【甚解小组】【TASK 4】原文抄抄抄之TRANSITIONS

周九UID：2769406

这段从从Logic那个小册子上抄来的，由于作者就是研究logic的，所以每个句子间，都力求逻辑关系明显，都有词语链接（估计也不是刻意的，研究logic久了，习惯成自然啦）。大家可以随意找些文章，即使句子间没有链接词，也可以看下例子间，段落间是如何进行连接的。~~

Chapter 11 Probability: The Strange Case of the Missing Reference Class


The preceding chapters have given us at least some feel for which inferences are deductively valid, and why. It’s now time to come back to the question of inductive validity: that is, the validity of those inferences where the premisses give some ground for the conclusion; yet where, even if the premisses are true in some situation, the conclusion could still turn out to be false.



The preceding chapters------ It’s now time to come back，上句讲过去，下句开头提示了要将现在啦。

: that is, 冒号和 that is，引出解释说明

; yet
分号 和yet 转折

even if 分号句内的让步

yet 和even if用得很巧妙，yet是指分号前后两句内的关系，even if是分号后半句句内关系，soga~~


As I noted in Chapter 1, Sherlock Holmes was very good at this kind of inference. Let us start with an example from him. The mystery of The Red-Headed League commences when Holmes and Dr. Watson receive a visit from a certain Mr. Jabez Wilson. When Wilson enters, Watson looks to see what Holmes has inferred about him:


As I noted in Chapter 1, 指出谈论的事物
Let us start with an example from him. 整个句子来做文章前后过渡。




‘Beyond the obvious fact that he has at some time done manual labour, that he takes snuff, that he is a Freemason, that he has been in China, and that he has done a considerable amount of writing lately, I can deduce nothing else.’

Mr. Jabez Wilson started up in his chair with his forefinger upon the paper, but his eyes upon my companion.

‘How, in the name of good fortune, did you know all that, Mr. Holmes?’ he asked.

Holmes is pleased to explain. For example, concerning the writing:

For example, concerning the writing: 举例，关于什么 concerning sth

‘What else can be indicated by that right cuff so very shiny for five inches, and the left one with the smooth patch near the elbow where you rest it upon the desk.’
Despite the fact that Holmes is wont to call this kind of inference a deduction, the inference is, in fact, an inductive one. It is entirely possible that Wilson’s coat should have shown these patterns without his having done much writing. He could, for example, have stolen it from someone who had. None the less, the inference is clearly a pretty good one. What makes it, and inferences like it, good? One plausible answer is in terms of probability. So let’s talk about this, and then we can return to the question.

Despite the fact that in fact, 这样也可以。。。fact fact

It is entirely possible that    举例，argument里面需要太多举例子用的连接词了，收起来

for example 的位置，别总放在句首，太单调了

None the less, 依然

in terms of，要是我就想不起来用，用上以后，后面变长了，前后平衡了~~

So~~~and then~~~

周九UID：2769406

2011/2/24



Normative legal theory, on the other hand, is concerned with values. A normative theory may, for instance, seek to establish whether strict liability of manufacturers of motor vehicles ought to be adopted in order to protect consumers. Would it be fair or just to do so? Normative legal theories thus tend inevitably to be associated with moral or political theories. In pursuing an evaluation of the law, normative legal theories might be either ‘ideal’ or ‘non-ideal’. The former relate to what legal rules would create the best legal system if it were politically achievable. The latter presuppose an assortment of constraints on the choice of legal rules, such as the difficulty of enforcing such rules.

But there is no clear-cut distinction between these two categories of legal philosophy. A normative theory may rely on a descriptive theory to obtain its purchase. Thus it is hard to sustain the normative theory of utilitarianism without a descriptive account of the consequences of the application of a specific rule. How would a utilitarian know whether rule X causes the greatest happiness (result Y) without a description of these consequences? Similarly, a descriptive legal theory may, on the basis of predictions about the likelihood of success of, say, law reform, put a brake on the normative legal theory that gave birth to the improvement.

It will also be seen how normative and descriptive theory may be grafted together to yield a hybrid species of legal philosophy. In Ronald Dworkin’s theory of ‘law as integrity’, for example, there is an amalgamation of the goals of descriptive doctrinal theory and normative theory. By claiming that a theory of law should both ‘fit’ and ‘justify’ the legal materials, his theory of law as an interpretative concept appears to allow descriptive doctrinal theory to coalesce with normative theory.

