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The second one:
The author reckon that credit derivatives and other risk sharing financial instruments actually are very risky and we should stop using the commonplace qualifier about the universal benefits of risk sharing. During asset price booms, financial markets generate the perverse incentives banks can maximize their profits by selling as many junk mortgages as possible to borrowers who cannot conceivably repay the loans. After that, something must go wrong in our risk-sharing world. Sharing risk can under certain circumstances be inherently destabilizing.
To explain his point of view, he provides two arguments.
The first is Hyman Minsky’s, which is partly agreed by author. He creates the financial instability hypothesis – a theory about the impact of debt on the financial system. Minsky treats banks and investors as the most important economic actors. He classifies investors in three categories. The first are hedge investors, they are risk-averse, and can meet their payment obligations out of current cash flows; the second category are speculative investors, who can do the same in the long run, but not necessarily in the short run. The third are Ponzi investors, someone who takes on new debt to meet current obligations, and hopes to finance the ever-rising debt through higher asset prices. The critical part of Minsky’s theory is that during an economic boom, an increasing number of investors gradually move from the first category to the second and third. In a Minsky economy, instability is not due to some external shock, but is inherent in the system itself, that’s why we need to justify heavy regulatory interference.
The second one is Raghuram Rajan’s. In his theory, investors, who are eager to outperform the markets, take on two different types of risk during a boom. The first is a so-called “tail risk”, these are high risks with a very low probability of occurring, which offer high rewards. The second risk is herd behavior, as investment managers do not want to underperform their competitors. During an asset price boom, investors are eager to take on the low probability tail risks, in the knowledge that others do the same. If the crash comes, they have at least not underperformed their competitors.
Comments
In April in 2007,
subprime crisis has already started to appear, although most of us may not have imagined it would become such a huge financial crisis that actually affected our lives. There are a lot of theories about the reasons of this financial crisis. Actually, I agree with what the author said. Risk-sharing is not risk eliminating, the hiding risks would finally blow up in the end throughout a wider area.
The first theory is very interesting. He divided investors into three levels, less risk-averse from up and down. We actually have this feel when we invest. We usually can bear more risks when the market is rising. Under this circumstance, the regulations should do more to intervene to the market and supervise the institutions in this market.
The second theory, two risks are taken during the boom. These two feelings are what we can hardly prevent even in our lives. We should always warn ourselves about the existence of these two risks and try to reduce them in our investment. |
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