; 排除; 妨碍; 使…行不通
intangible
adj.难以捉摸的, 难以理解的, 无法确定的〈商〉(指企业资产)无形的
expansive
adj.可扩大的, 可扩展的; 广阔的; 胸襟开阔的, 开朗的
unilaterally
adv.单方面地
idealistic
adj.有理想的理想主义的
optimistic
adj.乐观的, 乐观主义的