We live in a troubled, inequitable world. Perhaps it has always been so. In the face of wickedness and injustice, it is not difficult to descend into vague oversimplification and rhetoric when reflecting upon the proper nature and function of the law. Analytical clarity and scrupulous jurisprudential deliberation on the fundamental nature of law, justice, and the meaning of legal concepts are indispensable. Legal theory has a decisive role to play in defining and defending the values and ideals that sustain our way of life.

总是段首放一堆链接词也不合适，所以适当往后挪，看起来好一点。
on the other hand
for instance
thus
in doing(好久没有用过了)
the former
the latter
but
thus
similarly
on the basis of
for example
by claiming that
perhaps
in the face of


这篇的特点就是，全都做插入语，还有in doing，by doing，可以用来合并短句。

周九UID：2769406

to cafe~
文章作者是法学权威，玩弄文字的行家~

周九UID：2769406

2011/2/25

Critical race theory


CRT originated in Madison, Wisconsin, in 1989 as a reaction against what it saw as the deconstructive excesses of CLS. Nevertheless, it is no less sceptical of Enlightenment ideas such as
‘justice’, ‘truth’, and ‘reason’. Its mainspring, however, is the need to expose the law’s pervasive racism; privileged white, middle-class academics, in its view, cannot fully uncover its nature and extent. Those who have themselves suffered the indignity and injustice of discrimination are the authentic voices of marginalized racial minorities. The law’s formal constructs reflect, it is argued, the reality of a privileged, elite, male, white majority. It is this culture, way of life, attitude, and normative behaviour that combine to form the prevailing ‘neutrality’ of the law. A racial minority is condemned to the margins of legal existence.



CRT diverges most radically from full-blown postmodernist accounts (see above) in respect of the recognition by at least some of its members of the importance of conventional ‘rights talk’ in pursuit of equality and freedom. Its analysis of society and law therefore seems, in some cases, to be a partial one. This retreat from the postmodernist antagonism towards rights signifies an apparent readiness to embrace the ideals of liberty, equality, and justice. Several CRT adherents, however, evince profound misgivings about liberalism and the formal equality it aspires to protect, and a distaste for individual rights and other contents of the liberal package.



CRT scholarship often draws on ‘auto/biography’ to appraise social and legal relations. Patricia Williams, for example, amalgamates legal analysis and personal narrative to criticize legal subjectivity. CRT regards the hostility of traditional legal scholarship to the auto/biographical as a method by which to distance the law from the very social relations, especially racial and gender discrimination, that it generates.

分号和插入语的位置


Nevertheless
such as
however
in its view  减少it ，memo，argument开头的句子
it is argued
in respect of
by
in some cases
however
for example

周九UID：2769406

25号作业完成，mark~~

周九UID：2769406

Law as social fact: Joseph Raz

The writing of the Oxford philosopher, Joseph Raz (b. 1939) does not lend itself to simple synopsis. As a leading ‘hard’ or ‘exclusivist’ legal positivist, Raz maintains that the identity and existence of a legal system may be tested by reference to three elements; efficacy, institutional character, and sources. Law is thus drained of its moral content, based on the idea that legality does not depend on its moral merit. ‘Soft’ positivists, like H. L. A. Hart, reject this view, and acknowledge that content or merit may be included or incorporated as a condition of validity. They are therefore also called ‘incorporationists’.


As: 链接前后，并引入新信息
by reference to three elements： 举例
thus
based on
like：像某某
therefore


Raz argues, however, that the law is autonomous: we can identify its content without recourse to morality. Legal reasoning, on the other hand, is not autonomous; it is an inevitable, and desirable, feature of judicial reasoning. For Raz, the existence and content of every law may be determined by a factual enquiry about conventions, institutions, and the intentions of participants in the legal system. The answer to the question ‘what is law?’ is always a fact. It is never a moral judgement. This marks him as a ‘hard’ or ‘exclusive’ positivist. ‘Exclusive’ because the reason we regard the law as authoritative is the fact that it is able to guide our behaviour in a way that morality cannot do. In other words, the law asserts its primacy over all other codes of conduct. Law is the ultimate source of authority. Thus, a legal system is quintessentially one of authoritative rules. It is this claim of authority that is the trademark of a legal system.


however
on the other hand
For Raz：由于第一句Raz argues，为了避免重复
The answer to the question ‘what is law?’ is always a fact. It is never a moral judgement.
这个方式挺好，避免了用疑问句，还引出了正反两个观点。
In other words
thus


Raz identifies three principal claims made by positivists and attacked by natural lawyers:


The ‘social thesis’: that law may be identified as a social fact, without reference to moral considerations.


The ‘moral thesis’: that the moral merit of law is neither absolute nor inherent, but contingent upon ‘the content of the law and the circumstances of the society to which it applies’.


The ‘semantic thesis’: that normative terms such as right’ and ‘duty’ are not used in moral and legal contexts in the same way.


made by positivists and attacked by natural lawyers: 赞平行结构
without
neither nor but
such as

周九UID：2769406

26号作业完成，mark

周九UID：2769406

Law as social rules: H. L. A. Hart


H. L. A. Hart (1907–92) is often credited with charting the precincts of modern legal theory by applying the techniques of analytical, and especially linguistic, philosophy to the study of law. His work illuminates the meaning of legal concepts, the manner in which we deploy them, and the way we think about law and the legal system. What, for example, does it mean to have a ‘right’? What is a corporation or an obligation? Hart claims that we cannot properly understand law unless we understand the conceptual context in which it emerges and develops. He argues, for instance, that language has an ‘open texture’: words (and hence rules) have a number of clear meanings, but there are always several ‘penumbral’ cases where it is uncertain whether the word applies or not. His book, The Concept of Law, published in 1961, is a classic of legal theory and has served as a catalyst for many other jurists around the world.

Hart’s positivism is a far cry from the largely coercive picture of law painted by Bentham and Austin. Hart conceives of law as a social phenomenon that can be understood only by describing the actual social practices of a community. In order for it to survive as a community, Hart argues, there need to be certain fundamental rules. He calls these the ‘minimum content of natural law’. They arise out of our human condition which manifests the following essential features:


‘Human vulnerability’: We are all susceptible to physical attacks.


‘Approximate equality’: Even the strongest must sleep at times.


‘Limited altruism’: We are, in general, selfish.


‘Limited resources’: We need food, clothes, and shelter and they are limited.


‘Limited understanding and strength of will’: We cannot be relied upon to cooperate with our fellow men.


These human frailties require the enactment of rules to protect persons and property, and to ensure that promises are kept. But, though he employs the shibboleth ‘natural law’, he does not mean that law is derived from morals or that there is a necessary conceptual relationship between the two. Nor is he saying that this minimum content of natural law ensures a fair or just society. Hart disengages his legal positivism from both the utilitarianism (see Chapter 4) and the command theory of law championed by Austin and Bentham. In the case of the latter, his rejection is based on the view that law is more than the decree of a gunman: a command backed by a sanction.

周九UID：2769406

27号作业收到，mark~

周九UID：2769406

Law, in Hart’s analysis, is a system of rules. His argument is as follows. All societies have social rules. These include rules relating to morals, games, etc., as well as obligation rules that impose duties or obligations. The latter may be divided into moral rules and legal rules (or law). As a result of our human limitations, mentioned above, there is a necessity for obligation rules in all societies. Legal rules are divisible into primary rules and secondary rules. The former proscribe the use of violence, theft, and deception to which human beings are tempted but which they must normally repress if they are to coexist in close proximity. The rules of primitive societies are normally restricted to these primary rules imposing obligations. But as a society becomes more complex, there is obviously a need to change the primary rules, to adjudicate on breaches of them, and to identify which rules are actually obligation rules. These three requirements are satisfied in each case in modern societies by the introduction of three sorts of secondary rules: rules of change, adjudication, and recognition. Unlike primary rules, the first two of these secondary rules do not generally impose duties, but usually confer power. The rule of recognition, however, does seem to impose duties (largely on judges). I expand on this point below.

The existence of a legal system requires that two conditions must be satisfied. First, valid obligation rules must be generally obeyed by members of society, and, secondly, officials must accept the rules of change and adjudication; they must also accept the rule of recognition ‘from the internal point of view’.

As already pointed out, Hart rejects Austin’s conception of rules as commands, and the notion that rules are phenomena that consist merely in externally observable activities or habit. Instead he asks us to consider the social dimension of rules, namely the manner in which members of a society perceive the rule in question, their attitude towards it. This ‘internal’ aspect distinguishes between a rule and a mere habit.

周九UID：2769406

28号作业收到，mark

周九UID：2769406

Foundational Issues


The philosophy of language is both fascinating and difficult. One reason for this is that hardly any issue in this area is uncontroversial. Controversy begins with some foundational and methodological questions. Consider, for example, this very basic question: What are the tasks of the philosophy of language? One obvious task is: the study of linguistic meanings. But this immediately raises two questions.
First, what are these ‘‘meanings’’? Linguistic expressions have the function of communicating messages, conveying information about the world. Clearly, the meanings of expressions play a crucial role here. Yet, as Martin Davies notes in chapter 1, we cannot simply identify meanings with messages because the one sentence can be used to communicate different messages on different occasions; it can imply things that it does not literally say. We need to distinguish its literal meaning, studied by semantics, from other properties it may have that are studied by pragmatics. But there is much controversy about where and how to draw the line between semantics and pragmatics; see discussion in chapter 8.
Second, what sort of ‘‘study’’ do we have in mind? Is semantics empirical or is it a priori? Is it a science? In what way is it philosophical? These questions dominate Davies’ discussion. Someone who supposes, as many do, that philosophy is entirely a priori, will think that semantic theorizing can go on independent of any science. This antireductionist view is what Davies nicely calls ‘‘philosophical isolationism.’’ At the other extreme, naturalistically inclined philosophers will think that semantics reduces to empirical cognitive science. Davies calls this ‘‘cognitive scientism.’’ He would like to find an intermediate position, as most philosophers probably would. But finding it is difficult. Paul Horwich discusses reductionism and antireductionism in chapter 2.
There is a related issue. The dominant method in semantics is to consult ‘‘intuitions’’ about what an expression means, refers to, and so on, intuitionsthat are usually elicited in ‘‘thought experiments.’’ What are we to make of this practice? The isolationist will think of this as the characteristic method of ‘‘armchair philosophy,’’ yielding intuitions based on a priori knowledge of concepts. And she is likely to think that it is the task of semantics to account for these intuitions. The naturalist must see the intuitions as having the same empirical status that intuitions generally have in science and as serving at best as fallible evidence for a semantic theory.

周九UID：2769406

3.1收到，mark

周九UID：2769406

Presenting a history of sociological theory is an enormous task, but because we devoted only two chapters(1and 2) to it, what we offer is a highly selective historical sketch. The idea is to provide the reader with a scaffolding which should help in putting the later detailed discussions of theorists and theories in a larger context.(It would be especially useful to glance back occasionally to Figures 1.1 and 2.1, which are schematic representations of the histories covered in those chapters.)
The theories treated in the body of this book have a wide range of application, deal with centrally important social issues, and have stood the test of time. These criteria constitute our definition of sociological theory. Such a definition stands in contrast to the formal, “scientific” definitions that are often used in theory texts of this type. A scientific definition might be that a theory is a set of interrelated propositions that allow for the systematization of knowledge, explanation, and prediction of social life and the generation of new research hypotheses(Faia, 1986). Although such a definition has a number of attractions, it simply does not fit many of the idea systems to be discussed in this book. In other words, most classical(and contemporary) theories fall short on one or more of the formal components of theory, but they are nonetheless considered theories by most sociologists.

A number of the theorists who briefly discussed in Chapter 1(for example, Herbert Spencer and Auguste Comte) will not receive detailed treatment later because they are of little more than historical interest. Other theorists(for example, Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Emile Durkheim) will be discussed in Chapter 1 in their historical context, and they will receive detailed treatment later because of their continuing importance. The focus is on the important theoretical work of sociologists or the work done by those in other fields that has come to be defined as important in sociology. To put it succinctly, this is a book about the “big ideas” in sociology that have stood the test of time (or promise to), idea systems that deal with major social issues and are far-reaching in scope.

周九UID：2769406

task 4结束袅~